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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

OCTOBER, 1898.

THE PARTING OF THE WAYS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE writer of this article has been asked, almost at the moment when the present number of the JOURNAL was going to press, to contribute an article on the above subject. A profound interest in the questions involved, the belief which he shares with many, that a critical point has been reached in the career of the American people, and that a false step now may be attended with almost irretrievable disaster, together with the fact that the public mind is not yet conclusively made up, has led him to respond to the invitation. The citizen of a free commonwealth has the right and the duty not only to take part in the actual government of the country, however indirectly, but the no less important duty and right to claim his share in the formation of public opinion, the real "power behind the throne," the source from which emanate public decisions and the force which gives them effect. If he should not, on the one hand, in a spirit of undue self-esteem, exaggerate the value of his contribution, neither, on the other, should he withhold such thoughts as he may have to submit, but should express them freely and let them go for what they are worth.

We stand literally at the parting of the ways. The question before us is, whether we shall adhere to lines of policy which,

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until recently, one may say until a few months ago, have had among us the authority of a sacred tradition; or whether on the spur of the moment, as it were, under the sudden effect of what is called an expansion of the political horizon, we shall launch forth on a totally new course, which the sagacity of our statesmen and the instinct of our people have hitherto rejected as repugnant to their highest interests. It is true that circumstances alter cases, that new conditions arising may prescribe a deviation from accepted standards, that the mere fact of a certain course of conduct having been persisted in for a hundred years or more does not of necessity imply that it ought still to be persisted in, if, namely, the reasons by which it was supported have in the mean time become invalid. But then it ought to be convincingly shown that these reasons have become invalid, and the *onus probandi* is upon those who counsel innovation. The attempt will here be made to summarize the chief motives which seem to incline a part of our people towards the policy of Imperialism, and then briefly to set forth some of the weightiest reasons that may be adduced on the other side.

Among the motives that operate in favor of Imperialism may be mentioned, first, national ambition, the desire to play a shining part on the great world stage, to emulate the military and naval achievements of other nations in order to prove that we have the ability to equal or to surpass them. The consciousness of the American people in the early part of their history was mainly self-centred. They were absorbed in the subjugation of the continent and in the development of its resources, and, so far as their relations to other nations were concerned, they felt that they had a mission to fulfil for the benefit of humanity, that they had attained to a degree of perfection in their political life from which others were still distant, and that others, therefore, might learn from them, not they from others. The closer connection between the Old World and the New, which has been brought about by increased facilities of communication, has largely destroyed this narrow provincialism. The jargon concerning the "effete monarchies of Europe" has long since passed

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into discredit, if not entirely into disuse. No thoughtful American fails any longer to acknowledge the debt we are under to those nations whose civilization is older than ours, nor to recognize that we must still continue in many ways to be their pupils. Our young men will still go abroad to drink at the fountain-heads of science in foreign Universities, our young art-students will still seek to perfect their equipment in Paris and Rome. And even in the problems of political organization we are all willing to admit that "wisdom was not born with us," at least not all wisdom, that some of these problems have been solved more successfully in other countries than in ours. But it would be the saddest kind of mistake if the revulsion of feeling from the untenable position of our predecessors should now lead us to the opposite extreme; if, after having wrapt ourselves up in the arrogant and juvenile conceit of perfection, we should now become ashamed of the idea that we have a mission to fulfil for the benefit of mankind, and should lose the sense of that mission; if our failure to solve the political problem we have set ourselves should make us forget that the problem itself is a grander and a nobler one than any great nation has ever set itself and that its difficulties are due to its grandeur. Yes, it would be the saddest possible aberration if, instead of learning from others in the sense of adapting to our national genius the best they have to offer, we should become their servile imitators, and especially if we should imitate them where they themselves confess that they are least worthy of imitation; if instead of establishing the *Pax Americana* so far as our influence avails throughout this continent we should enter into the field of Old World strife and seek the sort of glory that is written in human blood. Can there be a more striking contrast than is to be found in the circumstance that at the very time when this young Republic seems about fatuously to assume the burdens of military and naval expenditure, from which it has hitherto been relatively exempt, the Russian Czar in his manifesto should proclaim the intolerable heaviness of such burdens, and should loudly call upon the nations to counsel together how they may be alleviated!

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The second motive, and for many the principal one, is the desire to gain access to new markets for the purpose of extending our commerce and stimulating industry. I shall refer to this motive in the latter part of my article, and shall therefore do no more than mention it here.

The third motive springs from a kind of fetishistic attitude towards the flag. It consists in the belief that any territory over which the national flag has at any time been raised thereby becomes taboo to other nations, and that we are bound to defend it as being mysteriously and indissolubly connected with our national "personality." This survival of the notion of taboo with respect to the flag among a civilized people may be highly interesting from the point of view of anthropology, but it is absurd and pernicious when allowed even the slightest influence in deciding a practical question. The flag is a symbol or a sign; its sacredness consists wholly in what it signifies. The American flag in particular is supposed to signify freedom and equality, the government of all by all and for the good of all, and to stand for these ideas, not in the abstract, but as they have been colored and expressed in the customs, habits, and institutions of the people of the United States. Wherever such institutions founded upon such principles are possible, the American flag is in place as the true sign of great things signified; but wherever such institutions are not possible,—as, for instance, in the Philippines,—the presence of the flag would have no meaning whatever. The flag itself, instead of being a sacred symbol, would be a worthless bit of bunting. Nay, the persistent attempt to maintain it in the midst of a population to which the principles it represents are inapplicable would be an advertisement to the world of our own disloyalty to those principles.

The fourth motive is based upon the recognition of a duty owed by the civilized races to the uncivilized. This is certainly the most honorable of all the motives that speak for Imperialism. It may be used insincerely by some as a mere pretext to cloak their ambition or cupidity; but certainly in the case of many it gives rise to a genuine scruple of con-

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science, to a feeling that we, as a people, should not isolate ourselves from the affairs of the world, that we ought to help in bringing the backward races abreast of progress, and that this is a duty which, however serious the difficulties in which it may involve us, we ought not to shirk. The existence of a duty to the backward races, it seems to us, must be admitted; but whether it is best discharged by the ordinary methods of land-grabbing, accompanied by the incidental benefits of impartial courts and the externals of Western civilization is, at least, questionable. To this also we shall presently advert.

But let us now endeavor to put before us the chief reasons that tell against the proposed Imperialistic policy. Of these, we mention three. First, the danger it involves to the political institutions of the United States; secondly, the obstacles which it is likely to place in the way of social reform in the United States; thirdly, the influence it is calculated to exert in diverting us from that line of effort along which we can best discharge our cosmopolitan duty towards other nations and towards mankind in general.

First, the danger to our political institutions. This danger has been pointed out by many able writers who have already expressed themselves on the subject. It cannot be too strongly emphasized nor too strenuously reiterated. The danger consists in this, that a democracy is by its nature incapable of ruling subject populations. The principle that an inferior class shall be ruled by a superior is the principle of aristocracies. The principle that no class shall be regarded as politically inferior, but that all shall participate on equal terms in the government is the principle of democracies. The two principles cannot keep house together in the same state. Either the inferior class must be enfranchised, raised to the same level of political rights as the others, or the democracy will inevitably tend to turn into an aristocracy.* The Athenian

* In this connection it is instructive to read the words of Mr. Whitelaw Reid, published in the September number of the *Century*: "The chief aversion to the vast access of territory with which we are threatened springs from the fear that ultimately they must be admitted to the United States. No public duty is more urgent than to resist from the very outset the concession of such a possibility. In

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democracy and the Roman republic both tried the experiment of ruling subject populations. The one broke down utterly in the attempt, the other carried the imperial principle to its logical conclusion by means of a transformation in the constitution of the state. But it is said that England has succeeded, and in every discussion of this question the example of England is apt to be put prominently forward, and we are told that what England can do we can do as well. The answer to this argument is that the political institutions of England are thoroughly permeated with the aristocratic spirit, and that England succeeds in governing subject populations precisely because her government is an aristocracy, while we should not succeed because ours is a democracy. The points of similarity between England and the United States are so often accentuated that the points of difference are apt to be lost sight of. It is of capital importance that the points of difference be kept in view and clearly marked off. The English, as Mr. Bagehot puts it, are "a deferential people." The existence amongst them of a class of social superiors is tranquilly acknowledged, the habit of looking up to "one's betters" is deeply rooted. And this class of social superiors, while the political prerogatives which it once possessed have been greatly diminished, still performs a most important political function, perhaps it would not be too much to say the most important of political functions. For in all states the most vital problem is how to bring it about that the best men, the most capable, the most efficient, the most honest shall come to the top as rulers. The hereditary aristocracy of England is an instrument of selection for the sifting out of the best men, or the relatively best, as rulers. It does its work indirectly but none the less effectively. The hereditary aristocracy attracts to itself the aristocracy of wealth and of talent, and in unison with these it erects and maintains a certain standard of honesty and efficiency the influence of which is all-pervasive, and which becomes

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no circumstances likely to exist within a century should they be admitted as a State to the Union."

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an unwritten law to which all persons who aspire to prominent positions, whether in the legislative, the administrative, or the judicial departments of the government, must conform. I do not say that the English form of government is better than the American. I merely say that the English are a deferential people, and that we are not; that they possess an instrumentality for solving the chief practical problem of politics,—namely, the sifting out of the relatively best men as leaders,—which we lack. We have set ourselves a new and far more difficult task than theirs; we wish to dispense entirely in the body politic with irrational factors such as hereditary kings and nobles; we wish to build up our political structure with rational elements only; we wish to show, in fine, that it is possible to get the right leaders and rulers winnowed out from among the masses of men, relying solely upon the common sense and the moral sense of the masses themselves to do the winnowing. That in the beginnings of this experiment (for as a great nation we have but just entered upon our career) our efforts should in some respects have met with conspicuous failure is no reason for giving way to premature and pusillanimous despair. Perhaps the machinery of representation which we have employed for ascertaining the popular will is at fault; perhaps minority representation would relieve us of many of our difficulties; perhaps what is called the "organization of universal suffrage" would help;* but, at any rate, it is too early to desert the standard of rational politics and give up the cause as lost because we have met with an initial check, however serious. But, on the other hand, the fact that we have not yet succeeded to the extent that we ought to, and may some day hope to, in bringing to the front as leaders the public-spirited, the efficient, the incorruptible, is an excellent reason why we should not indefinitely increase the chances of corruption by sending such men as would now be likely to be selected to govern subject populations in distant quarters of the globe. The fact that England has succeeded is no reason why we should suc-

* See on this important subject, Charles Benoist, "La Crise de l'État moderne."

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ceed; the radical difference in the conditions that prevail in the two countries is patent.

But the danger of increased corruption is not the only one; there is a subtler evil to be dreaded. The identity of the governing and the governed is of the very essence of the democratic principle; let this identity be broken up in any part of the state, let a differentiation take place between the class that governs and another class that is governed, without having completely the right to determine how it shall be governed, and the same differentiation will tend to spread to other parts of the state and become more and more general. Plainly, if we accustom ourselves to see millions of persons who live within the territories which belong to the United States excluded from the rights of citizenship on the ground that they are not fitted to exercise them, the question will presently be raised—indeed, here and there it has already been raised—whether on the same ground millions of persons now exercising the franchise within the limits of the United States ought not to be deprived of their rights. That universal suffrage is the indispensable safeguard of liberty; that no class, however well intentioned, can be trusted to legislate for another; that even the so-called lower classes know where the shoe pinches them better than their superiors in education can know it for them,—these elementary truths will then tend to fall into oblivion, and a habit of mind will be generated consistently with which democratic institutions cannot live. The masses of the people and all citizens who have not yet lost their faith in the capacity of the masses to become politically regenerate have every reason to oppose with the utmost earnestness the proposed policy of Imperialism. It is anti-democratic, as its very name implies.

The second reason against Imperialism, referred to above, is that it is contrary to the interests of social reform. The wage-earning class in particular and all who believe that the progress of society as a whole depends on the improvement of the condition of the wage-earning class have reason to oppose the new policy. And this not only, as has often been said, because the degraded labor of the tropics may thus be brought

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into direct competition with American labor, and tend to lower the rate of remuneration and the standard of living, but for another reason. The appetite for colonial dependencies, which is characteristic of the modern industrial nations, is due to the fact that the modern industrial system is top-heavy. That system, founded on the economic maxim of buying cheap and selling dear, when applied to human labor, leads at last to a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*. The wages of labor are depressed as far as possible for the sake of profit, or, if increased, are increased reluctantly in merely arithmetical progression, while at the same time the volume of production is enlarged in something like geometrical progression, and thus a condition of things is brought about in which the great body of manual workers, who are also the natural consumers, are no longer able to absorb the product, and what is called over-production ensues. From the condition of affairs thus roughly described there are two alternative exits. The one is to seek new markets abroad, keeping the wage-earners at home relatively poor, and this has led to the colonial policy of the European nations; the other is to enhance the power of consumption on the part of the wage-earners at home, and this it would seem is the policy which the best traditions of our past as well as our hopes for the future should engage us to adopt. Whatever tends to increase the skill and efficiency of the laborer and artisan, whatever tends to diversify agriculture and industry and to modify mere competition by the encouragement of collective effort of the voluntary sort, and especially whatever tends to deepen the respect we feel for every man in virtue of his character as a man will make in this direction. Mr. Bryce* says, "As regards trade, the United States would doubtless, like every country, gain by an increase in export of manufactured goods. But such an increase is not essential to her prosperity—first, because she relies largely upon her exports of food stuffs and such raw materials as cotton; secondly, because she has in her enormous popu-

* In his article entitled "Some Thoughts on the Policy of the United States," in the September number of *Harper's Magazine*.

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lation a splendid and swiftly increasing home market for goods of all kinds." To make this home market increasingly capable of absorbing the present surplus product is, indeed, one of the worthiest aims that our statesmen and reformers can set themselves. But to accomplish this it will be necessary to think less of the market and more of the "home," to regard labor less in the light of a commodity, and more as a condition upon which men, women, and children depend for the attainment of their human ends. It is hardly necessary to add that what has been said is not intended as a counsel of complete isolation, a condemnation of foreign trade, or an attempt to set up hard and fast limits of any kind. The point is that there are two tendencies between which we must elect, the one to keep the wage-earner relatively poor and to unload the inevitable surplus product on the peoples of distant countries, the other to make the masses of our own people increasingly capable of absorbing what is now a surplus product. It is the latter which self-interest and morality alike urge us to adopt.

The last subject to which I wish to allude is that of our cosmopolitan duties. That the civilized races have a duty to perform towards the uncivilized cannot be doubted. But when we come to consider what the nature of that duty is we find ourselves face to face with a large and complex question, which it is barely possible to touch upon here. Suffice it to say that the attitude of the advanced towards the backward races should be educational, and should be governed on the whole by the same principles that are at present everywhere revolutionizing the science of education. We need but substitute the word race or people for the word individual to make these principles immediately and fruitfully applicable. Among the most important of them, perhaps, are the following: that the educator must have at heart the true interest of those whom he wishes to educate, and not make them merely subservient to his own interests. In the present instance this would mean that a civilized people that honestly proposes to uplift an uncivilized must not go among them with the desire for profit in its heart and the language of humanitarian progress on its lips. A second principle, now generally

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acknowledged by all educators, is, that education to be genuine must be individualized, which means adapted to the individuality of those who are to receive it; that we may not in arbitrary fashion seek to imprint some stereotyped pattern of excellence that commends itself to us upon another's nature, but rather follow the leadings of his nature and develop him according to his own genius. Applying this rule of pedagogy to the problem of elevating the peoples of the Orient, it would follow that what we need is a new type of Missionaries of Civilization, who, as practical psychologists, will make it their business to study the peculiar genius of the people among whom they live, and will endeavor not so much to implant foreign ideas and ideals as to bring to the light the highest and best things of which those peoples are capable, along their own lines. Another maxim of education is, that while coercion may be used for the purpose of repressing gross violations of law, or of overcoming inveterate indolence, it should ever be employed for the good of those who are subjected to it, and with a view to being discontinued when the occasion for it ceases. According to this maxim, it would be desirable that the civilized nations of Europe and America should agree and combine to jointly repress such outrages as those lately committed by the Turks in Armenia, and it would also be justifiable that where civilized nations come in contact with savages they should for a time subject them, if need be, to a species of military rule in order to help them in acquiring those habits of industry without which progress towards better conditions is impossible. But it should be distinctly added, in this connection, that a monarchical or aristocratic people is far better fitted to assume such a task than a democracy, since the subjection of class to class is congenial to the former types of government, while it is thoroughly repugnant to the latter. A science of education applied to backward peoples, a pedagogy of nations, is a conception so new, opens up such vast fields of inquiry and speculation that the few analogies here set down can but serve to awaken interest, not to satisfy it. And yet it may be permitted in closing to submit one other analogy.

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It is not every one's vocation to be a teacher of the young, —that is, of undeveloped individuals; nor is it every people's vocation to be the teacher of other undeveloped peoples. Suppose some one had represented it as a duty to Isaac Newton to communicate to the young a part of his vast acquisitions in the domain of natural philosophy, and for this purpose to spend a portion of his time in teaching school. He might justly have replied that he could be of far more use to his contemporaries and to posterity by devoting all his time and all his energy to the prosecution of the profound researches in which he was engaged until he should have brought them to a triumphant conclusion. And so we may say, without presumption and without vain-glory, that a nation, too, may consecrate itself to the advancement and perfection of the principles of government rather than to the extension of those already accepted. Such is our case. We should join, indeed, with other nations in preventing international outrage; we should send out gifted individuals to dwell as Missionaries of Civilization among the natives of distant lands. But, as a people, we should not attempt to keep school, having backward peoples for our pupils; we should not suffer ourselves to be diverted from the great experiment on which we are engaged. That experiment, on the scale and under the conditions in which it is being tried, is new. It means the attempt to build up a rational state. To establish freedom, not in the sense of the unhampered expansion of the strong, but in that nobler sense in which it signifies the possibility for each, even for the humblest, of "living the best life," by discharging with maximum efficiency the particular social function for which nature has fitted him. Generations must still elapse before the success of this experiment can be assured. All the gifts, all the energies of mind and heart which we as a people possess, will be needed for its prosecution. If we shall succeed, even approximately, in the fulfilment of this great task, we shall have deserved well of human kind, and shall certainly have discharged in the truest and best way our cosmopolitan duty.

FELIX ADLER.

NEW YORK.

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A MORAL FROM ATHENIAN HISTORY.

THERE are two problems of human life in communities which have eternal interest. The first of these is how far the higher achievements of life are determined by material conditions; the problem, in short, which, though by no means new, has been forced upon the world afresh through what is known as the economic or materialist view of history. And the second is how far the truest greatness of man is bound up with national self-assertion involving the forcible maintenance of unity in societies against disruption within and hostility without. The problems are, perhaps, the same problem repeated at two different levels. The first, it might be said, asks how far the forces of nature control the destinies of man; the second, how far the relatively natural force of society, its ability to threaten and to exercise physical compulsion, is an agency essential to its highest functions.

On these two problems, it has always appeared to me, very important suggestions may be drawn from the history of Greece. The schism which has hitherto existed between modern sociology and classical studies has had the effect of depriving the theory of society of a set of examples which display, in the clearest and simplest shape, the connection between determinate physical conditions and a singularly lofty social achievement.

In general, and with reference to both problems, we are to note the very high individuality of the Greek race, and the greatness of the results which it achieved within narrow boundaries of space and time. Thus on the one hand the effects are highly determinate, and on the other hand the conditions, both material and political, are tolerably simple and limited; so that both conditions and effects are capable of a fuller correlation than is usually possible in sociological inquiry. And the subject of the present lecture has been suggested by

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the fact that both as regards material and economic conditions, and as regards the type and degree of political cohesion, the minds of Greek statesmen and thinkers reflect the circumstances of their world with extraordinary directness and precision. We seem to see the policy of this and that great mind growing out of the soil and the geographical relations, and completing and emphasizing their suggestions, just as wild plants or cultivated crops, or even the dwelling-places of man, follow and mark the lines and surfaces of a favorable habitat.

1. As regards the connection of Hellenic life and character with soil, climate, and geography, we may start from an interesting antithesis which makes itself felt in the simplest economic interpretation of history. Is a very fertile country, or one which demands much care and labor for its returns, more favorable to civilization? Neither side of the alternative, of course, cuts off the connection between conditions and character; but at the same time a certain bias as to the relative importance of factors in the problem reveals itself in the answer which we give. Buckle is inclined to insist upon the fact that the oldest civilizations belong to countries of extreme natural fertility,—India, Babylonia, Egypt. But it seems also important to point out that progressive civilization, in the modern European sense, has as yet only been found within the temperate zone. A nature that affords occasions for struggle, producing definite achievements by success, does more for man in the end than one that seems to do all. Professor Geddes has pointed out how the conditions which induce parasitic degeneration are "freedom from danger, abundant alimentation and complete repose, etc.; in short, the conditions commonly considered those of complete material well-being." *

The sides of the above antithesis correspond with the marked feeling of the Greeks as to the material basis of their own life when contrasted with that of the Asiatics with whom they came in contact. From the Homeric description of Ithaca, "a rugged country, but a good breeder of men," to the saying of the Spartan in Herodotus, "Poverty is always at

* Encycl. Brit., art. "Parasitism."

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home in Greece," * a whole series of anecdotes and observations—brought to a climax in the splendidly imagined interview of Solon and Crœsus—show a deep-rooted sense of the sparingness of nature in Greece as compared with her bounteousness in Asia. More particularly, no doubt, the Greek mind was influenced by the immediate contrast between the territory of Greece proper and that of the Greek cities of the Levant, which in the age of mature political experience were always tributary either to Greece proper on the one hand or to Persia on the other. The real reason for their defencelessness was rather their position on the coast line of a continent than the mildness of their climate or the wealth of their territory; but it is remarkable to find an agreement between the historian and the physician that an energetic and spirited disposition could not be expected in a climate so pleasantly tempered. †

Not that the Greeks of Greece proper were discontented with their own country. On the contrary, they believed it to be the best in the world as a breeder of men, whose type was equally remote from the untamable rudeness of Northern Europe and from the cringing trickiness which they ascribed to the Asiatic.

And it is true that their territory had an extraordinary aptness, of which its inhabitants were partly aware, to suggest and respond to definitely specialized forms of civilized achievement.

The maritime character of Greece proper, the ethical and intellectual importance of which was first, I believe, pointed out by Winckelmann, the great student of Greek plastic art, is too familiar to be enlarged upon. It is enough to note how it is suggested by the character of Greek territory,—a coast line of bays and peninsulas, the latter carried on in lines of islands; much like portions of the Scotch coast, where you

* Hdt., 7, 102. The whole passage illustrates the Greek feeling in question. "In Greece poverty is native and virtue is artificial, being achieved by wisdom and the strength of law; and by its help Greece defends herself against both poverty and despotism."

† Hdt., 1, 142. Stein's note, quoting Hippocrates.

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send a boat if you need the doctor or minister as naturally as elsewhere you might send a carriage. Look at the peninsula of which Salonika stands at the northwest and Mount Athos at the southeast angle; note how it reproduces on a small scale the outline of the Morea; and then read its history during the lifetime of Demosthenes, how, as an isolated bit of Hellenic ground, it was the first to fall under the dominion of the non-Hellenic * powers.

Consider again the cantonal character of the Greek territory; how the greatness of the several states followed from the size of the plains which were enclosed within their respective mountain walls; and how the structure of the Achæan league, the earliest Federal Government, was prefigured by the row of valleys, attached to each other side by side and not rounded into a centralized unity, which made up the state of Achaia. A classical example of this kind of study has been given by the historian Curtius in his great work on the Peloponnese; and those who desire an object lesson in the correlation of character and circumstance might do worse, if prepared to familiarize themselves with Greek history, than take him as their guide.

The position of Greece proper in the Mediterranean, and in relation to the Levant and the islands of the Ægean, is no less significant for history than its internal structure. The whole country is, so to speak, turned towards the East. The bays and natural harbors of Greece proper, and the lines of islands which guide and encourage the voyages of early mariners, lie to the East; and the basin of the Ægean, as the well-known opening sentences of Curtius's history point out, is rather a bond † than a division between Europe and Asia. Here in this predetermined focus of life, commerce, and ideas, continuous with the Euxine, with Asia Minor, and with Syria, Egypt, and Cyrene, we have the central area of the Greek

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* This illustration, as all in these remarks that is worth anything, I owe to my teacher, Mr. W. L. Newman, of Balliol, the editor of Aristotle's Politics.

† *Cf.* the relation of the Hanse towns to the North Sea, pointed out by Professor Geddes in lectures.

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dispersion, the basis of leagues and empires under Athens, Sparta, Alexander, and Rome, forming a homogeneous world of civilization, the field of Hellenistic and of Greco-Roman culture, and ultimately the seed-plot of Christianity.

Turning to our immediate problem, the natural endowments of Attica in particular, in relation to the conceptions of Athenian statesmen, we note in them simply an intensification of the characteristics belonging to Hellenic ground as a whole.

First of all we have to observe the central position of Athens in the world of maritime commerce of the fifth century B.C. She lay in the centre of the water-ways of the Mediterranean much as England lies in the centre of the maritime world to-day; and her natural harbors, of ample extent according to ancient standards, though not comparable with the vast harbor spaces of London, of New York, or of modern Marseilles, made it possible for her to use her position to the full.

In the next place, the internal resources of Attica point in the same way to an artificial—a commercial or industrial—type of life. The soil was not first-rate cornland, and no large population could have been maintained upon it by agriculture. The home corn-supply was probably enough for from half to two-thirds* of the year, when the population was at its maximum; in the United Kingdom the supply of foreign wheat began to exceed the home product about 1870. What Attica did possess was a good soil for olive, vine, and fig culture,† an inexhaustible store of the choicest marble, a supply of clay adapted for pottery, a sea well stocked with fish, a flora which gave the choicest honey, and above all, silver mines, from which a considerable revenue was drawn, and owing to which the Attic silver coinage had a general currency like that of English gold, and Athens could always pay for her

* It is interesting to see Socrates putting this question to the young would-be statesman as one of the first things he ought to know. But the young man has not given it his attention. Xen. Mem., 3, 6, 13.

† The soil of Greece requires irrigation, and it is interesting to see the process going on to-day just as it is described by Homer.

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imports in specie if commodities suitable for export were not forthcoming.

Now, the instructive point is that we observe, from the beginning of recorded history, a perfectly definite grasp of these conditions in the minds of Athenian statesmen. It would lead us too far to furnish details of the legislation and government of the sixth century B.C. But it may be taken as well known that the great legislator and the great prince who are the prominent figures of that century at Athens felt themselves to be dealing with a community whose future lay in industry, commerce, art, and letters. The admission to citizenship of foreigners exercising a trade, which is ascribed to Solon's legislation, stands out as an act of far-sighted liberality against the policy advocated in many quarters even to-day.

By the end of the sixth century, then, what we may call the suggestions of nature had already found their response in the Athenian mind. Athenian sculpture and building were fast rising into fame; Athens was becoming noted for pottery and for other products depending for their value upon skill in manufacture, such, for example, as olive oil; and the silver mines were producing a revenue to the state and to individuals, though the later and fateful application of that revenue had not yet been devised. Further, the city had already stations and factories over-sea, and more particularly had laid on the region of the Hellespont the grasp which it afterwards tightened with economic results of the highest importance.

Thus the mind of Athens is from the beginning a mind racy of the native ground and the native sea; and when we look at the cutting and setting of the marble blocks and drums on the sacred hill of Athene, we feel that above all things we have to do with a people to whom the working of marble and the building of walls and columns came as naturally as farming to an Englishman or horse-breaking to an Australian.

Omitting many things which would illustrate our point of view if it was possible to go into them,—for example, the decisive democratic reforms which closed the century in question,—let us look for one moment at the inherent logic of the

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Athenian mind as its world shaped itself further in the two great fifth century statesmen, Themistocles and Pericles.

In the first thirty years of the fifth century, or thereabouts, the attempt of the Persian empire to extend itself over European Greece was defeated, very greatly by the services of those poorer classes at Athens who formed the crews of the Athenian war-galleys.

Now, according to the story, which there is no reason to doubt, the existence of this powerful fleet of galleys was first made possible by the success of Themistocles in persuading the people to abandon the annual distribution per head of the silver revenue and apply it to building year by year a certain quota of ships. And the creation of this powerful fleet involved three closely connected results: first, the defeat of Xerxes and the liberation of the Levantine cities from his power; secondly, the maritime supremacy of Athens among the Greeks, and consequently her leadership and ultimately her empire; and, thirdly, the intimate and inherent connection of the democracy at home and the empire abroad, inasmuch as the latter rested on the skill and energy of the maritime populace who rowed the galleys.

But such a war fleet, not to speak of the commerce which it was to support, needed a defensible harbor. Here, again, the mind of the statesman revealed itself at the critical moment as penetrated with the individual and determinate capacities of his native territory. The selection and fortification of the headland of Peiræus with its three natural harbors, one of them a bay three-quarters of a mile in its greatest length, may seem no very gigantic conception to us who reckon our wharf frontages by miles and miles. But it was enough to secure a sea-power to Athens adequate to deal with anything that could be brought against it within the Greek and Phœnician world, and it presented itself with extraordinary felicity as the complement of the other capacities of Attica and the condition of their being effectively realized. The harbor town which grew up round the new harbors was the favorite work of Themistocles. It was to Athens what the East End is to London, because of its including the harbors and docks,

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the commercial and democratic centre. Themistocles, we are explicitly told, thought the Peiræus more valuable than Athens itself, and constantly advised the Athenians, if they should ever be overborne in a war on land, to take refuge in its fortifications and hold the sea.

In this there was something of the peculiar stamp of Themistocles's mind: a want of balance, of completeness, characteristic of one who it is said was not of full citizen birth, and reminding us of his answer, when invited to join in the music at a party,—this being an ordinary social accomplishment of an Athenian gentleman,—that "he could not fiddle, but he could make a petty town into a great city."

However this may be, if we summon before our mind's eye the appearance of Attica, say, ten years after the repulse of Xerxes, with Athens and Peiræus both successfully fortified by Themistocles's suggestion and contrivance, and the growing energies of the city making their mark triumphantly in art and industry, in war and external politics, we shall perceive in every characteristic of the busy scene at once a gift of nature and the stamp of great intelligences, working, through the logic of events, as a single intelligence.

And now, bearing in mind that we are only selecting a point here and there out of a mass of material, let us turn to Pericles.

Comparing his characteristic policy with that of Themistocles, we find it written on the face of the country by the famous Long Walls, impregnable fortifications extending a distance of five miles from the fortified city to the fortified harbor. Pericles, then, was resolute to sacrifice neither element of Athenian life, neither power nor splendor, neither democracy nor the pride of culture. He was determined, as it seems, to give a national value to his ancient city, which had such capacities for magnificence and refinement; and to do this he was aware that he must weld it into inseparable unity with the instruments of its maritime supremacy.

And in the great works by which he gave this imperishable value to the life of his city we may trace once more a wonderful continuity between the gifts of nature and the creations

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of genius. Pericles, of course, was not the first to deal with that rocky elevation in the centre of the Athens of his day, which became under his direction the most glorious sanctuary of art in the whole world. From time immemorial its surface had been used as a fort or palace or both; it had, indeed, been the ancient city. And in the course of centuries, by the work of kings and statesmen, the sloping rock had been built up and levelled into a spacious surface, bounded by sweeping curves, supported upon huge retaining walls, whose varied workmanship indicates the succession of generations occupied upon the construction.

So, then, when we see to-day the vast marble floors, the walls and columns, with their blocks and drums fitted to a hair's-breadth, standing on a spacious and grandly outlined surface, we should call to mind that while part of this surface is the living rock, part of it again is the work of man.* And we may say without a paradox that if the greatness of Athens is in one sense a gift of nature, yet the central endowment of its nature, the very ground in which its glory is rooted, is a creation of the national mind.

Thus the life of Greece and of Athens is an emphatic object-lesson in the relation of natural data to genius and character. A great life is, as it were, the flowering of nature in the medium of great intelligence. The highest genius does not make the least but the most of the nature which is its world. Aspects and characteristics of material things, which are silent to others, tell their secret to the gifted race or to the great statesman. But in making the most of nature, we must not forget that genius transforms nature. Nature, we may say, ceases to be mere nature when it becomes "a world" for mind. Its rough circuitous selection is replaced by an ideal selection which is rapid and direct. Its imperfect forms of unity are replaced by the forms of intelligence, making possible, for instance, such a transformation as that of the animal brood into the human family. The very surface

* The Parthenon, with its thousands of tons of marble, showing no trace of settlement, stands at one side on the living rock, at the other on thirty to forty feet of made earth and foundations.

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of the earth becomes, as we have seen, not, indeed, something which is other than nature, but a larger nature charged with mind.

The error of commonplace materialist views of history seems to lie in the old blunder of separating two inseparable factors and then trying to substitute the one for the other. Mind and its world are inseparable correlatives; the wealth of its world is the wealth of mind, is its very substance, and the driving force of its logical or ethical operation. Mind, it might be said, is the world taken as alive and focussed. "Circumstances" are "what stand around;" they stand around a centre; the centre is the unity of consciousness, and when we speak of "circumstances" we are already within a sphere which is not merely "natural," but transformed by presentation to intelligence. Cut the correlatives apart at a line which must be arbitrary, and the world or circumstances are dead, and the mind is nothing. And then it is natural to exclaim that here is nothing left but dead circumstances, material data, conditions; and they must be the essence of life, for we can find nothing but them in life. This is because at some arbitrary level of their unity you have killed them by dissociating them from mind, and now you say that they "really" are what they happened to be when you killed them. But in truth they are not a dead structure, prior to mind; they are a living fabric whose variety, as penetrated with a conation towards unity, is the mainspring of mind itself. Such an economic factor as the "standard of life" shows in a moment how futile is the attempt to represent economic conditions as mechanical or material, in the sense in which material or mechanical means external to intelligence.

The Greek thinkers knew better. They knew that the function of the statesman is to elicit the idea that lies in the conditions, as the artist finds the statue in the marble. They knew that the matter of life is not alien to the aims of mind, nor a fetter upon it, but rather is the individual form or idea in its less explicit phases, pressing forward and springing up into higher shapes of unity. And they knew that economic structure is not a sort of iron framework or foundation,

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affecting life but unaffected by it; but is simply one way in which the characteristic unity of any system of life expresses itself, partaking of the nature and degree of completeness of the unity attained.

The idea to be got rid of is the idea that specialized circumstances are a fetter upon individuality and genius. Homer and Shakespeare, for instance, are characteristic individual voices each of his country, race, and climate. Do we wish that it were not so? Do we think that they would be more themselves if they were not? What is the world there for if it is not, with all its rich individuality, to come to utterance in mind?

2. With the Periclean works on the Acropolis we pass naturally to our second problem, the place of force in the maintenance of a national unity. For all this splendor of Athens, all the culture and comfort of the democracy, meant imperialism; the position of a national capital maintained by force.

I will try to summarize the familiar story in a few lines. After the repulse of the Persian invasion by the services of the rowers and at the cost of a retirement which left the property of the wealthy classes a prey to the enemy, Athens had become, by the force of events, head of a naval alliance, offensive and defensive, against Persia. In time, as the object of the alliance was attained, a tendency grew in the allied cities to commute their personal services for money payments. This commutation Athens accepted, following, it is said, a far-sighted policy. But she would permit no further relaxation of obligations; and, in short, within a lapse of twenty years the alliance was transformed into an empire of some five or six hundred tributary cities, held together by overwhelming force, the fleet of the alliance being now simply the Athenian fleet maintained in part at the cost of the allies, the treasury being at Athens and under Athenian officials, and the Diet or Congress having ceased to exist. The splendor and comfort of Athenian life was greatly dependent on this relation. Athenian commerce "followed the flag." The corn trade was concentrated at Peiræus. Athens became

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the judicial and political centre of a large part of Greece, and was necessarily, therefore, a place of constant resort, besides being, in consequence of the Periclean works, partly paid for by the "tribute," a centre of artistic industry.

Undoubtedly there was a serious risk of selfishness in this state of things. Every Athenian citizen might be the better in purse and was the better in prestige because of the empire. A few sentences from a contemporary pamphlet, obviously written by a shrewd anti-democrat, and not the work of Xenophon, among whose writings it has come down to us, will tell us more than pages of inference and discussion:*

"Some people think that the Athenian democracy is ill-advised in forcing the allies to come to Athens for their law-suits; but others reckon up the advantages which this brings to the democracy; first, they get their fees as jurors throughout the year out of the costs; then, again, they can sit at home and control the allied cities without sending out ships; for they favor the democrats and ruin the other side in their law courts; now, if the allies had kept their law work at home, as they dislike the Athenians, they would have ruined those of their own people who favor the Athenian democracy. In addition to this, the Athenian democracy profits by the system in the following ways. The percentage (harbor dues) at Peiræus is increased; every one who has lodgings to let is advantaged; so is every one who has a horse or a workman (slave) to hire out; the public attendants are profited by the allies coming to town." . . . "The shortage of the corn crops, which depends on the weather, matters less to a sea power than to a land power. For the shortage is not all over the world at once; and the corn from the districts where there is a full crop comes to those who have the sea power." . . . "Whatever desirable product there is in Sicily, in Italy, in Cyprus, or in Egypt, in Lydia, or in Pontus, or in Peloponnese, or anywhere else, it is all concentrated into one spot by the operation of the Athenian sea power." . . . "So, too, as regards sacrifices and temples and festivals and consecrated

* De Republ. Athen., C. 1, 16.

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grounds; the democracy understands that it is impossible for each individual of the poorer classes to have sacrifices and banquets and temples of his own and to live the life of a great and beautiful city; and it has devised how this difficulty may be overcome. For they conduct their sacrifices on the method that great numbers of victims are provided by the city at the public expense; and it is the common people that banquets and has the breaking up of the victims. And so with gymnasia and dressing-rooms and baths. Some of the wealthy have these of their own; but the democracy itself builds on its own account many gymnasia and dressing-rooms and baths, and is better off in these respects than the few and the wealthy." Then follows a passage pointing out that all the various requisites for ship-building—metals, timber, flax, etc.—are not produced in any one country, and that consequently the city which has sea power is the only one which can make sure of having them all at its disposal, and can hinder any other country from acquiring them, and so from creating a fleet. We should note in addition that the free entrance to the theatre for those who chose to claim it was a characteristic point of Pericles's policy towards the democracy.

His idea evidently was that the citizens of Athens should accept the great position which was open to them, and should make themselves worthy of it by energy, justice, culture, and bravery. He would tread on the dangerous path of profit from dependencies, partly direct but especially indirect, so far as to secure the realization of conditions which would make these qualities possible for all Athenians. There are signs that if he could have found political forms adequate to the creation of a citizenship of the empire he would have tried to make use of them. But the thing, whether attempted or not, was impossible, and he turned to the other pole of government; not to be representative, or based upon consent, but to be worthy and efficient. That the immediate objects of the alliance were carried out under the Athenian empire is certain. No hostile ship nor any pirate showed its beak in the eastern Mediterranean while Athens retained her power. No account

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was rendered of the tribute, but the work was done. And if the artificial pre-eminence of Athens in trade was oppressive to the greater powers among the subject states, it was probably advantageous to the lesser. The trader from a small island would do better for himself at Piræus, than if there had been no such central market, and might also obtain better justice in the Athenian courts against a member of a powerful state than he could have done apart from such a system.

Probably the position of Athens, attained at the cost of a certain aspect of selfishness, was far more deeply connected with her services to the world than has generally been admitted. The question is not merely whether the works on the Acropolis were paid for by the tribute of the allies. It affects the whole concentration of experience, the whole brilliance of life and variety of intercourse, and sense of political headship, which gave its peculiar note to the Athenian mind. Plato belonged to the Athens which had been imperial as characteristically as Ruskin to imperial England. The work of Athens was national, not merely in the cost and style of her buildings —the Parthenon was a Doric temple—but in the varied and representative quality of her thought. Even Sparta, the silent sister, bequeaths her spirit to us through Athenian writings. Athens, said Pericles, was the school of Greece; and it is worth observing that the four great cultured nations of the world—France, Germany, the United States, and Great Britain —are to-day maintaining schools at Athens. It is a great thing that men and women who mean to play their part in modern life should think it worth while to-day to put themselves in contact for a time with the spirit and memories of the Greeks.

"I have lengthened out my account of the city" because it is important to approach our problem in no half-hearted spirit. It is easy to pretend, of course, that the services rendered by Athens to the world might equally well have been achieved without the aspect of force, absolutism, and selfishness, which by universal consent attached to her empire. To me this seems quite incredible, and the suggestion savors of running away from the difficulty. Her services rested on a basis of national unity; and when men's minds were wedded to the

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politics of the city-state, it was inconceivable that national unity should find a genuine political expression. It was a choice between such a unity—brief and fragile—as could be realized by force, and the privation of those achievements which Athens has given to the world. And we must say, I think, that Pericles was right, and that, if the choice was what it seems to have been, it would have been wrong and cowardly to take any other part.

But are we, then, subscribing to the gospel of "blood and iron"? What is the theoretical justification of the judgment I have suggested if it is not that for a laudable end you need stop at no oppression? And as all ends are laudable to those who desire them, it would be held to follow simply and absolutely that might is right.

I venture to put forward an explanation which at least would give room for applying criticism to such an evangel. Force, it may be suggested, is necessary and permissible in inverse ratio to political maturity. The substantive capacity of a race or people for unity and achievement may be much in advance of the formal development of their political consciousness. Then, if force is applied to break through to the latent unity and realize the full powers of the group, its members will not be more aggrieved than somebody always is under the most reasonable self-government. The force is justified or not, and on the whole is justified or not even for those subjected to it, according as it breaks through to a life worth living—a substantive unity of will—or fails to do so. For example, it can hardly be said that the subjects of Athens resented a strong ruling hand when her rule was at its best. The errors and weaknesses incident to absolute rule brought the system to an end, and it is well that this should generally happen, and that absolutism should be incapable of permanence.

But what is justifiable when the political consciousness is immature, is monstrous in face of a developed political capacity. Force, indeed, I believe that there will always be in a state, as the mere fly-wheel of the machine, to insure regularity and carry out what has become automatic in the general mind.

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But absolute government becomes irrational in as far as self-government becomes possible. Self-government, however, depends on the permeation of men's minds by forms of political co-operation adequate to the task imposed upon the community. Minds which are not thus permeated are as solid a barrier against unity as a range of mountains. What was a statesman to do with five hundred towns, united for common defence and possessed of a markedly national mind,* which had no conception of representative government, and would have rebelled if a common citizenship had been imposed upon them?

If men cannot work out the obvious problems of the time for themselves, owing to the inadequateness of their mental machinery, some one else must and will do it for them. But they learn, in time, to deal with their own affairs, and I trust that our conclusion, therefore, is not so bad as it might seem. We accept, indeed, the priceless gift which Athenian statesmen gave us, without turning up our eyes and regretting that they won it by force; but we understand for ourselves that the alternative to violence is education, and that absolutism becomes progressively less justifiable as men's minds become capable of expressing themselves effectively in the forms which constitute true political unity.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

* When the dependencies of the imperial democracy are of a different race, and on a different level of political capacity, from the democracy, we have a complication which did not exist in the case of Athens.

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BELLIGERENT DISCUSSION AND TRUTH-SEEKING.

IT is a sign of the times, and a most encouraging one, that polemical writing is losing caste. If seriously attempted, the classical attempt to "refute" a doctrine produces a smile to-day. The animus of the heresy trial is apt to return like a boomerang upon those who undertake it. All this is as it should be. Yet it sometimes seems as if the pendulum had swung so far the other way that people were beginning to distrust their capacity for profitable discussion on any terms. Many a discussion is little better than a wrangle, and to some persons all discussion seems to be practically such. On the other hand, there are few who cannot remember certain talks with old friends when insight seemed to advance more than in months of lonely thinking. Sometimes discussion is pure gain to all concerned, and makes us feel as if we could never get enough of it. For discussion is only thinking writ large, and we can scarcely give it up unless we are to give up thinking altogether. A group of friends can make up their group-mind precisely as a solitary thinker makes up his individual mind. The different sides of the question which in solitary thinking are turned over and considered within a single brain may be represented each by a single speaker. When thinking alone there is always danger that we may forget altogether to consider certain important aspects of the question, or that, from want of definite expression, the whole thing may be so murky and dim that the actual collisions or re-enforcements, the relative proportions and places of the different parts, may escape us. But get each view represented by a living companion and the resulting division of labor is as effective as in manufactures, or in a court of justice. We have decided that, as a rule, the court can make up its mind better if the pros and cons which the jury would otherwise have to remember and consider for themselves are impersonated by separate individuals,—the

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prosecuting and defending attorneys and the judge,—each of whom is responsible, like any specialist, for a certain portion of the problem in hand, and undertakes to present what is to be said from a given point of view. This method works so well that it is sometimes applied too literally to ordinary discussion. But in satisfactory discussions the general principle of division of labor is supplemented by the stimulating effect of mind on mind. We think more clearly when we have to present and defend our views in speech or writing, and the simple statement of a view contrasting with our own often sets our mental machinery humming in a most gratifying way.

Discussion, then, is not at all likely to be given up, and in studies other than philosophical there does not seem to be any dissatisfaction felt corresponding to our increasing distrust of philosophical polemics. Students of pedagogy, for instance, are constantly converting one another, modifying and enlarging each other's views, and getting from one another an increased power to deal effectively with the problems before them. But it is the rarest thing in the world to hear of a philosopher's conversion. Need this be so? What is it that makes one discussion more profitable than another?

In attempting to answer these questions, I shall simply state the results of the personal experience of one inveterately fond of discussion. In my own experience it has appeared that discussions have been satisfactory and instructive to all concerned in proportion as the following beliefs have been more or less unconsciously acted on:

1. That the essence of proof is exemplification or a reference to experience common to the disputants.

2. That all dissent should take the form of an attempt to reinterpret in a more comprehensive way the common experience under discussion.

3. That no opinion can be criticised adversely unless it has been understood so thoroughly that one feels decidedly tempted to adopt it; while, on the other hand, no opinion can be supported by one who has not felt the objections to it so strongly that he is tempted to reject it.

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4. That there are many important views of life which we cannot hope to understand without a pretty complete knowledge of their relations to the rest of the life of him who holds them.

5. That our instinctive aversion towards an opinion which differs from our own is not infrequently strong just in proportion to our ignorance of its actual significance, and that, hence, such natural hostility should be discounted in advance.

6. That we should attempt no paraphrase of an opponent's views, except in such phrases as we genuinely believe he might himself use.

7. That in characterizing another's doctrine we should never affix such adjectives as "mere," "bare," "dead," "brute," "abstract," and the like to his expressions (*e.g.*, "mere, dead atoms," "pure abstract idealism," etc.).

I believe in these rules chiefly because I have seen them *work* well, and accordingly my argument consists of attempts to exhibit their working in contrast with that of other rules followed (as before, unconsciously) by the participants in many current philosophical discussions spoken or written. I shall now try to exemplify each of them.

I.

For purposes of discussion the essence of proof is exemplification.

Obviously there can be no rational discussion without a common topic; there must be a set of experiences common to the disputants, which they try by discussion to interpret and understand. No doubt, all of us have been through the irritating experience of finding at the end of a long discussion that our opponent has been talking of one thing and we of another. I have seen two men come almost to blows in supposed disagreement about temperance, only to discover in the end that one of them *disbelieved* in temperance, supposing it to signify total abstinence from alcoholic drinks, while the other *believed* in it in the sense of moderate use of alcohol. One was talking of abstinence, the other of moderation. They

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agreed entirely in their conduct, and differed only in words. But my present point is that they never *intended* to talk of different things, else their discussion could never have arisen.

But what is there in discussion besides an announcement of the subject? I should say that in the most profitable discussions we do nothing but describe or point to the topic in such a way that certain less obvious aspects of it become clearer to all concerned. In relatively unprofitable discussions we do a great deal else, but wherever much progress in thought is made we find (according to my experience) that the words and opinions of the disputants are much like *gestures of pointing*. They are like the motions of a showman as he points out the less obvious characteristics of an animal to a knot of interested spectators. As he points, they look on and verify or modify his descriptions of the parts. They see the end of the elephant's trunk, which the showman says is like a finger, but they comment to themselves that it would be a very short and flabby finger.

Similarly, in trying to convince any one on a topic in philosophy, most first-rate disputants begin by getting clearly before the audience a case of what they mean. In the twenty-sixth chapter of his "Psychology," Professor James describes to us the state of mind of a man who is trying to decide about getting out of bed on a cold morning. This is to illustrate the doctrine of the Will, and the description is so good that the case is before us as vividly as though it were a patient wheeled into a medical lecture-room to illustrate the lecturer's views. "The nature of Will is such a thing as *there* occurs," Professor James might say, and we can hardly fail to understand him, for all his arguments are gestures. The kind of metaphor used shows a persistent attempt to keep the concrete facts clearly before the audience. This "*obviously*" is so and so—this is *evident*, this you *see*, we call your *attention* to this. By derivation, an illustration is that which "lights up" or makes clear; a *demonstration* is a "pointing out" (evidently with the showman's gesture in view); proof is a "testing" or "sampling," while "exemplify" is a word which goes back to

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the movement of a buyer who picks up an article to test it that he may judge of its value.

But derivative meanings are often superseded, and I rest my argument for the statement that proof is exemplification on an appeal to any one's experience with successful and unsuccessful discussions. Is it not true that the successful and profitable arguments have been those where the appeal to examples was frequent and skilful? Our friends who were disputing as to "Temperance" would have got down to business much quicker, had either of them given a case of what he meant. The whole misunderstanding would thus have been avoided, for their meaning—what they cared about—was identical. To begin by defining our terms is tedious and often impracticable. It may create as many misunderstandings as it removes, for the terms used in the definition need defining themselves. But a case or a story defines our symbols very easily. I do not mean an allegory, or an analogy, but an incarnation of the principle itself.

In his brilliant essay on "Education," Mr. J. J. Chapman says of Froebel: "His intention was so concentrated upon fact" (the facts of children's development) "that his terminology does not mislead. It can be translated into the language of metaphysics, of Christian theology, or of modern science, and it remains incorruptibly coherent.* What an oasis is an illustration in the pages of a difficult writer! Eagerly we scan the horizon till we see one, struggle along to it, and when we reach it we get strength to go on. In Hegel, an illustration is like the first gulp of air to the diver as he rises to the surface after a long submersion. And yet, with any writer who is alive and earnest, the doctrines he preaches are the reflex of his experiences. Often one wishes he would give us the experience and leave out the doctrine. Emerson's account of a preacher who thought to prove without exemplification is very typical of what I mean. "A snow-storm was falling around us. The snow-storm was real, the preacher merely spectral. . . . He had lived in vain. He had no one word in-

* "Causes and Consequences," by John J. Chapman (Scribner), p. 84.

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timating that he had laughed or wept, was married or in love, had been commended or cheated or chagrined. If he had ever lived and acted, we were none the wiser for it." (Divinity Hall Address.)

It may be said that in pure deductive reasoning or logical construction, illustrations are not needed; but I think the illustrations are still there, though in a slightly different form. In proving a proposition in geometry, what we do is to point out by diagrams and other devices certain aspects of the axioms which at first sight are less obvious than the axioms themselves. This is just what the showman does with his elephant, or the psychologist with his case of will.

Again, when one shows a statement to be self-contradictory what one does is to exhibit its failure to *work* when actually applied to a case. Thus, if our opponent makes the statement: "There exists an unknowable Being or Force," the attempt to show that this is self-contradictory naturally begins with some such question as this: "What makes you think so?" or "How do you know it?" The answer must contain some appeal to a case in point and the original proposition is thus upset, since it appears that in practice one knows a good deal about the unknowable.

Or, once more, to deduce a corollary from a principle is to exhibit a new or unfamiliar *working* of the principle, as is done in the second term of a syllogism. If the Monroe Doctrine be that no aggression of European powers in the United States is to be tolerated—the corollary, "The Venezuela boundary-dispute must be submitted to arbitration," is deduced *via* the decision that England's action in the matter is an example, or illustration of aggression such as the Monroe Doctrine means.

The examples given in the last few pages are what I mean when I say that in profitable discussions all proof is essentially exemplification. In Professor Royce's recent paper on the "Psychology of Invention," * he says, "These experiments do not indeed prove, but do in miniature illustrate a thesis

* *The Psychological Review*, 1898.

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whose proof I should leave to the whole history of invention." Here, obviously, proof means only the results of *more* illustrations upon the mind. The history of invention is to complete the proof by the accumulation of supplementary illustrations. In a similar sense I should say that the proof of my thesis that demonstration is illustration is to be left to the *whole history of discussion*, out of which I have selected certain bits which seemed suggestive of the rest.

II.

In progressive or convincing discussions, all dissent from another's views takes the form of an attempt to reinterpret, in a way more comprehensive than his, the common experience which is under consideration.

When a person says, "I understand your meaning perfectly, but I differ from it entirely," we can only take his words to signify this: "I see what you mean, but I think it badly expressed," or "Your meaning does not reach me at all."

If these latter phrases express dissent, why then dissent has a most vital function to perform in all discussion. But any other kind of dissent, any dissent which is of the type of the classic "refutation," or which implies that any view can be totally false or meaningless, does not exist, so far as I know, in the kind of discussion that widens mental horizons and nourishes character.

I remember a lady who repeatedly expressed the belief that all men are cross before dinner. What are we to do with a statement like this? The most useless thing that we could do would be to dissent and call it false. There must be some meaning there behind the words, some experience badly described. Inquiry showed that the lady in question was a person cut off by the nature of her duties from all masculine society except that of her husband and her son, both of whom were usually cross when their stomachs were empty. This was what she meant, as, on questioning, she admitted. From her meaning I could not dissent. Her facts were facts, and it was these she had in mind. It is easy to say: "The mean-

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ing is the inference, the personal reaction upon the facts, and thus may be wholly false and deserving of our hearty dissent." But with serious people it is rarely true, I think, that the meaning is all in the inference. A serious man "means business;" he means to state the truth, and means that you should get behind both his words and his inference to the facts he is trying to express. There is no occasion for going to the dictionary and trying to read the man's meaning out of the definitions of his words, for it is not *the* words but *his* words that you wish to understand. His words are a piece of the expression of his life, to be understood not in their isolated, dictionary signification, but, so far as may be, as he uses them, or as a part of him. He genuinely sees something and we have got to see it too, if we are to get his meaning. After that, we can consider the question of terms and adopt his language or make him adopt a better. In the same fine essay, from which I have already quoted, Mr. Chapman says,—

"If you wish to convince a man that you are right, concede that from his point of view he is right; *then move the point*, and he follows." (Italics mine.) To "move the point" we must first *get* it entirely; we must assimilate and, so far, adopt it. Then we are in a position to move it, and to dissent, in so far as moving it implies dissent. But this is not very far. You can only oppose that which offers resistance, and if you entirely understand a point of view before you try to move it, you and your opponent will progress together and without opposition against the common enemy,—ignorance.

Swift * writes that once, when half asleep, he fancied that he could not go on writing unless he first put out some water which he had taken into his mouth. Here there is so obviously some mistake that one could hardly be tempted to take the words literally or dissent from them. A moment's thought shows that they meant a fact,—namely, the fact that he could not *speak* without first emptying his mouth.

This is an extreme case of the sort of misunderstanding which, in less obvious forms, underlies a large percentage of

* Quoted by Bosanquet, "Essays and Addresses," p. 192.

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the disagreements among philosophers. Sometimes the difference is little more than a matter of terms, and yet leads to a good deal of waste of time and strength. Mr. Bosanquet tells of a discussion between two theologians which presumably was long and heated until at last a thought flashed upon one of them and he exclaimed, "Oh, I see, my dear sir; your *God* is my *devil!*" After that understanding was possible.

If I am right in what I have been saying, our position is this: we may understand a man's meaning, or we may fail to understand it, or we may not feel clear as to whether we understand it or not. If we understand it, we have possession of the facts, or the kind of facts, which he sees, and can differ from him only as to the best method of "boxing them up for shipment from mind to mind." (Phillips Brooks.)

If we do not get at the facts on which his argument rests, we do not understand *his* argument, though we may know the dictionary meaning of every word and be able to parse the sentences. If we do not understand him, or are not sure whether we do or not, of course we can neither agree nor differ.

III.

No opinion should be criticised adversely, unless one feels decidedly tempted to adopt it, nor can any opinion be reasonably supported by any one who does not believe himself to feel the full force of the objections to it.

We all of us recognize the *naïveté* of any attempt to support a doctrine like, say, that of "innate ideas," without recognizing the obvious objections to it. It is like going into a modern naval battle in a dory, with bows and arrows for artillery. But we may fail to see the equal absurdity of attacking a doctrine in which we see no considerable truth. The figure of the straw man who is then our adversary ought to rise before our minds. In presence of any serious argument that seems to upset or contradict our own, or to be devoid of meaning, our first duty is to understand it; our second is to understand it; our third is to understand it. We have no other concern. This, of course, applies only to serious dis-

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cussion, in which our companions are presumably as sane as we are, and as desirous of reaching the truth about the matter in hand. Otherwise, discussion is a farce. And yet in practice it is rare to hear or read a discussion in which none of the arguments imply that the "opponent's" opinion is a riddle with no answer, an utter mystery, a "*Ding an sich.*"

Some years ago I wrote a college thesis in criticism of Professor Royce's ethical system. That thesis seems to me today a very fine example of the wrong way to criticise,—the way which condemns a view without having ever personally experienced its force. "Remember that the opponent's view is convincing to him, and should be at least plausible to you." *

In the thesis to which I refer I have the best of reasons for knowing that I was judging adversely something the meaning of which I never had seen. I had read over many times the pages which I criticised, but never with any attempt at sympathetic comprehension. Instead of that, I pointed out with great glee seventeen respects in which I held that Professor Royce had contradicted himself. As I look over that thesis now, I see that not only did I fail to get an inkling of his meaning, but that I never for a moment attempted to do so. I was too busy warding off what I took to be attacks upon my own beliefs. To believe my own truth, I thought it necessary to knock over everybody else's.

A classical example of this attitude is to be seen in the long controversy which took place in the English magazines some years ago between Professor Huxley and the Duke of Argyle. To me the most striking thing about the contest was the absence of any attempt on either side to understand the other's meaning. It was "sparring for points" throughout,—efforts to raise a laugh at the opponent's expense, to put him in an uncomfortable position, to show his utter absurdity, insincerity, and incompetence. Apparently no suspicion crossed either combatant's mind that his opponent meant facts of some kind, and must have some sort of human expe-

* I think this sentence is from a lecture by Professor G. H. Palmer.

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rience behind his words. Oh, no! The opponent was always assumed to be a "*Ding an sich*" whom it was out of the question to understand, and who was to be crushed and forgotten as quickly and thoroughly as possible. Such judgments argue the incompetence of the critic, for they always prove too much. They prove not simply that the opponent's doctrine is mistaken, but that he has no doctrine at all: that his words are the babblings of one temporarily insane or wilfully blind to truth, which, of course, reduces the criticism to an absurdity.

In literary criticism it is fast getting to be an accepted canon that one cannot criticise an author unless one likes him. No one would think he could understand and judge a character in history without feeling the force of the motives that moulded his life. The scientific observer does not go at stubborn new facts with a club to crush them into submission. The translator does not try to "refute," terrify, or abash his text; yet it would be hardly more unreasonable for him to do so than for a philosopher to treat his opponent's opinions as "essentially false." Huxley was probably not very seriously tempted to hold the Duke of Argyle's position. He was like the schoolmaster, of whom Hegel tells, who gravely pointed out to his scholars the wicked selfishness of Alexander's vaulting ambition, and compared it with his own unselfishness in forbearing to conquer the East.

There is the same element of incompetent self-righteousness about any man who ventures to condemn as false a doctrine which he is not tempted to believe. The opponent's opinions are to the philosopher what the facts are to the scientist, the records to the historian, the text to the translator. They are something to work at, something to take in and find a place for, if possible; if not, they are "some of our failures," as Beau Brummel's vâlet said of the cravats he could not tie.

It may be thought that I have mistaken the vocation of the philosopher, and conceived it as too nearly akin to that of the student of history, or of natural science. "The scientific man has his definite facts before him to which he is subordinate, to

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which he can constantly refer, and his whole work is to record, not to judge. But philosophy deals with opinions, with abstract ideas, general conceptions and universal truths, rather than with particular facts. It rises above them, and is to be judged rather by its inner self-consistency than by its correspondence with facts."

There is no doubt that many have attempted to work at philosophy in this way, and have brought it into disrepute thereby. The popular idea that the philosopher lives in a world of very abstruse conceptions, "heights of metaphysical argument which he scales easily and in the rare atmosphere of which he is able to sustain himself" * gives him a very unenviable position in society. For no one else wants to scale these dizzy heights, and ordinary air contains none too much oxygen for common-sense lungs. The work of the sage in this rare atmosphere is generally agreed to be the splitting of hairs and the spinning of cobwebs of "pure thought" out of his inner consciousness. What else can he do, since he has forsaken the world of facts? If philosophy can cut loose from experience, if it has any use to which to put abstract ideas and general conceptions, except to make them concrete and practical as fast as possible, why then it certainly seems to me to deserve the contempt and neglect which it now receives from so many sources.

But what is important for my present purpose is to recognize that such a conception of philosophy renders discussion impossible. The typical dealer in abstract general ideas was the New England Transcendentalist of forty years ago. A speech by Mr. Alcott or one of his disciples was (very possibly) a phenomenon similar to the biblical "gift of tongues," in which the sentences were themselves the experience, and referred to nothing beyond. It was like music:—no one was supposed to receive any definite impression, and as each had his own "gift of tongues" no discussion could take place. It was a mistake to try to get our bearings through reference to examples. There were none.

* See Mr. Lushington's introduction to Professor Ferrier's "Lectures on Greek Philosophy," p. xxiv.

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I suppose this conception of philosophy has mostly died out, or at any rate become subconscious. Any "general truth" or "abstract idea" is agreed to *be about something*, and that something is the experience which the idea endeavors to convey. An example of it could always be given. Yet now and then something crops out which shows that "ideas" are still interpreted in some quarters as something else than accounts of experience. With the sterility of such philosophy as this, I am just now concerned only in so far as it makes discussion impossible. If the philosopher has not his data to interpret, as much as the student of history has, there is nothing to discuss and no way of holding the disputants together.

But does not one differ utterly and entirely from the burglar when one throws the coal-hod at him? Need one sympathize with his motives before venturing to judge them? No judgment about his motives is necessary for action. To fight the burglar or get him shut up, one need not judge his actions, nor the "opinions" or motives from which they spring. One acts against him, as one makes any quick, forced decision, under a suspension of judgment as to the precise merits of the question. We can differ, then, so far as action demands, without judging at all; but such a difference cannot be put forward as an argument. It has no claim to truth and is therefore excluded from discussion. But if we are to judge fairly we must appreciate the full force of the temptation to do or to believe any of the alternatives offered, before we can support or condemn any.

IV.

My fourth observation about the most profitable discussions is that in them the participants realize that:

"*There are important views of life which we cannot hope to understand without a pretty full knowledge of their context in the life of him who holds them.*"

It may be thought that my frequent reference to "experience" or "facts" as contrasted with abstract, or "pure" thought, implies that I hope to separate the matter of knowledge from

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its form, and get at the simple sensations or bare uncategorized data.

But I intend no such separation. By the "facts" I mean nothing more sensuous or immediate than the examples to which any truth refers and in which it is verified. In seeking to understand a companion, I simply desire to see the matter in hand as he saw it before he constructed his sentences, or made the special gestures through which it is to be conveyed to me. Now, as a piece of technique useful to accomplish this, it has seemed to me that in difficult cases, where differences of opinion are chronic and apparently incurable, nothing is so effective as an inquiry into the *natural history* and *philosophical ancestry* of the opinions concerned. If we can find out under what conditions a given belief grew up, we may, by subjecting ourselves, imaginatively or actually, to similar conditions, get a similar point of view. It is natural then to ask, "How long have you thought that? What appeared to develop the opinion? Out of what earlier opinions did it grow, and was the growth influenced by reading certain books, by intimacy with certain friends, by the experience of success, of passion, of contemplation, of grief?"

In many cases I doubt whether there is any shorter way to get at the meaning of another's views than to investigate his biography. Such helps to comprehension as are used in trying to understand an historic character are, I think, too much neglected in the case of living companions whose views we think very strange yet worth understanding. The method is slow and laborious, and perhaps rarely worth while, except from a purely psychological interest; but my point is that unless we have the opportunity for such methods of studying an opinion, we should not expect to comprehend it, and so, of course, should not be willing to differ from it.

It has been suggested in many recent philosophical discussions, and from various points of view, that beliefs are inseparable from motor attitudes,—*i.e.*, from plans of action nascent or expressed. Our ideas about fire express our knowledge about how to produce it, how to prevent its going out, how to avoid being burned, how to answer a question as to its chemical

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basis. It is from this point of view that I say that it is often impossible to understand a man's beliefs without such a knowledge of his corresponding activities as would be furnished by living in the same house with him and watching his behavior in the details of practical life.

It has happened to me more than once to differ from a friend very strongly upon some philosophical question, and then to get at the whole root of the difficulty by climbing a mountain with him, trying to help him in drafting a resolution, or in managing private theatricals.

All this seems natural enough if we think of a man's opinions as an integral part of him, and not as something which can be taken off or put on like a mask. They must be affected by all he does, and, in turn, color all his actions. "Here is the most excellent gentleman in America, an old idealist, untouchably transcendental. To your amazement he thinks that it is occasionally necessary to subsidize the powers of evil. He was bred a banker. . . . What has happened to that radical that he seems to have become so moderate and reasonable? You find that for six months he has been clerk to the Civil Service Reform Club. . . . This man is an optimist. It means that he has struggled. That man is a pessimist. It means that he has shirked." *

In these quotations the opinions are, perhaps, too easily accounted for. Their source is probably not so plain as all that. Yet such a method of approaching the study of an opinion as is here suggested seems to me of the greatest value for philosophy. Men who *must* understand each other, those whose life and fortune depend upon a considerable degree of mutual comprehension, men of action and of affairs, use this method day in and day out. They could not get on without it, and I believe that if we took our philosophical labors as seriously, if we always "meant business," and desired truth not only as "good seekers" but as "*good finders*," we should never neglect investigation along this line.

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* From Chapman's essay quoted above.

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V.

I do not intend to say that the task of mutual comprehension is an easy one. On the contrary, I wish to emphasize its difficulties, for I think that the unprofitableness of many discussions is due to our failing to recognize how arduous it is to understand any one, and how costly of energy. As I watch men in discussion, it often seems to me that they get oblivious and their attention is distracted just when the most difficult part of the undertaking is at hand. When the differences of opinion begin to crop out, I often catch myself paying less attention and thinking chiefly of my own forthcoming retorts, instead of buckling down to the desperately hard task of interpretation and reconstruction. If an idea means more than the words that express it, it means an attitude towards life, a way of dealing with experience. To take in, assimilate, and use an idea relatively new to us is about as much of an undertaking as to learn to paint in water-colors or to run a large hotel. It means prolonged effort and skill,—skill which I may be as incapable of acquiring as of learning to jump a six-foot fence. It means a wrench and a strain of our mental ligaments, and *it hurts*. It hurts to grow, and every relatively new idea means growth. Mental habits are even harder to change than physical habits, and a new idea may mean so thorough an overhauling and rearrangement of our mental furniture that the change wracks us as abstaining from tobacco wracks an inveterate smoker. Naturally we do not care to go through such changes often; possibly we could not stand it.

As we read a new work on philosophy, we often notice that there are certain passages which stand out very clear and luminous, while others are misty and easily drop out of sight. Some of us have to go through the mortification of finding on reflection that the luminous, sensible passages were just our own old shop-worn opinions given back to us, while the misty and easily forgotten parts were those which had a message for our ignorance. We notice over and over again the familiar traits of a friend's character, the birds whose names we already

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know, so that no attention is left for the new which we may need most to see.

But besides the travail of the birth of new ideas and the fatal tendency of attention to stick to the familiar and shun what we most need, there is another hinderance to our getting any new ideas,—viz., our disposition to regard anything that we don't understand as hostile and dangerous. This is not peculiar to the hide-bound conservative. Most radicals have a few favorite, weak points, about which they are solid conservatives. On these points a new idea seems to mean a charge of inefficiency. That an idea is new to us means that we have been slack in our work, and we naturally resent the imputation. Suggest to any country almshouse superintendent a cheaper method of making bread for the inmates, and nine times out of ten, even if it lessens his own work, his instinct is expressed in objection to the innovation. For besides the natural inertia towards any mental readjustment, there is a general uneasiness as to the security of his tenure of office. If one flaw can be found, why not more? This last fear has its parallel in thought. The new idea may upset the whole fabric of our personality. In simple self-defence we resist, and all our forces of resistance rush to repel the invasion, as in a child who begins to cry for the loss of his pudding, but goes on crying for all the accumulated disappointments of months. It is more than selfish conservatism. It may be a life-and-death struggle. "To take away a man's belief," said a friend of mine, "is like taking off his skin. Perhaps you can put on a better skin, but he'll die meantime."

So it happens that as new ideas rise above our mental horizon we often tend to resist them more strongly the more important they are for our development. To look away from such ideas, to dissent from them vigorously, even to feel some irritation towards them, is only to obey the natural reflex of self-preservation. But once become clearly conscious of this, and we can never do it again with the same *naïve* assurance. We begin to "discount" our own enthusiastic opposition. The clean-cut dissent that used to seem so virile, so independent and original, henceforth appears as simple

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Jingoism. It is natural at certain stages of development, but it is destroyed, like any form of innocence, by clearer self-consciousness. Discussions full of vigorous self-defence and gross misunderstanding are still useful. They stimulate mental activity and develop mental muscles. Each man goes home more firmly convinced than ever of the truth of his own doctrine and the falsity of his opponent's. The increased clearness about his own views which each disputant gets through such a discussion is of value both in itself and because the clearer any one-sided view gets, the sooner the difficulties in it appear, and the more likely it is to enlarge, so as, in the long run, to include even the wicked opponent's views.

But this is a very slow and round-about process compared with the method described, by using which we spend *all* our force in trying to enlarge our views by comprehending those of our companions, instead of wasting half our strength in punishing every one who is so malicious as to differ with us.

Eighteenth century controversies on religion or on philosophy very commonly took the form of sharp, decisive collisions. Christianity was either unalloyed truth in every particular or pure superstition and fraud. A philosopher had to be either an empiricist, who denied any contribution to knowledge on the part of the mind, or a pure intuitionist, for whom ideas were wholly innate and gained nothing through the use of the senses. "Either-or," true or false, was the order of the day. This was characteristic of a time not dominated, like ours, by the idea of evolution, but prone to think of every change as essentially a revolution. On the other hand, the idea of evolution, as has been often pointed out, is *a reconciling idea*, and tends to make it possible for disputants to organize their respective fragments of truth into a whole much truer and more satisfying than any of them could have achieved alone.

I have called attention already to the fact that the evolutionary idea has already remoulded biology, history, economics, and politics, and, to a much smaller extent, philosophy. In the modern histories of philosophy it has attained firm

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footing, but our current philosophical discussions still retain a surprisingly large element of eighteenth century methods.

For example, in the introduction to Professor Royce's recent book on the "Conception of God," Professor Howison says (if I understand him) that neither he, nor Professor Mezes, nor Professor LeConte has materially modified his opinion as a result of the discussion in which they took part. To me this seems as humiliating a confession as could be made. Philosophy as represented by these three writers seems to me distinctly discredited by the fact which Professor Howison so coolly states. It does not surprise him, and I suppose that few of his readers were surprised by it; but in any other department of life it would be thought a reproach to a body of workers to have to make such a confession, not because they differed, but because, apparently, they did nothing else.

VI.

I think I can make my thesis a little more clear by exemplifying its workings when applied to the method of stating an opponent's doctrine.

There is a rule observed, I think, by most fair-minded writers on non-philosophical subjects and by a few writers on philosophy (notably by Mr. Bosanquet),—viz.:

"*In stating an opponent's doctrine use only such terms as you think he himself might use regarding it, or, conversely, do not put into his mouth any words which on reflection you know he would not use.*"

This means that we cannot paraphrase any view which has not an organic relation to our own. If we thoroughly get the opponent's view (*i.e.*, share his experience), our voice can be as well used as his in stating the case. But if we cannot make it fit the facts of experience, if we can make nothing of it, if we cannot make it work, onr attempts to paraphrase it are pretty sure to be libellous and unfair. In any such case all we can do is to quote directly.

In a philosophical seminary which I recently attended, a speaker described his opponent's doctrine as "reducing every-

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thing to the dead level of brute fact," or, again, as "a rigid, static world of naked fact."

Now, can any one sincerely believe that a writer would himself describe his own experience in such terms? If not, what rationality is there, what fairness in so describing it? So to state it is surely a misrepresentation of the opponent's doctrine, though it may be a correct picture of some one else's irritation and disgust. What we attempt in discussion is to get at the truth, the meaning, in one another's interpretations of our common experience, and to state this meaning. Descriptions of our own states of emotional reaction are relevant only when they are the topic under discussion. Take the sentence just quoted, "Reducing everything to the dead level of brute fact." Omit from this the expletives, the expressions of aversion, and we have left the statement that the writer under criticism "reduces everything to fact." "Fact" is often used synonymously with "reality," and one need not shudder at the charge of "reducing everything to reality."

Without the "swear-words" the statement is quite harmless.

Professor James's recent book of essays, entitled "The Will to Believe," has been to many a great source of help and enlightenment. Yet I think that the book will do its work more slowly and less thoroughly than would be the case had the writer been more sparing of philosophical expletives of the type just exemplified, and kept to the rule of stating an opponent's views in terms which the opponent would accept as fair. All through Professor James's brilliant and stirring book, whether it be in the treatment of the poor scientist of the earlier essays, or of the ossified logician, or the befuddled Hegelian of the later ones,—in each case the eighteenth century method is adopted and the opponent's views stated in terms which are bound to seem to him unfair and prejudiced. His conversion is just so much postponed.

A sneer begets a sneer. To speak of the imaginary rationalist's "snarling logically" is not likely to produce any immediate result except a snarl in return. It does not set the opponent to pondering on the error of his ways.

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Contrast with this method that employed by Mr. Bosanquet in his "Psychology of the Moral Self." He is constantly obliged to differ from other writers, but never without first assimilating their views. His paraphrases and summaries would always be accepted as fair by the writers criticised.

Professor Dewey is as little of a Hedonist as Dr. Martineau. But the latter's description of Hedonistic doctrine makes it seem inconceivable that any sincere person could ever have held it,—while Professor Dewey shows how valuable a contribution the Hedonists have made to ethical theory, though he does not accept their results as the last word on the subject.

VII.

Finally, I wish to call attention to the use of certain question-begging adjectives in a way which I hope to see largely eliminated from philosophical discussion.

In characterizing another's doctrine, we should rarely, if ever, affix such adjectives as "mere," "bare," "brute," "dead," "abstract," to his expressions.

In the first place, take the word "mere." Any one who will take the trouble to notice the usage of this word as applied to an opponent's doctrine, cannot fail, I think, to be convinced that it is doing a wondrous amount of harm. It has, of course, important uses as applied to one's own doctrine, but I think I can show by a few examples that when used in characterizing an opponent's opinion it is very apt to express primarily irritation, and the attempt to ridicule, to threaten, or to embarrass, an opponent. If it does not possess these implications it is pleonastic, like any oath. It is especially scathing when coupled with such words as "brute," "bare," or "empty," "abstract," "dead." So, for example,—

A writer is discoursing on the deep wealth of the emotional life. His opponent straightway aims and discharges his heavy artillery at the absurdity, fickleness, and triviality of "*mere* sentiment." Of course, this is caricature and not description, for "mere sentiment" is not what is meant.

Or, again, a speaker attempts to be *consistent* and *reasonable*,

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and is attacked by an opponent who says that this is all a trick of the "mere logical intellect." But this is misrepresentation, unless you can believe that the speaker will be willing *himself* to describe his remarks as expressing "mere logical intellect," which few if any would agree to do.

Critics of materialism are prone to point out the inability of "mere" atoms to make up the concrete world we know. But no man ever described his *own* materialistic opinions in terms of "mere" atoms. It is a libel. What was meant was not mere atoms, but atoms in their context of wealthy relations.

"No *mere* negation," says Professor James, in his essay on "Some Hegelianisms," "can be an instrument of a positive advance in thought." Of course Hegel would be the first to insist upon this. Nothing is more profitless than *mere* negation, unless it be *mere* assertion, and it is unfair to represent Hegel as an upholder of *mere* negation.

I have the same objection to make against such terms as "bare," "arbitrary," and "abstract," when applied in criticism of another's doctrine. Such terms seem to be making the point at issue very clear by isolating it and clearing away the *débris* about it. But, in fact, they usually have the effect of belittling a writer's meaning by misrepresenting it. Suppose you were a real estate agent and knew a rival agent to whom had been given several houses to let. Now, if before seeing any of those houses you were to describe them in conversation as "horrid, disagreeable, little houses," you would be generally thought to have done a very mean thing. Yet, supposing a certain temperament, your offence might be no greater than is committed every day by writers or speakers on philosophic questions when they speak of another's doctrine as "mere, crass materialism," or bare, abstract idealism or "pure, arbitrary freedom."

The word "abstract" is one of which I have myself been especially fond, but always, I find, in characterization of other people's ideas, never of my own. I have hurled it like an anathema at various doctrines which I could not understand. Well, I can only say that I heartily repent and am endeavoring to do so no more. I used to throw about terms

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like "mere," "bare," "arbitrary," and "wilful" in the same way. But the habit of using the word "abstract" I have found an especially tenacious one, as difficult to get over as a drug habit.

Yet what, after all, are we saying of a man's statement in criticising it as "abstract"? We are saying that it is imperfect, that it does not cover the whole ground, and needs to be supplemented. But this seems to imply that a statement could be made that would not need to be supplemented, but which would cover the whole ground, and express the whole wealth of experience, which is obviously impossible. Every statement is abstract, or it would not be a statement, but a conscious universe. There is no possibility, so far as I can see, of making a statement which is not more or less one-sided. All that we can do is to show by our statement that we know there is another side,—that the story we are now telling is vitally interrelated with myriads of "*other stories*," as Kipling recognized in his favorite turn of phrase. Certainly there is a great difference between a conscious and an unconscious abstraction. It is one thing to isolate for purposes of study the physical processes and materials concerned in the making of music. Here is a conscious justifiable abstraction which one who did it might himself characterize as such. It is quite another thing to describe a string quartette as nothing but "a scraping of horses' hairs on cats' bowels." This is the attitude of special pleading,—the advocate's attitude; what philosophy calls for is the judicial attitude.

Instead of calling a doctrine abstract, why should we not begin at once by pointing out what should be added to make it truer? To call a man's idea "abstract" is a promise to tell later what they lack; similarly to call one's own stripe of idealism "a true idealism" is a promise to exhibit its convincing force later on. It is a dangerous procrastination and inertia in each case.

I have tried thus to suggest some details of the application of the method which I am describing. To eliminate such words as "mere," "bare," "abstract," and "arbitrary" from our description of others' views would, I am sure, promote

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that co-operative spirit which makes discussion fruitful. Our current philosophical discussions seem to me to have too much of the competitive about them; they remind us too much of competitive debates. Such dissent as is present in really co-operative study is the kind of dissent that completes the view dissented from as contrasted with the dissent which amounts to a flat contradiction.

VIII.

It may be felt that if we give up vigorous and radical expressions of disagreement, as I have advocated, we are left with what Emerson called a "mush of concession," where every one agrees at once with whatever is said, like a shy girl at her first ball. Or one might anticipate the formation of a mutual admiration society or a group of submissive disciples around a leader. But this is as far as possible from being my meaning. The difficulty of really taking a new view into our lives makes easy acceptance as impossible as easy refutation. In either case no progress in thought is made and the primary object of discussion is missed. You end no wiser than you began. If you demolish your opponent, or agree with him from the first, nothing has been gained.

So far from desiring to eliminate differences of opinion, I desire to have them prized even more highly. They are full of new truth for us if we treat them not as ultimate ("agreeing to differ"), but as the beginning of a new insight for both sides. Dissent that asserts the incomprehensibility or total falsity of an opinion is *sterile*. But dissent that is only the prelude to a series of questions, tentative interpretations, and comparisons of experience is the most fruitful element in discussion.

Discussion can be very lively and very instructive and yet consist wholly of descriptions, tentative interpretations, and questions. If a man says that telepathy is a fact, or that we are all Hedonists or all socialists, two courses are open to us. We can agree at once, which is profitless, or we can contradict and maintain the exact opposite, which is usually as fruitless as tame agreement, though more gladitorial and so more

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entertaining. On the other hand, we may begin with questions such as "What do you *mean* by telepathy?" and go on to tentative interpretations or extensions of the view in question; then, if all attempts to get into organic relations with it fail, we can only confess that it baffles us, that it does not reach us, that we cannot get hold of it.

The upshot of my argument is this: There are two ways of approaching an opinion which differs from yours.

1. You can swear at it, smother it with expletives like "mere," "abstract," "dead," "brute," etc., or you can put down your head and butt it aside, get it out of your field of vision, so as to leave your own cherished opinion monarch of all it surveys; or,

2. You can attempt to get into relations with it, to modify and enlarge your present ideas so as to include it, the test of understanding it being your strong tendency to accept it.

The penalty of refusing to enlarge our ideas so as to include what seems at first bound to upset us, the penalty of not taking the inclusive attitude, is that we are *excluded*,—we are "*out of it.*"

If we see no valuable truth in Hegel or in Herbart, we are just so far "out of it,"—as much as the unmusical man at a symphony. It is nothing for us. Any action based upon the attitude of total dissent is the same as an action based on total ignorance of the facts in question.

If a philosopher takes this position, he is falling back from the essentially modern co-operative method of thinking and working employed in other most highly civilized regions of life. History, literary criticism, physical science, government by discussion (instead of by arms), co-operation in all forms, the organic conception of experience of any kind,—all these have got beyond the stage of "either-or." Philosophy is slowly working in the same direction. Her advance will be the swifter the more she insists on pointing to specific yet common experience as the warrant and the essence of every statement.

RICHARD C. CABOT.

BOSTON, MASS.

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LUXURY AND EXTRAVAGANCE.

ECONOMISTS are probably over-confident in their opinion that the truth once demonstrated makes way by its own weight. Each succeeding generation of men seems to fall into the same fallacies as its predecessors, and the work of an economist in informing public opinion is an unceasing task. The advances which the science is making do not appear to make any impression on the public mind, which, indeed, is more apt to regard the controversies among specialists as an additional reason for reasserting the common sense fallacies which have been so often disproved. The tendency of modern economics towards specialization renders the duty more imperative on each economist, at times, to insist on those views on which substantial agreement has been reached, and to give his attention periodically to a restatement of the arguments against the fallacious views so often promulgated. There is no hesitation whatever among economists, of whatever shade and variety of opinion or school, in declaring that no man benefits a community by the services he can demand from it, or otherwise than by rendering services of some sort to it. There may be a legitimate difference of opinion regarding the kind of services which are really valuable to a community. Some may hold that the existence of a leisured class, living out of the proceeds of the labor of others, is an indispensable condition of the cultivation of art and literature; while others may hold, with William Morris, that true art cannot be based on distributive injustice. But all are agreed that it is work, whether physical work, or mental work, or moral work, which makes wealth, and that the mere spending of wealth is not a service to a community, such that a man may plume himself upon it and regard himself as a benefactor of the species.

Yet, in spite of this agreement, whenever there has been a more than usually vulgar and ostentatious display of wealth, whenever large masses of wealth have been destroyed by "the

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hand of God or the king's enemies," whenever there is a threat of war, the old fallacy is brought out from the lumber-room of ideas and decked in the phraseology of the hour to justify some senseless expenditure or to bolster up some bad cause. The first comment the writer heard on the news of a disastrous fire, which swept the town of Windsor (Nova Scotia) from the surface of the earth and rendered thousands homeless and dependent on charity through the long rigors of a Canadian winter, was that it would be good for trade. And some newspapers and makers of public opinion were prompt to urge on the war with Spain, because it would be good for business. The fallacy in these statements has been exposed a hundred times, sometimes wittily, sometimes weightily, but always apparently in vain. Bastiat covered its advocates with ridicule, and Professor Sidgwick has pursued them to their last retreat; but it makes its appearance with the same effrontery. It may be an obvious fact to the economist that you cannot eat your cake and at the same time give it away, or give employment, that is, cake, or, at least, loaf bread, to the baker; but what is obvious to Professor Sidgwick is apparently to the ordinary mind a truth which cannot be grasped. Bastiat probably hit upon the reason of the vitality of the fallacy when he spoke of the half of the truth that is seen, while the half that is not seen is entirely neglected. It is the duty of every economist, and, indeed, of every educated man, to insist on the half that is not seen, and to emphasize the fact that it is work, not waste, which makes national wealth. An economist owes a duty to the public as well as to his science, and ought, therefore, periodically to direct his attention to the practical fallacies, as well as the practical problems, which are engrossing the public mind.

The strength of the fallacy is in part due to the fact that when economists have given their attention to the subject, their interest has been hitherto mainly in the fruitless search after a flawless definition; and, although much has been written on the history of luxury, the public have been left without that authoritative declaration that is required. The half of the truth which the public did not see has been rightly

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emphasized; but the half which they did see, and naturally regarded as the more important, has not received sufficient recognition from the economist.

It is an easy matter to show that on economic grounds there is no justification for private or public luxury or extravagance. They see only half who ask such questions as these: Does not luxury give work? Does not war stimulate industry? Is not the destruction of wealth good for trade? But it is easier to refute the arguments than to convince those who use them. They point to the fact that there has been a boom in the building trades in Nova Scotia, as a result of the Windsor fire, and ask if the prosperity of one trade is not ultimately communicated to all others. We are members one of another, they say, and the advantage of one is in a certain sense, in a remote sense it may be, the advantage of all. They point to the fact that the property destroyed was, in part at least, insured; and, forgetting that Nova Scotia is not the world, they assume that had it been fully insured the burning of Windsor would have been a national benefit. The half of the truth which they do see need not be ignored. If the wealth produced be not consumed, work must cease and men will be thrown out of employment, and in some cases the physical destruction of wealth, or rather of that which stood in the way of wealth, has been an economic benefit to the community. There is a sense in which the burning of Chicago was a national benefit. The economic crash in Newfoundland, which brought the "oldest colony" to the brink of ruin, has proved its economic salvation. There had grown up there an evil system of doing business, and, though every one deplored it, no one was prepared to take the heroic step of doing away with it. It required an economic cataclysm to secure the reform which was needed. Wealth was destroyed and businesses which it had taken centuries to build up were overthrown. There was a real loss to the community; but the final result has been a great gain. I have heard it said that it was a pity the St. John fire did not carry its work a little farther; that there are districts of mean streets and unsanitary houses which are

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still a blot on and a danger to the town. But it must be remembered that the benefit in these instances consists in the destruction of inconveniences which are just useful enough to stand in the way of improvement, or which, owing to social conditions, may yield wealth and income to individuals or be supported by vested interests strong enough to baffle reform. Chicago, before the fire, was a city of mean streets; it rose from its ashes a city adapted for commerce and worthy of its destinies. Business was hampered in Newfoundland by the old financial system; but when the ground was cleared they imported the Canadian banking system and started on a new basis and on a new career of prosperity. The destruction of wealth in these cases was analogous to the pulling down of some poor building or shanty which occupies an expensive lot in the middle of a city.

But such cases are exceptional. In general, the destruction of wealth is a social as well as an individual loss. The wealth that is used up in riotous living is diverted from better uses. Extravagance is not necessarily luxury. The mere transfer of wealth from one hand to another does not involve destruction. Consumption means using up. When a nation spends two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for a great picture the wealth is not destroyed: it is simply transferred. When the Jubilee Plunger ran through two million five hundred thousand dollars in twelve calendar months, the wealth of the world was diminished only by the amount of it he and those who sponged on him put down their throats and otherwise wantonly destroyed. In so far as it was simply transferred to others to whom he paid extravagant prices, it was not destroyed. To give high prices for articles which are rare is not necessarily luxury, for the price and the rare edition or the old master both remain. It is true that extravagance may mean the transfer of wealth to those who will not use it well; but it does not usually mean this. It generally involves a transfer to the hands of those who will use it more wisely.

But, though luxury may not make wealth and may merely divert industry to reproduce wealth which has been unavoidably used up, does it not make money circulate? This plea

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is the last infirmity of purblind minds. It does make money circulate, but so does every other kind of trade and *non-trade* in existence. Money always circulates unless it is hid in a napkin. The most luxury can do is to make it circulate in unfruitful ways. The pool-room and the lottery make money circulate, and if mankind played dice till the last man starved, money would still circulate. The important thing is that in circulating, in passing from hand to hand, it should fructify the channels of industry and increase the utilities and not the futilities of life. The plea that luxury makes money circulate does not absolve any one from his duty to spend on rational wants only, a duty which lies on all of us, whether our means be great or small. Luxury consists in using up the results of our labors in unworthy and irrational ways, and luxury is, therefore, unfortunately as much within the reach of the poor as of the rich.

Moreover, while there is little or no economic justification for either luxury or extravagance, there is a great social and political danger in it. The distribution of wealth in the world is not so just that the rich can afford to flaunt social inequalities in the face of the poor. There is grave enough discontent with the present system without aggravating it by emphasizing class distinctions. The discontent is not removed by the patronizing assurance that luxury is good for trade. Even if this were true, there is no reason why the rich should have the monopoly of doing good to trade. The only justification for the possession of great wealth is its wise and rational use; and extravagance is not a rational use. Luxury is but the worst and most aggravated and aggravating form of extravagance where wealth is not transferred, but used up in the form of costly dishes and expensive wines, in rare exotics and splendid fireworks. Those forms of extravagance where actual wealth, the product of many days and many lives of hard, unremitting labor, is consumed in the revels of a single hour, constitute luxury. And in the present temper of the body politic it is well that luxury and extravagance and all that emphasizes the distinction between the *haves* and *have-nots* should at least keep itself as modestly as may be in the back-

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ground. To attempt to justify it is madness. Further, the existence of luxury and a luxurious class is the cause of much of the social inequality that exists. In a notable book on the poverty of West London, Mr. Sherwell has shown how the existence of luxury has degraded the poor of Western London to a depth of degradation unknown in the East, where there are no districts of mansions and magazines of luxury to relieve the monotony. He lays great stress on the evil influences which the luxury and vice of the leisured classes have on the working portion of the community.

"It cannot be doubted that the vicious excesses and selfish extravagances of the richer districts of West London have left an unmistakable mark in the degradation of the poorer districts. It is in this direction that we have to turn for the true explanation of many of the darkest and most painful problems of life in West London."

"The poor of West London are made to feel that they are aliens from life on the very borders of their own homesteads."

Practically, the only ground on which any justification, and that a limited one, for luxurious expenditure may be based, is that it may be preferable to mere waste of wealth. All wealth is produced to be consumed, and if it give not the slightest satisfaction after it has been produced it has failed of the object of its being. The physical destruction of wealth is the only way in which this can happen, when it passes away without having given even the most momentary and most trivial gratification to any one whatsoever; and luxurious expenditure is better than that. There are, it is true, conditions when for moral reasons absolute physical destruction is preferable. Wealth may have been produced to satisfy desires which ought to be suppressed, and from the suppression of which society would be a gainer; but, apart from such considerations, even the most trifling use to which the stored up energy of years may be put is better than the absolute waste of the results of such efforts. If the alternative were luxury or physical destruction, there would be little question which is preferable; but, fortunately, we are not tied down to the alternative.

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Luxury, again, may be preferable to indiscriminate charity. It at least makes men give work in exchange for the wealth they receive; and, although it may result in the moral deterioration of some of the workers, its effects are not so disastrous to the moral character as the effects of indiscriminate charity-giving. On the other hand, it may blind the rich to their duty and to their responsibility. It may be used, as it has often been used, as a sophistic reason for the existence of an unjustifiable distribution of wealth. Under the influence of current economic fallacies, it may lead the rich to imagine that they are doing all their duty by God's poor and make them forget that great wealth is but a stewardship for which account must be rendered.

From another point of view luxury might be partially justified. Society may be saving too much, devoting too much to the production of wealth and using too little of the annually accruing product, with the result that the productive energies of society may be confined within too narrow a circle of consumption, leaving no outlet for new energy and causing the grave social phenomenon known as over-production. There may be an over-production of the necessaries of life, for which there is, after all, but a limited demand; and luxury may provide an irregular outlet from an economic *impasse*. But this is, at best, a desperate remedy for a desperate state of affairs. Irregularity of employment is one of the great industrial evils; and it is an invariable concomitant of a state of affairs where the means of production have run ahead of the consuming power. Luxury may, in part, prevent this irregularity by preventing some capital from being accumulated, and opening up an irregular channel for what already exists. But it probably creates as much irregularity as it prevents. Industries which produce articles of luxury are peculiarly subject to irregularity because peculiarly subject to human caprice. Luxurious expenditure, by its very nature, involves irregularity, for luxury does not seem to be luxury unless it can frequently, and at a moment's notice, change its form.

That is the only real justification, and it does not go very far to offset the evils luxury brings in its train. Luxury is

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not the only remedy for over-production; and, although there is a great need for a better adjustment of productive and consuming power, it does not follow that the only method of remedying a wrong state of affairs is to encourage irrational and unwise expenditure. Wider opportunities may be opened for human energies by emphasizing Herbert Spencer's teaching, that the future is not necessarily, or always, preferable to the present; that saving is not always justifiable in itself, but only in so far as a wiser use of what is saved is made in the future than can be made in the present.

The definitions of luxury have been so various that the perplexity of the public is almost excusable. The notion seems clear, and yet it is elusive, for no definition seems to be generally accepted, and many of them seem to convey a false view of life. We must steer a clear course between the position of those who regard everything as a luxury which does not minister to the bare necessities of life, and that of those who, regarding luxury as essentially variable, seem to regard the luxurious rich as the protectors of civilization and the promoters of social progress. The first view is that most generally accepted, and is supported on what seem to be thought to be moral grounds, but really are immoral and anti-social grounds. Luxury is unproductive consumption. Such is the definition which seems first to occur to those who turn their attention to the subject; and it is as fallacious as obvious answers usually are. The assumption in such a definition is that man lives to work, and that all expenditure not intended to maintain the elements of physical life or to promote efficiency is in its nature superfluous. But consumption is an end in itself. It is the aim and the object of all effort, of all saving, and of all production. Man works to live, and to live well; and the fact that consumption may be the starting-point of a new economic cycle, while no doubt of very great social importance, does not alter the other fact that the end of all economic effort is enjoyment. Moreover, the definition in question simply raises the old problem, What is production and what is produced? If we limit the term to the production of material wealth, half of the active population are non-

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productive consumers; and it would be flying in the face of facts to declare that all these were guilty of luxury. Such an interpretation unduly restricts the rightful activity of man, and condemns by implication the activity of the artist and the teacher of literature, the minister of the gospel, and all those who render services to the community which are not of the kind which tend to promote or preserve the productive capacity of the community,—*e.g.*, the services of the medical man and the domestic servant. The progress of civilization means the devotion of an increasing proportion of the energy of society to non-material ends; and while we regard such ends as valuable, we cannot accept the definition of luxury as unproductive consumption. Moreover, we can with some accuracy determine the amount of wealth necessary to maintain the laborer in his efficiency; but by what standard are we to determine the necessaries of life for a great artist or musician, or even the necessaries for a humble student? To an outsider much of the expenditure of these classes must appear superfluous, and, judged by individual results, may really be wasted; while yet, in the long run, such expenditure may result in the creation of the suitable *milieu* for a great poet or a great scholar. Unless we are prepared to go the length of reducing life to its barest physical elements, we are not at liberty to denounce such expenditures as unproductive and luxurious. It is, of course, possible that a society may overspend its income in hiring services; and some communities would benefit, for instance, by indulging in less politics and more business. The edifice may be raised on too narrow a foundation of material wealth, and thus be insecure; but such cases are exceptional, and there is more danger that a society will spend too little than that it will spend too much on non-material ends.

Another explanation of luxury comes too readily to our fallen nature. Luxury from this point of view consists in the indulgences of others. Our own indulgences, we can readily show, are necessary for our happiness and for our effectiveness; but we are not so ready to allow the same privileges to others. Taxation has been justified on this narrow ground.

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Every one is agreed that luxuries ought to be taxed, but it is not clear who is to determine what are luxuries and what are not. What is a luxury? Tobacco, urges the ex-Finance Minister of Canada, who does not smoke, ignoring the fact, which his own speeches demonstrate by tables of figures, that the consumption of tobacco is yearly increasing, and apparently ignorant of the fact that to some tobacco is a condition of work, that lumbermen have been known to quit the woods because the supply of tobacco ran short, and that in literary work, for instance, there is a practical consensus of opinion that tobacco is a necessity of production. Luxury cannot be defined with reference to any supposed scale of necessaries, comforts, and luxuries. On the basis of the old proverb "early to bed and early to rise," it might as reasonably be made out that coal oil is a luxury; and though from a revenue point of view the taxation, either of tobacco or kerosene, may be justified, it is not because they are luxuries. In short, what to some may be, or appear to be, a luxury, may be an absolutely necessary expenditure to others. I have heard a country minister blamed because he bought books, while his church starved him on six hundred dollars a year; and men who spend a small fortune annually on cigars or fast horses seem to have no hesitation in condemning others who spend a tithe of the sum on books or on pictures. It is doubtful whether a New Brunswick House of Assembly would be found willing now, in spite of the increased liberality of its estimates, to authorize the expenditure of five hundred dollars for a princely bound hand copy of "Audubon's Birds," which is now, to the literary world, one of the glories of the province. It would be denounced as unqualified luxury and extravagance, and might lead to the defeat of the government that proposed it. A new steel bridge is a necessity, a university or an expensive book is a luxury!

The truth is that no absolute scale of necessaries, comforts, and luxuries can be drawn up. A "Kelmscott" edition may or may not be a luxury, not necessarily according to a man's means, but according to the use to which it is put. If it serves to edify and improve the taste even of one individual,

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the ten or fifteen dollars so expended may have been usefully spent; if it serves but to gratify a passing whim or a permanent vanity it may be a luxury, whether it cost ten cents or ten dollars. Each man must be left to a certain extent free to decide the form of his own expenditure. We have not all the same tastes and the same inclinations; and it is the height of arrogance to condemn the expenditure of another simply because our own inclinations lead us in some other direction. In the necessity of freedom of consumption Schaeffle finds his weightiest argument against Socialism, forgetting, perhaps, that under the present distribution of wealth for the great majority of mankind there is no real freedom of consumption. It is going too far, indeed, to assert that we shall pass no judgment upon the expenditure of others; but our criticism must be reserved for the end, not for the means. The necessity of living up to a conventional standard may or may not be admitted; but if we do admit it we are not free to criticise the expenditure requisite for that standard; and in many cases conformity to an admittedly false standard may be easier than dissent. There are undoubtedly cases when what seems luxurious expenditure is a social (or anti-social) necessity. One must live according to his means, and the conventional standards of decency may demand such a style of living as for others, with the same means, may be both unnecessary and extravagant. Adam Smith has included among the necessaries of life whatever public opinion considers it indecent to be without; and by a debased public opinion many are forced to live beyond their means. A French writer finds in this necessity the explanation of much of modern luxury, especially the luxury of female dress, in which, in his opinion, women must indulge to support even the business credit of their husbands and their fathers. This condition of public opinion we may deplore, but while we admit the standard of life as at least justifiable, we ought to refrain from criticising the means necessarily adopted for living up to the standard. Public opinion may be right or may be wrong, and there is always the ethical question of conformity to be decided; but while the standard is accepted,

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even ostentation may, under the artificial and anti-social conditions of modern life, be a social necessity. Diamonds may be a luxury to the great majority of people; in some classes they are undoubtedly necessaries. We may make our quarrel with a scheme of distribution which sanctions such distinctions of class, and demand in the name of equality that no man shall have the chance of using what is obviously out of the reach of the great majority of his fellow-men; but that is another and a more serious matter. While we permit the existence of such class distinctions we must admit the consequences,—that is, necessaries of life may vary greatly according to the class in which an individual lives. So long as we deal with conditions as they are we must recognize the common sense of a recent decision (1897) of the Supreme Court of Iowa, in which it was held that:

"The make of a shirt or the taste of the wearer may be such as to require some kind of button or stud. If the inexpensive pearl were used . . . it might be as much out of place on the shirt front of a person of fashion or fortune as a diamond in that of one who earns his bread by the sweat of his face."

The court wisely declined the task of deciding whether persons of fashion or fortune should exist. The question raised was not the justifiability of the present distribution of wealth which condemns many to earn their bread by the sweat of their faces, and permits some few to lead a butterfly existence in which diamond shirt studs are a social necessity. The gist of the decision was that, as things are, ornament and ostentation are as much a necessity for the rich as bread and warm clothing are for the poor.

The view of a large number of writers, of whom M. Leroy Beaulieu may be taken as the example, that luxury is essentially variable, and may be considered simply as "that superfluity of enjoyment which exceeds what the generality of the inhabitants of a country at a given time consider essential not only for the necessities of existence but also for decency and comfort in life," renders it difficult to account for the general condemnation of luxury except upon grounds of envy, and

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the reprobation is far too sincere to be inspired merely by such a low motive. The condemnation—and condemned luxury certainly is, or at any rate apologized for, which is the same thing—is based rather on moral than on economic gounds; but it can hardly be accounted for on this theory. This view really makes the attempt to remove an obvious inconsistency in economics which condemns luxury and at the same time regards the creation of new wants as the means of social progress. It shows how every decade some luxury ceases to be such in consequence of becoming more common and cheaper. The articles which satisfy these new created events are undoubtedly luxuries. Fashions and customs may change, but the fact that, generations hence, many articles of luxury will have become familiar to every consumer does not alter the fact that they are luxuries now; and surely that which is worthy of condemnation when practised by the few is still more blamable when practised by all, and surely also the basis of all that is highest in our civilization cannot be practices which in their origin were worthy of condemnation. A luxury is not an article consumed by the few, or a commodity which satisfies a want experienced now only by a few; and a luxury does not cease to be a luxury simply because the demand for it has become universal. The question of luxury is ultimately the ethical question of the worth of the want satisfied, and generally the mere fact of a want becoming universal is an evidence that it has some worth. It may be condemned in its origin, but it is wrongly condemned. If it is rightly condemned in its origin it ought to be condemned even when all mankind indulge in it. We have here a contradiction to be reconciled, that luxury is condemned, and yet that some of those things the use of which is condemned will become necessaries, or at least decencies of life, and will no longer be condemned. The contradiction is one of the most obvious facts in social history, and proves little more than that our social judgments are not infallible and that "causes that are judged this day may be rejudged."

The explanation of this contradiction may be reached

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through a clear understanding of two episodes in sacred history, one from the Old Testament, the other from the gospels:

"And David was then in an hold, and the garrison of the Philistines was then in Bethlehem.

"And David longed and said, Oh, that one would give me drink of the water of the well of Bethlehem, which is by the gate.

"And the three mighty men broke through the host of the Philistines, and drew water out of the well of Bethlehem, which was by the gate, and took it and brought it to David: nevertheless he would not drink thereof, but poured it out unto the Lord.

"And he said, Be it far from me, O Lord, that I should do this: is not this the blood of the men that went in jeopardy of their lives? therefore he would not drink it." *

The passage from the gospels also relates to an event which occurred in Bethlehem:

"Then took Mary a pound of ointment of spikenard, very costly, and anointed the feet of Jesus, and wiped his feet with her hair: and the house was filled with the odor of the ointment.

"Then saith one of his disciples, Judas Iscariot, Simon's son, which should betray him,

"Why was not this ointment sold for three hundred pence, and given to the poor?

. . . . . .

"Then said Jesus, Let her alone: against the day of my burying hath she done this.

"For the poor ye have always with you; but me ye have not always." †

And as the parallel passage in St. Matthew's gospel adds:

"Verily I say unto you, Wheresoever this gospel shall be preached in the whole world, there also shall this, that this woman hath done, be told for a memorial of her." ‡

In these two episodes, which teach apparently contradictory lessons, we have but the one idea, that the worth of the object for which the sacrifice was made determines whether it ought to have been made or not. The mere amount of the sacrifice

* 2 Samuel, c. xxiii. 14–17.

† St. John's Gospel, c. xii. 3–8.

‡ St. Matt., c. xxvi. 13.

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is not considered except in relation to the importance of the end. David would not have hesitated to accept the sacrifice made by his three mighty men had its end and object been the freeing of Israel from the Philistines; but because the end was individual and trivial, the satisfaction of a merely physical desire and of a passing whim, he felt that he was not justified in using what had been so dearly purchased; while our Lord was not approving of extravagance, but asserting his divine mission. The end in the latter case justified the means. The enforcing of that lesson, in his opinion and in the opinion of eighteen Christian centuries, was of more importance than the temporary alleviation of the sufferings of the poor; for man shall not live by bread alone.

All wealth is produced to satisfy human desire, but all wealth also requires effort for its production. The question of luxury is one of proportion between the importance of the desire satisfied and the effort necessary to satisfy it. Luxury consists in using up or consuming a disproportionate amount of human effort in the satisfaction of a trivial desire. Luxury, therefore, does not necessarily imply expense, although it usually exists only in the case of articles which have cost much to produce. A worthy end will justify even a very large expenditure, and an unworthy end perhaps should not be sought even at the smallest expenditure of time and energy. An article, therefore, may be a luxury to one man and a necessary of life to another. Their judgments of the worth and the importance of the desire may differ, and the satisfaction may be obtained at very different individual sacrifices. The poor are largely withheld from luxury by force of circumstances. The desires they can satisfy are but the most elementary. But should they prefer to satisfy some less important or worthy want and to expend in that way some of the effort they have exerted they may be guilty of luxury. There are two points of view of the effort required for a given satisfaction: an individual and a social. The individual may give too much of his time and energy to the satisfaction of unimportant desires, and may waste his substance in riotous living. But that is mainly an individual question, and so far as he has

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a right to do what he likes with his own, he is free to expend his income as he chooses. From the individual point of view, the poor are almost as likely to be guilty of luxury as the rich. An income of five hundred dollars from manual labor may be earned at an infinitely greater expenditure of time and energy than an income of one hundred thousand dollars from ground rents or railroad bonds, and from the individual point of view a rich man may spend ten thousand dollars a year in physical indulgence without being open to the charge of luxury, while a poor man who spends fifty or a hundred dollars may lay himself open to the charge. But the individual is not the only, nor the most important, point of view. We need not raise the question of the justice of the present distribution of wealth to recognize that consumption must be taken from a social standpoint as well. Production involves social sacrifice, and the expenditure of twenty thousand dollars in personal indulgence may not be justified, because it involves the using up of much social effort for an insignificant result. Here we come upon the real meaning of the condemnation of luxury. Society, in self-defence, condemns the waste of its efforts. It may have committed a large portion of this world's goods to the stewardship of a few individuals, but none the less it demands an account of that stewardship and marks its disapprobation by means of moral censure of luxury and extravagance, of those who have not wisely used that which was committed to their keeping. It insists, in an imperfect way, it is true, that the satisfaction obtained shall be in some sort equivalent to the sacrifice made by society in producing. Its right so to insist may not be admitted, but in the socialized section of the community the right is at least partially admitted. David would not drink of the water, saying, "Is not this the blood of the men that went in jeopardy of their lives?" yet he poured it out in an act of worship. The water which had been obtained at such a sacrifice was consumed; but it is to the irreligious mind alone that it seems that the sacrifices of the three captains of the host were in vain, or, in other words, that the water was wasted. Yet the end to which it was devoted was higher and nobler than the

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end for which it was so perilously procured. To what extent the social conscience is developed in modern society as it was in the warrior king of Israel is an interesting question for the sociologist. The rich may still need the lesson which Hood taught,

> "It is not linen you're wearing out,
> But human creatures' lives."

But the poor have long been conscious that as the fishwife said to Monkbarns in "The Antiquary," "It's no fish ye're buying; it's men's lives;" and they have judged hardly those who for their selfish gratification hazarded the lives of their fellow-men. For a worthy end they are willing that such a sacrifice should be made; but they condemn as luxurious expenditure on any end which does not commend itself to them.

The end of all wealth is to be consumed, and in being consumed to satisfy some human desire. To consume means to use up and in a sense destroy. The food we eat may give us strength for future work and enable us to produce further supplies of food; but in the using it is consumed and destroyed. And although all articles are not consumed in a single use, as food is at an eating, yet sooner or later the power of satisfying a human desire passes and the article is consumed. There are, of course, great differences in consumption goods. Some are exhausted in a single use, like fireworks, for instance; and some, like clothes, may yield their harvest of use during many months; while a great picture may elevate and refine generations of men during hundreds of years and remain almost as fit to render such services for hundreds of years to come. In some cases the use must be individual and exclusive: in others to share with other men in no way lessens the individual's enjoyment. Some are social, some are individual and exclusive, and some anti-social and immoral. We might classify consumption goods as present and future, social and individual; and although a cross division is for practical purposes involved, the classification will serve. But the present use is not necessarily unsocial, nor is the future necessarily social. The water

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which David poured out to the Lord was as immediately consumed as if he had drunk it; and social goods may be diverted to exclusive uses, as when an individual encloses some fine view or shuts up a great picture in some private cabinet. Before an expenditure is fully justified we must answer two questions to ourselves and to society: Is the end aimed at worthy? and is it obtained at the cost of a disproportionate amount of sacrifice? Men will differ in their estimates of the worth of the end, and consequently in their judgment of the amount of sacrifice which may be made to obtain it. A man may consume thirty, fifty, or a hundred dollars a year in smoking, and many hasten to condemn the consumption as waste; yet a smoker may be convinced that in no other way could he obtain so much satisfaction at so low a cost. Even then there may be a question whether the satisfaction thus obtained is, from a social point of view, worth the sacrifice. Our judgment of any given expenditure really depends in the long run upon our judgment of the end it serves. Neither the judgments of the individual nor the judgments of society are to be accepted as final. There is need often for the community, as well as for the individual, to revise its estimate of the worth of certain ends. We all accept too readily the received standards and order our lives according to conventional notions. All wealth may consist of utilities, but some utilities may be futilities; and the last word has not been said when we claim that an object satisfies some desire. We need still to inquire whether the desire is one which under present circumstances, or under any circumstances, should be satisfied. Our mode and manner of life are often highly artificial; and a plea for a simpler life might easily be made on the ground that we derive no real pleasure from the habits we are slaves to and the customs we adhere to. Many of us are wearily doing simply what others expect of us, and they do what they think we expect of them; and no one is satisfied with the result. The judgment of the individual must be formed with a certain deference to the judgment of the community, although in many cases it would be well that we should confine our judgments to our own actions.

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Otherwise the liberty of the individual may be unduly restricted and the progress of society in civilization hindered. Social history shows how the luxury of one generation has become the necessity of the next, simply because individuals were bold enough to defy the judgments passed on their luxurious expenditure. These pioneers decided, and as the event showed rightly, that the article in question satisfied some permanent and deep-rooted desire. They may have been animated by no lofty motive of promoting civilization; but, as Adam Smith said, "men are often led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of their intention." The desire which the article satisfied with what appeared to be a disproportionate sacrifice turned out to be a wide-spread desire, and the machinery of production was adapted accordingly. On the other hand, experience has shown and common sense teaches that certain luxuries satisfy no wide-spread desire that ought to be satisfied. The Roman epicure who entertained his friends with a dish of the tongues of birds which had been taught to speak was criminally luxurious because no gratification of vanity could justify such an expenditure and consumption of human energy. The social conscience must condemn such expenditures at all times, and the mere fact that they have become more common does not detract from their culpability. It is, perhaps, the exception for a luxury to become a necessity. In so far as the consumption panders only to vanity and a desire for ostentation it cannot become a necessary of life, although vanity may remain one of the strongest human motives. Yet the first tea-drinkers and the first tobacco-smokers have perhaps proved themselves benefactors of their species because they braved the ignorant condemnation of their own generation.

It is the end which justifies. A merely individual satisfaction stands on a lower plane than a satisfaction which is not exclusive. A temporary and passing satisfaction is not so worthy, and would, therefore, not justify so large an expenditure as a more permanent would. It is better probably to spend on dress than on food, at least on food beyond the limit of the amount necessary to maintain efficiency; it is better to

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spend on books than on wine, on pictures than on revelling, on travel and education than on picnicing, on the external adornment of house and grounds than on fine furniture. John Ruskin tried to teach the citizens of Edinburgh this lesson in 1853. Perhaps they and others still need the same lesson.

"Your separate possessions of pictures and prints are to you as if you sang pieces of music with your single voices in your own houses. But your architecture would be as if you sang together in one mighty choir. In the separate picture it is rare that there exists any very high source of sublime emotion. But the great concerted music of the streets of the city, when turret rises over turret and casement frowns beyond casement and tower succeeds to tower along the farthest ridges of the inhabited hills; this is a sublimity of which you can form at present no conception, and capable, I believe, of exciting almost the deepest emotion that art can ever strike from the bosoms of men." *

But his teaching must not be carried too far. It is the end that justifies, and the noblest end is not the only end. There may be occasions when expenditure on champagne may be justified. Yet we rightly condemn as luxurious the man who drinks champagne or Bénédictine at every meal; for in this case the end does not justify the means, which involve the destruction of the labor of many days and many years for the gratification of an unimportant moment.

JOHN DAVIDSON.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK, CANADA.

* Ruskin, Lectures on Architecture and Painting, 2d ed., p. 92.

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SEX IN CRIME.

THOSE who view superficially the psychical and physical differences existing between man and woman, and those who tenaciously hold the theory of separate creation, are the most ardent supporters of a belief, which has become quite general, that woman was created from a finer clay, and is inherently more moral, more virtuous, more æsthetic than man. Accordingly she is held to be less criminal; and, apparently, statistics sustain this view. Is woman's apparently lesser degree of criminality attributable to this congenital moral superiority, or is it due to sexual and social considerations and conditions over which she has had no control, such as her having been selected as the anabolic organism, having had the burden of parturition placed upon her, and having been the favored sex in the progress of civilization? Have not these facts combined to render her life one of restricted activity and slavery rather than one of freedom of activity and independence? and are not the latter necessary elements for an extended and varied commission of crime? One prominent class of anthropologists considers woman as midway between child and man in her development.

To demonstrate the hypothesis that woman's moral superiority, if she possess it, is not due to congenital causes, involves the necessity of investigating her evolution from both biologic and sociologic stand-points. Preliminary to this inquiry, however, cognizance should be taken of the inaccuracy in ascertaining the criminal class. A criminal becomes such only by legal process,—that is, when he has been arraigned in a court of justice and convicted of some violation of the law. In a comparative study of sex in crime, it becomes necessary to use a mathematical basis, and only prison statistics are available for such a basis, and those who sustain the theory of the lesser criminality of women use them unhesitatingly. This use is manifestly partial to woman for many reasons, among which the following may be mentioned: Women are

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less rigorously prosecuted; judgments against them, when indicted, are more difficult to obtain; and their punishments, when convicted, are less severe.* This is due to the sympathy and consideration which men give women, and those connected with the enactment and enforcement of laws are almost exclusively men. This prejudice in favor of women is well illustrated by the recent attempt in the Georgia Legislature to pass a bill providing that no woman shall be executed for the crime of murder except when the jury stipulates for such punishment. The passage of this bill was intended for the benefit of a woman already under sentence of death for murder. The fact of electrocution existing in New York undoubtedly influenced the jury in their verdict in the Fleming murder trial and in others. Prostitution is the most natural form of crime in women,† and indicates a low morality, lower than that of the crimes which men commit as a means of securing a livelihood,—larceny, burglary, etc. Convictions are most disproportionate to the prevalence of this crime, and, when secured, are usually for a short period. Woman is frequently the instigator to crime, man being the committer, but, unless the former can be proved to have been an accessory before or after the fact, she is rarely indicted and convicted, and when she is, her sentence is for so short a time that she is at liberty and instigating others to fresh crimes, while her male companion in crime remains incarcerated, thus year after year increasing prison statistics. If the statistics of the United States are used, of a country where, it may be argued, there is great independence of women, but no corresponding increase in crime, three additional factors must be considered,—namely, that the male population exceeds the female by nearly two millions; that foreigners constitute a large proportion of the criminal class,‡ and that immigrants consist mostly of men and include many who have been malefactors in their native country; that negroes furnish an abnormally large percentage of criminals in proportion to

* This is substantiated by a study of municipal police court records.

† "Criminal Sociology," E. Ferri.

‡ United States Census Report, 1890.

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their population, their crimes being generally those of sexual passion which woman is incapable of committing.* Were the determination of the criminal and non-criminal classes less legal and more sociologic; less based upon the crime and more upon the criminal, and upon the amount and nature of crime rather than upon the number of convictions, which are less than one-third of the actual number of crimes committed, the proportionate rate of the crime in the two sexes would be much more uniform. There are numerous conditions and acts indicating a low morality and a criminal nature, acts which are injurious to the community and state, of which the law takes no cognizance, but which would be indispensable factors in an accurate study of comparative crime in the sexes. This inaccurate determination of the criminal class, combined with the following biologic and sociologic considerations, will to a great extent eliminate the variance in the statistical rate of crime for the two sexes.

Before considering these biologic and sociologic conditions, the general causes of crime are important. There are two current theories,†—the first being that heredity is the great factor, that the tendency is inherent, and that the individual acts independently of his environment; the second, that the environment, social institutions, and the character of the law and government determine the nature and extent of crime and who shall commit it. If the former theory is accepted, the tendency would be for both sexes to inherit equally, and crime would be neither dependent upon nor peculiar to sex. If the latter view is accepted, it will be evident that the environment does not operate equally upon the two sexes, as both are not subjected in a similar manner and to the same degree to sociologic conditions and influences. The Italian school of criminal sociologists ‡ supports the former view and the French school the latter; § but the tendency is to consider

* United States Census Report, 1890.

† Consult reports of the last two meetings of the Criminal Anthropologic Congress held in 1895, and in 1897.

‡ Consult "Criminal Sociology," Ferri; "Female Offender," Lombroso.

§ Consult "Reports of School of Anthropology," Paris.

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crime as the product of both inherent and sociologic causes, both sexes equally inheriting the *tendency*, but the *expression*, *form*, and *extent* being much modified by reason of its remaining latent in woman, while in man it is developed by his more varied nature and more complex external relations.

The greater amount of criminality in man is remotely due to his more katabolic nature.* Previous to the differentiation of life into the higher organisms, many of the lower species were bisexual, parturition not being confined to either sex. Higher in the vertebrate series by a process of variation in which the male organism participated to a greater extent, and, through the necessity for economy of labor, as the environment became more complicated, the sexes became more specialized. The male was carried farther away from the anabolic existence, to which the female is more closely allied, and in him was developed a stronger physique, greater passion, and larger brain capacity. These became modifying influences upon environment, and were strengthened by heredity. When the stage of human existence was reached in the process of evolution,† woman, by reason of her tendency to conserve rather than to expend energy, did not pass along the rapid and varied lines of man's development.‡ She thus developed an inferior physique and less activity and mental power. This accumulated difference between the two sexes has been accentuated by the added influence of environment. In the tribes where woman is equally strong and intelligent, it is seen that mere sex is no barrier to her progress. This is illustrated by the matriarchal system of government which has prevailed in many countries. In Nicaragua the husbands are the slaves and perform the labor while the wives attend to matters of war and government. The women of the Dyaks of South-

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* Consult "The Evolution of Sex," Geddes & Thomson.

† Consult "Psychic Factors in Civilization," Ward; "Origin of Species," "Descent of Man," Darwin; "Metabolism of Sexes," Thomas, in *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1897.

‡ "The Chances of Death," by Carl Pearson, appeared before the writer too late for reference; but the statement therein made that woman is more variable than man is entitled to much consideration.

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east Borneo lead the men in war and exercise the authority of chiefs over the tribes. Among the Naiars on the Malabar coast of India the husband is a mere incident to the social organization, and woman's power is autocratic and absolute. It is well known that the female warriors among the Dahomeyans were much more dangerous than the men. These illustrations are given to support the theory that there is nothing essentially repugnant in the nature of woman to participating with man in all his varied life. If such repugnance exists, it is the result of the environment and lesser physical strength of women, and is due to the effects of artificial civilization. Woman's capability for good or evil depends not so much upon mere sex as upon the conditions determining the characteristics of sex and their development. That habit and environment have a great determining effect upon psychical traits and physical development is illustrated by the class of mammals given by Darwin,* where parturition remained the function of the females, but the male assumed entire charge of the young after birth. In this instance the female acquired all the pugnacity and prehensile organs of the male, while he remained docile and without these organs. The females also strive for the favor of the males.

When through the long process of variation the stage of human existence was reached and there dawned a moral sense, the two sexes must have been upon an equality. Because woman was less exposed to the influences of environment, was more inert, and possessed a less developed mind, she did not necessarily possess a superior moral conception. There must be the *opportunity* as well as the *inclination* to be immoral, and woman in the then existing civilization, slave that she was, was incapable of creating this opportunity. Notwithstanding that man committed the crimes which his greater strength and opportunity permitted, woman's criminal nature was shown, not by her compelled obedience alone, but by her sanction of these crimes and by her commission of such crimes as lay within her power. Infanticide prevailed to an

* Darwin, "Descent of Man."

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alarming degree and was largely committed by women.* The prevalence of this crime always argues a low moral standard among women. Individually women may rise above the prevailing moral standard, but collectively they assist in establishing that standard.

Among the distinctively biologic considerations, the following may be briefly considered:

Women are physically incapable of committing many of the crimes with which men are charged, owing to inferior physical strength, and they resort to subtle rather than to violent methods. In homicide this is shown by the use of poisons by women, rather than the resort to physical means. In burglaries, assaults, and other crimes requiring much strength, women are instigators rather than committers. Statistics substantiate the belief that physical strength is an important element, for in Italy, where the percentage of crime against the person is so large, women contribute only nine per cent. of the total, while in England, where the crimes are largely against property, their proportion rises to eighteen per cent.† Where woman has equalled man in her capacity for conceiving and strength for executing crime, and where there has been a deficiency in the maternal instinct, she has even exceeded him in the violence and cruelty of its commission.

Woman's incentives to many crimes differ from those of man, being due to emotional causes, love, hate, revenge, vanity, etc., rather than to those arising from economic, social, and political conditions, and this because woman's emotional nature has been developed to a greater extent. The former would produce a greater number of petty crimes and acts injurious to an individual rather than to the community directly. The *gravity* of an offence does not necessarily argue a lower moral standard, for the *nature* and *quality* of the act are equally important.

By reason of this inferior physique and nervous system,

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* In this connection, consult "Essay on Population," Malthus; "Woman's Share in Primitive Culture," Mason.

† "Crime and its Causes," Morrison.

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criminal tendencies in women often culminate in neuroses,* developing into hysteria, insanity, immorality, epilepsy, and sexual anomalies. They do not develop into crime because the psychic centres in women are less active, and the irritation consequent upon degenerative processes in her is neither so intense nor so constant. This is illustrated by the fact that while excess of passion in man, not directed into proper channels, leads to assaults and sexual perversion, in woman its existence more frequently culminates in mental degeneracy or physical disease.

The criminal age in woman is less than in man, depending upon functions peculiar to women. This operates particularly in such crimes as abortion, infanticide, etc., and is more remotely related to crimes of passion and prostitution, women becoming sexually indifferent at an earlier age than men. Women show a greater persistency in crime when once they have become criminal, this being partially due to the greater social ostracism of a degraded woman, but also to her lesser resistance to evil, when not protected by the safeguards man has thrown about her. Love in women is a frequent cause of crime, and operates to produce the same crimes as passion in men, but, as it leads her to instigate men to crime rather than to commit it herself, it is not so much in evidence. This was illustrated in the recent Thorn-Nack trial in New York city.

The crimes of women are more insidious. Prostitution, infanticide, abortion, and allied crimes exist to an alarming degree among women, and, from the view of public policy alone, are among the gravest, as they strike at the very root of society by decreasing population. The seriousness of the crime of abortion is twofold,—it lowers the moral standard of the women of a nation, and it destroys the physical health of the mother, who, when a child is born, transmits her own deficient physical condition. The fact that abortion is so prevalent among married women is of the gravest importance,† as it

* Consult "Criminal Sociology," Ferri.

† This is based upon facts gleaned by original investigation among reputable and trustworthy physicians and alienists.

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shows a decrease in the maternal sentiment which has preserved woman from much crime and degradation, and which is distinctly recognized as the crowning honor of womanhood.

In juvenile crimes, where the sociologic conditions do not operate so unfavorably upon the male sex, and where the maternal instincts and woman's protected position do not influence the rate, the statistical contrast is much lessened, the males incarcerated in juvenile reformatories being 11,535, as against 3311 females, there being 142,630 more males than females in the United States, between the ages of five and nineteen years. Among adult prisoners the rate is 75,924 males, as against 6405 females.*

Criminal women do not possess the physical anomalies characteristic of criminal men, and for this reason women are said to be occasional, rather than born, criminals. The Italian school of criminal sociology very strenuously asserts that there is a correlation between mental and physical conditions and processes, and that criminals are thus characterized by some corresponding physical anomalies.† Granting that this is true (and it is by no means conclusively proven), does the fact necessarily lead to the conclusion that there is less criminality among women, or that they do not inherit criminal tendencies? It must be remembered that many of the crimes in which women predominate and excel, as swindling, shoplifting, prostitution, etc., require a pleasing personal appearance, and women thus become more skilful in concealing physical defects. Prostitutes, by the nature of their crime, leave few offspring to inherit their defects and criminal tendencies. That criminal tendencies are inherited equally by the two sexes has been ably demonstrated in Dugdale's study of the Jukes family. According to the existing knowledge of heredity,‡ latent criminal tendencies in the one generation

* United States Census Report, 1890.

† "Uomo Delinquente," Lombroso.

‡ In this connection, consult Strahan on "Marriage and Disease;" Galton on "Hereditary Genius;" Ribot on "Heredity;" Weismann on "Essays on Heredity."

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may become active agents in a more favorable environment in the succeeding ones.

Sociologic and biologic conditions are closely related, but what may be viewed as more distinctly sociologic are the following:

There are many crimes which the law, by reason of its unequal political privileges, has rendered woman incapable of committing. Illustrative of these would be, offences against the government, including violations of the election and postal laws; of the revenue laws; against public health, as adulteration of foods. Women also commit less crimes against public policy, by reason of their inferior position in the business world. Wherever they are entering vocations hitherto open only to men, crime is increasing among them. Women have not entered the industrial world to the same extent as men and public life in all its phases is less open to them. Where they have entered the field, their positions are subordinate ones, and so give only limited opportunities. In Greece, where the women live an almost entirely domestic life, there is a minimum amount of crime among them, whereas in Scotland, where they are allowed a greater industrial scope, the percentage rises to thirty-seven. The want of adaptation to the economic order arouses criminal instincts in the sex that comes most in contact with it, and, as woman is equally unadapted to this order, she becomes more criminal as she comes into more direct contact.

The greater temptations and opportunities given man are important factors. Illustrative of this are the responsible positions of trust and position in financial administration. Special opportunities develop special classes of criminals: thus banking furnishes the opportunity for embezzlement, absconding, defrauding, and forgery. This great field of finance holds but few women in positions of trust. There are places, as clubhouses, saloons, anarchistic societies, etc., which are favorable to the contagion of crime. These places are not generally frequented by women, not necessarily because they do not choose to, but by reason of habit and custom which are the result of the restrictions placed upon their freedom by man.

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Alcoholic, cocaine, and allied habits are causes of crime, and man is more addicted to these than woman. Causes of this greater addiction include a consideration of his more social nature and greater prominence in the struggle for existence, these leading to habits and reactions, the latter culminating in pain which he seeks to escape. Men have more variable natures, and their need of diversion thus becomes greater. Women have less sensitive organisms (as experimental psychology has demonstrated, notwithstanding the prevailing contrary opinion), and they endure pain and privation better than men. It should be noted, however, that the increasing use of drugs among women is extensive, and particularly so among those exposed to an unfavorable environment or those seeking an anodyne for physical or mental suffering. There are conditions attending military life, or any organization composed exclusively of one sex, which tend to produce crime.

The combative attitude required in the struggle for existence is destructive to the higher instincts with which we credit women. Refinement, culture, and morality are cultivated best when the struggle for existence is not so great. Ambition and pride lead many men into crime, whereas vanity is the predisposing factor in women, as is seen from the large number of servants who are prosecuted for thefts, traceable to this cause. That women endure want longer before resorting to crime is not due necessarily to a superior morality, but to a more anabolic organism, which endures rather than exert itself into activity. This assertion, together with that of woman's lower sensitiveness, finds support in the manner in which women submit to surgical operations. They are more indifferent to the pain, rather than possessed of superior self-control or will-power.

In connection with this struggle for existence it must also be remembered that not a small proportion of women in the business world have excellent homes, and there is not the temptation to exceed the limits of salary which comes to a large number of men. Suicide, which is allied to criminality,

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is shown to be more prevalent among men, and Morselli * ascribes a large proportion of suicides to the sharpness of the struggle for existence.

The attitude of protection which man has assumed towards woman, and which is the refinement of the feeling which held her successively as beast of burden, slave, servant, subject, is incalculable in its influence upon her moral nature and its development, and it must not be forgotten that but a few decades have elapsed since in criminal law a woman was considered a part of her husband and could not be tried separately for crime. What opportunity here for the exercise of criminal tendencies in woman!

The power of association is greater among men, primarily because they banded together, first in defence of family and later of the tribe, community, and state. Rarely have women's organizations existed for the perpetuation of crime, owing to a weak power of association, infidelity to members of their own sex, and to a deficiency of capable organizers and leaders. Among such organizations is one known to have existed at the time of the epidemic of slow poisoning in France and Italy, in the sixteenth century. For relentlessness, cruelty, and extent the work of this association has seldom been equalled, although the participation in and rapacity for blood-shedding shown by the women of the French Revolution are somewhat analogous. These associations are great influences in increasing crime and in shielding criminals. Where women have developed this spirit of association, as in houses of prostitution, crime has become more varied and extensive and has been more advantageously conducted.

Man's broader education has given him greater capability for devising forms of crime and has made him more susceptible to criminal contagion. This is seen in the avidity with which men read newspapers, with the consequent imitation of crimes by the morbidly inclined, who read the published details of unusual or atrocious crimes. Woman's imitation often takes the form of emulation. The morbid, sentimental, maud-

* "Suicide," by Morselli.

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lin sympathy which women so often express in public and by direct personal acts, in regard to atrocious criminals, can be explained upon no other ground than latent, unconscious criminal tendencies expressing themselves in emulation rather than in imitation. By what freak of distorted imagination did the French populace, mostly women, "go wild" at the burning of Madame de Brinvilliers, and retain every atom of ashes, as those of a saint, to prevent evil coming to them? And this notwithstanding she had poisoned two members of her family and was attempting the lives of others, and all for a financial consideration! The scene is not surpassed, but is nearly paralleled by the flowers, visits, notes, and other expressions to which women resort in regard to the great criminals of to-day.

From the fact that crime exists to a greater extent among unmarried women arises the necessity for a brief consideration of the causes. These may be found in the fact (1) That maternity operates to a greater extent than paternity in preventing crime. Maternity is more developed because the relation of the mother to the child is more intimate, and because the greater part of her life has been given to it. Maternity should not be confounded with love, which is often a cause of crime. Maternity sometimes operates to the extent of determining the nature of or mitigating the crime, but is seldom or never the predisposing cause. (2) The sexual indifference of women, particularly mothers, where passion is held in abeyance by the demands and drains of motherhood, operates to prevent crime. (3) The greater predominance of religion among women, owing to their more superstitious natures and unwillingness to yield faith to reason. It may be said that woman's religion rather than her superior morality restrains her from committing crime. In her religion there is generally a large element of fear of incurring divine displeasure, and this operates as a bar. Religion has been a great source of epidemic crime, but it has usually been fanatically prosecuted in behalf of some fixed belief. (4) Married women are less subjected to the influences incident to a struggle for subsistence, their energy being largely given to domestic and social duties.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. FRANCES ALICE KELLOR.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

SOCIAL AND ETHICAL INTERPRETATIONS IN MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. A Study in Social Psychology. By James Mark Baldwin. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897. Pp. xiv., 574.

This volume is, as the author informs us in the preface, a continuation of the studies in genetic psychology begun in his previous work, "Mental Development in the Child and the Race." That it was crowned with the gold medal of the Royal Academy of Denmark adds to the expectation with which Professor Baldwin's readers will approach the present work. While the sub-title makes it clear that the book is primarily a psychological essay, the main title indicates that its interest is not merely psychological, but social and ethical as well. The social and ethical "interpretations" of mental development are always in the author's mind, and to the student of ethics and sociology who is interested in the psychological basis of his science (and what genuine student of these sciences is not?) this book will prove not less instructive and stimulating than to the psychologist. It must be remembered, however, that the psychological limitations of the inquiry forbid its extension into the fields of ethics and sociology. The interpretations offered are still psychological rather than ethical or sociological. The author's intention obviously is to keep strictly within the confines of psychology,—ethical and social,—although doubtless his own interest in the proper questions of ethics and sociology has stimulated his curiosity as to the psychological laws which govern the ethical and social processes. And while the reader can hardly fail to find between the lines of Professor Baldwin's discussion constant suggestions as to the content and significance of the facts and processes described, it must be admitted that, on the whole, he keeps well within the margin of his purpose, and forbears from the attempt at any extra-psychological explanation of the phenomena whose genesis he is undertaking to make clear.

The aim of the entire investigation is "to inquire to what extent the principles of the development of the individual mind apply also to the evolution of society," and the method is, as already indicated, "the genetic: the form of that method which inquires into the psychological development of the human individual in the earlier stages of his growth for light upon his social nature, and also upon the social organization in which he bears a part."

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(Introd.) The main question falls into two phases: (1) what are the principles which the individual shows in his mental life; (2) what additional principles, if any, does society exhibit in its forms of organization, progress, and activity? These two phases of the question dictate the division of the work into two books: Book I. dealing with "the Person, public and private;" Book II. with "Society." This division, however, is merely methodological, not real. For in reality the process of the personal life and that of social life imply one another, and the chief lesson of the entire inquiry is that either, without the other, is impossible and unintelligible. Not only do society and the person interact, but a non-social person, on the one hand, and an impersonal society, on the other, are unreal abstractions. Psychology, at any rate, as a real science, must view the person and society in their concrete unity and in their common life.

The great bond between the individual and society is, according to Professor Baldwin, the imitative tendency. This is the key to both the intellectual and the moral life. Even "the inventive person," the genius, is still, in the last analysis, only a variation of "the imitative person." The idealizing activity itself is but a more complex form of the same process. "Imitation runs through it all; imitation is, indeed, the essential method of growth in this active stretch of our energies towards the ideal. For the interpretations which our past actions express were secured by the imitative absorption of the personal suggestive copies of the social environment; and the projective part of the ideal set us by others is, in so far as we picture it at all, a reconstruction, in an imitative way, of the same material. And when the actor goes on to attain a new growth which brings him farther towards the ideal, it is again by actually finding in the social circle better illustrations of righteousness, beauty, etc., which he takes to himself by imitation" (p. 296). Thus the moral sense is "essentially a social thing." "The sense of obligation brings to consciousness two antithetical thoughts of personality: that of the self as it stands, more or less complete in habit, with its well-known tendencies to action; and over against this the sense of the ideal self, the being perhaps temporarily embodied in father, priest, or whoever-else, the better self from whose actions the copy is to come for the further reduction of the selfishly or generously capricious self to order and goodness. I feel that I ought to be like the better person" (pp. 297–98).

All this is argued with the author's well-known skill of analysis,

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acuteness of observation, and fertility of illustration. So far as its ethical interest is concerned, it reminds the reader most readily of Professor Bain; but the argument is greatly improved and brought up to date, it is applied more broadly, and more justice is done to the part played by the individual in the process of moral growth. For Professor Baldwin, the individual is, after all, just as important a factor in the case as society; without individual initiative social progress would be impossible. Nay, he goes so far as to admit the existence of a "circle" in the argument. The ethical sentiment, he says, "is in society because it is in all the individuals; but it is in each individual because it is already in society. It is one of those 'arguments in a circle' with which nature so often reasons out the development problem" (p. 304). But if the individual and society are two terms equally important and reciprocally implied, is it not going too far to lay the stress so entirely on the social factor of the case as to find in "imitation" the key to the entire situation? No doubt we need to be reminded of the essentially social character of the individual life, and imitation is certainly an important, and hitherto much neglected, feature of individual growth. But one can hardly help feeling that, in the ardor of his pleading for the recognition of this factor, Professor Baldwin has, like Professor Bain and Professor Royce, placed an undue emphasis upon a single aspect of a very complex problem, and thus made its solution appear more simple than it really is. The "dialectic of personal growth" is too subtle to permit of its reduction to any such single formula.

The study of the social life itself which is undertaken in Book II. leads to a further recognition of the *rôle* of the individual. "If we use the phrase 'social forces' to indicate the more broadly distinguished influences at work in society, when it is considered as a progressively organized whole, we may distinguish those influences which have their locus of origin *in the individual* from those which seem to have their point of departure *in the social organization*" (p. 449). These two forms of social force are distinguished as "the particularizing social force" and "the generalizing social force" respectively. "The individual produces the new variations, the new things in social matter" (p. 455). "The individual particularizes on the basis of the generalizations which society has already effected" (p. 456), and since he "particularizes for the future and for society," his activity "supplies the essential material of all human and social progress. This takes

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the place of the survival of the fittest in the organic sphere" (p. 460). On the other hand, "society generalizes what the individual has already particularized" (p. 466). It follows that "the real progress of society is measured, not by the individual's particularizations directly, but by society's generalizations" (p. 471), and "the advance on the social side, thus tested and measured, must result in a constant suppression of the individual's sanctions, as far as they remain in conflict with those of society" (p. 473).

The path of social progress is thus determined. "Only when both these conditions are fulfilled—when old social matter is particularized by an individual and then again generalized by society —can new accretions be normally made to the social content, and progress be secured to the organization as a whole" (p. 511). But, since the social generalization becomes, when particularized, the moral ideal of the individual, it further follows that the social progress which is mediated by this particularization "is necessarily in the direction of the realization of ethical standards and rules of conduct" (p. 519). Yet a final ethical conflict between the individual and society is admitted. "The final and irreducible antinomy of society" is "that in the ethical realm the individual may rule himself by rules which are in advance of those which society prescribes, and also exact them. This is common, not only with the moral seer, but in the life of us all" (p. 540). This conflict "is soluble only by the actual growth of society itself in the particular case, or by the suppression of the individual who revolts. And society solves it only to renew it always" (p. 544).

It is impossible here to discuss the many questions raised by Professor Baldwin in the course of this inquiry. The aim has rather been to call attention to the importance of the inquiry itself, conducted as it is with admirable patience, fulness of information, and skill in the scientific interpretation of the elusive phenomena of the mental life. If the reader is not persuaded, he is at all events provided with important materials for a decision, and he cannot fail to gain a good deal of fresh insight, as well as great stimulus to further thought, from the study of the volume.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. JAMES SETH.

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE MORAL INSTINCT. By Alexander Sutherland. Two volumes. London: Longmans, 1898.

In this work Mr. Sutherland, already known in Australia as a geographer and colonial historian, comes before the wider English-

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speaking public as an ethical writer. We cordially welcome his book, not only for its intrinsic value, but as an indication of the growth of thought in Greater Britain. We have already a young Australian school of painting; let us hope that before long we shall have an Australian school of philosophy.

The general plan of the work is as follows: Beginning with the lower forms of life, such as fish, the author remarks that among those species which take no care of their young an enormous and wasteful fertility is requisite to maintain the species. This huge fertility absorbs a great deal of the parents' vitality and stands in the way of all progress. But when fish begin to take care of their young, a vastly diminished progeny suffices for race-preservation and allows opportunity for the development of general intelligence. The same reasoning is applied to the higher animals. The higher they are, the more marked is their parental care. This operates for progress in two ways: firstly, by lessening the drain of reproduction on the parents; secondly, by allowing the offspring a longer childhood, during which their mental faculties may develop and ripen far beyond the level of the humbler and quicker-maturing species.

It is in warm-blooded creatures that parental care begins to undergo a change of the most far-reaching character. From mere instinctive attention it transforms itself into conscious solicitude, in other words, into sympathy. Now, sympathy, according to Mr. Sutherland, is the Moral Instinct. Thus parental solicitude, developed with increasing power as we ascend the stages of warm-blooded life, is the root of that conduct which in man we term morality.

The same line of reasoning is applied to mankind. The lowest races are marked by weak parental solicitude, high fertility, great infant mortality, early maturity of children, and defective education. The higher races are marked by strong parental solicitude with consequent improvement in all the other respects. The growth of sympathy is therefore a necessary condition not only of moral progress but of intellectual and material progress as well.

A similar argument is developed in regard to conjugal sympathy or love between spouses, and social sympathy or affectionate relations between neighbors and fellow-citizens. From these three forms of sympathy, parental, conjugal, and social, is formed the whole content of our morality. The sentiment of Duty is merely the systematization or standardizing of sympathy, moral enthusiasm

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merely the admiration for the higher forms of sympathetic conduct. The latter part of the book is occupied with the author's views on responsibility (wherein he avows himself a mechanical determinist), on the relation of morality to law, and on the nervous basis of the emotions. This latter part appears to us to be of considerably less value than what precedes.

It will be seen that Mr. Sutherland's book deals only in a minor degree with moral philosophy in the usual sense of the term. Moral philosophy is the explanation of conduct as the judgment and act of a personal moral agent. But Mr. Sutherland is interested rather in setting forth the natural-history conditions of morality and with what may be called sociological ethics, or the study of the moral habits and institutions of societies. It is in the moral-philosophic part of the book that his argument is least convincing. For example, his "hard" determinism with its denial of responsibility in the ordinary sense is repellent enough in itself; but he makes it more unreasonable by following it up with a profession of subjective idealism (ch. xxiv.). He is quite innocent of the often demonstrated fact that hard determinism and subjective idealism are maintainable, each by itself, but are mutually destructive in combination. But his great mistake is to suppose that out of mere animal sympathy we can get such conceptions as duty, self-respect, or moral beauty. These imply an appreciation of good conduct as a thing admirable in itself, which mere sympathy can never give us. Again, the title of the work itself is surely a misnomer. By "moral instinct," as already explained, Mr. Sutherland means sympathy. Now sympathy, as he himself points out (vol. i. p. 18), may sometimes make us do wrong. Hence the curious result that the moral instinct may dictate what is immoral. We want, then, a further criterion to decide upon the morality of the moral instinct, and where this is to come from Mr. Sutherland does not tell us.

In the natural-historic and sociological parts of the book there are evidences of more careful study, and the results achieved are proportionately more valuable. In his general theory Mr. Sutherland bases himself on the solid foundation of Darwin, and much of the best of his writing is a working out of hints and outlines contained in the third and fifth chapters of the "Descent of Man." Some of the technical terms he has invented are both ingenious and useful. For example, "perihestic" morality is the morality which grows up round the family hearth between the members of

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the same household; while "aphestic" morality lies in the legal relations of fellow-citizens to each other.

It need hardly be said that even after Mr. Sutherland's labors there is still a great deal left for other workers in the same field. Up to the present time the subject of the historical development of morality has suffered the most extraordinary neglect. A glance at the bibliographies will verify this. In Mr. Fortescue's indexes from 1880–1895 there is only one work which pretends to be complete,—Letourneau's "Évolution de la morale,"—and not more than three or four German pamphlets. Nor is the deficiency made up by previous writers. Mr. Lecky's "History of European Morals," learned and interesting as far as it goes, is but a fragmentary study of one curious epoch. The historian of morality has in fact not yet appeared before the world, and a most magnificent literary and philosophic opportunity still remains unseized. Such facts as these are a sufficient answer to sceptics who ask whether, in view of the length of time that men have been philosophizing, there can be anything left for philosophy to do. The main problem may be briefly stated. In civilized society there is recognized a certain moral ideal, or norm of moral conduct, regulating all conduct concerned with family life, property, civic intercourse, the state, and so forth. Among savages we find a vastly different ideal, much more rudimentary and greatly different in its features. Now, how is this difference to be accounted for? For what reasons, by what processes, through what variations, under what influences, has this mighty change taken place in the most vitally interesting of all matters of human action? To this great question we have as yet nothing but fragments of an answer. For Mr. Sutherland's contribution, welcome though it be, cannot claim to be more than an instalment of the whole.

HENRY STURT.

OXFORD, ENGLAND.

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS, AS BASED ON THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. By Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Translated by A. E. Kroeger, edited by the Hon. Dr. W. T. Harris, Commissioner of Education. London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1897. Pp. xii., 399.

It is difficult to imagine what can justify the publication of such a book as this. So far as mere familiarity with German is concerned, Mr. Kroeger would, indeed, seem to be sufficiently equipped

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for the task he has undertaken; for it is not very often that he has totally mistaken the sense of any particular sentence. But his inaccuracy and unfaithfulness to his original are so gross as to render his translation absolutely useless, as a substitute for the German, to any serious student of philosophy. It may, indeed, be doubted whether a student, whose object was to learn German and philosophy together, might not get as much good as harm, by using this translation *with* the original; but some false notions he could hardly fail to get from it; and Fichte's German, by itself, is far from difficult. For the general public the difficulty of the book itself must be a bar to its utility; and any one who hoped to get from this translation any notion of Fichte's simple and forcible style would be sorely disappointed; for Mr. Kroeger has, with great consistency, omitted those turns of phrase which are the most charming and characteristic in his author; and has, on the other hand, crammed his own style with barbarisms not to be met with in the German.

These charges are so serious that some substantiation of them seems owing alike to the two gentlemen whose names appear upon the title-page, to the readers of this JOURNAL, and to myself. I propose, therefore, to tabulate, with a few examples, those faults which seem to me most conclusive against the pretensions of this book to be considered an adequate translation. (1) Mr. Kroeger has adopted a division of the book into chapters and sections which seems to differ needlessly from that of Fichte. This division frequently prevents the reader from discovering the author's own classification of his matter. Thus, Fichte divides his book into *three* main parts; Mr. Kroeger into *two*. To take a more important instance: Fichte develops the Content of the Moral Law in *five* distinct steps (pp. 280–307, Ed. 1798); Mr. Kroeger proceeds with him to the end of the third, and then begins a new chapter in which Fichte's IV. appears as a new I. (p. 241), and, what Fichte treats as a part of V. (p. 311), is elevated by Mr. Kroeger into a new III. (p. 246.) On this head we may add that Mr. Kroeger arbitrarily rearranges the titles and paragraphs throughout, misleading in the former case, and losing much in the latter, since Fichte is accustomed to denote subsections within paragraphs by dashes, which Mr. Kroeger generally either omits altogether or elevates into new paragraphs. The sectional numbering, which runs throughout the whole of the original and is a considerable convenience for reference, is entirely omitted by this modern translator. (2) Mr. Kroeger frequently omits two or three whole sentences at a time, without

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leaving any sign that he has done so; and also, though less frequently, inserts sentences of his own. His object is apparently to make the sense plainer, and to reject superfluous repetitions; but this is certainly not translation, and moreover he appears to follow no principle in it. For instance, he omits on p. 32 a most significant note on the transcendental stand-point; and further instances may be found on pp. 25, 41, 51, 59, 85, 310, etc. For a specimen of his explanatory insertions we may refer to p. 307, where will be found eight lines of matter which have no place in the German. Omissions of mere clauses are too numerous to call for special mention. (3) Of the desperate inaccuracy of Mr. Kroeger's terminology we may give the following instances. "Selbst-ständigkeit" is throughout translated "self-determination," and so rendered indistinguishable from "Selbst-bestimmung:" in one place, indeed, Mr. Kroeger uses "self-sufficiency," but never the proper equivalent, "self-subsistence." "Causality" is made to serve not only for "Kausalität," but also frequently for "Wirksamkeit," and even for "Thätigkeit" (p. 3). For "Wirklich" and "Real," "actual" and "real" are used quite indiscriminately; and similarly for "Lust," "Genuss," "Befriedigung," which Fichte pointedly distinguishes, "enjoyment" and "satisfaction" (pp. 153, 154). "Empfindung" is consistently rendered "perception," and thus in no way distinguished from "Wahrnehmung." In particular instances you can never be sure what German word you have to deal with: *e.g.*, "thinking" in one place (p. 63) represents "Vorstellung" (and "Vorstellung" in italics, too), whereas in many others it represents "Begriff" (p. 47); and who would guess that "actions" (p. 61) stands for "Wollen"? To pass to a more disputable point, it seems a pity that the title "Sittenlehre" should have been translated "Science of Ethics," since "Lehre" has none of the connotations of our word "science:" Mr. Kroeger has himself used in the text (p. 2) the appropriate translation, "doctrine." Finally, we come to some examples which border on our next division—that of bad English. For "Sollen," "shall" (and Mr. Kroeger does not shrink from "*shall*-ing;" cf., too, "the canning" (p. 282), is much more often used than "ought," the only word which represents its ethical meaning in English; and the use of "a thinking," "this thinking," for "ein Denkendes," "dieses Denkende," as well as for "ein Denken," "dieses Denken," is as misleading as it is barbarous (p. 23). (4) This latter barbarism of using an English adjective to represent the substantival use of the German

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neuter with the article occurs throughout the book. For other examples of faulty English we may quote the following: The German construction of "wenn wir uns . . . bewusst zu sein glauben" (p. 73) repeatedly rendered "we believe to be conscious," instead of "we believe that we are conscious;" phrases such as "In simply a *formaliter* way" (p. 155), "It involves a twofold" (p. 183; cf. p. 355), "An absolute first, and in itself grounded somewhat" (p. 29), "Injurious, and all true morality-eradicating (sic) pretexts" (p. 330), "the all-to-his-wife sacrificing (sic) generosity of the husband" (p. 347); solecisms like "oppositedness" (p. 26), "objectivating" (p. 156), "continuating" and "esteemable" for "estimable" (p. 332, foll.); finally, vulgarisms, such as "shew up," "hunt up," "look up" (*passim*), and "sneak" (p. 207), which, in the sense in which Mr. Kroeger uses them, I cannot believe to be classical even in America. (5) Mr. Kroeger, while, as we have seen (p. 158), he ventures to omit some of Fichte's own explanations as unnecessary, has added just four notes of his own. The first of these (p. 102), in which he explains that the original points through which the Ego acts on nature are "a plurality of first men," is a mere absurdity, since Fichte immediately explains that they form the body as such. The second (p. 122), in which he identifies Fichte's natural organic totalities with Leibnitz's Monads, is also manifestly wrong; since Fichte allows to them neither consciousness nor complete independence. (Along with these, in point of falseness, may be reckoned the explanatory addition "or God" on p. 171.) The third note (p. 188), despite its irrelevant dogmatism, is at least questionable; since Fichte would appear to be speaking rather of the history of an individual than of "human history." The fourth (p. 350) would seem only to obscure what in the text was clear; unless, indeed, its reference to a man's "reason" as "reflected from some external thing" may be taken in connection with the curious remarks on "introspection," which occur in Dr. Harris's Preface (pp. vi. and vii.), as giving us some information about that sytsem of "rational psychology," which we are surprised to learn was established by Kant's Critique (*ib.*). (5) The number of misprints alone would suffice to prove the gross carelessness with which this book has been prepared. Omitting such as are of a common order, specimens of some interest may be found on the following pages: 2, 18, 41, 112, 135, 179, 219, 223, 227, 229, 252, 255, 265, 331, 349, 364, 384, 386, 392, etc.; we may instance "part" for "fact," "anxious" for "conscious," "private" for "finite," "located" for "treated,"

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"spirit" for "speech," "greater" for "preacher," "reorganize" for "recognize." (6) Absolute mistranslations, due either to carelessness or to misapprehension of the general sense, are not uncommon.

I have given so much space to exposing this so-called translation, that little can remain for discussing Fichte's work. And yet, perhaps, some praise is due to Dr. Harris and Mr. Kroeger for calling attention to it. I cannot, indeed, agree with the former that "Fichte's writings form the classics of introspection," nor that "Fichte's insight into freedom . . . is the foundation-stone of the subsequent philosophies of Schelling and Hegel; in which . . . the psychology movement comes into harmony with the ontology movement, both reach the same highest principles, namely, the personality of God, human freedom, and responsibility, individual immortality in an eternal church invisible." I hope I may be nearer the mark in saying that the "Sittenlehre" contains the most thoroughgoing attempt ever made to build a complete ethical system solely on the basis of freedom. Fichte throughout refers all his conceptions to freedom; whereas with Kant and other moralists, who explicitly adopt that basis, the direct emphasis is often thrown on other principles, the connection of which with freedom is by no means immediately evident. For this reason Fichte's Ethics are at the same time more systematic and more paradoxical. He allows, for instance, that the profession of a scholar is "higher" than that of a merchant; but he would appear to leave no possible meaning for such a phrase, since the scholar is neither more of a means to the "Rational End" but as a mere "tool" precisely equal in value with the merchant, nor can anything in the world be regarded as an end in itself: Fichte generally carries out rigorously this latter point of view.

With regard to the Preface and the lengthy deductions which form the first two divisions of the book, I must confess myself totally unconvinced of their main object,—the establishment of the Ego as something outside Nature, subject-object, and possessed of Freedom. The main point would seem to lie in this: Whether anything can be thought at all without thereby being made into an object, a "thing" (p. 33), a "being." If not, then, neither can the Ego, nor "thought" itself. That everything which is, is for consciousness in some sense, may be admitted; but it does not follow that consciousness itself *is* in another sense, as Fichte seems to assume. He confesses that he can only answer the "opposers of

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Freedom" by another presupposition (p. 174); and has only to say on his side that his presupposition enables him "actually to construct a philosophy" and "has intuition on its side;" both which advantages may be equally claimed by the other side. Similarly, when he comes to deal with conscience, he recognizes excellently, to begin with, the difficulty of finding an "absolute criterion of the correctness of my conviction about duty" (pp. 211–213); he proves that there must *be* such an one, and that it will appear as a feeling of harmony between the "original and actual Ego," and will hence compel our belief; but he spoils all by omitting to prove that nothing but such a harmony can thus compel belief (pp. 214–218). In short, we can follow him so long as what he says tends merely to show that something must be our duty, and that that something we must do; but he fails us entirely before the entirely different question—what that something is.

G. E. Moore.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

Studies in Philosophical Criticism and Construction. By Sydney H. Mellone, D.Sc. William Blackwood & Sons. Pp. xxii., 426.

In this book Mr. Mellone has undertaken "a general critical survey of the whole field of philosophy, as this term is now understood by all who make it a special department of study." Such an ambitious aim argues on the part of the writer great intellectual maturity or the reverse. After perusing the book, we cannot say that the author's attempt to traverse the ground with seven-league boots is justified by its results. The book consists of a series of papers on particular points in psychology, logic and epistemology, ethics and metaphysics. In no sense is it a whole; and the attempt to bring together isolated discussions only makes more plain the unsystematic character of the thought.

Without entering into problems of general philosophical interest, which are not germane to this Journal, we turn to the ethical discussions which occupy the last part of the book. In these Mr. Mellone has been chiefly influenced by Mr. Bradley, Dr. Martineau, Professor Seth, and Green. And it is one of his conspicuous traits as a writer that he is sympathetic towards such divergent lines of thought; but I think one has a right to complain that, in the main, he is sympathetic towards each one in turn, and that he makes no really serious attempt to fuse such diffusive intellectual sympathy into an intelligible whole.

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In the chapter on the Method of Ethics the discussion starts from the fact of moral judgment. "We say of an act that it is 'right,' our 'duty,' 'ought' to be done; or, again, that it is 'wrong,' 'ought not' to be done." We have, further, certain characteristic emotions attaching to these. And the aim of ethics is, generally stated, to seek for the meaning of these characteristics of our nature. The conclusion the writer reaches is that neither duty nor pleasure can be regarded as good for its own sake: "They are good only in so far as they contribute to the realization of the highest type of personality." The question, then, is, What is the supreme ideal of human life? This "ideal of personality," we are told, "is realized by that activity of consciousness which tends to promote the harmonious *efficiency*, as a whole, of those functions of consciousness by which truth is attained, beauty created and appreciated, and the social consequences of our conduct —its effect on other selves—adequately comprehended. In this regard the most fundamental quality needed is sympathy." This sympathy, or sympathetic insight, as it is called elsewhere, fills a large place in Mr. Mellone's theory, and the author claims that his form of statement "gives a rather more concrete content to our conception of what man's better nature is than Green's statements do." What, then, is the nature of the moral end? The writer tells us that it is self-realization,—"the progressive realization of the faculties of our nature as a whole, where the lower desires are given their proper place in the service of the higher." But he is careful to explain that the "self" which *he* has in view is "essentially the individual self." Two pages farther on we are told, still more decidedly, "the term 'self' should be reserved for the personal life of the individual: which is not something in *se ipso totus teres atque rotundus*, but is conscious of itself as imperfect, finite, and dependent, and, therefore, of itself as ruled by an ideal of infinite and absolute worth." Mr. Mellone asserts that "by Green and others the term self-realization is used in a much more extended significance: the self which is to be realized is held to be infinite, to be rational, to be social." The apologetic interpretation of these predicates, however, by which the author tries to show what Green understood, or at least should have understood, by them might have been spared. To take but the last. The writer tells us that "it is not in the least to be denied that man is only moral, and indeed only human, in society;" yet, when "the community that is to be realized is identified with the actual social organiza-

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tion, the whole contents of morality disappear into the external routine of my social station and its duties, and human selves are regarded simply as the products of society; they are products of a general life of humanity which uses them as its vehicles, but which cannot be said to be realized in them." "A man's personal perfection is not essentially and immediately, but only partially and in effect, manifested in the performance of the duties determined by his civic or social position. The effective performance of these is a consequence of his growth in perfection, although this growth would be impossible were he not in the society of his fellows" (p. 346). "The adequate fulfilment of the duties of a man's social position is not the most fundamental form of his good. . . . It is a hopelessly inadequate account of his good to regard it as realized simply in working out the functions determined by the political and social institutions of the community in which he actually finds himself. When limited thus, duty becomes an external routine; the concrete good of any and every case in actual life must contain far more than this" (p. 348). "We reject the view that the individual human life is a mere correlate of the general social life, and is an unreal abstraction if regarded as in any way independent of the latter" (p. 349).

Now, this view of the moral end seems to us to err as seriously in what it affirms as in what it denies. It holds up to us an abstraction called "social life" or "society" as if it were a something apart from the individuals within it, and being able easily to make this out to be an all-devouring monster,—for in fact it is anything you please, since it is nothing at all,—we are thrust back upon the individual self for salvation. But the description of this harbor of refuge is not an inviting one. So far as we can discover, it is nothing but a bundle of negations. What ethical content self-realization has when the self is independent of all other selves we are not told. Realize your *self*, your *individual* self; this command tells us nothing: if it does tell us anything, that something is immoral. We are not surprised, therefore, to discover that our author is forced gradually by the pressure of his own theory to bring in almost all that here he casts out. For example: "In this capacity of man's nature, from which *moral* activity springs, the individual seems to transcend his finitude, or go beyond himself more completely than in the pursuit of science and art" (p. 383). Now, obviously, a man cannot go beyond him*self* altogether; he may go beyond a narrower self to a wider, a more universal, a less self*ish*, a more social,—call

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it what you will,—but so long as man does anything and can be the subject of moral predicates, he is expressing or realizing him*self*. Mr. Mellone's argument, therefore, must be that to be moral a man must transcend his *self*,—not to become selfless, but to become unselfish. The self which he transcends, therefore, is the particular individual self, which, whatever homage it may command in epistemology, cannot pass the outer court of ethics, since in the simplest moral act we are already beyond it. The remaining portion of our author's discussion is in fact but the proof of this. On page 385 he tells us that "the *essential being* of all who constitute human society is the same;" and (quoting from Dr. Martineau) "the process of social evolution so implicates together the individual agent and his fellows that we can scarce divide the causal factors into individual and social; . . . spiritually he is not him*self* without them. . . . He has no self which is not reflected in them." On page 387, "The social bond is a concrete spiritual life penetrating its members." Again (p. 389), "The 'social impulse' is a tendency uprising from the very roots of our being, and expressing itself in every direction of mental activity. Reason is *social*, in that my reason cannot work unless it works together with the reason of my fellow-men; for its structure and laws are identical in all of us." This last sentence reveals, however, in what a gingerly way Mr. Mellone has grasped the conception of the individual as essentially social; for an identical reason in each of us would be *of itself* rather a ground for separation than for union. And we are not surprised to be told, immediately afterwards, that "in order that reason and knowledge may go to work there must be different personalities to work it out: my reason is my own, your reason is your own, though in all it has a common root." For, even admitting the truth of this, what enlightenment is there in telling us, first, that reason is social, and then that each man's reason is his own, unless in some way these aspects are shown to stand in an essential relation to one another. It may indeed keep a problem in equilibrium if we buffet it first to the one side and then to the other, but it does not make it any more intelligible. What we want to know is why and how *both* of these are true, and how they stand to one another. We may readily agree with the writer when he says (p. 393), "What we have to seek is a *common good*. Whatever be the different ways in which men may seek their own or others' good, whatever divergence there may seem to be between these two, we have to take our stand upon this, that no man can find the highest good for himself unless he so lives that his life

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helps others to find that same good. . . . This is the primary condition of realizing the end and aim of life." But we ask, and in my judgment ask vainly, from the writer some logical or consistent account of the possibility, to say nothing of the necessity, of this transition from man and his individual good to man as social. And the fact that, in the later pages of his book, Mr. Mellone swallows the principle of idealism at one gulp does not make one at all certain that it will purge his system of its crudities. For while the finite self of the earlier stage of the inquiry is changed later into a self which is essentially and *distinctively* a sharer in or a partaker of an infinite and eternal life, this change is not logically evolved, nor is its significance realized or appreciated by the writer himself.

ROBERT A. DUFF.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

UNFORESEEN TENDENCIES OF DEMOCRACY. By Edwin Lawrence Godkin. Archibald Constable & Co. 6 shillings nett.

These essays are a latter-day criticism of Democracy. They try to take stock of its gains and losses. Nothing is more remarkable to the student of politics than the change that has taken place in the course of the last century in men's views on popular government. It has now few open enemies, but, on the other hand, it has few ardent advocates. It has ceased to be feared, but it has also ceased to be praised. No one would now write as Burke does against it. On the other hand, no one would write with the exuberant faith of Paine in its defence. Mr. Godkin is not concerned with the triumphs but with the failures of Democracy. Taking this general disillusionment as his starting-point, he seeks to explain it. It is due he thinks in part to a false estimate of ordinary human nature. The supply of wisdom and public spirit that it contains was lamentably overestimated by early reformers. On the other hand, it is due to a false estimate of the nature of the problem. The multitude and complexity of the interests that a modern government must take account of were lamentably underestimated. This has become especially conspicuous in the case of "the large masses of population called cities." As Mr. Godkin puts it, "it cannot be said, in the light of history, that the new men are giving communities worse government than they used to have, but government in their hands is not progressing in the same ratio as the other arts of civilization, while the complexity of the interests to be dealt with is steadily increasing."

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Mr. Godkin's analysis refers chiefly to America. But in spite of the difference of circumstance, the English student of politics has much to learn from the defects he brings to light in the working of the American system. Moreover, he devotes a special chapter to Australia, the *enfant terrible* of modern democracy. We are here asked to observe what the English democratic system can be when released from the restraints imposed upon it by the traditions of the old country on the one hand, and a written constitution, such as America has enjoyed from the beginning, on the other.

The three most important essays are those on The Nominating System, The Decline of Legislatures, and Peculiarities of American Municipal Government.

Americans do not require to have the eccentricities of the American Democracy in the arrangements it has made for procuring the nomination of candidates explained to them. The English student who knows his Bryce will recall the description there given of the "Primary,"—"the vulgar figures in good coats, the universal *cameraderie* with no touch of friendship about it; something between a betting-ring and the flags outside the Liverpool Exchange,"—that is the keystone of the American political structure. That a freedom-loving people should sit down contentedly under so egregious a system is always a puzzle to newspaper-reading people in England. Mr. Godkin offers them an explanation of the paradox. It comes of the amount of nominating that has got to be done. If there is a deal of voting work to be done people have to be got to do it. The only means hitherto invented of getting them is the appeal to party loyalty. But there are loyalties and loyalties, and to the reader who asks why party loyalty works out in one way in England and in another in America, Mr. Godkin gives further excellent analysis in reply. In America there is a written constitution which removes whole classes of the most interesting questions that can exercise the human or at any rate the political mind from discussion. In America, also, there is a committee instead of a cabinet system which also acts as an extinguisher to debate. In America, again, it is required that the candidate shall be a local man. All this means there is no large spontaneous supply of public-spirited men to undertake the duties of government. Politicians don't grow, they have to be made, and it is the distinction of American Democracy to have invented a "machine" to make them. Of the quality of these machine-made politicians Mr. Godkin tells us more elsewhere. In concluding the chapter upon

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the "primaries" he suggests some remedies. But construction is not a strong point of this able book, and it strikes the reader as somewhat inadequate. To purify the *rôle* of voters with the power the law gives you is an obvious reform. But Dr. Clarke's further suggestion of companies of voters selected by lot is rejected. The ground given is that it would leave no place for party loyalty; but is not the example of Mr. Low's independent candidature in New York, which Mr. Godkin recommends for imitation, open to precisely the same objection?

The contrast between expectation (see *The Federalist* and De Tocqueville) and event is nowhere more striking than in the *personnel* of the Legislatures themselves. Mr. Godkin begins his essay on these with an interesting comparison between the European system of government by cabinet and the American of government by committee. The former gives every man his chance—in England, of supporting or opposing a government bill; on the Continent and in Australia, of bringing in a bill of his own. It is true that in America any one is free to propose what he likes; but he sends in his bill to the committee as a student sends in his theme to the professor, or an artist his picture to the hanging committee of the Royal Academy. He has no power of advocating its claims. What this implies let those reflect who are inclined to echo Carlyle's observations upon the talkativeness of the British House of Commons. The American committee has the merit of discouraging debate, but this, as Mr. Godkin points out in vigorous language, has its disadvantages. It makes it the grave of honorable ambition and the Legislatures themselves "scenes of obscurity, hard work, and small pay," with the consequence that "it is increasingly difficult to-day to get a man of serious knowledge on any subject to go to Congress if he have other pursuits and other sources of income. To get him to go to the State Legislature in any of the populous and busy States is well-nigh impossible." One would have thought that such a system would have acted as a discouragement to legislative zeal on the part of such men as go. On the contrary, it encourages legislation. The multitude of acts and resolutions throughout the States that are annually passed is incredible. Mr. Godkin estimates them at some sixteen thousand. The explanation is simple. A legislator is paid to legislate, and legislate he must on pain of losing his seat. If he has no special talent that way, he falls back, like the legislator in Kansas, upon the Ten Commandments and proposes to embody them in the

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State legislation, or like the legislator in Nebraska, he consults his wife, and proposes to make the wearing of corsets a criminal offence.

Mr. Godkin's remedies for this state of affairs are again disappointing. His suggestion for the State Legislatures that they should have fewer meetings suggests Carlyle's remedy of locking the door of St. Stephen's. If there is no genuine business for these Legislatures, by all means let them be suppressed, but if a State is a real entity and has real business, surely this is a case where cure is better than prevention. It is not a cure for an ill-fitting coat to go without one, nor for an ill-acting method of government to go without any at all. The suggestion of the extended use of the referendum is perhaps good, but we require definition and illustration. The alteration of the time of the elections with a view to bringing it closer to the time of entry upon office is an obvious reform.

Coming to Municipal Democracy, we might have expected *a priori* that New York or Chicago instead of Glasgow or Birmingham would have become the model of all that a corporation ought to be, and the Mecca of the political reformer. The American city has no vested interests, no inveterate abuses to contend with. Democracy has here a clean slate. How is it that these cities have become a by-word for political corruption? Mr. Godkin explains it as the result of the subjection of the city to the State Legislature. Whereas in England and in Europe generally the municipality may be said to have existed before the state, in America the great modern cities have sprung up within it. The result has been that the State Legislatures have always regarded the cities with suspicion. This feeling has been encouraged by preachers and poets (what of Walt Whitman?) on the theory presumably that God made the country and man made the town. It has been further increased by the habit of choosing the political capital without reference to industrial importance, with the result that the boss and his doings are removed from healthy criticism. This explains why three-fourths of the American States have denied the townships the right of autonomous government in manifest contradiction to Democratic principles. To deliver the Prometheus of city government from the vulture that preys on its vitals is a labor worthy of a modern Hercules.

The chapter on Australian Democracy is less convincing. The author has not been there, and is dependent on second-hand in-

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formation. Yet what he says is well worth reading. The chief differences between Australian and American Democracy he traces to the different circumstances under which they respectively rose. America took as its model the English system of government as it existed in the time of George III. and before the idea of cabinet government, as we understand it, had arisen. Australia, like the new European Democracies rising later, has reproduced the main features of the English cabinet system. Two questions face her: 1. Is this system workable without the party loyalty which has given governments stability in England? Australian experience is not more encouraging here than European. The kaleidoscope in South Australia has given us forty-two governments in forty years, in New South Wales twenty-eight, in Victoria twenty-six, in the same period. 2. Will it bear the strain of being applied to a federal system? Experience is not yet to hand, but it may be shortly, and we shall see.

Another difference between Australia and America is the absence in the former of a written constitution. This is a direct encouragement to rash governmental experiments. "A law paramount drawn up by picked men assembling for the purpose at stated intervals of twenty years or less, and safeguarding all the primary social rights against popular passion or impulse or legislative corruption, and interpreted by the courts, is a device peculiar to the United States. It is the only really valid check on Democracy ever devised." In its absence Democracy in Australia and New Zealand has gone on unchecked in the path of social experiment. Capital is lent by government to societies and individuals on imperfect security; lands are let; provision is made for cheap transport; bonuses on produce are paid; work is provided for the unemployed; had it not been for the action of the governor of Queensland in 1867 they might to-day have been floundering in the quagmire of inconvertible paper currency. Many of these experiments have undoubtedly been notorious failures. They all point in a direction which Mr. Godkin strongly disapproves, the alteration of existing society in the direction of Socialism. Will the colonies learn by experience and stop in time? Three grounds of hope are suggested: first, the hold that the competitive system has taken of the Anglo-Saxon race; secondly, the very rapidity with which experiments succeed one another and develop their consequences; thirdly, the seriousness, ability, and purity of the press.

The merits and the limitations of Mr. Godkin's book are clearly

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marked in this last essay. Mr. Godkin is not a philosophical writer in the technical sense. He has no theory of the state or of the precise limitation of its sphere. Where he touches on questions that presuppose some view on these questions he falls back on a somewhat uncritical individualism. There is thus no attempt to discriminate between social experiments, such as limitation of hours, enforcement of sanitary legislation, which make for national wealth and progress, and others like the creation of work for the unemployed, inconvertible notes, bonus on exports, which make for poverty and reaction. This somewhat detracts from the value of his criticism of Democracy in Australia and New Zealand. On the other hand, he has made a close study of the actual working of Democracy as a whole, and, though he regards its present state in all parts of the world as sufficiently serious, he writes with a hopefulness which one misses in some of the recent critics of Democracy in England. Even the abuses in the Great Republic of which he is a citizen are not inveterate. He despairs of an immediate remedy. But he cherishes a robust faith in the ultimate soundness and energy of popular opinion. In this he reminds one of the great saying of Lincoln, which he quotes: "You can fool part of the people all the time and all the people part of the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time,"—an altogether sound and inspiriting creed.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

BIRMINGHAM.

ANARCHISM: A CRITICISM AND HISTORY OF THE ANARCHIST THEORY. By E. V. Zenker. Translated from the German. London: Methuen & Co., 1898. Pp. xii., 271.

The author tells us that his work originated in an impromptu lecture which he gave (? in Vienna) on the day of the bomb outrage in the French Parliament. His purpose is to clear up the widely prevalent ignorance as to the real nature of Anarchism,—an ignorance typified in the statement of an American author of a large book on the subject (Mr. Schaack) that "all Socialists are Anarchists as a first step, although all Anarchists are not precisely Socialists." Mr. Zenker's chief difficulty has been in the fact that Anarchist literature is, as a rule, not to be found in the great public libraries, and cannot easily be procured through the ordinary channels. Those who have attempted to make a study at first hand even of the calmer writings of Socialists have often encountered the

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same difficulty. The book before us is divided into three parts: Part I. deals with early Anarchism, the Anarchist movements in the middle ages, etc., Proudhon, "Max Stirner" (Caspar Schmidt), etc. Part II. is entitled Modern Anarchism. One chapter is devoted mainly to Bakunin, another mainly to Kropotkin and Elisée Reclus, while a third gives a brief account of recent Anarchist writings in Germany, England, and America. This chapter is confessedly incomplete so far as America is concerned, as even a personal application to Mr. Tucker failed to procure a copy of his journal, *Liberty*. Some account is given of Mr. Auberon Herbert's "Voluntary State;" but nothing is said of the sentimental anarchism of Mr. Edward Carpenter. Part III. treats of the Relation of Anarchism to Science and Politics. One chapter is devoted to a proof that the sociological stand-point of Mr. Herbert Spencer differentiates him completely from the unscientific idealism of the Anarchists. Another chapter deals with the spread of Anarchism in Europe, and the book concludes with some very striking remarks on the attitude that civilized society should take towards Anarchism, theoretical and practical. The bibliographical notes appended to each important name are a valuable feature of the work.

"Anarchy means," says Mr. Zenker, "in its ideal sense, the perfect, unfettered self-government of the individual, and, consequently, the absence of any kind of external government." If this definition be accepted, theoretical anarchism has been the creed of many saintly and of some philosophical persons in many different periods. The author shows that Anarchists are not a new product of modern unrest, but have their precursors in the anarchist communists of the middle ages. With reference to that remarkable woman, Louise Michel, the perfectly sound remark is quoted, "If she had lived in the middle ages, she would without doubt have been the foundress of a new religious order" (p. 170). Anarchism might be traced even farther back than the middle ages or the early Christian centuries. The "Egoism" of Max Stirner, according to which property is "that over which I can assert my power" (a principle widely accepted in practice), is a theory at least as old as the Callicles and the Thrasymachus of Plato's Dialogues; and the philosophy of Proudhon, of Stirner and Bakunin, in spite of its use of Hegelian formulæ, is only a survival of the crude individualism of the Cynics and of the more audacious Greek Sophists. Mr. Zenker's history of theories is not always accurate. It is a mistake to represent Hobbes's form of the Social Contract

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theory as necessarily involving monarchy (p. 14). It is absurd to call "Hooker, the ecclesiastic," a pioneer of Anarchism (p. 16), while scornfully rejecting any recognition of the genuinely Anarchist element in Mr. Herbert Spencer's political thinking (pp. vi., 106, 201–212). But on the whole the work seems very carefully done and is written in a spirit of great fairness and impartiality. Of practical importance is the clear recognition of the antithesis between Anarchism and Socialism; and the author shows how Anarchism in its most dangerous "active" form is most prevalent in those countries where Social-democratic parties are weak or divided. Mr. Zenker finds a social value even in extreme Anarchist theories as a protest in favor of individual freedom against the Socialist tendency to make the state all powerful. The criminal Anarchist, he argues, should be treated as an ordinary criminal, or perhaps as a lunatic. Exceptional legislation is mischievous and exceptional severity only turns scoundrels into martyred apostles. The Anarchist assassin is no new type, though modern chemistry has supplied him with new weapons. At the Reformation time he used religious formulæ; now he uses those of anarchical theory. "The state cannot, of course, allow itself to look on at Anarchist crimes and to shorten its arm; but it must not delude itself with the notion that it will remove such crime or stop the Anarchist movement by means of the guillotine. Does this mean that society is helpless in face of Anarchism? It is, if it possesses only the force to suppress and not the power to convince; if society is only held together by compulsion, as the present state partly is *and the Socialist state would be still more*, and threatens to fall to pieces if the apparatus of compulsion were given up; if the state, *instead of trying to redress the unfortunately unalterable natural inequality of its members*, only intensifies it by legalizing all kinds of new inequalities, and if it regards its institutions, and especially the law, as instruments for the unalterable conservation of all present forms of society with all their imperfections and injustices" (pp. 262, 263). Is the criticism on Socialism, implied in the first passage I have here italicized, quite consistent with the undoubtedly Socialistic ideal put before the state in the second passage? Mr. Zenker seems to adopt the assumption of Mill and Spencer that all compulsion as such is an evil, a view which is hardly compatible with the attempt "to redress the natural inequality" of mankind. To *alter* the *unalterable* natural inequality is what a sane Socialism will not attempt.

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The translation is fairly done, but is disfigured by a good deal of carelessness and awkwardness. Thus, it is absurd in an English translation to give the title of Marx's criticism of Proudhon in German, "*Das Elend der Philosophie: An Answer to Proudhon's Philosophie des Elends*" (p. 60, *note*). H. Spencer's book should not be cited as *The Individual versus the State.* And in the account of Spencer the following sentence almost needs retranslation into German before we get the correct English:—"When the *régime* peculiar to militarism, the status, has disappeared, the *régime* of convention appears in its stead." For "the status" read "status," and for "convention" read "contract." Truly, as Roger Bacon said long ago, a translator ought to know not only the language from which and the language into which he translates, but also the subject with which his author is dealing.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

POLITICAL CRIME. By Louis Proal. London: T. Fisher Unwin; New York: Appleton & Co., 1898. Pp. 355.

The theme of M. Proal's interesting and valuable book is that politics cannot be divorced from morality. Science without conscience, Rabelais has said, is the ruin of the soul; and M. Proal endeavors to enforce the maxim that politics divorced from morality is the ruin of society. In the opening chapter of his volume M. Proal points out that immoral political maxims date much farther back than the times of Machiavelli. The doctrine of two moralities—one for public and another for private affairs—is a doctrine which has come down to the modern world from Greek and Roman times. All that Machiavelli did was to state this theory and to show how craft and treachery might be utilized to acquire and retain political authority. The doctrine of two moralities is put forward by one of the characters of Euripides when he says, "If it be needful to resort to injustice to attain power, let us have recourse thereto: but under all other circumstances let us be honest." Reasons of state is the modern form which this ancient maxim has assumed. Injustice is defended on the ground that in the particular circumstances the welfare of the state demanded it. Politicians are accustomed to use this expression as a cloak for every iniquity. It was for reasons of state that Socrates was condemned to drink hemlock, that the early Christians were subjected to martyrdom, that the Protestants were massacred by

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Charles IX. and banished by Louis XIV. In fact, reasons of state can always be alleged with a certain show of plausibility for the most abominable crimes. The ultimate standard to which public opinion must make politicians conform is not reasons of state but the permanent principles of justice. "It is false," says Cicero, "to assert that states cannot be governed without violating justice: it is by absolute justice and justice alone that it is possible to govern states." A Nemesis overtakes nations which allow themselves to be governed by reasons of state. It is a policy which on purely utilitarian grounds does not pay in the end. Many instances of the truth of this will be found in M. Proal's pages, and the unhappy condition of Spain to-day is in no small degree due to the politicians, who suppressed intellectual liberty among their countrymen for pretended reasons of state.

M. Proal very truly points out that the moral standard of political rulers is determined by public opinion. It therefore rests with the public to purify the political atmosphere where it has become polluted by refusing to support unscrupulous candidates for power, and unscrupulous methods of political action. But in order to do this effectively the public themselves must be permeated and animated by genuine and deep moral principles. At the present moment the clash of national interests and of class interests is in many ways a menace to civilization. The only manner in which these conflicting interests can ultimately be reconciled and harmonized is by bringing the combatants together on the common meeting ground of justice. All other methods are more or less Machiavellian in character and can only terminate in confusion and strife.

Readers of M. Proal's book may regard it as one-sided on certain points, and perhaps as unduly alarmist as far as regards the power for evil of certain extreme political tendencies and doctrines. In my view he is unnecessarily alarmed at the developments of Anarchism and Socialism. The deep-rooted conservatism of the human race is too strong for the political theories of the apostles of socialism on the one hand or anarchy on the other. The comparative study of man makes it quite plain that the lower down we go in the scale of civilization the more fixed and rooted are human habits and modes of thoughts. Of all sections of the population the masses are the most closely attached to the habits of the past, and if a tolerable amount of economic well-being is assured to them, there is no likelihood whatever that political doctrines which strike at

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the root of immemorial habits will secure a practical footing in their minds.

W. D. MORRISON.

LONDON.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 2 vols., crown 8vo. Longmans, 1897.

The authors have thoroughly and skilfully used their almost unique opportunities;—apart from all else, their book is a valuable record of facts, never before presented together and many of them never before presented at all.

The first section, on the Structure of Trades Unions, with its history of the gradual growth of the present dominant type, a democracy tempered by bureaucracy, gives us a series of experiments in self-government. Various deductions are made. The *referendum*, for example, is rejected. The notion that a representative should be a delegate is refuted. The experience of Trades Unions in their own domestic government is said to point to their eventual representation in parliament "by a class of expert parliamentary representatives" on the model of their own expert officials (I. 66). Representation of the working-classes must in fact become a profession. The authors do their best to distinguish this professional representative from a mere delegate (69).

To the student of political philosophy this is one of the most interesting sections of the book; it should be compared with the concluding chapter of the second volume, on Trade Unionism and Democracy (807 *seq.*). The next, on the Function of Trades Unions, includes a description of the ways and means of trades societies, their "method of collective bargaining," their fight for a standard rate of wages, normal day, and protection of health and life, as well as their attitude to apprenticeship and machinery. It is strikingly brought out that, while the leading principles of trades unionists are substantially the same, as soon as they try to embody them in a policy for the united action of all they break up like other folk into "Conservatives, Individualists, and Collectivists" (II. 597). The sea is salt, wherever you drop in your bucket.

The third and last part of the book, on "Trade Union Theory," after an acrimonious chapter on the Economists, gives us the authors' view of the present position of parties in the industrial world. The manufacturer is strategically at a disadvantage before the wholesale trader, the wholesale trader before the shopkeeper,

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the shopkeeper before the customer; all the rest are thus pressed to reduce expenses in every possible way, and they all bear down, like a pyramid on its base, upon the workingmen (II. 662–671). At least this would be so if each class of producers did not raise "bulwarks or dikes" against encroachments. Such bulwarks, however, exist in combinations, unions, or legislative monopolies (676–702). The picture is not all dark, after all.

It was, perhaps, natural that writers conscious of having done much for their subject should occasionally write as if no one else had done anything. There is a worse offence than this, however, in notes like that on page 357 of Volume I., where we are told that all economic manuals repeated the statement that unpleasant trades have high wages till the "refreshing originality" of Fleeming Jenkin told the truth about them in 1870. Mill's "Political Economy," perhaps the best known of all economic manua s in this century, contained the correction of the error as early as 1862 (5th ed., II. xiv, § 1). The major prophets as well as the minor should have their due.

J. Bonar.

London.

The Social Teachings of Jesus: An Essay in Christian Sociology. By Shailer Matthews, A.M., Professor of New Testament History and Interpretation in the University of Chicago. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897. Pp. 235. Price, $1.50.

The main effort of Jesus, according to Professor Matthews, was to present ideals, and the present work concerns itself almost exclusively with his conceptions of what society may become and the means and processes through which the desired consummation may be reached. Entrance into a transformed society, "the kingdom of God," is the goal and reward of the individual's endeavor—in the view of Jesus. The "kingdom" is not a mere synonyme for personal holiness or righteousness. It stands for an ideal society or social order. In it the relation of men to God is that of sons, and (therefore) to each other that of brothers. Sonship means not so much descent from as likeness to God,—*i.e.*, practically, moral aspiration and effort; and brotherhood is not "universal brotherhood," in the modern sense, but the brotherhood of the members of the kingdom, of the sons of God.

Professor Matthews contends strongly that the kingdom was not something "post-mortem or post-catastrophic." Jesus did not

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occupy "an exclusively eschatological point of view." The kingdom was to be an evolution, or at least the process by which it was to be reached was evolutionary. It is "the natural possibility for man's social capacities and powers." It may be (and was, indeed) established in the midst of the existing social order, though when completed the existing order will pass away. To the latter incident Professor Matthews refers only in passing, and misses thus the secret of the extraordinary power which the Christian gospel first had. Jesus said the kingdom was "at hand." It was this that startled and compelled the attention of men. The purifying and purging were to be done soon. The exact day or hour Jesus did not pretend to know, but the utmost boundary he set was the lifetime of the generation he addressed. Professor Matthews's exposition, in general so excellent, lacks in objectivity at this point. Indeed, little is said of the goal in general,—of the king coming in glory, of the judgment, of the consuming fire for the wicked, of the new order of nature in which marriage (and birth) and death would pass away,—though in Jesus's teaching the goal (at least, in its aspect of the judgment) is almost as prominent as the immediate present and gives an overshadowing awe to the present. Only on almost the last page of the book is the "cataclysm" distinctly recognized. But on the whole, and in many details to which we cannot refer here, the work is a welcome fruit of advanced Christian scholarship. It shows, we may add, discrimination and sense in incidentally dealing with the social agitations of the present day.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

CHICAGO, ILL.

JEWISH IDEALS, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Joseph Jacobs. London: David Nutt; New York: Macmillan & Co. Pp. 242.

A JEWISH STATE. An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question. By Theodore Herzl. London: David Nutt, 1896. Pp. 102.

These two little volumes are written by two Jews, and deal with the Semitic problem in modern Europe from two entirely different points of view. Herzl is of opinion that this problem is insoluble so long as the Jews reside among the Christian populations of the West. He considers that the Jews have lost the power of assimilating with the European races. He also considers that the Jews produce a great number of mediocre intellects who can find no wholesome outlet either upwards or downwards for their energies.

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If the Jew goes down, he becomes a member of the revolutionary party. If he rises to wealth, he immediately begins to exercise the terrible power of the purse. He is hated by the peoples among whom he takes up his abode because he will not assimilate with them. He is also hated because he either develops into a revolutionary or a plutocrat. Professor Herzl sees no prospect of the Jewish lamb and the Gentile lion consenting to lie down in peace together. He believes that the only solution of the anti-Semitic question is the solution advocated by the ancient prophets. Come out from among the heathen was their watchword. It is the watchword of Professor Herzl as well, and the greater portion of his interesting pamphlet is in the nature of an exposition of how this new exodus is to be effected. His proposal is that the Jews should leave Europe in a body and form a nation of their own either in Palestine or Argentina. This new state would be governed in accordance with Jewish ideals: it would absorb the floating Jewish proletariat which is now wandering over the world in search of a settled home. In it the Jew would be able to develop his individual and collective life in peace. Persecution of the Jew would cease, the Gentile world would be rid of him forever, Jew baiting would become a thing of the past. Such is the solution of the Jewish trouble which Professor Herzl proposes to his coreligionists, or, as he would perhaps prefer to call them, his fellow-countrymen.

Mr. Jacobs hopes to lay the demon of anti-Semitism by other methods. He admits with Professor Herzl that the Jews have not assimilated with the races among whom they have taken up their abode. So long as they are Jews they must cherish the Messianic hope, and as long as they cherish this hope they cannot assimilate and must remain apart. If a Jewish father or a Jewish mother believes the Messiah may spring from their loins or from the loins of their children, how is it to be expected that they will assimilate with the unclean Gentile? It is of the very essence of their religion that they should remain apart. Assimilation would mean the pollution and desecration of their most cherished ideals. Notwithstanding this unfortunate fact, Mr. Jacobs believes that the Jewish question may be solved by a less drastic process than the one recommended by Professor Herzl. He attributes the hostility of the Gentile to the Jew to what he describes as the "Jew's Eye." According to Mr. Jacobs, this is an organ which is never at rest; it is perpetually on the watch, keen to perceive, never relaxing in its intensity. "In whatever relation of life you meet a Jew, his eye is

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forever unslaked in brilliancy, and his soul ready for the conflict, and as a necessary condition of conflict ready and desirous to get the better of the fight." "To have that eye upon you at all times, even in moments of relaxation, is enough to goad the Goy into perpetual irritation. The Jew carries on the conflict of life into affairs where there should be no conflict. He converses on politics, the theatre, a friend's character, or what not; he is never content unless he comes off victor, or at least has the last word. If you want to stop a Jew's talk, a friend once said to me, agree with all he says; without the stimulus of conflict he cannot continue." Mr. Jacobs in these passages gives us to believe that the dislike of the Jew arises from the aggressiveness of his character. Get rid of this aggressiveness and the Jewish question would disappear. In order to effect this end, Mr. Jacobs advises his coreligionists to adopt different ideals in the education of their children. He bids them remember Kingsley's line, "Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever;" and he asks them to inculcate the lesson which this line teaches on the hearts and minds of the Jewish youth. It is probable that Mr. Jacobs' solution of the Jewish trouble is more feasible and practical than Professor Herzl's. It is to be added that Mr. Jacobs's volume is not confined to a discussion of the relations between Jew and Gentile. It contains a number of interesting and cleverly written essays on other Jewish topics.

W. D. Morrison.

London.

Various Fragments. By Herbert Spencer. 8vo. Williams & Norgate, 1897. Pp. 156.

As its title indicates, this volume consists of sixteen "fragments," reprinted from magazines and other sources, on miscellaneous topics and of very varying lengths. Those concerned with ethical subjects are, all but one, replies to criticisms made by different men of science on special parts of Mr. Spencer's system. Of the non-ethical writings, most are letters and articles republished from the *Times* on questions of political and social interest, such as Anglo-American Arbitration, the Parish Councils Act, etc. Some of these are rather interesting as characteristic of the author's way of thought than intrinsically important. The letter on the "Bookselling Question," and the "Views concerning Copyright," have practical significance in view of recent controversies; but of these,

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too, the interest for the general reader is chiefly biographical. The details which they disclose concerning the production and profits of Mr. Spencer's works increase our respectful admiration for the tenacity of purpose and self-confidence (in the best sense) with which he has planned and executed his life-work. They will scarcely, however, encourage the impecunious to follow philosophy as a profession, or even as an inexpensive luxury, showing as they do that if Mr. Spencer had not happened to possess private means, the laws of Survival of the Fittest and Free Trade would have strangled the Synthetic Philosophy in its cradle.

One of the most interesting Fragments is that called "An Element in Method." This lays down a method by which men may guide themselves in forming true scientific hypotheses. Mr. Spencer does not say of his method that *exæquat fere ingenia*, but his bold attempt to analyze and reduce to rules the workings of scientific intuition suggests the Baconian parallel.

Of the ethical pieces, the most important is a criticism of the latter portions of Huxley's Romanes Lecture. Mr. Spencer argues first, that Professor Huxley gives two inconsistent accounts of the relations between the cosmic and the ethical process; and, secondly, that one of these is closely similar to his own account of the matter, and cannot therefore have been intended as an attack upon his doctrine. His argument can only be understood by quoting the passages at issue. On page 33 of the Lecture, Professor Huxley says, "The practice of that which is ethically best—what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence." But in Note 19 he adds, "strictly speaking, social life and the ethical process, in virtue of which it advances towards perfection, are part and parcel of the general process of evolution, just as the gregarious habit of innumerable plants and animals, which has been of immense advantage to them, is so." Mr. Spencer points out the inconsistency of these two passages, the latter of which he accepts as a statement of his own view. But he does not quote the whole of Note 19. A reference to the Romanes Lecture shows that, after enlarging on the social habits of animals, Professor Huxley goes on: "To this extent the general cosmic process begins to be checked by a rudimentary ethical process, which is, strictly speaking, part of the former, just as the 'governor' in a steam-engine is part of the mechanism of the engine."

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This explains clearly enough in what sense it is meant that the ethical process is at once opposed to and part of the cosmic process. Even so, however, it must be admitted that Professor Huxley, as was natural perhaps in a popular lecture, has expressed the antagonism of "nature" and "spirit" somewhat too broadly, since that which regulates and "modifies" the cosmic process cannot rightly be said to have "no sort of relation" and "be in all respects opposed" to it.

The main object of this discussion is the same as that of the short paper on "Social Evolution and Social Duty," and of the replies to the criticisms of Professor Cairnes and M. de Laveleye,—viz., to point out the important place which has been given in the Spencerian system to the altruistic activities and social agencies, and to rebut the charges of a "brutal individualism" brought against it. The disadvantage to the general reader in following these discussions is that only one side is given; and, although large questions are involved, the argument turns directly on statements and expression of which he has not the text by him. Another drawback to the reprinting of magazine controversies between zealous philosophers is that they are apt to be conducted with an acrimony to which it seems a pity to give permanence. This is notably the case with the fragment entitled "Professor Tait on the Formula of Evolution."

The close student of Mr. Spencer, however, will no doubt find it useful to refer to the volume for further elucidation of those points of his system which have called forth most criticism.

ELEANOR RATHBONE.

LIVERPOOL.

THE APPLICATION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION. By J. F. Herbart. Translated and edited, with Notes and Introductions, by Beatrice C. Mulliner, B.A. Lond. Pp. CXXV., 229. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

THE HERBARTIAN PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO EDUCATION. By John Adams, M.A., B.Sc. Pp. iv., 284. London: Isbister & Co.

"Herbartian literature," says Mr. Adams, "is springing up in almost alarming luxuriance." But all who believe in a science of education will be glad to offer a more or less unqualified welcome to such literature. For at the present time any scientific treatment

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of education is sure to be to some extent Herbartian in form, if not in idea. At the same time the thoughtful educator who is not a mere partisan cannot but recognize the existence of a danger of an uncritical acceptance of Herbart's doctrines. For Herbart's educational theory is the outcome of the union of his psychology and his ethics, and his psychology is inseparably connected with his metaphysics. But his metaphysics seems to us to be false, and his ethics insufficient and unsatisfactory. Moreover, Herbart's psychology was, in his own view, nothing if not mathematical—a statics and dynamics of mental life. But the futility of his efforts in this direction is now generally recognized. Whilst, then, we may accept much of Herbart's work as offering a convenient description of many aspects of mental life, we cannot accept his psychological hypothesis as a satisfactory explanation of that life. Those who agree with us in this must decline to accept Herbartianism as a true and complete theory of education. They may recognize much of the highest value and importance in it, they may thankfully accept its help in organizing the work of instruction, but after all they must refuse to find in it the whole truth. "The soul," says Herbart, "has no capacity nor faculty whatever, either to receive or to produce anything." Those who thoroughly accept this position must also accept Herbart's doctrine when he says, "I confess to have no conception of education without instruction." Indeed, all education is instruction if the mind is to be built up of ideas according to the Herbartian psychology, for even example and "discipline" can only be efficacious if they supply ideas which can attain and hold a dominant place in that internecine strife of ideas which is, for Herbart, the totality of mental life. Doubtless, it is difficult to consistently maintain this position of soul passivity, and the most thorough-going Herbartian may even speak—as Miss Mulliner does—of mind as "giving the unity" to complexes of impressions; the soul with no activity but that of self-preservation is found insufficient when one comes to deal with actual human life.

It is for reasons such as we have indicated that we believe more good will be done by books like that of Mr. Adams than by translations such as Miss Mulliner's. In her Preface to the latter, Miss Beale says, "It would be contrary to the spirit of the Master if we adopted his system as a complete whole," and she adds: "We must have, so to speak, a 'native' ministry." This is exactly what we ourselves feel. We must take what we find valuable in Herbart

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and leave the rest, whether, indeed, our selection is "contrary to the spirit of the Master" or not. This is what Mr. Adams does, and does consciously, saying, indeed, that "no doubt the old philosopher would turn in his grave did he know that we were dropping what he considered the most essential part of his work." Mr. Adams recognizes that "Herbartianism has weaknesses;" hence, though his essays "are written with a Herbartian bias," yet "it does not follow that the writer is a Herbartian." Indeed, he shows that—at any rate, in his opinion—the greatest contributions of Herbartianism to pedagogy may be reached on quite a different psychological hypothesis from that of Herbart's elastic, indestructible, and essentially unchangeable ideas. Mr. Adams's position towards theories of psychology is indeed of a somewhat cavalier character: "There may be a one true and living psychology before which all the rest must bow, but in the meantime it has not made good its claims." All existing systems may, therefore, be regarded as hypotheses, and the teacher should select that which promises to be most useful in meeting his needs. Of course, this is open to the retort that if education is really to be an application of psychology, then, unless the psychology is true, the education must be mistaken. To take a psychology because it fits in with educational practice is largely to invert the relative positions of the two sciences. No doubt, Herbartian psychology, when treated and applied as in Mr. Adams's book, becomes educationally fruitful, even if it does not remain strictly Herbartian. Indeed, we know of no more suggestive and stimulating book among the publications of recent years than this of Mr. Adams. It is everywhere marked by a pretty humor, and the illustrations are such as really illustrate. We think it would have been even better had the statement of psychology in Chapter III. been less Herbartian in form, for many of the conclusions are such as can only be called Herbartian by a use of the term so wide as to be misleading. Indeed, as Mr. Adams himself says at the end of his book: "This outcome of his work would no doubt have greatly surprised Johann Friedrich Herbart." He ends by suggesting that it is in a synthesis of Herbart and Froebel on Hegelian principles that the true educational doctrine is to be found. This we believe to be the case, but then we cannot get such a synthesis without breaking away from Herbart's atomistic psychology. Mr. Adams thinks such a synthesis "would not be excessively difficult." Whilst grateful for what he has given us, we wish he would undertake that task also.

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Of quite a different character is Miss Mulliner's book. It consists of an excellent translation of Froebel's unfinished "Letters on the Application of Psychology to the Science of Education," with useful explanatory notes and an introduction giving an outline of Herbartianism in all its aspects. Miss Mulliner is apparently a very enthusiastic disciple of the school of Jena, and her Introduction is pitched in a key of the warmest eulogy. But in such a brief space it was, of course, impossible to be either deep or thorough, and considering that several excellent general introductions to Herbartianism already exist, Miss Mulliner would, perhaps, have been better advised in limiting the extent and increasing the intent of her remarks. For we cannot help thinking that those who will profit from the letters will not benefit from the milk for Herbartian babes offered in the Introduction, whilst those who need the latter had better avoid for a time the strong meat of the former. For, indeed, these letters are by no means easy reading. Miss Mulliner scarcely seems to recognize how difficult they are, for she apparently thinks that the greater part of them will find acceptance with "the general reader" (cf. notes, pp. 148, 182). We doubt this very much, whilst we do not doubt at all that the same "general reader," were he to read them, would find them largely unintelligible. For Herbart assumes a knowledge of his own psychological positions and writings of which the general reader would certainly be innocent. References to his "Psychology" are scattered throughout these letters, and the acceptance of Herbartian mathematical psychology is taken as a matter of course. And we must go further and say that for those who are familiar with Herbartianism, these letters will be disappointingly bare of suggestion and inspiration. They are unsystematic, they are dull and heavy, they involve a large amount of obsolete physiology, and they really seem—in Herbart's own words—"to take us no further than to a repetition of that which every experienced practical teacher already knows." No doubt the professed Herbartian will be glad to have some more of the Master's work in an English dress, but we do not think any others will derive either pleasure or profit from the letters. We are sure that a perusal of them will not aid the inexperienced teacher in his work, whilst the student of pedagogy will not find in them anything with which he is not already familiar.

J. Welton.

The Yorkshire College, Leeds, England.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION: A Research into the Subconscious Nature of Man and Society. By Boris Sidis, M.A., Ph.D., Associate in Psychology at the Pathological Institute of the New York State Hospitals. With an Introduction by Professor William James. D. Appleton & Co., 1898. Pp. vii., 386.

Dr. Sidis opens with a discussion of the phenomena of suggestion, including in it the results of some interesting and original experiments, develops upon this foundation his theory of the dual nature of man, and concludes by applying that theory to the explanation of many more or less closely related groups of phenomena, notably those of insanity and of crowd and mob psychology.

While Dr. Sidis's theories are not novel in their essential traits, his book is written in a vigorous and forceful style, and contains much fresh illustrative material which will repay examination.

His theory is essentially an extension of Pierre Janet's doctrine to the field of the normal. Not only in the hysteric, but in the normal human being as well, there exist realms of mind distinct from the empirical consciousness. This unknown region should not be conceived with Myers as the transcendent reserve of a spiritual personality,—rather does it represent the functioning of cortical cells disassociated from the central coherent system which constitutes the physical basis of the empirical consciousness. The processes of the subwaking consciousness are usually unknown to us, although their effects are frequently traceable in the normal life, but occasionally, in dream, trance, and hallucination, the actual content of the subwaking is intruded into the normal upper consciousness.

In its character the subwaking consciousness is far inferior to the normal, and it usually lacks personality. Dr. Sidis has clearly grasped the conception of impersonal consciousness, and his description of the six chief types of conscious organization is one of the best things in the book.

The best opportunity of studying the traits of the subwaking self is in hypnosis and in some forms of insanity. In the mob, also, we see the activity of the upper self temporarily quiescent, while the hitherto dormant lower bursts out in outrage and excess.

This attempt to explain mob violence by reference to a secondary consciousness is akin to Le Bon's statement that the individual member of the mob is in a state analogous to the hypnotic, but is

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not to the present writer convincing. No such *deus ex machinâ* is needed to explain the irresistible instinct to conform one's conduct to that of the crowd,—for that, natural selection suffices. Even if there were no evidence for a native instinct, the changed conditions in which the individual finds himself, the total removal of the social sanction (or, rather, its attachment to an unusual class of conduct), would sufficiently account for the temporary suspension or intensification of the ethical instincts based upon it. The experimental evidence also which Dr. Sidis has amassed, although showing both ingenuity and patience, falls far short of proving the existence of the subwaking self in the normal individual.

Dr. Sidis's book is marked throughout by a degree of confidence in the doctrines set forth which seems to the present writer a little premature in view of the scantiness and ambiguous character of the evidence now in our possession. But if he can supply us with more experiments like those on the hyperæsthesia of vision here reported, and more cases like that of the Rev. Thomas Hanna, he will put the world of psychologists in his debt.

WILLIAM ROMAINE NEWBOLD.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

A CONCISE HISTORY OF RELIGION. By F. J. Gould. Vols. I., II., and III., pp. 154, 209, 292. London: Watts & Co.

In these volumes, "issued for the Rationalist Press Committee," Mr. Gould makes an able and laborious attempt to accomplish what seems an impossible task—that of writing a history of religion which shall be at once "concise" and satisfactory. Something, of course, depends on what is meant by conciseness. Bernier, in the seventeenth century, wrote an "abridgment" of the philosophy of Gassendi in eight large volumes, to which he added other seven by way of supplement. But Mr. Gould is concise on quite another scale. He puts the whole of religion, except Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, into a small volume of about one hundred and fifty octavo pages. Even the cleverest manipulation can hardly make that satisfactory, and the result must inevitably be either jejune or indigestible. Doubtless Mr. Gould has in view the plain man who is interested in religion but has no time to read voluminous histories. Yet somehow one cannot help feeling that here is another case of the current fallacy of "essences," the fallacy that a large amount of physical or intellectual nourishment can be so boiled down that it may be carried in a man's waistcoat pocket.

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The "essences" of physical food, though they contain little nourishment, are safe stimulants, and I have no doubt that Mr. Gould's book, which contains a vast amount of information, will be intellectually stimulating to its readers. The evils of too great condensation are to a great extent alleviated by the excellent list of books appended to each volume, and Mr. Gould's work thus becomes a useful guide to the whole literature of the subject.

Volume I. deals with the "Chief religions of the world, with the exception of Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism" About half of the volume is devoted to the earliest and lowest forms of religion, Animism, Ancestor-worship, Fetishism, Totemism, worship of natural objects, etc., while the remainder of the volume, following the order of Tiele's "*Outlines*," treats of the religions of the various great races and nations. Volume II. is a chronological review of "Judaism and Jewish sacred literature," concluding with an account of the "environment of early Christianity," that is to say, the various religious and philosophical systems which contributed to the formation and development of Christian belief and worship. Volume III., on "Christian Origins," treats Christianity as the outgrowth of a Puritan Jewish sect, "the New People," who cherished Messianic hopes and who had much in common with the Essenes. In connection with the development of this sect the utmost importance is given to the work of Paul, a Pharisee of Tarsus, not educated in the gentle and liberal school of Gamaliel, but a zealot for the law and a persecutor of the New People, until their excellence, in spite of their disregard of Mosaic observances, opened his eyes to the vision of a new liberty, a "moral franchise" that was independent of the law. Mr. Gould's account of Jesus and his disciples comes afterwards, and the latter part (more than half) of the volume is devoted to the question of the origin and meaning of the Gospels and other New Testament writings and to a careful account of Jewish and Christian literature to the end of the second century.

The book increases in interest as it goes on. The first volume (probably owing to the vain effort at condensation) is somewhat dull. It is to a large extent a record of facts regarding the external features of the religions it deals with, and it leaves no very clear impression on the reader's mind. In the second and third volumes the reader gains by having the background of the Bible; but, apart from that, there are fewer scrappy, indigestible facts, and there is much more of living interest,—more of the soul and spirit

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of the people, which make their religion worth understanding. The volumes are full of controversial matter, which cannot fittingly be discussed here. The value of the book seems to me to lie in the importance it gives to the social, as distinct from the purely individual, factors in the development of religion. Every religion seems inevitably to involve devotion to a real or ideal person; but the share of the worshippers in the making of the religion has been too often minimized. Mr. Gould's book will help to correct this. It will not commend itself to the orthodox, but it is carefully and reverently written, in a clear and simple style, and it puts into small compass a great amount of reading in the best authorities.

ROBERT LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

IN TUNE WITH THE INFINITE; OR, FULNESS OF PEACE, POWER, AND PLENTY. By Ralph Waldo Trine. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company, 1897.

An amiable spiritual pride, a humane but essentially immature idealism, an edifying vagueness, a somewhat dilute solution of the ancient lore of mystical faith,—these are the constituents that go to make the doctrine of this not at all unattractive little volume. The type to which it belongs is well represented in the American popular literature of to-day. This book is by no means a poor or unworthy representative of its class.

Every one is "building his world from within." "The optimist, by his superior wisdom and insight, is making his own heaven." "The great central fact of the universe is that Spirit of Infinite Life and Power that is back of all, that animates all, that manifests itself in and through all." "There have been and are highly illumined souls who believe that we receive our life from God after the manner of a divine inflow. And, again, there have been and are those who believe that our life is one with the life of God, and so that God and man are one. Which is right? Both are right; both right when rightly understood." God's relation to man (p. 14) is like that of an "inexhaustible reservoir on the mountain side" to a smaller reservoir "in a valley." Both contain the same water. They differ in the amount of the water. So man's life is the "same in essence" as God's life. There is only a "difference in degree." The practical result is that if man "opens himself to this divine inflow," he "approaches" God, and "takes on the God-powers" (p. 15). The "only limitations man has are the limitations he sets

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to himself by virtue of not knowing himself." "Ignorance is the most potent factor in setting limitations to the majority of mankind." The cure for this ignorance is "the operation of thought," defined in the well known mystical fashion. The "soul life" is "direct from God" (p. 23). The "physical life" "relates us to the material universe about us." "The thought life" connects the one with the other. It is this that "plays between the two." Thought is "a vital living force" as we nowadays prove "in our very laboratory experiments" (p. 24). "We are all living in a vast ocean of thought." The true spiritual art consists in closing myself to "all things below," and making myself "receptive to all higher influences." "Bodily health and vigor" (p. 42 sqq.) result from such opening of the self to the divine inflow, and our author devotes a considerable space to the discussion of the mental causation and cure of disease. "Mental therapeutics" (p. 51) must now be studied by every doctor. "Many absurd and foolish things have been claimed and done" as to mental healing, but the "great underlying laws" themselves remain. The author knows "*personally*," as he assures us, of cures belonging to this type. Meanwhile "one may cure another, but to be *permanently healed* one must do it himself" (p. 53). "Suffering is designed to continue only so long as sin continues; sin not necessarily in the theological, but always in the philosophical sense, though many times in the sense of both." Exercises for the improvement of health through mystic communion are hereupon discussed, with that curious tendency to encourage chronic spiritual hypochondria which too many lovers of mental healing seem nowadays disposed to indulge. The length of the chapter upon this topic (pp. 42–88) indicates the author's general position as to this whole subject. "Love," "Wisdom and Interior Illumination," "The Realization of Perfect Peace," "Coming into Fulness of Power," "Plenty of All Things —The Law of Prosperity," and "How Men have become Prophets, Seers, Sages, and Saviours," are the titles of later sections of the book. And here it is that the amiable spiritual pride aforesaid finds plentiful and not ungracious expression. "Miracles have abounded in all places and at all times" (p. 201). Anybody who "lives in the realization" of the "oneness of his life with the Source whence it came" becomes "a prophet, seer, sage, or saviour," and can presumably work miracles (p. 152). Among the author's friends are numbered several people who seem to have reached very beautiful elevation of life and character, and in such

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company one thinks little of many attainments that on the "physical plane" would seem impossible. "Whatever can't be done in the physical can be done in the spiritual."

The new mysticism, very prevalent at this time in America, is thus, indeed, not ill represented by this very pleasant book. Critical thinking there is none, of course, from one end of the volume to the other. There is the simple assumption that this is what any philosophical Idealism must come to,—an assumption that the present reviewer has several times dealt with at some length in the course of discussions on Idealism. As a fact, this gentle optimism, with its well known opposition of "lower plane" and "higher plane," of the "physical plane" and the "invisible," becomes often rather painfully dualistic at the very point where a sound idealism, facing the problem of evil with a true sense of its gravity, is most needed to give a practical unity to the concrete life and warfare of humanity. The new mysticism, like the old, is selective, and appeals only to a portion of mankind; but the old mysticism—the doctrine of the Hindoo forest sages, of the mediæval mystics, or even of our own earlier Transcendentalists —had an historical background, an energy of life, and an originality of expression and of experience that one has almost wholly to miss in our recent disciples of mental therapeutics, and of the "higher plane." The new doctrine saves its invalids, and has already given us a few really valuable contributions both to poetical literature and to the literature of direct personal experience; but it has yet to produce its "prophets."

JOSIAH ROYCE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGION. An Essay in English Culture History. By M. W. Wiseman. London: The University Press, Limited, 1897. Pp. 340

This book is an attempt to criticise the movement of theological thought in England since the Reformation from the atheistical stand-point. According to the writer, religion is a disease, priests are impostors, and the "main forces in the making and unmaking of churches are those of personal and pecuniary interests." At the end of the eighteenth century these conceptions of religion and ecclesiastical institutions had a certain vogue; but it is rather remarkable to find them dug out of their graves towards the close of the nineteenth to serve as an explanation of the dynamics of reli-

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gion. "The fortunes of religion," says Mr. Wiseman, "are determined by ignorance, by avarice, by self-interest, by fashion, by carnal organization, by anything rather than reason, argument, conviction, or good faith." Mr. Wiseman's powers of denunciation are not confined to belaboring religious institutions: wherever he sees a head he cannot resist the temptation of hitting it, no matter whose head it happens to be. He tells us that Newton and Locke were guilty of dissimulation, that Berkeley was a hypochondriac, that Mr. Morley and Mr. Lecky lack logic and coherence, and that Mr. Morley's rationalist propaganda has been damped down by the indirect pressure of personal interest among other things. Mill's final leanings to theism were probably due to "a contraction of the understanding or shrinkage of the spirit with growing age." Mr. Leslie Stephen's attitude towards rationalism is "intelligible only as either a survival of early prejudice in a critic trained for the Church or an apprehensive propitiation of the orthodox reader." The last thing which Mr. Wiseman is prepared to concede to a man or an institution is a certain measure of sincerity and good faith. In fact, he opens his book with the assertion that man is a liar, and his criticism of men and movements in England during the last three hundred years is dominated by this belief.

It seems impossible for a writer with an ethical outlook of this character to do justice to any individual or any institution. The judgment is warped as effectively by a suspicious and cynical temper as by credulity and superstition. It is to be regretted on many grounds that Mr. Wiseman has approached his subject in such an unfortunate frame of mind. He has plenty of literary ability, and a considerable amount of knowledge. But these gifts are to a large extent spoilt by an aggressiveness, a cocksureness, and a supercilious acerbity towards all manner of men and things. Men win acceptance for their ideas as much by the ethical temper in which they are expressed as by the intrinsic power of the ideas themselves. It is rather curious that a writer of so much ability as Mr. Wiseman should at this time of day assume religion to be little else than a form of mental disease, concocted and kept alive by priests. No doubt history shows that priesthoods have not always been the friends of religion and that religious beliefs have been sometimes exploited by them for selfish purposes. It is not an unknown thing for mothers to starve or even murder their children, but these unnatural acts do not force us to the conclusion that the

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maternal sentiment is an exploded superstition. The misdeeds of priests are a scandal to religion but not an argument against it. Besides, religions have existed in which, as far as can be discovered, there were no priests. How does this fact fit in with the view that religion is a priestly imposture? If religion is an imposture, it is remarkable that it should have existed so long. We find it in every stage of human history; among the most backward as well as among the most progressive races. Surely, if this great element in human life and conduct were of the spurious character which the writer of this book assumes it to be, some nations at some period of their history would have abandoned it. But it is useless arguing against positions which have been abandoned long ago by almost all serious students of religious history. In spite of much acute criticism on the theological controversies of the last three hundred years, Mr. Wiseman's general estimate of things ecclesiastical is of the same character as an anarchist's estimate of the existing order of society. Hitherto the doctrine of universal destruction, whether in the religious or the political sphere, has not appealed to the common sense of mankind, and there is no likelihood that it ever will.

W. D. MORRISON.

LONDON.

AFFIRMATIONS. By Havelock Ellis. London: Walter Scott, 1898.

This book has borrowed its title from Friedrich Nietzsche's writings, and, without any doubt, it will be mainly read for the essay on that German philosopher which fills the first eighty-five pages of it. Whatever follows them—essays on Casanova, Zola, Huysmans, and St. Francis and others—is of comparatively minor importance. Mr. Ellis is one of the few Englishmen who really feel the greatness of Nietzsche's intellectual achievements. For him Nietzsche stands in the first rank of the distinguished and significant personalities our century has produced, and he has too generous a turn of mind to condemn Nietzsche's philosophy because Nietzsche's life ended in insanity. "No doubt it was once a consolation to many that Socrates was poisoned, that Jesus was crucified, that Bruno was burnt. But hemlock and the cross and the stake proved sorry weapons against the might of ideas even in those days, and there is no reason to suppose that a doctor's certificate will be more effectual in our own," are his own words. They express an attitude towards the subject very different from that taken up by almost the entire English criticism ever since Nietzsche's writings

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have begun to appear in English. Mr. Ellis divides his able attempt of giving an account of Nietzsche into three parts. In the first he merely gives an extract from the biography of Nietzsche, written by his sister, and, therefore, is least original. All his acuteness and breadth of view, however, become apparent in Part II., in which he analyzes the writings of Nietzsche's middle period from 1876 to 1883. It is with the writings of that time that he sympathizes most heartily, and it is these which he has studied most carefully. He therefore gives an admirable account of the leading ideas laid down in "Human, All-too-Human;" "Dawn of the Day," and "Joyful Science." But he, apparently, feels less sympathy for the Nietzsche of the time after 1876. Whilst the "Antichrist" is characterized correctly, full justice is not done to "Beyond Good and Evil," "Genealogy of Morals," and "Thus Spake Zarathustra." More especially to the study of the latter most difficult book he has not devoted the time required for penetrating into its secrets. Here even many things are incorrect. Not to mention small matters, as that German *kultur* means in English civilization, and not culture; that not *Beyondmen* assemble in Zarathustra's cave, but the *Higher Men* (which Nietzsche very definitely distinguishes from the former), he entirely leaves out of account Nietzsche's inferences from Darwinism and Jordan's poetry, his theory of eternal recurrence; his position towards the various shades of individualism; and the interesting and often strange conflicts which arise from a collision of these different mental currents. He altogether treats Nietzsche too much as an isolated fact, failing to give him his place in the intellectual development of our age, both as regards his services and as regards his suggestions. Nevertheless, Mr. Ellis's essay on Nietzsche can be heartily recommended as a good introduction into Nietzsche's philosophy.

ALEXANDER TILLE.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS TO HIMSELF. An English Translation, with Introductory Study on Stoicism and the Last of the Stoics, by Gerald H. Rendall, M.A., Litt.D., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Principal and Professor of Greek, University College, Liverpool. Macmillan & Co. Crown octavo. Pp. cxlvi., 188.

In this book the "English Translation" and the "Introductory Study" form two fairly equal portions. The object of the former

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is to "give Marcus Aurelius to English readers with scholarly precision and in becoming dress." This is the main object of the book, to which the "Introductory Study" is "strictly supplementary." The latter, that is to say, has for its aim, "not to give a complete or balanced exposition of Stoicism as a whole, but to consider so much of it as remains implicit or explicit in the words of Marcus Antoninus, so that the reader of the 'Thoughts,' in approaching the dogmas and the formulas which they contain, may have in mind their origin, their meaning, their development, and their eventual content for Marcus and his contemporaries."

In both respects Professor Rendall may, we think, be congratulated. The English reader has a rendering the scholarly accuracy of which he may trust, and from its style may gather much of the tone, at once so simple, so manly, so sad, of the "Thoughts." This is a task which it was (in the words of the Preface) "worth while to do," and it has been done well.

The Historical Introduction consists of five chapters, entitled respectively: Origins of Stoicism—Birth of Stoicism—Stoic Dogma —Stoicism in History—Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. It thus falls naturally into two parts,—(1) a History of Stoicism, (2) a personal study of the emperor himself. In both the limitations the author sets himself, viz.: the needs of the English reader, are adhered to, but within these limitations the work done is excellent. The best part of the historical account is the second section of Chapter II., where the relation of Stoicism to Cynicism, and the difference between them, especially with reference to their respective interpretations of the word "Nature," is well drawn out; but the whole of this part of the Introduction is clear, accurate, and straightforward. There are occasional statements about other schools of thought which seem open to question, and one especially (on page lxiv.) about Plato and Pantheism which few would accept, but these are small blemishes and do not affect the value of the account given of Stoicism itself.

The study of Marcus Antoninus is discriminating, thoughtful, and sympathetic. The early influence of his life, the "conservative" school of statesmanship in which he was brought up, his loyalty to duty so steadfast amid the awful loneliness of his position as emperor, his clear sense of the hollowness of mundane things, with the unswerving determination to be "till God sounds the withdrawal, still ready for the march," are worked out with force and truth. The author's final verdict is that "Marcus Aurelius

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Antoninus survives as perhaps the loftiest exemplar of unassisted duty whom history records—unalterably loyal to the noblest hypothesis of life he knew." With this verdict few will quarrel, and Professor Rendall's translation will help to bring it home to many readers who would otherwise only know the "Thoughts" through the inadequate medium of some history of philosophy.

W. H. FAIRBROTHER.

LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD.

THE MORALITY OF MARRIAGE, and other Essays on the Status and Destiny of Woman. By Mona Caird. London: George Redway, 1897.

It is difficult to review with justice a book like Mrs. Caird's. It consists of a number of essays published in the first instance separately at intervals extending over a period of nearly ten years. During those ten years the subject treated of has undergone the most striking changes both as regards the conditions of women's work and the attitude of those who approach the consideration of her "status and destiny." These changes are but little reflected in Mrs. Caird's essays. It is difficult for the student of the subject as it now is to put him or herself completely at the point of view of ten years ago; but it may, perhaps, be doubted whether the frankly partisan attitude adopted by the writer was the wisest or most serviceable even at a time when custom was harder and prejudice more unbroken than they are now.

The earlier part of the book recounts at wearisome length the marriage customs of savages and semi-civilized peoples; the latter part advocates many good and desirable ideas of reform and development in married life; ideas, however, common to-day not only to the literature of the subject but to actual married life itself. Mrs. Caird mars her advocacy of these good things by basing it on the, alas! painfully familiar misconception of freedom as the absence of all interference or restraint. It is, perhaps, this very abstract method of approach which induces in Mrs. Caird her startling pessimism as to the condition of married women among us to-day. When one thinks of the multitude of mentally active married women one knows who are neither slaves nor drudges nor puppets nor dolls, who bear an active and weighty part in the formation of the common will and judgment which directs and controls home life, and who take an ever-increasing share in the formation of the rational will and judgment of the wider

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community also, one cannot help thinking that if this brilliant writer devoted her thought more to life and less to theory she would back her admirable sympathies by sounder arguments and have more hope of the fulfilment of a more rational ideal.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

PORT-ROYAL EDUCATION. Extracts, with an Introduction, by Félix Cadet. Translated, with an Index, by Adnah D. Jones. Pp. 260. Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

Most students of the history of education are familiar with M. Cadet's useful monograph on the educational work and doctrines of the Port-Royalists. We have here a translation of the work into English, which, so far as we have tested it, is correct if not brilliant. So thoroughly is it a translation, indeed, that a passage from Dr. Bain's "Education as a Science" is retranslated from the French into English altogether different from that of the original, and the page reference given is, we presume, to the French edition; at any rate, it differs from that in the English original by one hundred and nine pages. It seems strange, too, to read in a note on page 181 of Plato's "Lois," as if the Greek philosopher wrote originally in French. Similarly on page 2 we are referred to the "Œuvres Sociales" of Channing. As to the work of M. Cadet, but little need be said. There is a sensible introduction, which recognizes the limitations as well as the merits of the Port-Royalists, and this is followed by extracts from their writings, generally, though not quite entirely, dealing with education. There is much that is admirable in the educational doctrines set forth,—the deep religious and moral aim, the self-devotion of the teachers, the gentle firmness of the discipline, and the generally intelligent conception of method. In the last point, the plan of teaching in the mother tongue was the greatest reform advocated. In all these particulars they had, indeed, been anticipated by the great English writers on education of the preceding century, but in most of them they were preaching a doctrine new to French ears; and, indeed, to Continental ears in general. But their system had serious limitations; the isolation of the pupils from ordinary family life, the constant supervision by the masters, the deliberate restriction of education to a very few carefully selected children, the monastic repression and monotony of the pupils' lives, the neglect of physical training, are most serious blots, and prevent us from placing the Port-Royalists—able as they

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were—in the front rank of educators. No teacher can, however, read the extracts which M. Cadet gives us without receiving stimulus and suggestions, and we are glad to commend this translation to those who cannot conveniently read the original.

J. WELTON.

THE YORKSHIRE COLLEGE, LEEDS.

THE SEVENTH EARL OF SHAFTESBURY AS SOCIAL REFORMER. By Edwin Hodder. London: Nisbet & Co., 1897.

Mr. Hodder has done well to attempt some abridgment and selection from the larger "Life and Work" of Lord Shaftesbury which he published some ten years ago. The present volume is a new book, and confined to that aspect of his career which has made the name of the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury a household word. It is, in fact, a brief and popular *résumé* of the philanthropic movements to which he devoted his life. It is certainly a striking story that is told, and its effect is heightened rather than diminished by the plain and matter-of-fact way in which it is set out.

SIDNEY BALL.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

A SKETCH OF MORALITY INDEPENDENT OF OBLIGATION OR SANCTION. By M. Guyau. Translated from the French by Gertrude Kapteyn. London: Watts & Co., 1898.

THE NON-RELIGION OF THE FUTURE: A Sociological Study. By Marie Jean Guyau. London: William Heinemann, 1898.

THE MAKING OF RELIGION. By Andrew Lang, LL.D. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

[A somewhat elaborate investigation of early phases of religious belief. A work of great value to students of anthropology, and also to all who are interested in "psychical research." The main results are summarized as follows (p. 331): "On the hypothesis here offered to criticism there are two chief sources of religion: (1) the belief, how attained we know not, in a powerful, moral, eternal, omniscient Father and Judge of men; (2) the belief (probably developed out of experiences normal and supernormal) in somewhat of man which may survive the grave. This second belief is not, logically, needed as given material for the first, in its apparently earliest form. It may, for all we know, be the later of the two beliefs, chronologically. But this belief, too, was necessary to religion: first, as finally supplying a formula by which advancing intellects could conceive of the Mighty Being involved in the former creed; next, as elevating man's conception of his own nature. By the second belief he becomes the child of the God in whom, perhaps, he already trusted, and in whom he has his being, a being not destined to perish with the death of the body. Man is thus not only the child but the heir of God, a 'nursling of immortality,' capable of entering into eternal life." The first of these two beliefs does not seem to be as thoroughly dealt with as the second; and hence the interest of the volume for the student of Ethics and Philosophy is considerably less than that for the student of Psychology and Anthropology.]

THE WONDERFUL CENTURY: Its Successes and its Failures. By Alfred Russel Wallace. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1898.

[The "successes" include progress in the mechanical arts and in physical science. The "failures" consist in the neglect of Phrenology, of Hypnotism, and of Psychical Research, the enforcement of Vaccination, the growth of Militarism, and the extension of economic injustice. Distinctly an interesting book.]

FOOTSTEPS IN HUMAN PROGRESS, SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS. A Short Series of Letters to a Friend. By James Samuelson. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE: An Edition and Translation of the remaining Fragments of the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, together with a Translation of the more important accounts of their opinions contained in the early

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epitomes of their works. By Arthur Fairbanks. London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., 1898. [A work of the greatest value to the student of ancient philosophy.]

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH DEMOCRATIC IDEAS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By G. P. Gooch, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. [*Cambridge Historical Essays*, No. X. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1898.]

PROBLEMS OF MODERN INDUSTRY. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. [A series of Essays on Women's Wages, the Sweating System, the Reform of the Poor Law, Co-operation and Trade Unionism, Socialism, etc.]

COSMOPOLITAN DUTIES. A Paper read before the Liverpool Philomathic Society. By Professor MacCunn, M.A., LL.D. Liverpool: D. Marples & Co., 1898.

AN ESSAY ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN ITS ECONOMIC ASPECTS. (*Ancient Times.*) By Prof. W. Cunningham, D.D. (*Cambridge Historical Series.*) Cambridge: C. J. Clay & Sons, 1898.

NEO-MALTHUSIANISM: An Enquiry into that System, with regard to its Economy and Morality. By R. Ussher. London: Gibbings & Co., 1898.

CREED AND LIFE. A Critical Enquiry concerning the Ancient Orthodox Creed, and a Declaration of its Contents in proof of its capacity to meet the Needs of Modern Life. By the Rev. C. E. Besby, B. D. Oxon, Beverley, E. Yorks.: John Wright & Co., 1898.

PHILOSOPHY IN RELATION TO LIFE. A Lecture delivered at the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy. By Professor J. H. Muirhead. Reprinted from the *Ethical World*. London: The "Ethical World" Publishing Company, 1898.

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE. By Professor Wesley Mills, M.A., M.D., etc. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1898.

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[Among the contributors are Messrs. A. L. Smith, J. Gow, P. E. Matheson, etc.]

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Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
Prof. E. Boirac, 51 Rue Jeannin, Dijon, France.
Prof. Fr. Jodl, 45 Porzellangasse, Vienna, Austria.
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Merchiston, Llanishen, near Cardiff, Wales.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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INTERNATIONAL

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THE TSAR'S RESCRIPT.

On the twenty-seventh of August of the present year the *Official Messenger* of St. Petersburg contained one of the most remarkable documents that has seen the light during the present century. It had been handed three days before, by order of the Tsar, to all the foreign representatives accredited to the Court of St. Petersburg, and thus had been placed at once in a position of prominence only accorded to diplomatic communications of the first importance. Its contents showed that it was even more remarkable in itself than in the circumstances of its origin. It contained a summary of the chief arguments against "the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations," and concluded by proposing an international Conference to "put an end to these incessant armaments, and to seek the means of warding off the calamities which are threatening the whole world."

The reception given to this Peace Rescript of the absolute master of nearly three million soldiers has been curiously compounded of enthusiasm and dislike, relief and doubt, sanguineness and hesitancy. It is understood that all the powers who received the Tsar's invitation have accepted it or intend to accept it, some with reservations and some without. But official answers to official communications often give little insight into the real minds of their authors, especially in

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diplomacy, where "exalted sentiments" and "benevolent intentions" are as common on paper as they are rare in the every-day intercourse of states. No statesman cares to pose before the world as an enemy of peace and the things which make for peace. But the men who are mainly responsible for the present state of affairs, in which the preparations for war are almost as burdensome as war itself, are hardly the persons to whom we should look for a sincere and strenuous effort to put an end to the period of armed truce. They will shrug their shoulders and murmur that, though the ideal of the Tsar is noble, it is unattainable. They will magnify the very real difficulties in the way, and will make little effort to overcome them. It is not that they are bad, but they are sceptical. Most of them are oppressed with labor and slaves to routine. The ablest and the best are loaded with cares, surrounded by officials whose interests are bound up with the continuance of the present system, and incapable, from training and environment, of believing in the existence of a genuine altruistic enthusiasm in their fellow-men. If they are to move at all, they must be convinced that the nations they represent desire that the proposed Conference shall be a reality and not a sham; and if they are to strive with all their might for the realization of the Tsar's dream, they must be made to understand that the bulk of their fellow-citizens will hold them responsible for any failure their efforts could have avoided. Unless the public opinion of the civilized world declares unmistakably in favor of some stop being put upon the expansion of armaments, armaments will continue to increase. Statesmen must feel a force behind them impelling them to act, and then their ability and experience, both of which are indispensable if good intentions are to be translated into good deeds, will be used without stint for the attainment of the ends in view. In England public opinion has spoken with no uncertain voice. Towns' meetings, religious conferences, and trade organizations have vied with one another in giving an emphatic endorsement to the Russian project. The leaders of political parties and the chief ministers of the various denominations have all spoken in the same sense, and, though an undercurrent of

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suspicion and dislike is sometimes in evidence, it would be impossible to obtain anywhere from an open public meeting a resolution requesting the government to take no part in the proposed Conference. The people of the United States have been so occupied with the great problems of national policy now pressing for solution that they have not been able to spare much attention for proposals that affect them more remotely, though not less seriously, than the questions arising out of their war with Spain. But in so far as they have considered the project of the Tsar they have pronounced in its favor. Among the English-speaking peoples all the world over, that statesman who openly and avowedly tries to wreck the Peace Conference will have a heavy account to settle with his fellow-countrymen. But on the continent of Europe appearances are not so favorable, except in Russia, where the peasant dimly discerns that the grandson of the Tsar who liberated him from serfdom is endeavoring to liberate him from the bondage of military service. In most other countries there is apathy among the masses of the people. In France there was at first actual hostility, caused partly by offended *amour propre*, because the great ally of the Republic had not taken her rulers into his confidence before he spoke to the world at large, and partly by the fear lest an acceptance of his invitation would seem to involve acquiescence in the present territorial distribution of Europe. But the apprehension of having to give at least a tacit recognition of the right of Germany to the provinces ceded in 1871 seems to have been removed by diplomatic assurances that the Conference would be limited in its scope to the question of armaments; while a perception of the fact that France, which has practically come to an end of her resources in men, has more to gain than Germany, whose population is increasing rapidly, by an agreement to attempt no further expansion of armies, has done much to remove the feeling of soreness due to resentment at not having been consulted beforehand. We may, then, reckon the French people among those who are taking no strong views on either side. Like the population of most of the states of Europe, they are indifferent; and it is upon the possibility of turning this indif-

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ference into active support that the prospects of the Conference depend.

To a spectator at a distance it would seem strange to the last extreme of strangeness if the peoples of the continent were not roused to demand the acceptance of proposals which would put some limit to the demands upon their blood and treasure. In the language of the Rescript itself, "Hundreds of millions are devoted to acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which, though to-day regarded as the last word of science, are destined to-morrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same field. National culture, economic progress, and the production of wealth are either paralyzed or checked in their development. Moreover, in proportion as the armaments of each power increase, so do they less and less fulfil the object which the governments have set before themselves. The economic crises due in great part to the system of armaments *à outrance* and the continual danger which lies in this massing of war material are transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden, which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing." France is piling up debt to an extent unknown and undreamed of, even in the wasteful days of the Second Empire, while her worship of that strange fetish she calls "The honor of the army" has made her tolerant of outrages on justice and defiances hurled at the civil power. In Germany personal liberty is disappearing beneath the attacks of militarism and the autocracy which rests upon it. Austria sees taxation, expenditure, and armaments increasing by leaps and bounds, and gains no corresponding advantage in external or internal security. In Italy whole provinces are taxed into semi-starvation and disease to support enormous forces, which, in turn, crush out revolts due to the madness of hunger.

Doubtless sheer ignorance is one great cause of the apathy discernible in Europe. Another may be found in the fear of offending the powers that be, especially the all-pervading military element among them. Where the people are really free and have learned how to fulfil the task of controlling their own destinies, as in Switzerland and Norway, there is a

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very active and whole-hearted support of the Tsar's project. Mistaken patriotism is a powerful force in the array opposed to the Rescript. The obvious fact that any disarmament which a Conference would consent to must be proportional and simultaneous is ignored, and people are led to believe that their country will be the victim of some trick. Another stumbling-block is found in the attitude of most of those organized societies which exist for the exalted purpose of establishing the reign of peace and law. Their aspirations have received welcome in an unlooked-for quarter. A great ruler has adopted as his own the best of the arguments which they have for generations addressed to deaf ears. The whole civilized world has listened and consented to discuss. The commonest prudence would have dictated a great and united effort to concentrate opinion upon the support of the one definite proposal of the Tsar, the abatement of the plague of excessive armaments. But this was much too sensible to content the enthusiasts who dream of organizing the *millennium* by means of a few resolutions and a plentiful supply of rhetoric. The International Assembly of delegates of Peace Societies which met at Turin at the end of last September declined to do anything so mean and grovelling as "represent the practical spirit only." They therefore started off in hot pursuit of the ideal; and after expressing a hope that "all the governments will give their sincere adhesion to the proposal of the Emperor of Russia," proceeded to suggest that the International Conference "should propose to the nations the conclusion of a general treaty of permanent arbitration," and should attempt to secure the adoption of a code of International Law, which should safeguard the independence of each nation and secure justice among peoples. It is due to the British delegates to say that they fought hard against these egregious proposals. They pointed out that a general Treaty of Arbitration and a formal code of International Law were distant goals which might be attained in the far future, but could not be reached within the next few months. And they warned their colleagues against making themselves the laughing-stock of Europe by coupling projects which the average man would at once reject

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as Utopian with the one practical project which had just received the unexpected adherence of a great military ruler. But their arguments met with no acceptance from the great body of the Assembly. They were impatiently voted down. The idealists triumphed, happy in the fond belief that they had affirmed eternal principles in the face of a hostile world, and apparently without the slightest suspicion that they had struck a heavy blow at the very cause which they are organized to defend. Possibly in their attempts to influence their fellow-citizens they may act more wisely than when they were assembled together in conference. Unless this happens, a great opportunity will be thrown away by those who should have been the first to avail themselves of it, and a great force will be wasted when it is most needed to overcome the apathy of the continental peoples with regard to the Tsar's humane proposals.

Passing on from the reception which has been accorded to the Russian project, we may proceed to a consideration of its ethical value. Those who, like the author of the present paper, avowedly approach the subject from a Christian point of view, may be content to say that the overgrown armaments of modern Europe are in themselves a negation of Christian principles, and any proposal to abate them or prevent their further increase should receive the whole-hearted support of all Christian people. In order to adopt this view, it is not necessary to hold that war is always and in every case wrong, or that the profession of the soldier is forbidden to the followers of Christ. All we need take for granted is that the peace which our Lord left as a legacy to his disciples was meant to include nations, and that the law of brotherhood applies to states as well as to individuals. If we believe that the work of Christ will not be fully done on earth till "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more," we must range ourselves with those who see in the Rescript of the Tsar an attempt to bring the practice of civilized states into some approximation to agreement with the principles of the religion which most of them profess.

But such considerations as these are not likely to meet with

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universal acceptance, and in any case it is desirable to reinforce them by other arguments. No one can fail to see that the withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of young men from the peaceful careers just opening out before them involves enormous industrial and social waste. Moreover, during the time they are learning the business of mutual slaughter, they are supported by public funds raised from the taxation of their countrymen. The burden is already in some countries destroying the springs of industry and closing the avenues of commerce. Even wealthy England has been warned by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer that, if her expenditure on armaments continues to increase at the present rate, she will have soon to choose between increased taxation and the cessation of her efforts to reduce her national debt. The twenty-four thousand miles of soldiers which, according to a Germany authority, represent the sum total of the armies of continental Europe, are not fed, clothed, and provided with munitions of war without an annual expenditure of hundreds of millions sterling. And, while money is poured out like water for warlike purposes, education languishes owing to the difficulty of raising the necessary funds, and the eternal lack of pence hampers every effort to deal with such problems as the housing of the poor and the provision in towns and villages of the amenities of communal existence. Nor are the evils of militarism confined to the diversion of national wealth from productive to unproductive channels. It brings with it grave moral dangers, which it is both foolish and wicked to ignore. M. Urbain Gohier, in his book "L'Armée contre la Nation," which has brought upon him prosecution at the instance of the French government, may possibly paint too dark a picture. But much of his information is taken from official reports, and he deliberately declares that barrack life is a school of drunkenness, debauchery, and every filthy vice. The youths of the nation go into it healthy, clean, and vigorous. They come out rotten and tainted, to become centres of moral and physical corruption on their return to civilian occupations. It is impossible to pronounce an opinion upon such sweeping charges without

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an investigation, which few would be able or willing to undertake. But it may not be amiss to remark in passing that, human nature being what it is, the aggregation of young men together in large masses without the possibility of marriage, and with a good deal of time hanging idle on their hands, is sure to lead to results of a most unsatisfactory kind, unless the greatest pains are taken by the authorities to provide influences which shall counteract those other influences whose existence is so well known that they need not be described. Unfortunately, it sometimes happens that those who from their official position should be foremost in the combat with vice have adopted the doctrine that it is a necessity, and do their best to encourage what they ought to endeavor to stamp out. But lubricity is not the only evil that may easily be made to flourish in the atmosphere of camps. Contempt of civilians, impatience of civil authority, distaste for civil life, are each and all fostered by the overgrown military system of most continental nations. The old doctrine of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that a standing army is dangerous to liberty, may receive startling confirmation at the close of the nineteenth century.

It is said, on the other hand, that armies are schools of patriotism and self-sacrifice; and no one who possesses a knowledge of the gallant deeds done by soldiers of all countries will be disposed to deny that there is a large amount of truth in the statement. Yet it is false to add that patriotism cannot exist and flourish without the aid of a military training. The United States, with its army of twenty-five thousand men in a population of seventy millions, is a striking proof to the contrary. At the beginning of the present year no ruler of a great civilized power controlled so small an armed force as did President McKinley. But when the need was felt, he had but to stamp his foot and armed men seemed to rise from the soil. If any real danger from a foreign foe should threaten the American Union, the industrious population which tills her prairies and toils in her workshops would throng by millions to her defence. In no country is the sentiment of patriotism stronger, and in no country is it less dependent

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upon the influence of a standing army. As to self-sacrifice, it is taught far better by the charities and restraints of domestic life than by the wild rush of the battle-field or the comradeship of the camp and the march. Courage and devotion, organization and discipline, are not the sole prerogatives of the soldier, though the world rings with his deeds of daring and his feats of obedience and endurance, while civilians do not find the special correspondent at their elbow and the daily press filled with descriptions of their exploits. The management of a great industrial concern requires as much talent for organization as the planning of a campaign. The thousands of workmen who obey one head and combine their separate efforts to attain a common end are disciplined differently but as thoroughly as the long lines of marching infantry who delight the eye at a great review. If peace necessarily meant ignoble ease there would be much to say for the theory of Von Moltke and other great generals, that war was necessary to preserve the virility of the race and keep alive the manly virtues. But who can visit the busy hives of industry without being convinced of its fallacy? The arts of peace require as much active cultivation as the arts of war. While there are seas to be traversed, mines to be dug, explorations to be carried out, engineering feats to be accomplished, and scientific discoveries to be made, no one need fear that patience, courage, perseverance, and skill will die out among mankind for lack of exercise. The dangers of fire and flood would call forth heroism and devotion even if war were but a dim memory of an evil past. Honest toil and manly exercise would develop the human frame to the height of its strength and beauty even if military drill were as obsolete as the formation of the Macedonian phalanx.

We may dismiss as phantoms of a too active imagination all anticipation of moral decay consequent upon the abatement of war. But even if they were as well founded as they are groundless, they would form no argument against going into conference at the Tsar's invitation. The Russian emperor does not propose to abolish war, or even to provide machinery for settling international disputes with as little resort to war

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as possible. Neither does he suggest anything in the nature of complete disarmament. His project is much more modest. All he asks is that the rulers of states shall concert measures for stopping the increase of armaments, and, if possible, reducing proportionately those which already exist. It is necessary to insist on this because it destroys the force of an economic objection which has been put forward in some quarters. Sad pictures have been drawn of the misery and destitution which would be caused were the millions of men now under arms suddenly sent out into the world to compete for employment in industrial avocations. Nothing of the kind is contemplated. Even if, in some sudden access of humanitarian zeal, nations were to resolve to beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks, they would not, unless they were simultaneously bereft of sense, disband all their forces at once. The general disarmament would be carried out step by step. The soldiers and sailors would be gradually absorbed in peaceful industries, and at the end, labor freed from the burden of taxation for military purposes, would be far more efficient and far better remunerated than it is to-day.

Unless the foregoing arguments are altogether fallacious, the ethical value of the Tsar's proposals must be ranked very high. If they can be carried out they will relieve civilized humanity of some portion of a burden which is rapidly becoming too heavy for its strength. They make for peace, and they tend to abate that spirit of militarism which is dangerous to morality and liberty. And all these things will be done without dislocating industry, weakening patriotism, or destroying the robuster virtues. It follows, therefore, that they are to be welcomed as far as they are practicable. But before we discuss their practicability it will be advisable to deal with a preliminary matter which has an important bearing upon the main question. Doubts have been expressed as to the good faith of the young autocrat of all the Russias. If they have any foundation, it is obvious that the chance of a successful issue of the Conference is much less than it would be were the author of the proposals to be discussed filled

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with a single-hearted determination to carry them through. But are they justified? No one can venture to dogmatize on such a question, because no one can look into the mind of the Tsar. But the indications point to sincerity. It is said that Russian diplomacy is shifty, if not absolutely untruthful. This assertion is often heard in England. But it is advisable for Englishmen to remember that just the same thing is said on the continent of English diplomacy. In both cases national prejudices have much to do with the charge. Certainly no one would go to diplomatic history for conspicuous examples of the virtue of truthfulness. On the other hand, it is certain that many of the accusations of the want of veracity made by one people against another are based on misapprehensions. Would it not be wise to drop them for the present and discuss the Tsar's action upon its merits? Even if he should happen to have ulterior motives, that is no reason why other powers should decline to consider his proposal or refrain from doing their best to carry into effect so beneficent a plan. But has he any hidden objects? There is flat absurdity in the statement that he cannot mean what he says because he has lately approved of plans for greatly strengthening his fleet. Surely a ruler may deem it his duty under present circumstances to increase his armaments in order to safeguard national interests and yet long for the time when such increases will be rendered unnecessary by the general agreement of his neighbors to stop their increases also. We need not acclaim the young emperor as one of the greatest of heroes, or indulge in hysterical laudation of him as a sort of Napoleon of peace. Such utterances do more harm than good, and by their manifest exaggeration provoke exaggerated statements on the other side. Let us wait for the issue before we reverence Nicholas II. as one of the noblest benefactors of the human race. Meanwhile let us treat him as a man of honor, sincerely desirous of benefiting his fellows, and let us with equal sincerity examine his proposals, and give him what aid we can in his laudable attempt. We ought never to forget that though the annals of the Tsardom are stained with terrible

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deeds of violence and cruelty, yet the personal inclinations of many of the Tsars have been noble and generous. Alexander II. freed the serfs in 1860, procured the condemnation of explosive bullets by international convention in 1868, and made, in 1874, a strenuous but unsuccessful attempt to induce all the states of Europe to agree upon a code for regulating military operations on land and depriving warfare of the last remnants of its old ferocity. Alexander III. kept the peace, often under great provocation. Even Alexander I., when he founded the Holy Alliance in 1815, was in a condition of moral and spiritual exaltation, and honestly believed in his own declaration that the sole object of the alliance was to manifest before all the world the determination of the allied sovereigns "to take for their rule of conduct, whether in the administration of their respective states or in their political relations with other governments, none but the precepts of the Christian religion,—precepts of justice, of charity, and of peace,—which, far from being applicable only to private life, ought, on the contrary, to have a direct influence on the resolves of princes, and to guide all their steps, as being the sole method of strengthening human institutions and remedying all their imperfections." With this strain of idealism and enthusiasm in his blood, the young Tsar may well have resolved to signalize his reign by a great effort to lighten the war burdens of the nations, and thus furnish "by the help of God a happy presage for the century which is about to open." And this is rendered all the more probable from what we know of the strength of his domestic affections. He is profoundly influenced by two women,—his mother and his wife. His mother is the widow of Alexander III., who was aptly called "The Peace-Keeper of Europe;" and his wife is celebrated for her humanity and gentleness no less than for her beauty. With these good women by his side he will find sympathy and support in every project undertaken for the relief of his suffering subjects and the welfare of humanity at large.

The question still remains, Is the Russian plan practicable? We may commence our attempt to find an answer by admitting that, if the settlement of all outstanding quarrels between

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states is a necessary preliminary to any agreement for stopping the increase of armaments, the attempt to bring about such an agreement is doomed to failure. No human being possessed of average sanity can imagine that at one and the same time the future of Alsace-Lorraine will be settled to the satisfaction of France and Germany, the ambitions of Russia and England in the Far East reconciled, the devolution of the various provinces of the Turkish Empire determined, the authority of Great Britain in Egypt and the Nile Valley defined and regularized, the controversy between Sweden and Norway ended to their mutual comfort, American and Canadian differences composed, the French shore of Newfoundland rendered harmless as a source of international complications, Japan accorded a position in the family of nations acceptable at once to herself and her competitors in the race for empire, and a hundred other matters arranged with equal celerity and success. Rather is it true that the mere raising of any of these questions would tend to frustrate the object for which the Conference is called. When there are so many lighted matches about, any attempt to sweep up all the loose gunpowder strewn over the surface of the earth is far more likely to end in disaster than in the removal of inflammable material. Whatever views may be entertained in some quarters of the character of Russian statesmen, no one believes that they are lacking in sagacity. But they would deserve to rank among the most foolish of mankind if they entered the Conference on disarmament with a plan for calling up all the questions which excite the most angry feelings among the nations. We may safely say they will do nothing of the kind. Indeed, the reservations made by many of the powers when accepting the invitation render such a course impossible. When the Conference meets it will proceed at once to the discussion of the only subject it is asked to consider.

Can the nations of the civilized world agree to disarm entirely under present circumstances? No. Their conflicting interests and mutual jealousies forbid it; and, even if there were no other reasons, they dare not commit treason to civilization by rendering it helpless in the face of barbarism.

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Can they consent to a large and proportionate diminution of their overgrown armaments? Probably not. Who is to say what reduction in the British navy is equivalent to striking off one hundred thousand men from the muster-rolls of the German army? Who is to decide whether small and slightly-armed states, like Holland, or neutralized states, like Switzerland, are to be called upon to diminish their defensive forces when France or Austria disbands an army corps? Who is to tell the United States whether it may or may not increase its army and navy till they bear some resemblance in strength to the establishments of European powers? But though total or partial disarmament is scarcely within the bounds of possibility, an agreement to proceed no further with the mad competition of warlike preparations, which is ruining the nations without increasing their security or seriously altering their relative positions, stands on a very different footing. There would be no need to solve a host of knotty problems before it could be made; and, when it was made, some machinery for securing that it was honestly kept ought not to be beyond the wit of man to devise. It has been suggested that the relief gained by such a pact would be small; but the facts of recent history show that the reverse is nearer the truth. In the financial year 1893–94 Great Britain spent more than thirty-three million pounds on her army and navy. In the financial year 1898–99 her Parliament has voted close upon forty-three millions. The difference of ten millions between the two sums would have been sufficient to establish a system of old-age pensions. Again, in July of the present year Russia determined to spend about nine millions sterling on the increase of her navy. Great Britain immediately incurred an additional expenditure of eight millions for new ships of war. Thus the relative strength at sea of the two powers remains almost exactly what it was before. The only difference is that the tax-payers of the two countries will have to find a sum of seventeen millions over and above their previous payments. Other powers have been increasing their fighting forces in the same way, and with similar results. The spectacle would be ludicrous if it were not sad. And it would have been prevented had the

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nations agreed a few years ago not to carry their warlike preparations beyond the point they had then reached.

It will be said in reply that, though such an agreement might be made, there could be no security that it would be kept. The objection is a real one. A dishonest government might be able for a time to conceal forbidden preparations, especially in countries where there were no parliaments and no real freedom of the press. But might not such dangers be averted by the establishment of a commission with power to visit all establishments and obtain the truth by personal inquiry? Such a commission should be composed of representatives of small and neutralized powers, which could not be suspected of designs to enter the race for empire. It should have an office in Switzerland, and should be charged with the duty of issuing an annual report certifying that the agreement to abstain from further armaments had been loyally kept. Any state which deemed that a neighbor was guilty of some infraction of the bond should have the right of presenting a complaint to the commission. The commissioners would then inquire, and report their finding to all the powers. Should they decide, either on their own initiative or on complaint from an aggrieved government, that a breach of the agreement had been committed, the peccant state should be called upon to reduce its forces to the stipulated level. In the event of a refusal, other states should be authorized to compel submission. Self-interest would probably cause a considerable number of them to take action, and the desired result would generally be obtained by a mere show of overwhelming force. In other cases the struggle would be short and decisive.

But if public opinion proves strong enough to force statesmen into devising a workable plan for preventing the further increase of armaments, it will probably be strong enough to stop any attempt to persevere in a proved breach of the agreement arrived at. We are thus brought back to our original position. The success or failure of the Tsar's scheme depends upon the amount of enlightened sentiment that can be rallied in its support. Without being unduly despondent on the one

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hand or foolishly sanguine on the other, we may wish the young ruler of Russia "God-speed" in his difficult undertaking. "Boys," said General Sherman to a corps of cadets, "they tell you that war is all glory. But let me tell you it is all hell." The man who can persuade the nations to take the first step in the abatement of hell will be crowned with immortal honor, and win a conspicuous place in the list of those who have conferred lasting benefits on humanity.

T. J. LAWRENCE.

DOWNING COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

COSMOPOLITAN DUTIES.

THERE can be no doubt that cosmopolitan duties do actually enter into men's lives. Not only does private international law recognize in foreigners rights that impose corresponding duties upon the citizens of the country that receives them; many of us go far beyond this. We act towards foreigners in the ordinary intercourse of society, whether we be their hosts in our own country or their guests in theirs, not otherwise than towards our own people, if indeed we be not (some certainly are) all the more scrupulous in the observance towards them of the obligations and the courtesies of life.

Still loftier ground is taken by much of the current and even trite language of religion. "Children of a common Father," "sons of God," "men for whom Christ died," "heirs of salvation,"—these are among the phrases that suggest ties sacred in their obligation and wider far than those of nationality. And if there be cynics to say that these are but big words, the religious world has its answer: it can point to missions (religious, not diplomatic) and to the work, the outlay, the heroism bestowed often upon the most benighted and distant of barbarians. Even authors whom one might not suspect of cosmopolitanism have at times their proselytizing aspirations, and, if only they could induce all mankind to read their works, would gladly write for the universe. Nor, in a land like our

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own, has there been any lack of a cosmopolitanism very practical indeed. Money has freely flowed to relieve calamities in other countries; organized effort has given itself—and not in vain—to the freeing of the slave, and to the protection of the aborigines of savage or semi-savage territories. War itself, which might well seem the death of cosmopolitanism, does but disclose it in a new vitality, and this not only in that humanity to wounded or captured enemies which helps to redeem the horrors of battle-fields, but even in formal declaration that, though killing must needs come, it must be done as humanely as the high development of the science of projectiles permits.

And yet, when all is said, the amount of fact to which it is possible to point is comparatively meagre. Moreover, even when fact cannot be ignored, it is, in some quarters, flouted. For there are those in whose eyes cosmopolitan duties are but cosmopolitan illusions, and cosmopolitan profession a thing suspect. "Homicide philanthropy" is Burke's description of French fraternity. "Lover of his kind and hater of his kindred" is his bitter epigram upon Rousseau. "Friend of man, and enemy of every man he met," is Carlyle's verdict on the elder Mirabeau. Language reflects this spirit. Who would covet to be called "humanitarian" or "philanthropist"? Nor can we blink the fact that apathy to the sufferings of distant and especially of savage peoples is the rule, and that international and inter-racial hatreds are writ large on the face of the world.*

Deplorable these facts may be. But by the believer in cosmopolitan duties they need not be deplored. They put him on his defence. The very paucity of facts to which he can

* "What a well-informed writer," says Mr. H. Sidgwick, . . . "calls 'the wretched details of the ferocity and treachery which have marked the conduct of civilized men in their relations with savages' form one of the most painful chapters in modern history."—"Elements of Politics," 309.

Even the philosopher of Sympathy is far from reassuring. For though he waxes eloquent on universal benevolence, he is constrained to add, "The administration of the great system of the universe, however, the care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God, and not of man."—ADAM SMITH, Part VI.

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appeal; the very flouts and scoffs that would discredit them,—these do but press home the question if, such as they are, they admit of theoretical justification. There was a time when men sat loose to their duties to slaves, to incurables, to sickly or deformed children. Few would repudiate these duties now. Time has proved that their first feeble recognition was but the earnest of more. So here. Could we but once assure ourselves that cosmopolitan duties, however tentative, however sporadic their recognition, do actually root themselves in what is human and reasonable, we might be patient with comparatively small beginnings because we might see in them great or at least greater endings. Indeed, as T. H. Green asserts, turning the tables on the men of facts, "It is rather the retardation of the theory (of cosmopolitan duty) that the historian has to explain." He has reason on his side. For, so far are cosmopolitan duties from being illusions, that we cannot repudiate them without laying the axe at the root of these more familiar duties which none of us dare repudiate. If we can justify our duties to our neighbor we can justify, on precisely similar ultimate grounds, our duties to a savage. And if we have no justification of our duties to the savage, then will our duties to our neighbor lose the very corner-stone of their authority.

For there are here two things that must, in thought, be forever kept distinct. One is the manner in which, from place to place and time to time, the duties of men are articulated. This varies. It varies endlessly with the conditions of national life and idiosyncrasy. The other—the grounds upon which there are any duties at all to articulate. These are not various. These do not change from country to country. They exist wherever there are men. If anything be absolute, they are. This may be clearer if we ask at once *what these grounds are.*

Suppose, to begin with, we ask why we feel constrained to acknowledge duties—quite ordinary duties which no one dreams of doubting—towards our fellow-countrymen. Because (so might our answer run) we recognize that the realization of their capacities for a truly human life constitutes the very substance of that moral ideal which we are imperatively

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bound up to our powers to enact. This moral ideal, this plan of a good life, would become an impoverished and empty thing if it did not include in it the fullest practicable development of those capacities for a good life which we believe our fellow-countrymen to possess. And by the life they are enabled to live, no less than by the life we live ourselves, is the obligation to work for the moral ideal more fully satisfied.

Such, in skeleton statement, are the grounds of duties towards our fellow-countrymen. They involve the recognized authority of a moral ideal, the belief that this moral ideal is best realized through a common life in which all are sharers, and the conviction that what gives this common life the worth which can alone make it an adequate end of dutiful effort, is that the stuff of which it is made is the bettered and ever-bettering lives of our fellow-citizens.

If now we turn and ask if this line of justification applies to alleged duties to slave or savage, we are of course met by obvious differences. We manifestly do not stand related to slave or savage as we do to fellow-citizens; and of course it is easier to understand what is meant by a common good, in which all are sharers, when the community we are thinking of is the nation. Yet such admissions do not touch the central point. The ultimate grounds of duties to neighbor are likewise the ultimate grounds of duties, not so practicable, perhaps, but not less imperative to slave or savage. "They, too, have immortal souls," says the preacher. "They, too, have the capacity for happiness," says the utilitarian. "They, too," we venture to add, "have in them (unless, indeed, they be insane or abnormally depraved) the capacity for a good life." It is this capacity that at very least forbids us to treat them as brutes or chattels. It does more, it compels respect,—if not for what they are, at any rate for what they may have it in them to become. It does more still: it enjoins, as duty, conduct towards them which such respect dictates,—whether this be the meagre acknowledgment, which none but ruffians would repudiate, of the bare claim to life, or the more generous effort to bring into their lives, at least so far as they can receive it, that moral ideal of which they and we, after our diverse fashions,

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are alike the servants. In this lies the reason why we dare not repudiate even our most distant duties. Allegiance to the moral ideal forbids it. For we cannot, without contradiction, be true to it and indifferent to the fate of those through whose development it may secure a fuller enactment. At very least, the citizen who would repudiate duties to slave or savage must pay a price. He must be prepared to shut his mouth in presence of those—if there be such—who would scout the duties to the helpless waifs and failures of our own land. For why do we care for *them?* Not because they are English; and not because we merely pity them (though pity does its work); but because we can see in them beings in whom there lives, it may be in deplorably obstructed mode, that principle of moral life whose realization we deem so momentous that we make it, in our own case, matter of imperative obligation. For it is not that a man is miserable that is the real evil of the world. It is that he is *obstructed.* This we know well in our own case in proportion as Duty speaks with imperative voice. And this is what reminds us that in every human failure, be it waif or outcast, slave or savage, that moral spirit which we seem to value above all else suffers one more defeat. There are times when we wonder that cosmopolitan ties should ever be called in question. They are the times when we see how the duties of man to man can survive the vices and the crimes which surely interpose more formidable barriers than race or country. If honest men refuse to give up the profligate and the scoundrel of their own people, it becomes less wonderful that they should acknowledge the bond to slave and savage.

If this be so, we need no longer hesitate as to whether Cosmopolitan Duty exists. If any duty exists, it exists. And the real question is wholly as to *possible enactment and articulation.*

The moment *this* question is raised difficulties emerge. For there is a natural order in the development of our duties. Burke formulated it when he declared that "no cold relation is a zealous citizen." And Coleridge—in this only reproducing Burke—went on to say that cosmopolitanism is not

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possible but by antecedence of patriotism. There is reason in this. The duties, as well as the affections of life, are normally developed in those relationships of life that touch us in our familiar and habitual intercourse. It is by doing our ordinary duties that we first truly know and feel what duties are. And if a man for any reason neglects these duties, then whatever aspirations he may carry into the larger world, he will *not* carry the dutiful spirit trained, as it can alone be trained, in the definite daily service of the nearer relationships. Duty to mankind will mean *something;* but it will be poor and empty of meaning in comparison with what it can signify to him to whom it is eloquent of actual service to kith and kin, to friends, to neighbors, to fellow-citizens. This is part of the meaning of that homely gospel, against which cosmopolitan Mazzini protested,—"Do the duty that lies nearest to hand." Do it *first*, at all events.

Hence that suspicion of the fraternity that rushes to welcome the more distant, unusual, more spectacular, possibly less exacting relationships. It has grounds. Who will say that he finds it easy to exhaust these homelier duties? And so long as this is so, is it not good economy of life's resources, is it not simple honesty with ourselves, to postpone the claims of foreigner or savage till, by better doing the duties that lie nearest to hand, we have graduated for the wider service of mankind at large? This is at the root of much written against philanthropy. For it is easy to suggest that it savors of cant, if the price of a wider duty glorified is a nearer duty neglected. "It is not to the West Indies that I run first of all," says Carlyle, in his scoffing *Nigger Question*. "Oh, brothers! oh, sisters! it is for these white women that my heart bleeds and my soul is heavy."

And yet this, though forcible enough, is not convincing.

1. From kin to kind, although the normal, is not the sole law of development. There are men so constituted that seemingly they must needs have distant enterprises or none. The very remoteness of the objects of their interest does but appeal the more to their helpfulness, just as within one's own country, by a strange law of moral attraction, some seem to

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come nearer our good offices the further they recede in iniquity. A similar law holds in politics. "Where is liberty," said Franklin, "there is my country." Paine improved upon it,—"Where is not liberty, there is mine."

It would be a mistake to repress these crusaders of duty by insisting that they should first prove their quality in the narrower charities of life. Better that those who volunteer for these forlorn hopes of humanity should have no narrower ties to divide their allegiance, not even the ties of patriotism. We must not forget that Stoic citizenship of the world rose upon the collapse of the patriotic municipal state of Greece, and that Christianity, with its startling call, if need be, to hate father and mother, has been taxed with a sacrifice of political ties to the enthusiasm of humanity; or that the Universal Church, to which Christianity gave birth, has usually claimed an allegiance to which the ties of citizenship come second; or that Fraternity of the Revolution was proclaiming the brotherhood of man and guillotining Frenchmen at one and the same moment. There is such a thing as Cosmopolitanism by negation of patriotism.

2. It is more important still to realize that the service of mankind need by no means be postponed till our duties to our country are fulfilled. Quite the reverse. For if we have any claim to be loyal citizens of our country, it will be part of our citizenship to be already doing our best, through the habitual exercise of our political rights, to shape the policy of the nation in the interests of mankind. This was one of the leading ideas of Mazzini's life. For this great political saint of Italy never thought that in building up a free and united Italy he was engaged in a service that ended there. Cosmopolitan to the core, he believed that he was also forging an instrument for the service of mankind. The self-centred nation and the cosmopolitanism which (like that of Marx and the International Society) made light of the nation, were equally abhorrent to him. Nor was it even cosmopolitanism by antecedents of patriotism that could satisfy him. Nothing would satisfy him but cosmopolitanism *through the nation.*

Now it may well be that this mode of influence will not

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suffice. For there will always be some—some of the salt of the earth—who will not rest satisfied with anything less than personal influence and action upon persons. And the true missionary spirit, hungry for "converting" souls, will stop at nothing less. Yet there are numerous ends, fruitful of benefit on a vast scale, which the organized strength of a nation may by its policy achieve. It is citizenship to work for these. It is citizenship to struggle for free trade and the opening of the ways of commerce; to work for peace; to champion, in public meeting or polling booth, the cause of oppressed and struggling peoples; to jealously watch, in Parliament and out of Parliament, the administration of great dependencies and protectorates; to support, by pen or word or vote, the policy that, by influence or annexation, brings law and justice into uncivilized territories, and substitutes peaceful commerce for cutting of throats. And the citizen who does these things, though he may never leave his own fireside, may be as genuinely cosmopolitan as the missionary who goes with his life in his hands to the ends of the earth.

This is what we too often fail to see. We are half-hearted in our cosmopolitanism. As individuals, we may recognize our obligations; we may satisfy ourselves, if we please, that they can be justified. But we are content with the idea or the sentiment, or with at most the ineffectual and desultory outlet of voluntary humanitarian agencies. And all the while there lies ready to hand a supreme instrument, through which, if rightly used, the destinies of whole tracts of the earth, with teeming populations, might be changed. Sometimes we awaken. We realize we have natural duties to Bulgarians or Armenians after they have been massacred, to Soudanese after they have been plundered and enslaved, to South Africans when they revolt, or East Africans when blood begins to flow; and we clamor then for national intervention. It is good that we should awaken, however late. But these ebullitions are too apt to be spasmodic, intermittent, sentimental. And they are so because there is a quite definite question we do not face, and on which there is no clear understanding among us. This question:—Is the citizen entitled to look

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to the nation as the instrument through which, *as a matter of settled policy*, his cosmopolitan duties and sympathies are to find enactment? Yet this is the question we ought to put—and to answer in the affirmative.

This, however, is a view which, if it is to justify itself, must first dispose of two classes of opponents: the one, the apologists of national selfishness; the other, the advocates of non-intervention.

1. We need not make the apologists of national selfishness worse than they are. Let us therefore acquit them of the immoral dogma that it can be the end of any nation to exploit humanity for its own gain and glory. And let us tax them simply with the common enough notion that the scope of a nation's policy must needs be bounded within the circle of its own interests, and that the world beyond must be left to take its chance. Thus construed the policy of national selfishness has its apology. It often springs from nothing worse than the exaggeration of a maxim of prudence. For, in an international system which *de facto* rests less on Law and Morality than on Force, it is a counsel of prudence that no nation can afford to practise an unguarded selfishness. It must not recklessly embark upon costly crusades. For every generation receives the national civilization as a kind of trust. This it must guard. This it must hand on unimpaired, remembering that there is no one else to guard it; remembering, too, that there are foes (self-willed despots, irritable republics, and such like) against whom it needs to be guarded. No nation is worthy of the name if it have not sufficient faith in itself to believe that its self-conservation is essential to civilization.

This has force, and for a weak and menaced nation overwhelming force. But how miserable the plight of such a people! For either it must stifle in its citizens those cosmopolitan sympathies which are, in essence, as well grounded as duties to kith and kin, or it must leave them to find nothing beyond the meagre, precarious, fitful, ineffectual outlets of private effort. Meanwhile the rest of the world is not idle. History is making itself. Other peoples, some for good and some for evil, are shaping for centuries to come the destinies

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of millions of the civilized and uncivilized world while it—this nation without a mission—sits still in impotence.

It may be doubted if any strong nation would as a matter of fact consent to this. Certainly it ought not to consent to it. For on the one hand it is bound to recognize in the cosmopolitan aspirations of its citizens one of the most justifiable of all the fruits of its civilization; and on the other, with every increment of power, it is bound to accept responsibilities which it cannot evade, for shaping the destinies of mankind far beyond its own boundaries. By all means let it pay its tribute to prudence, and when it takes a risk (it may be in espousing trampled or struggling freedom, or in annexing a dependency, founding a colony, proclaiming a sphere of influence) let it discount possible failure, and take securities that it is not staking too much on any single throw. "Burning its boats" is folly in a nation. This done, let it stand in and take its share in shaping the future of the world, thereby at once satisfying and educating those cosmopolitan instincts and duties which are not to be quenched so long as one moral law is above all. The real question is, How is this to be done?

2. This brings us to the non-interventionists. Non-interventionists are not to be confused with the apologists of national selfishness. In their typical representatives—in Cobden, for example—nothing can be more manifest than that, in sympathy and conscience, they are genuinely cosmopolitan. Men scoffed at Cobden's ideal as the Calico Millennium of a bagman; but nicknames will not hide the fact that he certainly believed himself to be proclaiming nothing less than a gospel of civilization.

"It is because I do believe that the principle of free trade is calculated to alter the relations of the world for the better that I bless God I have been allowed to take a prominent part in its advocacy."

"Free Trade! What is it? Why, breaking down the barriers that separate nations; those barriers behind which nestle the feelings of pride, revenge, hatred, and jealousy, which every now and then burst their bounds and deluge whole countries with blood."

The characteristic note of non-interventionists is therefore, not any lack of cosmopolitan ideas, nor any failure to urge

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that the nation's policy ought to be the world's gain. What really marks them is their own peculiar doctrine as to the way in which a nation can act upon the world with most effect.

There is but one way (so they will have it),—that way of peaceful, industrial, and commercial example, upon whose ultimate efficacy as a civilizing agency Cobden believed more than upon all that could be done by diplomacy, with fleets and armies at its back. "Peace at any price," said scoffing critics. No, unless it be this, to declare one's readiness—as Cobden did—to vote, under certain contingencies, one hundred million pounds for the navy. Not peace at any price, but *non-intervention* at any price. This was absolute. We are to preach free trade to the nations that sit in economic darkness; we are to make treaties with them if we can bring them to make treaties with us. We are to refuse to subscribe to war loans, "loans for the cutting of throats," if we can convert the Stock Exchange. We are to establish arbitration in international affairs, if behind our courts there be no force or threat of force. There we must stop. Happen what may, not a ship nor a man must go. If trade is still to follow the flag, it must be the flag of cheapness, no other flag. If a despot annex a free country, if a great power absorb a little one, if one-half of a republic is spending its best blood in driving slavery out of the other half at the point of the bayonet, and so forth, it is all the same. Be our sympathies what they may, we must go to our counting-houses, our mills, our yards, and foundries, and talk and argue. What we must never do is to intervene.

It looks like rank national selfishness,—none the more attractive, perhaps, in that there are cosmopolitan professions in the background. Yet it is not this. In Cobden, at least, there is no taint of insincerity in his cosmopolitanism; because it was with him a conviction, built on a large knowledge of economic fact, that a great industrial and commercial nation, if only it had self-control enough to hold its hands from intervention, would, in the long run, best act on the world as a shining example of national prosperity; whilst its neighbors, no matter in how just an intervention, were, like magnified

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prodigals, squandering their toil-won wealth upon what Bentham called "mischief on the largest scale." Add to this the reminder that intervention is, in the nature of things, so precarious a course. "There are two things we confound," says Cobden, "when we talk of intervention in foreign affairs. The intervention is easy enough, but the power to accomplish the object is another thing." It is not timidity. He does not fear that a strong nation need encounter defeat. What he fears is half victory, bought at the price of dissatisfied ambition, depleted exchequer, dislocated trade, and a suffering and mourning people.

This is the pith of the case, which is, of course, in the main, an economic argument. But there are two further considerations,—one moral and one theological,—and they play so considerable a part in some minds still that we must not pass them over. One is that the hands of no nation are clean enough to entitle it to stand forth as the armed champion of humanity. The other is one of those vast metaphysical assumptions in which practical men so often lightly indulge,—none other than that God is over all, and that to Him alone appertains the power and the responsibility of regulating the affairs and righting the wrongs and miseries of other nations and peoples.

From all this the whole duty of the citizen emerges clear enough: to work by all agencies for the national well-being; to lift his eyes likewise, like this inspired world's-bagman, to the well-being of mankind, in the belief that through the conquering influences of peaceful trade and of national example the Divine Ruler of the world will somehow extract from the self-seeking of nations a higher harmony; and that thereby our cosmopolitan aspirations will find realization fuller far than by intervention, however righteous, however resolute.

None but a fire-eater would deny value to this doctrine. When a nation has, for good or for evil, been industrialized and commercialized to the core, it can ill afford, by waste of wealth or growth of debt, to weight itself in that race with rivals for markets upon which not only its economic system but all that is built thereupon has come to rest. Non-interventionism has proved that armed intervention is, at least for

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the time being, commercially a bad bargain. "I thank God," once said Cobden, "we live in a time when it is impossible for Englishmen ever to make war profitable." The most righteous intervention is here on the same level as the most flagitious aggression. There is a price to pay,—a price in wealth subtracted from production; a heavier price in reform arrested and domestic progress thrown back, it may be, for generations.

It does not follow, however, that non-intervention, though it carries this truth, is the whole truth. At very lowest one may doubt if it is practicable. There comes a time when a people, if strong in their cosmopolitan sympathies, which non-interventionists themselves encourage, cannot as a matter of fact be held back. This being so, it is part of all real statesmanship to provide for such contingency. Perhaps the most deplorable fate that can overtake a statesman is, in blindness to the strength of international sympathies, to prepare for non-intervention only to find himself thrust by a *vis à tergo* into that intervention for which his country is all unready. Non-interventionists who quicken our sympathies for mankind, as Cobden does, must remember that, like incapable conjurers, they may be evoking forces to devour themselves.

One may further doubt if the cosmopolitan conscience could actually find untroubled rest in this policy of peaceful national example, however admirable. For the worst of this doctrine of civilization through national example is that it seems so admirably fitted to secure the non-intervention of the nations that ought to intervene, and the intervention of those that ought not to intervene. If only the gospel of Cobden were taken to heart by the rapacious master of legions, or the predatory leader of political brigands! But it is to secure their non-intervention that Manchester principles seem so impotent. Preaching will not secure it, nor example, however prosperous (if, indeed, this do not beget malignant envy), nor denunciation of loans for the cutting of throats, nor sanctionless courts of arbitration. Nothing will secure it short of the armed hostility, actual or threatened, of those less selfish powers which, however passionate their cosmopolitan sym-

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pathies, are forbidden by Cobdenites to intervene at all. How is Justice, how is even Peace, ever to be safeguarded, if it be not by a league of powers federated to repress the brigand nations, if need be by force of arms? Hardly could our cosmopolitan sympathies find satisfaction in a policy which would be, in point of fact, a guarantee of impunity to ambition and rapacity.

Nor need a great nation be stayed from intervention by any or all of the doubts that Cobden throws on its fitness for the task. If he taunts it that its record is not clean enough, the answer is that it is by intervention in a righteous cause, rather than by the humiliating acceptance of acknowledged depravity, that the uncleanest of records is best expatiated. If he argues that in the perplexities, legal and moral, which beset all international action, a nation and its government are not wise enough to be trusted to choose a side, there would be much in this were it perfect wisdom that were needed. But the issues of this world can seldom be formulated as absolute wisdom *versus* folly. And many a time a power is fully justified in intervening, not so much by its own wisdom as by the greater unwisdom of its neighbor.

Least of all is it possible to find any real satisfaction in that theological optimism that tells us all will be right with the world if only Providence be left to regulate, after its own fashion, the destinies of nations. There is an odd motto on the title-page of Carlyle's "Latter Day Pamphlets": "Then," said his Lordship, "well, God mend all! Nay, by God, Donald, we must help him to mend it." The words may sound irreverent; but they contain a truer philosophy of History than the soothing dogma of Cobden; for if, indeed, there is in history a Providence which disposes the nations by some dimly discernible divine tactic, it is none the less *through the actions of men and nations* that its purposes are wrought out. So it has been from the beginning. "Do you suppose," asks Cobden, "that the Almighty has given to this country, or to any country, the power and the responsibility of regulating the affairs and remedying the evils of other countries?" May an answer not be found in the bolder, but not less reverent

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declaration that "the history of the world is the judgment of the world," and that by consequence the world will run a risk of never being "judged" at all, if nations shut their eyes to these responsibilities which seem, as a matter of fact, to be inseparable from the trust of power. In saying this, it is not necessary to hold a brief for the perfect righteousness of any nation; in the tangle of national concerns, interests, and ambitions, it is not justice that is done; only at best some approximation to justice. Nor need we look for perfect national wisdom; for this is what no form of constitution known to man has hitherto sufficed to elicit from the rivalries of parties, the policies of diplomatists, or the schemes of autocrats. There are likewise—as has freely been admitted—counsels of prudence. And, indeed, it may well be that when a nation has expanded into an empire with colonies, dependencies, protectorates, and spheres of influence, it may find a large and acknowledged field for cosmopolitan duty within its own limits. Long, and on the whole successful, intervention may then furnish one of the strongest arguments for non-intervention.

Yet, when all is said, a keen sense of cosmopolitan duty—grounded as this is in fundamental ethical fact—is at once one of the most elevating and the most justifiable attributes of a free citizen. And a great empire like ours, gathering into a political unity men of the most diverse races, creeds, ideas, characters, civilizations, savageries, is the greatest school of cosmopolitanism the world has ever seen. There has been nothing like it for educating those sympathies and obligations which, in Bentham's words, have "limits none other than those of the habitable globe." For though these duties to mankind may seem to be far enough away from the door of the hard-driven artisan or the agricultural hand, this is only because for them, as for many more favorably placed than they, enactment may seem so impracticable. Yet for them, and for every citizen of a great country, enactment—enactment that takes the most practical form of shaping the destinies of millions—becomes possible from the day when the organized force of the nation is recognized as the supreme

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instrument for the civilization of the world. Not a perfect instrument by any means; for it is still in the process of making. But it is no part of human wisdom to hold our hand till we can find perfect instruments. Better for the citizen himself, better for mankind, to resolutely use the nation with all its imperfections than to decline upon the alternative,—the alternative of first feeding our cosmopolitan conscience upon the words of preacher, novelist, poet, orator, political reformer, and then, when it comes to action, saving ourselves from impotence only by recourse to the difficult, distant, limited ways (glorious as they are to those who walk in them) of private missionary or other civilizing work.

A further point remains. The nation, it has been admitted, is far from perfect, and its imperfections may take the form of going wrong. It may ally itself with the enemies of freedom, or become an enemy of freedom itself. What is the citizen to do then, when he finds every cosmopolitan instinct and obligation at variance with national policy? Is he, *e.g.*, to refuse to meet a war tax, or decline to pay his taxes, or even to lay down his citizenship and go forth to find a new country?

This is, of course, a question of political casuistry. And it is in the nature of casuistry that, as the issues or problems are of necessity exceptional cases, their solution is not to be found in any mere application of general principles. Each must be discussed on its own merits. And, with the remembrance of the infinite ingenuity of the casuistical mind in devising exceptional cases, it would be rash to affirm that a citizen is *never* justified in even laying down his citizenship in the name of what he believes to be the highest obligation to mankind. This granted, it is as well to add that, however strong the wider obligations, there are weighty reasons why the citizen should not sit lightly to his duties to his country, even when he may think that it is taking the wrong side.

For it is only by the undeviating, the unwearying loyalty which presents a solid front to the world, that any nation, in an international system where weakness of internal division may quickly invite the encroachment of unscrupulous force, can hope to stand secure. It must be able to count upon the

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service of even the most cosmopolitan of its sons. There are, at any rate, possibilities that ought to be exhausted before recourse to that dire alternative of civic suicide. One is the use of every art of persuasion and loyal agitation to arrest the course of a mistaken policy. This surely our country has a right to demand. A second is that, even if persuasions and agitations fail, it does not follow that the citizen's duty is to break with his country. There is a passage in which the greatest of our political thinkers is discussing this very subject. He is asking if a man should ever abandon his country, even in the hour of its infatuation. "Do me the justice to believe," is his answer, "that I never can prefer any fastidious virtue (virtue still) to the unconquered perseverance, to the affectionate patience of those who watch day and night by the bedside of their delirious country; who, for the love to that dear and venerated name, bear all the disgusts and all the buffets they receive from their frantic mother."

Why should a man do this?

One answer is that it is human to recoil from the rupture of ties to the fatherland in which we have been cradled and nurtured. A second is that the inheritance upon which the humblest citizen of a great nation enters is so rich, and so irreplaceable, that it is not lightly to be renounced. But there is a third answer,—not exclusive of the other two,—and we may find it in the conviction that, just in proportion as the cosmopolitan spirit is passionate and rational, the citizen will see in the nation in which his lot has been cast the supreme instrument, forged in the long and painful process of historical development, through which he can act effectively and with far-reaching results, upon the destinies of mankind. For his allegiance to it may well endure many a disgust and many a buffet, many a diplomatic blunder and many an administrative folly, if meanwhile he can feed the hope that in the long run, through its policy, in which as a free citizen he plays his obscure but not ignoble part, Justice, which some call divine, may be less imperfectly done upon earth.

JOHN MACCUNN.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LIVERPOOL.

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"THE WILL TO BELIEVE" AND THE DUTY TO DOUBT.

Of all the devices for the relief of scepticism in which speculative subtlety has abounded, the simplest is the attempt to establish desire by arguments of philosophy as final master of the situation; to prove that each of us may lawfully take counsel of his "nature," and freely elect what he shall believe. The doctrine that faith is a duty and doubt a sin, that both by consequence are directly in charge of the will, is, of course, of ancient origin; but in most Christian exhortations the pleas addressed to will are found side by side with pleas addressed to reason, and the two pleadings are not fully distinguished. The appeal to "deliberate and courageous volition," standing consciously by itself, seems for the most part to have come in almost within the century, in the train of that intellectual assertion of self and spirit of speculative adventure which belong to the Revolution and the romantic movement. Within the century the appeal has been frequent and often vehement. It had not, of course, been literally uttered by Kant, but with his theory of God and immortality as "postulates," involved in acceptance of the moral law, Kant opened the way. Fichte followed more boldly and preached a theory similar but more comprehensive, with a new and fervent accent. All conviction is "faith, that voluntary acquiescence" in a view, "because only through this view can we fulfil our vocation." "It proceeds from the character, not from the understanding." It is "a resolution of the will." "I do not accept because I must; I believe . . . because I will." "All our thought is founded on our impulses,—as a man's affections are so in his knowledge." "I shall open my eyes; shall learn thoroughly to know myself. . . . I shall thus form my own mode of thought. . . . I might have followed blindly the teachings of my spiritual nature. But I would not be a work of nature, but of myself, and I have become so even by means of this resolution."

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Since Fichte,* this thought of the supremacy of will has deeply colored much of the philosophy of the century. It has even affected the theory of inductive science, for influential treatises on logic, including some of the most influential—those of Lotze, Jevons, and Professor Sigwart, for instance, as well as Professor Bain's,—base the whole procedure of empirical science on the "postulate" or assumption, voluntary and unproven, of the regularity of nature; and the like is heard from men of science such as Helmholtz and those so little influenced by German romanticism as Huxley and Clifford. There have been metaphysical systems in plenty, more or less sceptical in premise, but positive in aim, which have by natural consequence handed over the ultimate decision to will. That this tendency is still powerful in Germany, Professor Paulsen, among others, has attested by his lucid and in some respects beautiful "Einleitung in die Philosophie," published some six years ago. How powerful the tendency is at present in the English-speaking world appears (to select brilliant instances from a multitude) in Mr. Arthur Balfour's "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," and "Foundations of Belief," and most forcibly of all in Professor William James's volume called "The Will to Believe, and other Essays." †

In none of all these has the principle of the free "postulate" stood forth in such bold relief or found advocacy from so congenial a temperament as in the last instance. In most of them there are occasional traces of the pre-romantic tendency to throw some thin protection of reason over the firm stand of the will, or to give proof that they build upon something better than pure desire. It would be hard to find another among the many "postulators" of the century who has so completely the courage of his assumptions. Fichte sought carefully to distinguish his position from "ein freier Entschluss das für wahr zu halten was das Herz wünscht." Newman urges in "Tract 85": "Let us forestall knowledge by faith. Let us

* Fichte, "Werke," ii., 253 *et seq.* I have used Dr. Smith's translation.

† A brief notice of this book appeared in this JOURNAL in January, 1898. I shall here concern myself only with those of the essays it contains which bear on the subject of voluntary belief.

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maintain before we have demonstrated." But in the "Grammar of Assent" it appears that our faculty for extracting certainty from partial evidence, the faculty of religious faith, acts somehow with the authority of reason. Mr. Balfour, after summing up the conclusion of his "Defence" in the proposition that logic has no objection to offer to "an ultimate impulse to believe a creed," tries in his later work by an ingenious argument to bring in this "ultimate impulse" out of its isolated exposure into at least the sheltered neighborhood of reason. It is a refreshing move towards clearness when Mr. James, instead of still further torturing metaphysic and extorting some new approximation to proof for a religious optimism, takes his stand on sheer volition. He vigorously "preaches the liberty of believing," "the lawfulness of voluntarily adopted faith," "the right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced." "I wish to make you feel," he says,—I take a form of his favorite declaration pitched upon almost at random,—"that we have a right to believe the physical order to be only a partial order; that we have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust, if only thereby life may seem worth living again." "The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, 'Do not decide, but leave the question open,' is itself a passional decision, just like deciding yes or no, and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth." "Faith based on desire," "believing by volition,"—thus he characterizes a mood of mind which he goes on to defend with inexhaustible resources of ingenuity and illustration, and with that well-known diction, straight from the hot-springs of an intense imagination, with which already, in his "Psychology," he made alive whatever he touched.

There is something in Mr. James's stress upon the intellectual offices of will calculated to do essential service to

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philosophy in the forlornness of its present state; but only if clearly distinguished from the letter of his teaching. The literal precepts, as above, to which he lends his high authority are, I hold, among the formidable obstacles to progress in that disordered and distracted science. For my own part, I am of the old-fashioned conviction that such precepts are in effect an attempt to corrupt intelligence, that they aim a deadly blow at the vital instincts of the upright intellect. This is not the aspect of the matter that I should myself choose to put first. There is that to my own perception in honeyed theories of our place or prospects as men, in postulates of a golden solution of things fetched from whatever heaven of invention which are accredited because so eminently to our taste,—there is that in the sight of the constructive postulator, fancy-free, busy at his landscape-gardening in the infinite,—which is not so noticeably immoral as ridiculous. Desire strikes me as a quaint fortune-teller for man or the world. The defects in the appointments of this universe as a home for sensitive beings are only too obvious; but to rely for remedy upon the familiar human propensity to disbelieve in the existence of that which would be exceedingly disagreeable, seems a device past articulate comment. At such a medicine for its maladies, "the soul, if the soul had fingers, would snap them." But this JOURNAL is devoted primarily to ethical concerns; and Mr. James has himself raised the question of intellectual duty by scoffing long and heartily at the fantastic scruples of scientific purists and pedants who condemn the "faith" he defends as immoral. The charge is old. Moral distinctions are said to soften with age, and it even seems a return to the pragmatical sourness of a bygone controversial spirit and little in accord with the easy temper of speculative discussion at this hour to call a theory "immoral." That, in the feelings of large contemporary minds, is an epithet that should attach to disputed opinions only as a quotation from the Philistines and provincials. But thought is an agency; as Mr. James truly sets forth it may be guided, thwarted, or seduced by the will; it has goods to gain and evils to escape; and hence has its right and wrong. So far as intellectual emancipation permits us to retain intellectual

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conscience we still have the organ to discern that belief forcibly seized on is not honestly come by. The Will to Believe is a thing to be absolutely separated from the will to know the truth. The former is a desire for a purely subjective result, a state of our own consciousness that we seek in the first instance for its own sake, and may be willing to take an efficacious intellectual drug to produce. The latter is a desire that our convictions may correspond with reality, and naturally leads us to seek simply, with inflexible directness, for the fact. Nor must we confound the will to believe with the wish, in itself blameless, natural, and even laudable, to find the truth congenial. As the author justly observes, "the most useful investigator, because the most sensitive observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he be deceived." The wish to find the truth congenial must first of all in consistency be a wish to find the truth. The Will to Believe is the will to deceive—to deceive one's self; and the deception, which begins at home, may be expected in due course to pass on to others. It is the will to hold that thing certain which now we feel to be uncertain; it says, "This thing seems to my best intelligence doubtful; but I will subject my mind to such a course of treatment; I will so tempt and beguile it by presenting this one matter for its credence and withholding rivals; I will so hypnotize it by keeping its gaze on this one brilliant object; that I shall presently find myself reposing in the peaceable possession of a full belief."

No one can retort that the mind does not arrive at conviction in this way. The process is all too easy, the issue with many tempers all too assured. We shall perhaps have space to consider briefly the relations of will and belief and note certain differences with Mr. James as to the precise means by which the first can bring about the second. Meanwhile the objection to this systematic cozening of the intellect is assuredly not that it fails of its end.

In speaking with all unreserve of this philosophy of intellectual despair, it is as natural as needless to say at starting with what earnest, respectful heed I receive (as one who would

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distinguish great from small in the things of speculation) whatever its author may choose to say. It would be idle to dilate on the mastership of this strong and humble thinker and perceiver, or on the place of authority (in the only sense in which authority in science has a meaning) which he holds against his will. But there are aspects of his peculiar power which concern this discussion. Philosophy and the neighboring science of psychology have for the most part been singularly sapless branches of the tree of knowledge. Their voluminous annals seem in some moods not unlike the pyramid of eighty thousand skulls that Timour erected in the valley of Bagdad. Even the wit that one may come upon in their disquisitions suggests a little the marrowless grin of a skeleton. In psychology the laws and elements of the mind have been described to us in chill mechanical terms from which the vital heat of conscious life has long escaped. It is fortunate that the psychological movement of the second half of the century (not without kinship with the romantic and historical interests, nor again with naturalism in fiction), which has brought forth things strange and new—which has spared attention from the broad unvaried elementary laws for the differences, the idiosyncrasies, the moods and maladies of consciousness—should have found a thinker so fitted to give life and warmth to its work. Here is indeed a mind created for psychology in its later development; a mind animated by an instinctive self-forgetful interest in all consciousness, but chiefly in all that pertains to feeling and will, the active essence of the psychic being; fascinated by personality and temperament, by whatsoever is differential, unique, and irreducible, by the emotional depths and secret recesses, the shadows and twilight of the mind; all this interest being sympathetic and affectionate, a standing refutation of the fancied antagonism between love and knowledge. Here is the very romanticist in psychology, keen to trace the scarlet thread in the tissue of things, his back turned upon the theories that seem to make of mind a mere passive flow and association of lifeless ideas—the pallid theories of the eighteenth century. Here is the predestined interpreter of the rich variety, the "warmth and intimacy" of conscious-

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ness, whose instinct it is to seize on words of depth, volume, and vital strength that sometimes fairly grip the heart. An intelligence so humane, an imagination so vital and various, have a strange power over the reader. As one follows his pages one gradually becomes aware of the large benignant eye that looks out from them,—an eye in which intellectual travail and spiritual experience have not dimmed the native fire. In the hands of this author psychology becomes in no mocking or unmeaning sense the science of the soul.

It is not wholly surprising, therefore, that a mind of this cast, when it turns to universal problems, should give us the philosophy of a psychologist. His teaching is not an objective cosmical construction; it is a medicine for souls. I may illustrate my meaning in part by a very different example. It has often been debated regarding Hume whether he was essentially a sceptic or no. The answer is that he was not essentially a sceptic, because he was not essentially a philosopher; he was a psychologist. He was an analytical man of science, the whole world of whose interest was human nature. He conceived himself to have discovered laws and other principles that held true throughout that world, and with this discovery he was satisfied. Any facts of mind that were inseparably bound up with facts not of mind,—the psychology of the senses, for instance, which is bound up with physiology,—he instinctively rejected (like others of his time), for its entangling connections. The sureness of his instinct is shown by the fact that the study of the senses has brought into psychology an influx of a new order of thinkers from the physiological quarter, who seek to find in the mind at large mere instances of laws that apply to the whole universe that contains it. Hume took the mind as his sufficient whole, and if the laws and distinctions he found to prevail there seemed to involve confusion and stoppage to the reasonings of philosophy about the world in general, he states that result placidly, and turns back undepressed to his favorite ground. He states the result in a purely subjective and psychological way, telling us how his moods of belief and of unbelief in the world succeed each other. Had his interests been in any

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primary degree cosmical, and had his principles been in no point revised, he must have become a serious philosophical sceptic.

Mr. James has a far more eager cosmical interest (of an indirect sort) than Hume, and his psychological interest is of a far different character; he loves, not to undo the joinery of consciousness, to resolve things mental into sharply distinct constituent particles, but to watch the will at work, the deep passion thrusting the lighter passion aside; he is in his first concern no analyst or atomist, but a humanist, an absorbed spectator of consciousness in its personal and dramatic meaning, fellow-being and physician to the life he observes. But, like Hume still, despite all this unlikeness, his cosmical interest is subordinate to his psychological and seldom wholly dissociated from it. The world to him,—it is the human spirit musing on its world. Malebranche taught, in the well-known phrase, that we "see all things in God;" Mr. James, for the most part, sees all things—God and the world—in the temperament of man. The outer self-subsistent nature of things ("realistic" or "idealistic"), save as a depressing or sustaining vision to the individual conceiver, is (till he forces his thought full upon it) a cold and almost negligible "thing-in-itself." In the adjustments of theory the interests of the spirit are for him self-evidently first. If he does not interpret this in a hedonist fashion and say with Pater, for instance, that theories exist to minister to our pleasure and prepare us for greater pleasures, it is because his sympathies go with another wing of romanticism, and prize not so much what is received as what presses from within and issues into act, the stir, stress, and leap of impulse;—the precise sense and scope of the word pleasure suffering a trifle, perhaps, in a repugnance to all that is associated with systems that make the mind essentially a passive recipient of experience. All the qualities he values in the spirit must be fed and fostered in its philosophy,—its care for rich fulness, for instance, and its strength. The author's own love of richness is tempered only by a still greater love of strength. The recent movements of philosophy, he tells us, "are but tackings to the common port, to that ultimate *Weltanschauung* of

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maximum subjective and objective richness, which, whatever its other properties may be, will at any rate wear the theistic form." Hence his protest against what he deems a narrow and niggard asceticism in matters of belief that would have us mortify the imagination and starve the spirit in the pursuit of a visionary rational sanctity. For the purposes of scientific calculation he does not deny the validity of the atomic theory; but when in the name of science it asks the central place in an ultimate *Weltanschauung* for a world of atoms stripped by science of its coat of many colors, and standing there to the mind's eye in all its shivering nakedness,—nay, the unsightly skeleton of a world,—he will have none of the repulsive thing. From such a pallid conception of the background of human life he incites us to take refuge in scarlet sins (as timorous logicians fancy them) of imaginative faith. So, too, as to such analytic theories of mind as seem to take from it finally its unity, its freedom, its power upon matter. The refusal to see the world dismantled and the soul dismembered by scientific analysis is absolute; for the rules of reason itself are based on nothing deeper or firmer than the demand that in these things we shall not be permanently despoiled and impoverished. "From the soul there is no appeal,"—the words might have been his own. Philosophy, as it is necessarily the expression of temperament, so by its essential office ministers to the intellectual and spiritual life; and any form of it which presents the universe as a low-lived thing, or in its ultimate derivation of conscience drags the noblest part of us through the mud, is thereby self-condemned.

As for the quality of strength, nowhere does the heroic moral note of a strenuous romanticism burst more nobly and stirringly forth than in these philosophic expositions:

"The deepest difference, practically, in the moral life of man is the difference between the easy-going and the strenuous mood. . . . The capacity for the strenuous mood probably lies slumbering in every man, but it has more difficulty in some than in others in waking up. It needs the wilder passions to arouse it, the big fears, loves, and indignations; or else the deeply penetrating appeal of some one of the higher fidelities, like justice, truth, or freedom. Strong relief is a necessity of its vision; and a world where all the mountains are brought down and all the valleys are exalted is no congenial place for its habitation.

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. . . This is why, in a merely human world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy falls short of its maximal stimulating power. Life, to be sure, is even in such a world a genuinely ethical symphony; but it is played in the compass of a couple of poor octaves, and the infinite scale of values fails to open up. Many of us, indeed, like Sir James Stephen, in those eloquent 'Essays by a Barrister,' would openly laugh at the very idea of the strenuous mood being awakened in us by those claims of remote posterity which constitute the last appeal of the religion of humanity. We do not love these men of the future keenly enough; and we love them perhaps the less the more we hear of their evolutionized perfection, their high average longevity, and education, their freedom from war and crime, their relative immunity from pain and zymotic disease, and all their other negative superiorities. This is all too finite, we say; we see too well the vacuum beyond. It lacks the note of infinitude and mystery, and may all be dealt with in the don't-care mood. No need of agonizing ourselves or making others agonize for these good creatures just at present.

"When, however, we believe that a God is there and that He is one of the claimants, the infinite perspective opens out. The scale of the symphony is incalculably prolonged. The more imperative ideals now begin to speak with an altogether new objectivity and significance, and to utter the penetrating, shattering, tragically shattering note of appeal. They ring out like the call of Victor Hugo's Alpine eagle, '*qui parle au précipicé et que le gouffre entend*,' and the strenuous mood awakens at the sound. It saith among the trumpets, Ha! ha! it smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the captains and the shouting. Its blood is up; and cruelty to the lesser claims, so far from being a deterrent element, does but add to the stern joy with which it leaps to answer to the greater. . . .

"The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our natural human possibilities that even were there no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living hard, and getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest. Our attitude towards concrete evils is entirely different in a world where there are none but finite demanders, from what it is in one where we joyously face tragedy for an infinite demander's sake. Every sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity for handling life's evils, is set free in those who have religious faith."

What, however, are the specific articles in whose interest this defence of faith is maintained? What is it more precisely that Mr. James would postulate in religion? The essentials only he gives us to understand in his first essay; and they seem at first sufficiently vague. "Religion says essentially two things:

"First, she says that the best things [and Mr. James means morally best] are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe that throw the last stone, so

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to speak, and say the final word. 'Perfection is eternal'—this phrase of Charles Secrétan seems a good way of putting this first affirmation of religion, an affirmation which obviously cannot yet be verified scientifically at all.

"The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true."

In another essay: "Religion has meant many things in human history; but when from now onward I use the term I mean to use it in the supernaturalist sense, as declaring that the so-called order of nature, which constitutes this world's experience, is only one portion of the total universe, and that there stretches beyond this visible world an unseen world of which we now know nothing positive, but in its relation to which the true significance of our present mundane life consists. A man's religious faith (whatever more special items of doctrine it may involve) means for me essentially his faith in the existence of an unseen order of some kind in which the riddles of the natural order may be found explained. In the more developed religions the natural world has always been regarded as the mere scaffolding or vestibule of a truer, more eternal world, and affirmed to be a sphere of education, trial, or redemption?" This is not closely defined; and "it is a fact of human nature that men can live and die by the help of a sort of faith that goes without a single dogma or definition." Elsewhere, however, these nebulous postulates become not a little more specific. We are frequently told that they amount to a belief in God, and in one passage that the essential features of that belief are first, "that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, He must be conceived under the form of a mental personality. The personality need not be determined intrinsically any further than is involved in the holding of certain things dear, and in the recognition of our dispositions towards those things, the things themselves being all good and righteous things." . . . "A power not ourselves, then, which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which recognizes us, such is the definition which I think nobody will be inclined to dispute. . . . In whatever other respects the divine personality may differ

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from ours or may resemble it, the two are consanguineous at least in this,—that both have purposes for which they care, and each can hear the other's call."

One marks a broad gain when Mr. James thus emerges from the sunlit mist of a vague optimism to assert in terms a personal God. In these times of mental confusion, when *disjecta membra* of old religions float by us and the clouds of Hegelheim have streamed loose and blacken the sky above our heads, it is a relief to hear of a philosophic divinity that is rather somebody than something. It was one of the singular failures of perception in a singularly perceptive mind that Matthew Arnold should have dismissed the pronouncement of the personality of God as a bit of Aryan metaphysics standing where it ought not, amidst the really precious moral truths of Christianity. A morality touched with the kind of emotion called spirituality should have seen that upon the conceived presence of a person hangs communion, and the ideal of the social passions. No other form of theism can hope to concentrate the optimistic, the moral, the contemplative, and the affectionate elements of religion. It is, indeed, despite its difficulties, so sovereign a thought that one cannot better express the futility of the postulating humor than by saying that the whole nature's craving to know it true may be quite disjoined from any temptation to drug one's doubts, creep into the belief on any terms, and have done. Even the mere mechanicians of logic and artisans of analysis (for whose ways of mind Mr. James does not dissemble his contempt), too thoroughly subdued to what they work in to share the deeper spiritual appetites of men, may feel at times its seizing and sustaining power; even if they lack the high spirit in dealing with ultimate problems to tell themselves thereupon loudly that it is true. It is interesting, however, to see how little *stress* is laid by a mind so preoccupied with personality as the author's upon the consciousness of God or our communion with it. God is rather an imposing, cloud-mantled figure and a mighty voice than a thinking and feeling life. An absorption in the intricacies of the near warm, struggling, imperfect consciousness that we know, can exist without any

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keen interest in a consciousness that by its omnipotence and its superlative excellences may seem in contrast "defecated to a pure transparency."

And this sheds some light upon the author's attitude towards the conception of immortality. Here seems an obvious and tempting occasion for the postulate; but Mr. James does not embrace it. Nothing in "naturalism" has seemed to do deeper damage, or has given more cause for the repinings of the spiritual imagination than its refusal to sanction this belief; and the craving for this belief has been a head-spring of voluntary faith. Theism is commonly sought in great part as a guarantee for immortality. The loss of this guarantee is, perhaps, for most natures (hardly for the finest) the first sting of all theories that make man stand friendless in the universe. The haziest optimism that affirms nature's good-will towards us, and "the ultimate amiability of all things" is really ascribing to the cosmic powers that be such a care for humankind as will, against all chances, preserve it. The mind draws back at a representation of the universe as a vast wilderness of atoms with sporadic forms of consciousness clinging to them, not only, or perhaps mainly, because of its ugliness or the parasitical part assigned to man, but because the thought is carried forward to the moment when consciousness will be extinct, and the material remains of the world—its lifeless corpse—exist alone. It is idle to maintain that this imaginative clutch of life for the man and the race is transitory or ignoble. Mr. Frederic Harrison may tell us as vehemently as he will that "a perpetuity of sensation" would be a veritable hell (assuming gratuitously that the liability to fatigue must remain the same); to him who has life is commonly given the appetite for it in proportion, and to him who has an affection the proportionate will that it shall continue. Moralists resigned to "naturalism" have been so fertile in devices (tonic and noble beyond praise in themselves) for making edifying use of the memory of friends we have lost that they are almost ready to say that no value has been forfeited; to deny the primary essence of love,—the desire to know the existence, presence, and well-being of its objects.

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Here, strangely enough at first sight, Mr. James is not with us. "I have to confess," he tells us in his recently published Ingersoll Lecture, "that my own personal feeling about immortality has never been of the keenest order, and that among the problems that give my mind solicitude this one does not take the very foremost place;" and in the argument with which, in the Lecture, he rebuts a philosophic objection to a future life, he makes it anything but plain that on his own conception personality would remain. Perhaps in this as in the case of divine personality (if conjecture may be acquitted of impertinence in a student who would come at his author's intent) what carries the consciousness beyond discernible struggle and passion and the play of "wavering lights and shadows,"—beyond the "Rembrandtesque chiaro-oscuro" that fascinates this psychologist,"—carries it away from the vivid centre of his interest. A clever critic has said of Browning that "the method by which the fool arrives at his folly is as dear to him as the ultimate wisdom of the wise." Mr. James, too, has certainly a close and kindly interest in imperfection.* His want of solicitude about the spirits of just men made perfect and of the desire for

> "Something afar
> From the scene of our sorrow,"

seems akin to his little love for the "evolutionized perfection," "high average longevity," and the like, of the men of the future. At all events, this indifference lends a certain disinterestedness to his defence of faith. It is not a universe more considerate of our interests or more sedulous of our survival that he postulates. It is not spiritual creature-comforts that he would have us secure by the will to believe.

The interpretation of the author's thesis that I gave at the outset seems no more than is implied in the title he has chosen for his book and such other expressions as were cited. But there press upon me as I write the ready replies, the

* The postulate that "perfection is eternal," quoted above, seems to mean that the moral elements in the strife of the world will persist and somehow conquer.

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plentiful facts and reasonings, with which he would meet, and mostly has met in advance, the comment I there made. To a book so full of argumentative resources, full justice cannot in this brief space be done at all. No approach to justice is possible without some deliberate analysis; and it is little else than a partial analysis that I am attempting here. It must be said at once that the interpreter encounters difficulties; indeed, it is impossible to collect from the many scattered passages in point a wholly consistent meaning. The volume is a medley of essays written at various intervals and promptings, and by no builder of a system nor contented dweller in any. The author avows a belief that there are "real possibilities," "real indeterminations," and "real conflicts" in the world, and that whatever it has of value depends upon their reality. Well, just so there are real indeterminations and real conflicts contained within his own thought and text, and the richness and pregnancy of these rest partly upon that fact. But it is the result of this inclusion of contending forces, of the "pluralistic world" of his own reflection and temper, that an author is in some sort chargeable with the flaws of both alternatives that his thought embraces.

Having thus some view of the articles in which we are to put faith, the question arises whether the author means that we are to bring ourselves by use of will into a believing state of mind, an internal assent, or only that we are to act as if we believed. A critic in the *Nation* newspaper apparently judges that it is the latter. In truth, much vigorous writing could be cited to either effect. We hear of our "right to believe" and also of our "right to adopt a believing attitude;" of "the right of the individual to indulge his personal faith at his personal risk," and again, of merely "acting on the assumption" of a certain tenet.

The author speaks of "those questions that belong to the province of personal faith to decide." If faith "decides," as in the case here referred to, a question of truth or falsehood, faith would appear to be the mental state of belief. Indeed, it is roundly said, "Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; and," the writer goes

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directly on, "as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance." Thus (though one does not gather why the thing should be identified with its test) it would seem that it is no mere outward scheme of living, without an *ex animo* assent, that is recommended, but action flowing from and expressing a state of mind which is none the less belief because it rises superior to the evidence. However, there is much about risk boldly faced. "I have discussed the kinds of risk; . . . and I have pleaded that it is better to face them openly than to act as if we did not know them to be there." Faith "is in fact the same moral quality which we call courage in practical affairs." But the risk in question is the risk of being wrong, and to face that risk is to face uncertainty, to entertain doubt. And, as if to put us finally to confusion, comes the remark, to illustrate the courage of faith, that "there will be a very wide-spread tendency in men of vigorous nature to enjoy a certain amount of uncertainty in their philosophic creed, just as risk lends a zest to worldly activity."

The possible attitudes in this regard are not hard to classify. To believe a proposition is to hold it true. To believe it incompletely is to hold it more or less probably true, but possibly false. To recognize it as possibly false is so far to withhold belief from it. Belief is the appearance to the mind of truth in a proposition, reality in a thing. Belief and admission of falsity are, whether absolutely or in degrees, mutually exclusive. Now we may (as I said seemed the inevitable implication of terms the author puts in the foreground) deliberately make "good resolutions" of belief; we may resolve to kill a doubt we have and breed a belief we as yet have not; observation informs us that this can be done. In this case at the outset we face risk, the risk that our belief presently to be acquired may be false, that our doubts now being smothered may be justified. When, however, our course of self-treatment has been successful, and the belief is duly installed, the doubt by the force of the terms has vanished, and the uncertainty, though from the former point of view it was there and from some other mind's point of view may still be there, can by the

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mind in question be "faced" no longer. At this stage it is inapposite to quote, "the virtue to exist by faith as sailors live by courage; as, by strength of heart, the sailor fights with roaring seas," for in the exact measure in which faith is present, courage is not needed. At an earlier stage there may have been intellectual courage, though the species of courage involved in purchasing either mental comfort or mental exaltation, by shutting our eyes to sources of uncertainty, is much that of the ostrich that buries its head in the sand. A person who vigorously asserts a thing to himself because he wishes it to be true, is not commonly called a brave man for his pains. But note in any case that what is supposed to be courageous is not faith (if as Mr. James defined it "faith means belief"), but the will to acquire faith, the will to believe; and so far as that will accomplishes itself, the occasion for courage has passed.

The other alternative is the resolution not to believe, but to act as if certain propositions were true, from social motives, or ultimate personal preference, though we freely and mentally admit the while that they are entirely doubtful. There is no peculiarly intellectual courage here, because there is no intellectual interference of the will, but its practical application only. Under either alternative there may or may not, of course, be courageous practical conduct, but that is foreign to the question. Under this second alternative, however, it has to be noted, we may have a subtle approach to the first; for in controlling our conduct we may tend to control our imaginations, and so fix that habit of thought which constitutes belief.

The present case exhibits, I believe, both of these situations intermingled and not, I think, distinguished. In his preface Mr. James calls his attitude "empiricism." "I say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of experience." There speaks to us the philosopher in wide contemplation of philosophic systems. Later, to the same effect, in the body of the book, "Faith is synonymous with working hypothesis. . . . A chemist, etc.

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. . . Now, in such questions as God, immortality, absolute morality, and free-will, no professed believer at the present day pretends his faith to be of a radically different complexion; he can always doubt his creed." Thus we should will to believe in default of evidence, but we are never to allow that will wholly to take effect. It is, perhaps, only the Will to Hope. Or is it that the multitude are humanely counselled to drown their doubts while the philosopher himself keeps his vision clear? Is this (unconsciously to the author) a gospel for spiritual weaklings delivered by a strong man who cannot find it in him to take advantage of it himself? Or are we all expected to have in us something of the multitude and a little of the philosopher; to know ourselves needy of faith and resolve recurringly to embrace it; to turn again and again with an access of resolve a set face of conviction to our world; to remember with return of self-consciousness that this is but our own attitude, taken at a risk of error; to act thus both the teacher of "wholesome doctrine" and the taught, deceiver and deceived, by turns or at once, and so appropriately illustrate our time?

About Mr. James himself there can be little question. For himself he is not one of those who, as Hume somewhere says, cover their eyes with their wings, their perceptions with their aspirations, like the angels in the Book of Revelation. Not wholly believing, or ever rejecting, he lives after all on the perilous edge, breathing the "eager air" of hazard to the last. And the temper that spurns agnosticism with its logical qualms and scruples and its spiritual penury, that gains "richness of result" by "indulging its personal faith," but all the while "enjoys a certain amount of uncertainty," is a fit birth of the *Zeitgeist* in an age of mental indecision. Mr. James's words had sometimes led us to picture him as one of a full habit of belief despising the water-gruel regimen of suspense and negation to which a pedantic rigorism would restrict us. But, no; he does not believe, albeit with the best will to believe (at times), in the world. He has the courage of his assumptions, but not their serenity. He has only a fighting faith (so to use the term for the moment), but no resting or reaping faith.

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We must place him among "*die Philosophen des gefährlichen vielleichts.*" No student of Carlyle can fail to remark much affinity to him in Mr. James's spirit and ideals. Of Carlyle, Friedrich Nietzsche has written: "*Ein Mann . . . den beständig das verlangen nach einem starken Glauben agacirt und das Gefühl der Unfähigkeit dazu (darin ein typischer Romantiker!). Das verlangen nach einem starken Glauben ist nicht der Beweis eines starken Glaubens, vielmehr das Gegentheil.*" The late Sir James Stephen described Newman, in the midst of his subtle dealings with doubt in the "Grammar of Assent," as "a worm wriggling on a hook." But in our present author nothing evokes so potently as his suspense between belief and unbelief that something ardent, manful, and generous that escapes at all times from his pages. He has a frank and fearless exultation in his plight, a sense of sublimity as at the abyss's brink, an appeal to the pride of will and last "turnings of the character" which, profitless, perhaps, in their literal philosophic import, have in them something that rouses the blood like the peal and tucket of a bugle. His speculative attitude expresses his scorn of intellectual ease. Philosophy is for him a strenuous exercise and high adventure of the spirit,—at once a fortifying discipline and a test of our present quality.

If, now, I speak in this scanty space of the philosophic justification of the Will to Believe—or to Make-Believe—according to whatever interpretation, I must pass over most of Mr. James's points of argument and touch only on what is fundamental. My deepest philosophical difference with Mr. James may be put thus: It does not follow, because we cannot prove everything, because in the last resort we can prove nothing, that we are free to assume what we choose. He appears to conceive that with the surrender of what he terms Rationalism, Absolutism, etc., belief becomes a question of taste. This is the enviable liberty of what he pleasantly calls his Irrationalism. As soon as the lights of reason are turned down we may help ourselves in the dark to what we can lay hands on. Since there is no longer a rational warrant for belief, there is no longer a rational bar to assumption; one belief is just as

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good in that regard as another; so that we may deal with them on the single basis of our predilections, unconfused by the introduction of any alien standard. The comfortable doctrine has not, of course, been confined to Mr. James. Mr. Balfour, in his "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," a book fascinating by its bold play of intellect and exquisite logical delicacy, the book of no temperamental romanticist, be it said by the way, but of a classicist if ever there was one, comes to the conclusion that we accept science, not from adequate reason, but from a "practical need," "a kind of inward inclination or impulse," and that hence we have no ground to resist a similar impulse, "rooted . . . in the loftiest region of our moral nature," to accept the Christian religion.

Now the denial of "rationalism" I would not contest. It is, I think, an important and seasonable service of Mr. James's and Mr. Balfour's books that they assail its foundations. The fabric of belief cannot be completely "rationalized." That is, there are legitimate beliefs which cannot be proved. This familiar statement, in some sense a commonplace of philosophy, is commonly evaded by putting ultimate beliefs under some form of protection by reason which is not identical with proof. But this is equally hopeless. Reason cannot communicate validity to all beliefs, because reason itself rests upon certain beliefs. The general principles of reason or presuppositions of reasoning are either so-called analytic or verbal propositions, not real mental propositions at all, or they are in their ultimate resolution propositions expressing indemonstrable beliefs, unproved assertions of our nature. Nor is this a profession of philosophic scepticism. I cannot accept this name put upon it by Mr. Balfour, any more than Mr. James's name of "irrationalism." To ask of reason what it cannot here perform, to regard its inability as a discomfiture, a failure to meet due expectation, is entirely to misconceive the office and pretension of a subordinate engine of the mind. It is the function of reason to bring our minor and dependent beliefs into harmony with those that are fundamental and independent, to subject superficial tendencies to

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permanent instincts. Taken with its cerebral counterpart, it is, from the point of view of physiology, a form of inhibition; from the point of view of general biology, a means of checking first tendencies to reaction, and so preserving the organism alive in an environment full of traps. I cannot think it other than a misfortune that in a time when, despite or because of emancipations, both caprice and prejudice, in and out of philosophy, receive their liberal share of applause, the authority of reason should be deemed weakened because a confused theory calling itself "rationalism" falls to the ground. The effect could not be better illustrated than in Mr. James's impression that the way is now open to postulate an unseen world designed with a view to its stimulating effect on certain too torpid emotions.

The truth is that Mr. James and Mr. Balfour fail to discriminate beliefs found from beliefs made; those subsisting in the mind of themselves from those that we fetch, plant, and water there. It is not true that we accept the foundations of science because we have a "motive" to do so consisting of a certain "inward inclination or impulse." Motives are for choices, impulses are to actions, and we do not choose to believe the foundations of science, nor do we adopt them as true by act. We find them existing for our minds; an assured belief presents itself without our forth-putting. Nature to us, and its elementary properties, are simply real: that is what is meant by saying that we believe in them. Where we have to create a belief, we at first by hypothesis have it not. In that stage the thing is not real to us; but we so deal with our minds that it subsequently becomes so. Our authors write for persons who do not securely possess religious belief, but who would like to possess it. These, indeed, have an inward "inclination or impulse" to obtain satisfactions from which they are debarred. Our authors invite them to put forth the hand and take what they desire; and yet fancy that in doing so they have behind them the precedent of our attitude towards science.

I said that this (which my limits forbid me to discuss in full) was my deepest philosophical difference with Mr. James; but

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there is a psychological difference involved in it which is the deepest of all. In his view, if I understand him, belief is always, because in essence, a matter of the will. In my conviction it is of an essence altogether distinct from will. Mr. James's opinion so pervades his mind as to color his literary style. He is so accustomed to class together desires and impulses, on the one hand, and an unformulated sense of likelihood or evidence, on the other, that I cannot yet be certain, after a somewhat earnest and sedulous study, whether his "Will to Believe" is not after all quite as much what Tennyson called a "heat of inward evidence,"—a heat, of course, liable to recurring chills. I mean, I suspect—and could instance passages in plenty—that the determination to have the "unseen world," etc., real is rather at times a vague but burning sense that they *must be* real, a dim internal perception of grounds past formulation that exhibit the denial of them as evidently false. In point of fact, of course, there is a broad difference between an informal inference and a desire. The vast majority of our inferences, all but a vanishing fraction, are informal, and many of these can by no pains be forced into the explicitness of formal conclusions. Nor are these latter therefore invalid. It would be virtually impossible to put into terms our ground for the conclusion on watching some "low" type of organism that it possessed consciousness. I suppose such an alleged effect on consciousness from without, as is known in the language of "Psychic Research" as a "mental impression," could not be pronounced impossible; the recipient's judgment that it was really not of subjective origin would, whether right or wrong, be a judgment (at a disadvantage through vagueness) from experience; as would also be his judgment that it was an illusion. The sense that in certain moral experiences we are in communication with a will and a spirit not our own; the unclear experience at various times of encompassing relations not of the acknowledged order; these may be as true as they may certainly be delusive; and if true, they would be "perceptions," informal inferences.

Now, Mr. James again and again fails to distinguish be-

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tween such an obscure sense of evidence and a longing, or, as he delights to call it, a "demand." "It is almost incredible," he says, "that men who are themselves working philosophers should pretend that any philosophy can be, or ever has been, constructed without the help of personal *preference*, *belief*, or *divination*." The italics are my own comment. "If I am born with such a superior general *reaction to evidence* that I can *guess* right and act accordingly . . . while my *less gifted* neighbor (paralyzed by his scruples and waiting for more evidence which he dares not anticipate, much as he longs to [a relapse to the notion of mere demand]) still stands shivering on the brink, by what law shall I be forbidden to reap the advantages of my superior *native sensitiveness?*" Of course the obvious objections to the will to believe do not apply to a superior native sensitiveness to evidence. The will to believe is defined as a resolution to have faith in excess of the evidence. If this means in excess only of the tangible or producible evidence, it seems an abuse of terms. But the truth, as I have said, is that the author declines to take cognizance of the distinction between feeling a thing to be true, or, in a less degree, to be likely, and accepting it as congenial. Cravings and divinings with him are one. In the chapter of his "Principles of Psychology" on "The Perception of Reality," he adopts at starting the dictum of J. S. Mill and Professor Brentano that mere presentation or imagination and judgment or belief are two irreducibly different and unanalyzable modes of consciousness. Further, belief is a variety of feeling and, he adds at the close, essentially the same mode of consciousness as will. I regret that I can quote his remarks only in part. "All that the mind does is in both cases the same; it looks at the object and consents to its existence, espouses it, says 'it shall be my reality.' [Behold in the sober definitions of psychology the self-assertive spirit of the Revolution!] It turns to it, in short, in the interested, active, emotional way . . . *Will and Belief, in short, meaning a certain relation between objects and the self, are two names for one and the same psychological phenomenon.*" The emphasis is the author's own.

The dissident is usually rather tempted to describe the

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views he rejects as "singular" than to explain them as natural; but, for my own part, I could wish for room to trace the tendencies which made it possible to maintain that in believing we are constantly upholding in existence the world of our belief and of ourselves enacting its reality. But I am confined to stating an opposite view. This does not regard mere mental presentation and belief as radically different, but the latter as a species of the former. James Mill's theory of belief as an indissoluble association of ideas is, indeed, inadequate. The association may be dissoluble, the image may be distorted or taken apart, but not without resistance. When Mr. Spencer implies that belief is a persistent association, he comes nearer to avoiding objection. Mr. James Ward, Mr. Stout, and Mr. H. R. Marshall have given kindred analyses. Dr. Alfred Hodder,[1] independently of the later writers, has transformed James Mill's formula into a "spontaneous association of ideas," and it is from his clear exposition that my view is adopted. When Professor Brentano examined and rejected in succession the opinions that the difference between presentation and judgment was a difference of intensity, a difference of content, a difference in the combination of subject and predicate, and thereupon concluded that it was a unique and undecomposable difference, he overlooked one possibility. It might be a difference in the behavior of the content. It might be what Hume had in mind when, besides the various terms of intensity that he employed, he characterized a belief as a more "firm" and "steady" idea. That conformation which the representative images take of themselves when we think of a subject, and keep of themselves while we think of it, not wholly preventing their being tampered with by voluntary effort of imagination, but offering some resistance to such effort; that stands to us for the conformation of the facts. In other words, the shape the images take of their own accord when we let them alone (where they take any stable shape, where we are not doubting or dreaming),—the attitude into which the mind instinctively falls,—that is the belief. That is, belief is our

[1] Philosophical Review, vol. v., p. 3.

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habitual way of imagining the facts of any subject; it is a habit of imagination. Hence it may also be described as an involuntary conception. Where we have to put together or hold together the images in that special configuration, the result is no longer our belief, but the way we choose for the moment to imagine the thing.* The objective world appearing in perception is distinguished (among other marks) by being independent of our wills; while our eyes are open, there the object stands, will it away as much as we choose. So it is with the objective world appearing in belief and not immediately present to the senses; it is distinguished by being independent of our wills. We may close our eyes, or we may cease thinking of the subject; otherwise the thing independently maintains itself for consciousness. Much comfort has been taken by Professor Paulsen and Professor James, in their defence of the postulate, from what the former calls the "voluntaristic" view of intellect and the latter the "essentially teleological" view of the "conceiving or theorizing" faculty. This is the basis of the latter's essay on "Reflex Action and Theism." The intellect "functions exclusively for the sake of ends," for proper reactions upon the environment. Let me admit it at once. It follows from this, however, as we learn, that when we are taking to ourselves a philosophy we have only to consult directly for its effect upon action. The inference sadly miscarries. If our reflective faculty subserves reaction upon the environment, how does it subserve it, and why should such an appliance be there? The answer is bound up with the theory of belief. The reflective faculty subserves reaction by carrying a copy or representative of the environment. If

* As we have seen, a belief may be produced by will. But it is not maintained by will. James Mill in effect compared a belief to a rod which no effort can break asunder. Let us compare it rather to a strap of india-rubber, which may be drawn apart, but which flies back when we let it go. But if we are fascinated by the effect of drawing it out, and repeat the operation often enough, the strap is likely to lose its elasticity and remain of itself elongated. The only feature that the analogy fails to illustrate is that the belief in its new form has a fresh elasticity of its own, as at first. Force of will, then, may produce a habit of imagination,—*i.e.*, a belief; but when the habit has become such, it dispenses with the support of will.

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we tamper with that representative we tamper with our sole clue to action. If, as commonly, we are not in sensible presence of the particular portion of the environment with which we are concerned to deal, it is all-important that when we were in its presence it should so have left its impress upon us that now we retain some semblance of the original—a conceived, or, as Professor Simon Patten has called it, a subjective environment—to which to suit our conduct. Precisely because it is purely incidental to action must this subjective environment be kept intact,—uneffaced and unembellished by the mutinous active impulses that at times would meddle with it. This subjective environment is, of course, the world of our belief.

I hold then—as this broken summary and these scattered suggestions would indicate—that there is a sufficiently firm basis in the conditions of life for the stern fact-facing temper for which Mr. James has so sorry an opinion. I feel it to be a declension from the heroics of "deliberate and courageous" faith; but after all one need not be put to confusion because the masters of speculative romance can "use grander language" than oneself; nor need one be envious of the scenic sublimities enjoyed by gentlemen who regard philosophy as an opportunity to express their taste in universes. We are told, indeed, that the quality of our own natures is shown by the scale and imperiousness of our "demands" upon the world we inhabit; but I cannot think it necessary, in order to clear one's character as a man, to commit a folly as a thinker. We are told, too, that all philosophic thought is an affair of one's demands, and that in disagreeing with so many of our opponents' opinions we make it evident that our own intellectual taste is essentially negative and destructive. There is an unspiritual energy of intellect whose love is for logic as a craft, and which animates a class of critical rigorists and precisians, extreme to mark what is done amiss in the minutiæ of argument, but of a nature scarcely deep enough at root to feel the more far-reaching needs. To this I suppose there is little to be said. Not being of those who "enjoy a certain amount of uncertainty" in their religion, we cannot demonstrate by a

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postulating faith our depth of spiritual nature. For the rest, it may perhaps be taken as a confirmation of the charge that we are unanxious to rebut it.

DICKINSON S. MILLER.

PHILADELPHIA.

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS.*

THERE is none of us, I suppose, who does not, in some way or other, hope that he is making progress, or that progress is being made with some plan or work in which he is interested. It is the common characteristic of human life to look forward. "Man," as it has been said, "partly is, but wholly hopes to be." And this common characteristic is one that has been specially emphasized in recent generations, more particularly in connection with what has come to be known as the doctrine of development or evolution. Thus it comes that there are few words that are more freely used in our time than "progress." We speak familiarly of the nineteenth century as having made more progress in the arts and sciences than any other century that went before, or perhaps (as Mr. A. R. Wallace has recently urged) than all other centuries put together. We speak of our political institutions as having made great progress since the time of the Revolution. We commonly think, also, that we have made some progress, if not quite so great, in manners, in literature, in the appreciation of nature, in sympathy for our fellow-men. And sometimes we tend to go farther, and to think of progress not merely as a characteristic of this "wonderful century," but as a law of the universe, as an aspect of the great cosmic process, showing itself in the development of animal species as well as in the growth of human institutions, extending downward also to the life of plants, and perhaps even to be seen in the structure of rocks and mountains and islands and continents, and in the formation of suns and worlds.

And certainly, whatever may be thought of the larger ques-

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* A lecture delivered before the Bristol Ethical Society in October, 1898.

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tion about the universe in general, it is difficult to doubt that in almost every important aspect of human life there has been a marked development. Even the pessimism of Carlyle relaxes a little on a general survey of life. "I do not make much," he says, "of 'progress of the species,' as handled in these times of ours; nor do I think you would care to hear much about it. The talk on that subject is too often of the most extravagant, confused sort. Yet, I may say, the fact itself seems certain enough; nay, we can trace out the inevitable necessity of it in the nature of things." Yet, on a closer investigation, there are certain doubts that suggest themselves as to the nature and value of human progress, which it seems of some importance to consider.

The first doubt that presents itself has reference to the general character and value of the progress that has been made. Admitting that the conditions of life have been gradually ameliorated, that laws have been made more just and manners more humane, we may yet ask ourselves whether the change has not been largely mechanical and superficial in its character, and whether it has not been accompanied by a corresponding loss and deterioration. Can we really flatter ourselves, it may be asked, that, with all our advance in the physical sciences and in the mechanical arts that depend on them, and with all our progress in political organization and in the regulation of social forms, our life is better in its most essential elements than that which was lived by the Athenians in their most cultured period or by our own ancestors in the Middle Ages? Can we compare ourselves in intellectual force or artistic sense with the Greeks that surrounded Pericles? And have we not lost something of the fine faith and whole-heartedness by which our own ancestors were distinguished in the best ages of mediæval Christianity? And are not the superficial comfort and refinements of our modern existence poor substitutes for those more important goods? "Knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers." We have better machinery than any people ever had before; but are our men as satisfactory? We have more comfort in our lives; but have we as much nobility and beauty? This is a kind of

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doubt that has been much impressed upon the modern mind by such writers as Carlyle and Ruskin; and, so long as it remains unresolved, it leaves it an open question whether the modern civilization of which so much is heard means a real advance in the life of mankind.

But it is possible to carry our doubts even farther than this. The doubt that has just been stated does not affect the common conviction that advance has been made in the comfort and happiness of life, but only the belief that this implies a general improvement of mankind. A recent German writer (Nietzsche) has said that happiness is not the aim of men, but only of Englishmen; and perhaps even an Englishman may admit that, if happiness accompanies deterioration, it cannot be accepted as the supreme good. But we may go farther than this, and raise a doubt whether even the happiness of mankind has been advanced by the progress of civilization. It was said by the Preacher that increase of knowledge is increase of sorrow; and it has been thought by some that the same may be said of the increase in the complexity of life. Even Adam Smith expressed the view that the happiness of the poor was probably not in general any less than that of the rich, the multiplication of comforts leading only to the multiplication of wants. Again, it is urged by such writers as Mr. Edward Carpenter that civilization in general involves physical deterioration, and with that the loss of happiness. And, at any rate, if this is too extreme a paradox with regard to the more prosperous members of our modern societies, there is at least a good deal of plausibility in the contention that the life of a savage in his native woods is superior, in almost all the important conditions of happiness, to that of the majority of the dwellers in the slums of our large cities. "Hell," it was said by Shelley, "is a city much like London." * And, indeed,

* "Hell is a city much like London,—
A populous and a smoky city;
There are all sorts of people undone,
And there is little or no fun done;
Small justice shown, and still less pity."
Peter Bell the Third.

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when the human mind has once embarked on such comparisons of the happiness of the civilized state with that of more primitive conditions, there are hardly any limits to the unfavorableness of the comparisons that may be drawn. Probably most people can to some extent sympathize even with the preference for the state of the lower animals, which has been so emphatically stated by Walt Whitman.

> "They do not sweat nor whine about their condition,
> They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
> They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
> Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented
> With the mania of owning things;
> Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago;
> Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth."

But again, even if we grant the intrinsic value of the progress that has been made in material welfare, doubt may still be thrown on its permanence. It may be urged that it is in all probability merely an ephemeral gain. It may be pointed out that it is largely due to accidental circumstances, and may be easily destroyed by others equally accidental. It depends, for instance, it may be said, on the supply of coal and iron, which are not inexhaustible, and on certain scientific discoveries which happen to have a practical bearing. It depends, also, on the preponderance of the Anglo-Saxon race, which is not likely to be perpetual. How different the course of the world might be if the Chinese were to gain preponderance, or even the Russians! Again, it may be pointed out that other civilizations, hardly less advanced than our own, have passed completely away, leaving scarcely a trace behind, or only such a bewildering trace as the Pyramids in Egypt. Have we any reason, then, for supposing that our present civilization, such as it is, has any better chance of being a permanent possession for the world?

Such are some of the doubts that naturally present themselves to men's minds when they reflect a little on the nature of human progress as we see it at the present time; and though at first they may be set aside as idle fears, they have a tendency, when once presented, to recur with a haunting

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persistence, and if we yield to them to land us at last in a state of abject pessimism.

Now, we may no doubt steel our minds against such doubts for a time by saying to ourselves that such speculations are wholly idle and futile. And in a sense this is true enough. We cannot possibly foresee the course of events to such an extent as to have any real confidence about the conditions in which life will be lived in future ages; and, even if we could, there is often very little point in asking whether life lived under one set of conditions is better than life lived under another set. It would not be easy to decide whether it is better to be a porpoise or a kangaroo; and the same kind of difficulty meets us when we try to decide about two modes of human life in which the general circumstances are entirely different. In whatever circumstances they are placed, men find themselves with plenty of problems to contend with; and, in general, we may perhaps say that they may realize as valuable an existence in contending with one set of problems as in contending with another set. What Browning says of places seems to apply very largely to all kinds of conditions.

> "If we have souls, know how to see and use,
> One place performs, like any other place,
> The proper service every place on earth
> Was framed to furnish man with: serves alike
> To give him note that, through the place he sees,
> A place is signified he never saw." *

"The situation," as Carlyle otherwise puts it, "that has not its Duty, its Ideal, was never yet occupied by man. . . . Thy condition is but the stuff thou art to shape that same Ideal out of: what matters whether such stuff be of this sort or that, so the form thou give it be heroic, be poetic?" With such reflections as these, we may very well settle down to "cultivate our gardens," to make the best of the conditions in which we find ourselves, without much concern as to whether they are better or worse than others, and as to whether mankind as a whole is progressing or degenerating. And, indeed,

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* "Red-Cotton-Night-Cap Country."

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we might go farther, and say that, if there are doubts as to the reality and persistence of progress, there may also be doubts as to whether the persistence of progress is in the end desirable. John Stuart Mill argued in favor of a more or less stationary state in the economic life of mankind; and it might similarly be argued that this is what is most desirable in life in general. On such grounds, then, it may be said that comparatively little interest attaches to the question whether we are in advance of our fathers, and whether our sons are likely to be in advance of us. Let us cease to trouble ourselves about the larger question of human progress, and content ourselves with making the conditions in which we at present find ourselves as satisfactory as we can.

Now, I am far from denying that there is a good deal of wisdom in such an attitude as this It is seldom the part of a wise man to concern himself much with remote goods and evils. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," and the good, too. But, unhappily for our peace of mind, the good and evil of to-day have nearly always a very close reference to the good and evil of to-morrow, and even to the good and evil of remote generations; so that even by devoting ourselves to the problems that we find nearest to our hands, we by no means escape from the thought of the future. Even if we but cultivate our gardens, we must sow our seeds with reference to what we believe of future seasons and conditions. "The present," as Leibniz said, "is big with the future." The interest of the present moment is never an interest that is confined to the present moment. It is always in something that we seek to do, something that we hope to bring about, and so the idea of a future end is bound up in it. Hence any doubt about the future of human life is inevitably a doubt about its present as well. If we lose our confidence in what men are to be, we lose also to a large extent our confidence in our present interests and duties. Hence I cannot but believe that it is a vain effort to seek, in any such way as that now suggested, to rid our minds of all concern about human progress. However small and circumscribed our duties and interests may be, they must yet have the most intimate con-

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nection with the whole development of human life, and presuppose a certain confidence in it. If we lose faith in mankind, we necessarily lose faith in ourselves, and the significance vanishes from all our deepest interests and obligations. I do not mean, of course, that it is not possible to do much excellent work without any belief in progress. As Mr. Balfour has recently urged, any explicit belief of this kind is comparatively modern;* and many of the most heroic actions of the ancient world were done in the face of an explicit belief rather in degeneration than in progress. But they were done at least as a desperate effort to check the imminent decline, and implied at any rate that those who did them were not indifferent to the question of human progress. And in modern times the thought of progress has become more explicit. Though it is only recently that we have come to talk about evolution, yet I suppose all through the Christian centuries there has always been some hope that the world will be "saved," that the life of mankind will in some way be made better than it is. If this belief were to be altogether lost, it is hard to calculate how much of the meaning would go out of even the commonest activities in which we are constantly engaged. All of us, I fancy, can feel the force of the question ascribed by Browning to "the famous ones of old":

> "Was it for mere fool's-play, make-believe, and mumming,
> So we battled it like men, not boy-like, sulked or whined?
> Each of us heard clang God's 'Come!' aud each was coming:
> Soldiers all, to forward face, not sneaks to lag behind!"

And even in our own unheroic age, could any of us really be content to think that the efforts that are being made for human advancement are mere "fool's-play" and "make-believe"? Could any of us bear to believe that the evils of which we are conscious in our present state would never be in any degree removed or mitigated? Hopeless of a perfect cure for human ills we may very well be. But if we gave up all hope of mitigating them by degrees, it may well be doubted whether any thinking being could regard life as worth living.

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* "A Fragment on Progress," in "Essays and Addresses."

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Are the lives of the rich always to be empty and idle? Are the lives of the poor always to be wretched, ruined by soul-destroying cares? Is there always to be war, discord, injustice? Perhaps; but at any rate a large part of the interest of life for thoughtful men has always lain in the hope that such evils may be diminished by patient effort. If this hope is an illusion, the best efforts of mankind are turned into vanity. Hence the doubt as to the reality of progress is one that cuts at the very root of human life.

Now, the doubts that have been suggested might no doubt be partly removed by simply confronting them with the facts of experience. Thus, the doubt as to whether our material progress is accompanied by development in the higher artistic and moral faculties might possibly be removed by a careful comparison of modern civilization with that of the Greeks and other older peoples. It might then be shown, as Green, for instance, has shown, that, if in some respects we have a less intense development of particular qualities, yet we have a wider range of sympathies and a more exacting standard of duty.

"We are apt to speak," Green says,* "as if the life of the Greek or Roman citizen, in the full bloom of municipal civilization, was much fuller and richer than that of the modern citizen under a *régime* of universal freedom and equal rights. For the many we admit the modern system may be a gain, but for the few we take it to be a corresponding loss. Yet this is surely a very superficial view. The range of faculties called into play in any work of social direction or improvement must be much wider, when the material to be dealt with consists no longer of supposed chattels but of persons asserting recognized rights, whose welfare forms an integral element in the social good which the directing citizen has to keep in view. Only if we leave long-suffering, considerateness, the charity which 'beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things,' with all the art of the moral physician, out of account in our estimate of the realization of the soul's powers,

* "Prolegomena to Ethics," Book III., chap. v.

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can we question the greater fulness of the realization in the present life of Christendom, as compared with the highest life of the ancient world." Similarly, Dr. Bosanquet, in a striking passage,* after quoting the famous expressions from Mrs. Browning, as to our "little thinking if we work our *souls* as nobly as our iron," † lays his finger at once on an obvious point of advance, by asking, "Has there been any civilization before or outside that of modern Christendom in which so noble a trumpet-call could have been sounded by a woman?"

The doubt as to the relative happiness of the civilized man, as compared with the savage, is still more easily removed; for its plausibility seems to exist at all only when we compare civilized life at its worst with savage life at its best. If we compare the best with the best of each, or even the worst with the worst, there can hardly be any possibility of doubt. Even if we take such wretchedness as that of the London slums, it must be remembered that this is not without its mitigations. In illustration of this, I may quote the cheering words with which Mrs. Bosanquet concludes her admirable book on "Rich and Poor." Referring to the saying that "Hell is a city much like London," she goes on to remark, "If this were so, I would cheerfully accept a sentence which should doom me to hell, and would play my part as a citizen to the best of my power; for it would be a city full of pathos and humor, where much that is bad is mingled with all that is human and lovable, where the very fiends who are represented as tormenting the lost are really engaged in works of mercy and brotherly love; a city, above all, where justice and straightforwardness and manly effort never fail to make their influence felt."

As to Walt Whitman's paradox about the animals, that of course was only quoted as an instance of the lengths to which this line of thought might lead us. I suppose his expressions are hardly serious enough for refutation. Nor perhaps, for a

* "Civilization of Christendom," p. 70.

† I feel bound to add also that, if we could really be sure that we are working our iron nobly, there could not be much doubt about our souls. It is rather the bad working of our iron that reveals the flaws in our souls.

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different reason, is it worth while to spend much time over the precariousness of our advance in material civilization. Everything that depends on external conditions must be to some extent precarious; but we need not, at any rate, be greatly alarmed by the want of permanence in older forms of civilization; for it does not appear that the scientific basis of material progress was understood by any former age as it is by ours. The continual advance in the discovery of the *causes* of things in modern times gives ground for hoping that we may learn to have a permanent control over the external conditions with which we have to deal. At least there certainly seems enough ground for confidence to make the effort worth while.

Yet, however much we may comfort ourselves with such reflections as these, they hardly suffice to lay our doubts completely when once they have been fairly raised. We have only appealed to empirical observations; and the results of such observations are always liable to be upset by others. When Carlyle assails our political institutions, when Ruskin attacks our commercial life, when Tolstoi throws doubt on our civilization as a whole, accusing even our art and music of not appealing to a simple taste, and throwing suspicion even on our cleanliness as a sign of degeneration,* we are apt to feel confused and hardly know what we ought to answer. The only way, I believe, of really meeting such objections is by asking ourselves more definitely what progress really means, by attempting a scientific analysis of the idea, and then asking how far it has actually been realized.

Now, there is a short and easy way that is sometimes resorted to of convincing ourselves from a scientific point of view of the reality of progress. It is thought that the general theory of biological evolution warrants us in believing that the development which is found going on in the world in general cannot fail to make its appearance in human life also. Everywhere, it is urged, we find an advance going on from indefinite incoherent homogeneity to definite coherent

* See his recent work on "Art," and his earlier book entitled "What to Do."

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heterogeneity. "Setting out with the human body as a minute part, and ascending from it to greater parts," we find, according to Mr. Herbert Spencer, that "this simultaneity of transformation is equally manifest,—that while each individual is developing, the society of which he is an insignificant unit is developing too; that while the aggregate mass forming a society is becoming more definitely heterogeneous, so likewise is that total aggregate, the earth, of which the society is an inappreciable portion; that while the earth, which in bulk is not a millionth of the solar system, progresses towards its concentrated and completed structure, the solar system similarly progresses; and that even its transformations are but those of a scarcely appreciable portion of our sidereal system, which has at the same time been going through parallel changes." * But the very vastness of this conception, even if it could be regarded as scientifically demonstrated, may soon convince us that it has but little to do with human aspirations. And this view is further confirmed when we find Mr. Spencer himself protesting against the introduction of teleological considerations into our conception of progress. "The current conception," he says,† "is a teleological one. The phenomena are contemplated solely as bearing on human happiness. Only those changes are held to constitute progress which directly or indirectly tend to heighten human happiness; and they are thought to constitute progress simply *because* they tend to heighten human happiness. But rightly to understand progress, we must learn the nature of those changes, considered apart from our interests." But if progress is to be thus regarded, it is clear that, even if it can be shown with the utmost scientific rigor that there is a real progress in human life, yet the progress may be such as in no way to make our lives happier or better, but only more complete, more heterogeneous. This point was further brought out, perhaps in rather too antithetical a way, in Huxley's celebrated "Romanes Lecture," where the kind of progress that is brought about by the cosmic processes is contrasted with that which

* "First Principles," p. 546.

† "Essays," Vol. I., p. 9.

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men are trying to bring about by moral effort; and the one is represented as almost directly opposed to the other. Without pausing to consider how far this opposition can in the end be justified, it seems at least to show that the mere statement of a general doctrine of evolution is not enough to give us confidence in the progress of mankind, in any sense that would suffice to satisfy our human hopes. In order to gain such confidence, we must ask ourselves what we mean by progress, and then ask ourselves what grounds there are for believing that it can be brought about.

Now, I do not think it would be possible in such a lecture as this to attempt any thorough examination of the idea of progress. But perhaps a few general observations may have some use. It seems to me that when we speak of human progress, there are three main aspects which it is well to distinguish,—viz., first, the development of the individual; secondly, the improvement of the material conditions of life; thirdly, the improvement of the social conditions of life. Any progress which did not involve all of these could not, I think, long be regarded as satisfactory. The development of the individual, without the necessary material and social conditions for the maintenance of a complete life, would be left in an utterly precarious state. On the other hand, it is still more certain that the improvement of material and social conditions would be an empty boon if it were not accompanied by the development of the individual. All wise human effort must be directed, therefore, to the advancement of life in all these three aspects; and the only doubts as to human progress that have any real point are doubts as to the possibility of a satisfactory combination of these three aspects. Doubts as to whether they have yet been satisfactorily combined may be set aside as unimportant. "If it isna weel buskit, we'll busk it again." The unsatisfactoriness of what has been or now is only stimulates to renewed effort. The doubt that paralyzes effort is that as to the possibility of improvement. Now, there are, I think, two ways in which a fundamental doubt may be raised with reference to the possibility of human progress in those three aspects to which I have referred. We may say that the

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improvement of material conditions is in the end incompatible with the highest development of the individual life; or we may say that there is an ultimate conflict between the good of the individual and the good of society. Let us consider shortly each of these two doubts.

It may be urged, on the one hand, that what we call material improvement is fatal to the development of the individual. Individual development, it may be said, requires struggle. If we make the conditions of life too easy, inferior types will be preserved, and even the better types will be deteriorated from lack of an adequate exercise of their powers. Hence the more we improve the material conditions of life, the more do we interfere with the development of the individual.* The biological question involved here is quite beyond my province; but there seems at any rate to be no very clear evidence either that the improvement of material conditions diminishes the struggle for existence, or that, if it does, it necessarily leads to deterioration of the race. And, even if all this were shown, there seems to be some possibility of artificial solution, even without resorting to those methods of "social surgery" which have been advocated by Mr. Bradley.† Apart from the biological question, however, there is the more purely economic one, whether the effort after the improvement of material conditions does not inevitably lead to modes of life which are destructive of the higher forms of individual development. Is not the commercial life inimical to the heroic and artistic temper, and in the end destructive of the moral and religious spirit? A view of this kind was very prevalent among the ancient Greeks, and finds expression in the writings of their most serious thinkers; and, if it is less apparent to ourselves, this is perhaps due in large measure to our not really caring so much for the highest types of personal development. This is one of the most serious questions

* For some discussions bearing upon this point, see Dr. Haycraft's book on "Darwinism and Race Progress." Cf. also Mr. Edward Carpenter's book on "Civilization: Its Cause and Cure," and the recent work on "Degeneracy" by Dr. Talbot.

† See INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. IV., No. 3.

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by which we are confronted in modern times; but on the whole it can hardly be doubted that it is capable of being answered in a satisfactory way. The answer seems to be that for a time the work of bringing the powers of nature under control for the use of mankind has a narrowing influence, but that this influence need not be permanent. It seems to arise largely from the fact that the first efforts to improve our material conditions take the form of devising machinery; and, until men have learned to use this machinery, it tends to tyrannize over their lives. But, when the problem comes to be, more and more, not how to invent and make machinery, but how to use it for the good of mankind, there seems every reason to believe that this narrowing influence will cease to make itself felt; that it will no longer be even epigrammatically true, in Emerson's phrase, that "things are in the saddle and ride mankind," but that men will once more assume the mastery and put things in their proper place.* How this is to be done is no doubt a great problem which must for a long time to come occupy the attention of those who make economic conditions the study of their lives; but I see no reason at all for thinking that it is a hopelessly insoluble problem.

The doubt which is thus raised, however, is intimately connected with another one, which is even more far-reaching,—viz., with the question whether there is not a certain opposition between the progress of the individual and the development of social institutions. This is a question that has often been raised in different forms. It appears, for instance, in the famous paradox of Mandeville, that "private vices are public benefits," and in those other kindred ideas which so much of the ingenuity of our eighteenth century moralists was spent in refuting. In our own time, however, it has reappeared in a

* It should be observed that when Aristotle regards the money-making life as unnatural, his reason for so describing it seems to be that he regards it as being taken as an end in itself, and so as having no definite limit. This is no doubt a constant danger of the commercial life, but it is one to which the military life also is in some degree exposed. The chief hope for the modern world lies in the possibility of reducing all such aspects of life to their proper position as means. See Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics," I., v. 8; "Politics," I., ix.; Stewart's "Notes," Vol. I., p. 68; Newman's "Politics of Aristotle," p. 130.

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more subtle guise; and I believe I cannot more profitably occupy the closing part of this lecture than in calling attention to two recent attempts that have been made to bring out the fundamental opposition between the individual and society.

The two attempts to which I wish to call your attention have been made by two exceedingly different writers,—Benjamin Kidd and Friedrich Nietzsche. Neither of these can perhaps quite be described as a philosophical thinker; but both have produced a great popular impression, by giving forcible expression to certain ideas that were more or less in the air. Both rest their views on the idea of evolution, but they think of this in very different ways, and point to very different goals. Yet they are at one in emphasizing a certain opposition between the life of the individual and that of his social environment.

Mr. Kidd brings out the opposition in this way. He urges that the maintenance and development of human society depends mainly on the presence of an altruistic spirit, a spirit of devotion to the common good. But when the individual reflects, he finds no rational ground for such devotion. It is not reasonable for him to seek anything else than his own personal happiness; and this is often in opposition to the public welfare. Hence on public grounds it is necessary to appeal to what is described as an ultra-rational sanction, some influence which cannot be seen to be reasonable, but which men feel bound to obey. This influence he finds in religion. There is thus an opposition between what the individual sees to be reasonable and what he feels to be right. The former would guide him to his own good; but for the sake of society he must obey the latter. Altruism must, consequently, be encouraged to develop itself in opposition to the reason of the individual, and in opposition to what he perceives to be his own greatest good.

The point of view of Nietzsche is almost diametrically opposed to this. The great evil of modern times he believes to lie in its excessive altruism,—an altruism which has been cherished by the religious spirit, and especially by Christianity. Christianity inculcated a system of morality founded on the

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idea of self-sacrifice. This Nietzsche describes as the morality of slaves. He thinks that it rests essentially on weakness, on the inability to assert one's self. To this he would oppose a more masterful morality, which should consist in the effort to assert and realize one's self. "Be distinguished" (*sei vornehm*) would be one of its leading commandments. By the exercise of such a morality he hopes to develop the mode of existence which he describes as that of the more than man (*Uebermensch*), of which he seems to regard such a man as Goethe as the harbinger.

What these two views have in common is the doctrine that the realization of the individual is naturally opposed to devotion to the good of the race. Of course, I do not mean to say that either Kidd or Nietzsche represents this opposition as absolute. A careful study of their writings would no doubt reveal many qualifications of this view. But on the whole it seems fair to say that both of them think that an individual who reflected carefully on his own highest good, and chose what it seems most reasonable to choose for himself, would avoid the attitude of self-devotion to the public good, which such a religion as Christianity demands. But while Nietzsche accepts this result as a good one, Kidd thinks that it must be counteracted by ultra-rational sanctions. Now, it is easy to see that there is a certain plausibility, and perhaps even a certain truth, in the views of both these writers. We have probably all known people whose self-devotion to public ends might be described as weak and morbid, people who are always attending meetings or conducting classes or doing something for their neighbors, who never possess their souls in peace, and whose work is often rendered futile from want of inner self-development and calm reflection. To such people one would be inclined to preach, with Nietzsche, a more masterly morality; to say, if not "Be distinguished," at least "Be strong; do not weakly yield to every public claim that seems to come before you, but choose rather what can be done with some effect, and without undue sacrifice of your own powers for future action and for future development." On the other hand, the opposite type of person is equally familiar; one who can never

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throw himself with any heartiness into any form of public duty, because he is afraid of interfering with his own career. In dealing with such, one would be glad even to resort to Mr. Kidd's ultra-rational sanction, if there were no other means of rousing them to action and enthusiasm. But while it is thus clear enough that there is a possibility of erring on two opposite sides, it is by no means apparent that there is any fundamental opposition between devotion to one's own greatest good and devotion to the greatest good of mankind. Indeed, it is evident rather that he who weakly sacrifices himself for others hardly ever confers any real benefit upon them. If a wise mercy is twice blest, a foolish one is twice cursed. And it is equally clear that the man who is incapable of a wise self-devotion misses the highest zest of life, and does not really realize himself. Why, then, is it that we still find popular writers insisting on this opposition?

It springs, I believe, from an error which is at least as old as Hobbes, and which had to a large extent the sanction of Bishop Butler, the error of supposing that there is such a thing as a self-centred individual life, capable of finding its realization and its happiness within itself. Hobbes thought that every one necessarily pursues his own power and happiness, and that this naturally opposes itself to the power and happiness of others; and even Bishop Butler held that, "when we sit down in a cool hour," it seems unreasonable to aim at anything else than our own individual happiness,—meaning by that something which it is possible to distinguish from the realization of public welfare. But is any such self-centred life possible? Surely not much reflection is needed to see that the happiness of life can be found only in the extension of our circle of interests. How much truer was Aristotle's account of the man who is truly self-loving!* "If what a man always set his heart upon were that he, rather than another, should do what is just or temperate, or in any other way virtuous,—if, in a word, he were always claiming the noble course of conduct, no one would call him self-loving, and no

* "Nicomachean Ethics," Book IX., chap. viii.

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one would reproach him. And yet such a man would seem to be more truly self-loving. At least, he takes for himself that which is noblest and most truly good, and gratifies the ruling power in himself, and in all things obeys it. But just as the ruling part in a state or in any other system seems, more than any other part, to be the state or the system, so also the ruling part of a man seems to be most truly the man's self. He therefore who loves and gratifies this part of himself is most truly self-loving. . . . Those who beyond other men set their hearts on noble deeds are welcomed and praised by all; but if all men were vieing with each other in the pursuit of what is noble, and were straining every nerve to act in the noblest possible manner, the result would be that both the wants of the community would be perfectly satisfied, and at the same time each individually would win the greatest of all good things. . . . The good man, therefore, ought to be self-loving." If we understand self-love in this sense, as meaning the effort to develop what is highest in our own individual nature, and so to secure the richest form of happiness, it seems clear that this is inseparable from our interest in the realization of the most complete form of social welfare. On the whole, I believe it will be found that all the experience of life goes to show that what is reasonable is real and coheres with itself. The effort after the kind of welfare that we reasonably seek for ourselves —the development of our most important powers—fits in with and is perfectly compatible with the effort after the kind of welfare that we reasonably seek for others. As Spinoza said, "The highest good is common to all, and all may equally enjoy it." It is, on the whole, only the effort after unreasonable forms of welfare that leads to contradiction and conflict. If, then, we take as the goal of progress the attainment of the rational welfare of ourselves and others, there seems no reason for thinking that this cannot be attained. Hence the opposition between the good of the individual and the good of society seems on the whole to be superficial.*

* Cf. article on "Self-Assertion and Self-Denial," INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. V., No. 3.

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On such grounds as these, then, I think it is possible to retain our belief in the feasibility of human progress, in spite of all the objections that can be raised. The grounds, indeed, on which this belief rests I have only been able very imperfectly to indicate. What I have chiefly aimed at bringing home to you is, on the one hand, that we must not be content with the surface appearance of progress, but must try to understand what progress really is; and, on the other hand, that we must not suppose that progress is a fatal fact in human life, which is bound to come to us whether we will or no. On the whole, I believe, we are likely to have just as much progress as we really try to have, and just of the kind that we really try to have. He that seeks finds. If we have in Great Britain set ourselves—as perhaps we have too much done—to have a merely material progress, to buy and sell more than any other people in the world, we may very probably succeed in doing so. But how much shall we be the better for it? If, on the other hand, we determine to have progress of another kind; if we remember the better traditions of our race, and rouse ourselves, in Milton's phrase, "as an eagle mewing her mighty youth;" if we seek not merely for material progress, but for progress in education, in art, in philosophy, in social justice, in all that contributes to the highest development of individual and social life, I confess I see no reason why we should not find that too. Only we must not suppose that it will come of itself. It will come only if we fix our minds constantly upon it, and seriously set ourselves to understand what its realization involves.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

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SOME AIMS OF MORAL EDUCATION.

EXPERIENCE seems to show that patience and tact, even when acting under the inspiration of lofty ideals, afford no warrant of success in the great work of forming the character of the young. Not merely have unworthy men and women come from homes where they have always been surrounded by the ennobling influences of a good example, but children for whose moral welfare everything had been done that anxious thought could suggest have gone forth into the world with nothing better than a weak and cowardly will, a prey to the first temptation that happened to cross their path. Such results are usually attributed to "total depravity,"—there was no better nature to which an appeal could be made,—a comfortable doctrine, on the whole, for what is inevitable can always be borne, especially if it happens outside the walls of one's own home. But in view of the magnitude of the interests involved it may be worth while to consider whether a large share of these failures is not due to the employment of inadequate methods of dealing with our material, the adoption of which is attributable in great part to hazy and incomplete notions as to the exact nature of the ends in view.

In the average family the aim of moral education seems to be restricted to the formation of habits. In this way it is sought to develop not merely the virtues of punctuality, order, obedience, and industry, but also veracity, honesty, and self-control. The means employed to establish the desired modes of activity, to the exclusion of whatever will militate against them, are—so far as specifically religious considerations are not called in—the threat of punishment and the promise of reward, or an appeal to the desire for approbation, or to affection for the parent who will be pained at disobedience. The fact can hardly be overlooked that the first of these motives will cease to operate at precisely that moment when the real struggle of life begins, and that the last of the three will lose most of its effectiveness upon the separation of the

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child from the family, and with the growth of the conviction that as a man he must lead his own life, regardless of what his mother might feel if she should chance to hear of things which in all probability will never reach her ears. But it is hoped that if the child is once properly started he will continue to do right of himself, like a perpetual-motion machine, which when wound up and given a push would go on forever. And this conviction has been strengthened by the emphasis placed upon habit in recent years by psychologists and pedagogists until the oft-quoted words of Wellington, "Habit a second nature! Habit is ten times nature," are taken to represent the sum and substance of the work of moral education.

That this method is indeed far from perfect would doubtless be admitted by every thoughtful person. At best it results in a purely mechanical product, a life in harness like that of the factory hand, with as little love or joy or freedom; it leaves the individual as helpless to cope with changed conditions as the savage when brought into contact with civilization; it provides neither initiative nor aggressiveness and knows nothing of the potentialities of development and growth. Nevertheless it is ordinarily believed to be absolutely reliable as far as it goes, and since it appears to assure the existence of the fundamental virtues, the lottery of chance is depended upon for the rest. But what needs to be pointed out to-day is that this system is weak just where it is supposed to be strongest. We may hold what opinion we please about the habits of a man of fifty, or about the effects upon certain elements of character of the drill and the regulation of army life; what we are concerned with here is the young men and young women who at sixteen or eighteen years of age are practically emancipated from parental authority and often cut off entirely from the influences of the home. How far the habits of a youth of eighteen can be depended upon to withstand the pressure of unfamiliar forces in a new environment will best appear if we inquire how habit works.

Now the domain of habit is as broad as life itself, but that form of it which we are now considering consists in the automatic

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suggestion under certain conditions of a given mode of activity, to the practical exclusion from the mind of the thought of other alternatives. "When angry count four" is the sage advice of that distinguished successor of Emerson, Mr. Puddin'head Wilson. If this rule were conscientiously adhered to for a time the appearance of the calming monosyllables at the proper moment could be depended upon with absolute confidence and we should be saved many an unkind word that, when spoken, we would gladly recall. In the same manner the practice of veracity may become fixed so that the truth springs spontaneously to the lips of the speaker, whatever the circumstances. In a certain section of our country the Germans have the reputation of being so honorable in their dealings with their creditors that among them bad debts are almost unknown. A business man who has had extensive dealings with all the nationalities within the limit of that State has explained this happy condition of things as due primarily to the fact that the possibility of leaving a debt permanently unpaid never occurs to the minds of these estimable people. Even when conflicting suggestions make their appearance a person's imagination may fail to entertain and develop the idea of *his* acting in this manner, through sheer incapacity to picture anything so foreign to his past experience. Or, finally, if the suggestion is entertained for an instant, a feeling of discomfort may arise at the thought of getting out of the beaten track, a feeling often sufficiently intense to drive the offensive idea from the mind. It is evident that reliance can be placed upon such a principle only on condition that the young man is to be surrounded always by the influences of the home, or that he is to live in a comparatively isolated community with fairly homogeneous customs, like the Germans just referred to. But such cases are the exception. The boy to whom it has never seriously occurred to cheat in any way goes to college, and at the close of his first term finds his new friends preparing cribs for the impending examinations. He discovers that his unpreparedness in this direction is on the whole a source of amusement to his companions, while offers of instruction and aid are plentiful. The boy who has not told a lie since his

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earliest childhood enters a lawyer's office. One of his first commissions is to go to court and secure the adjournment of a case upon to-day's calendar. If innocent enough to ask what grounds he is to assign, he is told to use his powers of invention. Here, then, are suggestions that find their support not in the dead past, but in the living and ever-renewed present; here pictures which powerful forces combine to hold before the mind. At first he may recoil, and the thought of breaking with his past may seem intolerable. But if the opposition have no deeper source he will find that in dishonesty and lying, as in smoking, "it is the first step that costs." Evidently when a young man leaves his home he must go forth equipped not merely with habits, but also with so profound a sense of the importance of the modes of activity they represent that he will value them more highly than all he can lose by his devotion to them.

Here, then, we have reached the fundamental defect of moral education as commonly conducted. It creates at best a machine which when well started would doubtless run on forever if it were not for the existence of friction. But morality involves a conflict with opposing forces, and in this we must depend not upon inertia but life. What is required, therefore, is a spirit of positive and ardent devotion to moral ideals; this alone can beget that loyalty to goodness that prompts to endurance for its sake. "No heart is pure that is not passionate; no virtue is safe that is not enthusiastic," writes the author of "Ecce Homo." These words contain the secret of moral education.

What, then, we must ask, is the nature of the ideal a love for which is to be developed in the minds of the rising generation? The moral life is a very complicated phenomenon, and no one article can do justice to all it involves. But we may select two of its elements as on the whole most likely to repay our study in the present state of thought on the subject, and confine our attention to these. Their nature will appear when we observe that morality, whatever else it may include, means on the one hand the service of our fellowmen, on the other beauty of character. Objectively these are

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but different aspects of an organic whole. Beauty of character, at least in its highest and most complete manifestations, appears only in connection with the life of service, while the life of service is the visible expression of the beautiful character. But in thought at least we can easily distinguish the utilitarian from the æsthetic aspect, and for our immediate purpose it is necessary to do so. Morality, then, is, first of all, service; the service of family, friend, and neighbor; of the strong who ask only for honest dealing and fair play, and the weak that need relief; of country, and of that larger fatherland whose limits are the boundary of the race. On the other hand, such service—though absorption in his immediate purpose may make one unconscious of the fact—means a character in which strength of will, unity of purpose, unsullied purity, and deep and tender sympathies have united to create the noblest work of art which it lies in the power of man to form. The Marcus Aurelius who bids us "stand firm like the rock" is a grander spectacle than the ocean-girt cliff of which he thinks, as we behold him unmoved though not untouched amid the storms of adversity which one after another swept over his empire and which sank to rest, for him, only with his death. In the commonplace, every-day world about us live women of whom we may write as one has written: "When I think of her, it gives me a sense of awe similar to the feeling we have when looking at the stars or into the mysteries of life through the microscope." This aspect of character is sometimes overlooked in the case of those whom we personally know. We see such a life as the insect does the statue upon which it crawls; but whenever we step back and view it as a whole, then we become sensible that character is valuable not merely for what it does, but also for what it is. Dull would he be of soul that could study without emotion Greene's magnificent portrait of Washington introduced with the words, "No nobler figure ever stood in the forefront of a nation's history."

The methods to be pursued in developing ideals of service depend primarily upon the principle that as a rule—and it is only of the general rule that we can here speak—the strength

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of the desire to help another varies with the vividness with which his need is realized, and this vividness of realization depends in its turn largely upon the amount of detail with which the given situation is pictured. For a family in my native town whose sufferings and struggles I have myself witnessed I am willing to make greater personal sacrifices than for the inhabitants of a famine-stricken province in China of whom I have merely read. In order to save a life many a man will risk his own who would sacrifice nothing and risk nothing to save that same person from a very considerable misfortune. The reason is the same in each instance. The first case requires no comment; the second finds its explanation in the fact that the irrevocableness of death's stroke impresses the imagination as nothing can do that may be looked upon as a passing evil, and that the helplessness of the victim is here so obvious, the effect being often heightened by his agonized attempts at resistance or escape, that even the dullest mind can appreciate to some extent the significance of the tragedy. Thus it often comes about that governments or social conditions may rob life of all that makes it worth having, and no public protest will be uttered till the Kurd begins to use fire and sword, or till starvation is seen following upon the heels of want. More persuasive, therefore, than the generalities of the orator or the logic of the moralist was the simple biography of Uncle Tom which made the reader live for the time the life of a slave. An analogous effect has been produced on a smaller scale by the story of "Black Beauty," which for some of its readers at least has made cruelty to the higher animals an impossibility. Consider for a moment why it is that our own future appeals more strongly to us than the interests of a stranger. It is not that I am I and you you; this is in fact no reason whatever. But I *realize* what the possession of wealth, social position, or power will mean to me; these are not bare abstractions, but fairly definite modifications of my present position, picturable oftentimes in all their details. On the other hand, what another will get out of his wealth, or what success in a given undertaking will mean to him, I can only vaguely conceive. We repeat: inter-

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est in a specific form of service grows in proportion to the detail with which the given situation, its demands, and the results of an effort to meet them are presented to the mind. And let it be noted for our encouragement that the effects of awakening such an interest are not confined to the production of the limited form of activity which the occasion may have called for. With each new essay the power of concreting the abstract is developed and the habit of doing so is more firmly established,—a habit, we need hardly say, to which the criticisms urged in the earlier part of the paper do not apply. The farther problem of ways and means lies beyond the scope of this inquiry. But perhaps a single hint as to method of procedure, in the way of an example, may not be out of place.

In a New England preparatory school is a fifteen-year-old boy whose mother is an earnest and efficient worker among the poor of New York. In her letters to her son you would find something more than the news of the home and gossip about friends. Side by side with this appears the story, not, of course, of the privations of the very poor, but of that supreme struggle between the forces of good and evil for the control of the great city, whose outcome is of more importance to the inhabitants of the tenement-house than the success of any charity. He is told what has been lost and why, and how it is hoped to make good the defeat; he learns of a gain here, a new ground of hope for farther success, the next move in the campaign, some new sign of the awakening of the civic conscience, until now these things are as much realities to him, as much a part of his life as the fact that the family have bought a new house, or that they are to go to Bar Harbor for the summer. As a result, when manhood has come, a victory for good government or a contribution to the higher life of the municipality will appear to him at least as well worth striving for as the winning of a case in court or the placing of a successful investment.

Where such interests have been developed it will be a comparatively easy matter to awaken the boy to a consciousness of the fact that the trade or profession for which he is fitting

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himself may be looked upon as something more than a means of accumulating money; that it is, indeed, a valuable, possibly the most valuable, part of the service due from him to society. If his life-work is to be that of the clergyman, the physician, the teacher, the journalist, or the army officer, this lesson will be readily learned; but even if he is to be a farmer, a manufacturer, or a trader, the development of a sense of the fundamental importance of these occupations may be made to culminate in the discovery that in reality idleness and dishonesty are for the merchant or the manufacturer what the cowardice that abandons the passengers of a sinking ship is to a sea-captain. He who takes up his chosen calling inspired by these ideals will not fail to see that a part of the work which lies next to him is contributing his share towards the creation among his business colleagues of that *esprit de corps* which dignifies and often glorifies the army, the navy, and the best of the professions.

But for the average man or woman it is not enough to realize the value to his fellows of the services he can perform; he must hold the recipient worthy of such service. The sacrifice which is easy for one we admire may be impossible for one we despise. The question whether Howard was justified in devoting his life to prison reform at the cost of the welfare of his son was answered in the negative by a young woman with this significant reservation: "If the prisoners had been good men it would have been different." When Timon of Athens has learned of the baseness and selfishness of the false friends upon whom he had been lavishing his wealth, his only thought on discovering gold after having fled from the haunts of men is how he may do the most harm with it. It is true that those in whom the enthusiasm of humanity is strong will not pause to investigate the moral status of those whom they know they can benefit; we are not told that Howard, for instance, was under any illusion as to the actual character of the men for whom he lived and died. Nevertheless that belief in the dignity and nobility of the human race which is essential to the existence of a broad altruism in some persons is favorable to its healthy growth in all, and should, therefore, be carefully

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fostered. With this end in view we may encourage the study of the life of the moral heroes of the race. The young man who knows something of the vain efforts made to bribe Washington, Franklin, and the other American patriots in the early years of the Revolution is safe from the doctrine that every man has his price. He who is familiar with the career of George William Curtis will not be tempted to believe that all high endeavor belongs to a remote past. And the qualities which inspire reverence in these great leaders he must be taught to discover in the apparently commonplace men and women about him. He must be told of the school-teacher who denied himself everything beyond the barest necessities of life that a younger brother might be provided with an education; of the forewoman in a burning building who lost her life in saving the girls under her charge. Nor can we stop here. He must come to know something of those paradoxes of the moral life, which if they are the despair, are also the hope of the reformer; such cases as that of the manufacturer who at the very time that he is grinding down the helpless women in his employment is giving up amusements, the society of friends, personal comforts, and the very wealth gained by his oppression in his devotion to an invalid wife. Finally, we should exhibit the power of the material and social environment to destroy or to stunt the growth of the germs of high aspiration and nobler endeavor, so that he may see, if not in all, yet in the vast majority of his fellow-beings, the undeveloped potentialities of the courage, strength, and love that blossom and bear fruit in the life of the hero and the saint. For examples of such tragedies he will not have to go to the works of George Eliot; all about us are Silas Marners, as hard, as bitter as he was before the storm and the winter's cold laid the little child at his door. It is not so much what man is as what he has it in him to become that must be the source of our inspiration.

When human nature is viewed in this light the temptation disappears to idealize at the expense of truth. Washington and Lincoln may be, nay, must be, painted as they were. Otherwise the discovery on the part of the youth, practically

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inevitable in the growth of knowledge, that he has been made a victim of what he will regard as a pious fraud may result in a reaction from everything that parental influence has stood for. And the shattering of ideals by contact with a world whose moral tone is infinitely below anything he had been prepared to expect is likely to develop a soul-destroying pessimism that is as exaggerated as the optimism it replaces. Of course, the problem of dealing with the faults of good men is one of great difficulty. But we cannot refuse to face it on that account. To those who are convinced of this fact the following suggestion as to method, from Plutarch, may be helpful. In his life of Fabius he treats a discreditable episode in the career of his hero as follows: "Here, we must confess, ambition seems to have overcome him. To make it appear to the world that he had taken Tarentum by force and his own prowess, and not by treachery, he commanded his men to kill the Brutians [one of whom had betrayed the city] before all others. . . . Such proceedings were very different from those of Marcellus on a like occasion, which, indeed, very much set off in the eyes of the world the clemency and humanity of the latter, as appears in the account of his life."

As we have seen, morality has two aspects: on the one side it means service, on the other, a perfected character. To these two aspects correspond in any individual two classes of motives: by the one he is lead to seek the good of his neighbor for that neighbor's sake, in entire obliviousness of anything that he himself may thereby gain; the other urges him to seek the attainment of a personal possession, *i.e.*, perfection, through devotion to another's well-being. In the one instance the ultimate end in view is a certain state of his neighbor; in the other, of himself. It is at present the fashion to ignore or to deny the existence of this distinction, primarily on the ground that, as is alleged, in every deliberate action a man is necessarily lead by the idea of a state of himself. Now, this proposition does indeed adumbrate an important truth, though one of no immediate concern to a theory of moral education. As it stands, however, it asserts a vicious error. It is, to be sure, possible that there are a few persons of whom

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it literally holds true. The question, What am I going to get out of it? represents the highest flight of which they are capable, and whether the aim be wealth or reputation or character, the figure of self as possessor occupies the entire field of vision. But this need not be the case. When a man gives up his seat in the car to a woman, the choice may in some instances lie between the prospect of loss of comfort on the one hand and the thought of increased unselfishness and power of enduring fatigue on the other. But the normal gentleman, we venture to assert, does not think about personal gain at all; the act is prompted solely by the perception of another's need. If so, the two classes of motives that lead to service are distinct, and moral education must recognize the fact. A theoretical justification of this position will not be attempted here. I omit it the more readily because the majority of people do not look with a great deal of favor upon the type of mind that can never quite forget itself, that in its most heroic deeds is but using others' needs and interests as a means of developing its own moral muscle. In fact, the child who should share his toys with his playmate or divide his bread-and-butter with his dog in order to strengthen his generosity would commonly be regarded as little less than a monstrosity. Thus we reach the apparently paradoxical conclusion that only those will ever succeed in attaining a considerable degree of perfection of character who are capable of being moved by other considerations besides the thought of possessing it. If so, we must cultivate in our children—as has been assumed throughout in this paper—that direct interest in others' welfare which carries with it forgetfulness of self. But from this it by no means follows that the idea of a perfected will has no place whatever among the legitimate inducements to right action. Service for the sake of the served ought always, we believe, to be the primary consideration before the mind. But only too often the response to such a call is a feeble one, and if this had to bear the brunt of the fight alone, the forces of evil would many a time have an easy victory. But let it be reinforced by the thought of a nobler self whose fate hangs trembling in the balance, and the temp-

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tation may be repelled. Evidently, no system of moral training can afford to neglect for a moment so powerful an ally.

The principle upon which depends the development of aspiration for the perfected character has been stated once for all by that master of pedagogues, Plutarch. "Virtue," he says, "by the bare statement of its actions can so affect men's minds as to create at the same time admiration for the things done and desire to imitate the doers of them; and it is for this reason," he adds, "that we have thought it fit to spend our time and pains in writing of the lives of famous persons." Let the child, then, be familiarized with all forms of high endeavor, till strength and harmony and grace of character are as much realities to him as the amusements and comforts he craves, and the effort and pain he instinctively shuns. It need hardly be said that the ideals which the youth is thus to be inspired to attain must first of all be visibly incorporated in the parents themselves. What rather needs to be insisted upon is that this will not be sufficient. If the majority of even cultivated people are incapable of completely appreciating a play of Shakespeare or a symphony of Beethoven without help, can we wonder that the immature mind often passes by the moral excellences of his elders without noting them? And we can hardly demand that the parents should point out their own perfections to their children! But all about our boys and girls goes on the drama of human life. Nothing but wise and sympathetic guidance is needed to enable them to discover the elements of beauty and grandeur half hidden in this moving spectacle. In every community there is at least one man who embodies what is best in its moral ideals. Let the child come to understand and reverence him, and that whether personal acquaintance is possible or not. Let him become the boy's hero, the warrant for him that devotion to principle is something more than a name, that manliness is neither a dream nor the outgrown fashion of an earlier age. Such a method may be supplemented by the use of books. Through biography and history he may learn to know the courage of a Garrison, the liberality and public spirit of a Franklin, the tireless energy and the humility of a Newton. Half uncon-

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sciously, as he reads, the wish will arise that he, too, might be able to act in like manner. Where there is no taste for reading a story will always be listened to, and at least one young barbarian owes his entire knowledge of Robinson Crusoe, which is by no means inconsiderable, to the advantage that was taken of this fact. The recital of noble deeds was a favorite instrument of moral training among the Greeks and Romans. We should do well to learn of them in this respect.

It is but an extension of this method when the low or base element in an action which might otherwise have passed unchallenged is exhibited as identical in nature with what is certain to arouse disapprobation, or where a deed which awakens no emotion is shown to involve the possession of a trait of character which we admire. No boy was ever insensible to the courage of Froissart's heroes. But it is not difficult to lead him to see that this does not differ in kind from the moral courage that makes a boy tell the truth, even if he is to be punished as a result, or that enables him to take the unpopular side among his companions. In some prosaic service that will spare his mother pain or weariness or in the protection and care of his little sister, he may be made to recognize the chivalry of a knight of the Round Table. On the other hand, in a public career devoted solely to the pursuit of private gain and the indulgence of personal passions, he may be taught to behold the vulgar sordidness, the cynical indifference to what is highest in human nature, which was exhibited by the same man in the abandonment of a companion on a sinking steamer with its "every one for himself," as the response to her cry for help. Nor is it necessary to range far afield for our examples. Any exceptionally gross and disgusting instance of selfishness on the part of one of his companions may be turned to account as a revelation of the essential nature of all selfishness. Unfortunately, this work will have to be supplemented by a direct attack upon certain mischievous associations which are almost certain to be formed unless a constant watch is kept. The goodness which is due to weakness, to want of initiative and courage, will be confounded with the goodness which is strength in

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that it feels but overcomes. Similarly, sympathy, which really involves power—namely, the ability to put one's self in another's place, and whose absence simply means so much stupidity—may be mistaken for the mawkish sentimentality that indicates an unbalanced mind. One of the most mischievous of these associations is frequently the direct result of the attitude taken by the parent or teacher towards the child. We are quite apt by word or manner to impress the young unduly with our sense of their childishness, their helplessness and need of guidance, and the model child is represented as he who takes to this *régime* most kindly. There is an age when the boy or girl does not object to being treated like a "lamb of the flock." But when doing right and being a lamb of the flock have once become identified in his mind, he is in danger of being lost till he learns that it is the man in the child to whom morality appeals, and not the child in the man.

The application of the principles laid down in this paper to the problems of religious growth should present no difficulty. The goal of all genuine religion is the establishment of moral relations between man and his God, and religious education is accordingly a department of moral education. Its ends are strictly analogous to those already described; in the one case the object of service is our fellow-men, in the other, our common Father. The motives also are the same in nature, that which makes man capable of self-forgetting devotion being everywhere identical; hence the pertinency of the question, "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" Accordingly the concrete aims to be kept before the religious teacher in his practical work are those enumerated above. He must arouse, on the one hand, a realizing sense of the perfection of God; on the other, of His need—self-imposed, if you will, but still a need—of our co-operation in His great work of establishing the kingdom of heaven among men. Since all that He demands of us is resolvable into loyalty to the requirements of the true interests of ourselves and our fellow-creatures, religion does not add to the number of our duties, but

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rather supplies additional motives for faithfulness and zeal in the performance of that which was already our duty on other grounds.

In concluding, attention should perhaps be called to the fact that it has been no part of our purpose to draw up a programme, or, indeed, to discuss the methods of moral training. Whatever has been said on this subject has been introduced solely to throw light upon the question of aims, and must be so interpreted. It is the more necessary to say this because a systematic and detailed study of methods would lead to a modification of some of the general statements of the text. In any concrete case the immediate aims must vary considerably with the age and mental status of the pupil. We must never forget that the child begins life with his intellectual and volitional powers approximately at zero, and in the course of his growth passes through the various stages of mental development through which the race itself has passed. Even at a rather advanced period he is to all intents and purposes little more than a savage, yet a savage who, like his brother in the Australian bush, has an ethical code of his own. At each step in this advance we must appeal to those motives and only those that have some reality for him, for the attempt to force upon the mind moral ideas which it is entirely incapable of comprehending can result only in harm. The ideal in its details should be present to the imagination of the educator from the beginning, but only gradually can its contents become vital factors in the process of development which he is seeking to direct.

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

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DISCUSSION.

CAN THERE BE A MORAL REALIZATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL SELF?

MR. DUFF'S observations on parts of the book "Studies in Philosophical Criticism and Construction," in the last number of this JOURNAL, seem to call for a brief reply.

A reviewer is of course entitled to condemn a book in any terms which he pleases to use; and such mere expressions of "individual" opinion cannot be profitably discussed. I therefore pass by Mr. Duff's remarks concerning the "unsystematic thinking," "intellectual immaturity," and "crudity" which he finds in my "system." Still, I must say that nothing was further from my mind than construction of a "system." I do not believe that a system is possible for us yet; but if we shall ever attain to that desirable ideal, it will not be by parading a few general formulæ as solutions of all the problems of life; it will not be by the specialist's method of intensifying the isolation of different knowledges from one another; it will be by an attempt to unify the different branches of knowledge by developing their unity out of themselves. I presume that Mr. Duff would admit that there is a sense in which it is true that we are not yet utterly identical with the Absolute,—we have yet some progress to make towards a complete expression of the Absolute; and if so, the finite and partial are real in the beginning at least. In ethics and epistemology alike the unity has to be wrought out of the parts. That was why I "brought together isolated inquiries," doing, I dare say, little enough towards working out their unity. But if this defect were corrected, it would not be by narrowing the field surveyed.

Mr. Duff devotes nearly four pages to a criticism of the last two chapters, on the method and postulates of ethics. His criticism would have been more instructive if he had taken the trouble to make himself aware of the presuppositions with which the author approaches this inquiry, and if he had not spoken entirely from the point of view of his own presuppositions which the author rejects. The criticism turns on the meaning of individuality, and the issue seems fairly expressed in the question placed at the head of this note. I have no quarrel with Mr. Duff's statement of the principle

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of Idealism, that the finite self is "essentially and distinctively a sharer in and partaker of an infinite and eternal life." This principle is expressed or implied from the first page of the book to the last. But I hold, and have defended, the view that there can be no "logical evolution" of the idealistic principle, no "appreciation of its significance," unless it is read in the light of the conception which Mr. Bradley has done so much to enforce,—Degrees of Truth and Reality. Apart from this conception, the principle of Idealism cannot be made intelligible, for when you have grasped the social side you have lost the individual, and when you have grasped the divine side you have lost the human; and the converse. Such mere phrases as that the individual is essentially social, the human essentially divine, serve only for a superficial concealment of this dilemma. I may have stumbled in trying to work out the doctrine of degrees,—there is difficulty enough in working it out; but for me it is the vital factor in the doctrine of Idealism; and I tried to bring it to bear on the closely connected problems of the individual's relation to the social whole and to the Absolute. To criticise an author's views while you suppress or ignore his main contentions is a species of misrepresentation which is, to say the least of it, curious.

It seemed possible, if we grant that the doctrine of degrees is valid, to hold that the individual self has a certain independence, that is, a *real* life of its own which not even God can live for it; and at the same time to hold that the self "is not something *in se ipso totus teres atque rotundus*, but is conscious of itself as imperfect, finite, and dependent, and, therefore, of itself as ruled by an Ideal of infinite and absolute worth:" an Ideal which is partially realized in the historical achievements of the human spirit and wholly realized in the Absolute. Mr. Duff quotes this passage, but evidently supposes that by ascribing to the individual life a certain independence I must mean that it is a selfish life unrelated to everything human or divine,—the "particular individual self" which "cannot pass the outer court of ethics" (see especially p. 99). This conception is attacked and rejected in the book on ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical grounds.

The critic asks what ethical content self-realization can have when the self is individual. To answer this, as I showed in the chapter on the Method of Ethics, we observe the actual constitution of individuality, or personality, which is the same thing. We find what Mr. Bradley calls its "main tendencies," and the conditions

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of their realization. We find that as individuals work out these tendencies together, they work out a kingdom of humanity which may be truly called "a spiritual life penetrating its members," but which is not identical with the actual organization of society. The awful examples which Mr. Duff quotes on p. 99 still seem to me to be obvious truths. Further, in the chapter on the Postulates of Idealist Ethics I tried to bring out the deeper aspects of these "main tendencies" in the individual life, when their Ideal is found to be the presence of the Absolute in us and to us. But an indispensable factor in this idealistic view is that the finite and growing self, the individual, must have a reality of its own; while at the same time it is vitally related to the deeper reality which is the Absolute. Whatever difficulty there may be in holding both of these to be true, it is not solved by calling one of them by the name of the other, by saying that the individual self is essentially social, or the human essentially divine. When the meaning of the terms is scrutinized, such phrases are seen to be only verbal propositions, carrying us no further than we were before.

I did not express or imply any "transition from man and his individual good to man as social," nor change a finite self into "a self which is essentially and distinctively a sharer in a universal life," if individual means *isolated* and finite means *merely finite*. The ideal of personality was affirmed to be an ideal and a realization of the essentially individual life, because experience shows that the realization of the ideal involves the intensification of *individuality*, along with the overcoming of *isolation or mere finiteness*.

S. H. MELLONE.

EDINBURGH, SCOTLAND.

REPLY.

I SHOULD be sorry to have done Mr. Mellone any injustice; but the review of his book, which appeared in the last number, was not the result of any hasty perusal; nor do I think that the author's present defence of his position does anything to lessen the force of the objections to which his view seemed to me to be exposed. A careful reading of the author's reply discloses in my judgment the same defects of thought as I have already pointed out in the book itself. Further discussion of the question would therefore be of little service.

I would only add that I did not, as the author complains, overlook the principle of Degrees of Truth and Reality, apart from which

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the idealistic principle, he holds, loses all its significance; but want of space prevented my dealing with it. And, moreover, I see no reason why one may not judge the value of a principle by the results to which it leads the author, or the adequacy of the explanation of morality which in his hands it affords. If Mr. Mellone wishes his solutions of moral problems estimated by the worth of his metaphysical presuppositions, one might have much to say on that point also; for I at least do not believe that this principle of Degrees of Truth and Reality, which many writers have hailed as a kind of open sesame, does much to solve the problems to which it is applied. But to give adequate reasons for this assertion would lead us far afield.

ROBERT A. DUFF.

GLASGOW.

BOOK REVIEWS.

A SKETCH OF MORALITY INDEPENDENT OF OBLIGATION OR SANCTION. By M. Guyau. Translated from the French. Second edition. By Gertrude Rapteyn. London: Watts & Co., 1898. Pp. xii, 215.

This translation is good enough to enable the English reader to estimate the value of what Guyau has to say. Guyau's own work contains so little close reasoning and so few technicalities, that the numerous inaccuracies of his translator can scarcely give rise to any important misunderstanding. The only defects of this kind, likely to give the student any trouble, are perhaps the unfortunate translation "*Love* of risk" for "Plaisir du risque," consistently adopted in Book II.; the use of "positive" for "certain," as well as for "positif" in the sense analogous to that which has given rise to the word positivism; the use of "tangible," "evident" (p. 198), etc., as well as "sensible," for the French word "sensible" in the technical philosophic sense; and the consistent use of "hypothetically" for "par hypothèse." Nevertheless the translator appears to be unaware of some very rudimentary points in French scholarship. She constantly translates "aussi," at the beginning of a sentence, where it has the sense "accordingly," by "moreover," "besides," etc. (*e.g.*, pp. 96, 100, 102, 109, 158, 165, 187, 205); she has "ignore" (p. 103) for "ignorons;" "conscience," in the sense of "consciousness," she usually translates "con-

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science" (*e.g.*, pp. 96, 100); and "sens," in the sense of "direction," seems to give her trouble (*e.g.*, p. 97). Moreover, it seems a pity that she should have altered Guyau's arrangement of his paragraphs, making them longer or shorter at her pleasure, on almost every page; and that she should so frequently have omitted his italics, equally without apparent reason. Her English, too, is frequently awkward; whereas, I suppose, Guyau's title to fame is partly based upon his literary merits.

It may perhaps be useful to give a few of the grossest mistranslations I have noticed; but it must not be assumed that the list is exhaustive: "*Propriety* of the Sunday" should be "cleanliness" (p. 11); p. 17, the stop should be removed from after "reward" to after "beg," so as to give the contrary sense to that now given; p. 49, "possible without a 'why,'" should be "without any possible reason;" p. 66, "to rid the assertion of moral justice of" should be "to deduce the assertion of moral justice from;" p. 82, "is created independent in everything," should be "is changed into an independent whole;" p. 152, "every reason, being *a priori*, unites" should be "every reasonable being unites *a priori*;" p. 159, "deduction" (twice) should be "induction," and "a statement made by" should be "a relation of;" p. 162 (note), "*no* act" should be "any act;" p. 174, "want him to take it in anger" should be "want to make him angry;" p. 181, "It was barely a century before" should be "Barely a century ago, before;" p. 191, "the very last resource of all," should be "our ultimate object;" p. 204 (note), "he happens to recognize," should be "he has just recognized."

So much for the translation; we have only to add that in two places (pp. 93, 116), where Guyau thinks it worth while to transcribe into a note a whole passage from another of his works, his translator thinks it only necessary to give a reference to the English translation of that work.

With regard to Guyau himself, I hope it is not necessary in a philosophical review to conform to the maxim "De mortuis nil nisi bonum." For I confess the contents of the book do not seem to fulfil the promise of its title. It might, I think, be more appropriately described as "General remarks on psycho-physics, including hortative parentheses, and followed by an appendix on rewards and punishments." That this description is not unjust will perhaps be allowed, if the author himself be called to witness it. "The object of the science of morals," says Guyau (in the words of his

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translator), "is to show how action, produced by the mere effort of life, springs incessantly from the unconscious depths of being, to enter into the domain of consciousness; and how, next, action may be weakened in this new sphere, often even be suspended; for example, when there is struggle between the instinct of life and such or such a belief in the rational order, etc." (p. 80). It is unnecessary to quote more. This abstract shows clearly enough what is the tendency of the main part of the book. And yet, even after this it may be surprising to learn that ethics is "the only science" "having for its object neither facts purely unconscious nor facts purely conscious" (p. 79). Had Guyau never heard of psychology?

The fact is that Guyan seems never to have understood the difference between "what is" and "what ought to be;" although, needless to say, he is anxious enough to tell us what we ought to do. This is the more remarkable that in a passage to which he refers us (p. 72) in his "Morale anglaise contemporaine," "on the distinction of the desired and the desirable," he would seem to recognize the difference in question. He there objects to Mill that "desirable," in the ethical sense, does not mean "what *can* be desired," but "what *ought* to be desired." Nothing, one might think, could be juster; but it is disappointing to find that in this "Sketch of an Ethics," *duty* is, after all, said to be nothing but a kind of *power*, and that "I *can*, therefore I *ought*" is to be substituted for Kant's "I *ought*, therefore I *can*." (See pp. 89–97, 211.)

This absurdity may perhaps be best explained by a short account of Guyau's conception of ethics. He is anxious to base morality on "facts;" but at the same time he recognizes that such a morality must be limited, and thinks it should be supplemented by "metaphysical hypotheses." The reason why "scientific" morality must be limited is that it cannot always supply a sufficient *motive* for self-sacrifice (which Guyau assumes to be good); and the "metaphysical hypotheses" are called in at this point, because the belief that the "unknowable" is of a certain nature may supply such motive. Guyau seems not even to see that his "scientific" morality supplies no motives at all, but only attempts to find out what motives do actually produce the conduct he thinks good; and that his doctrine of "metaphysical hypotheses," since they are merely one class of such actual motives, is nothing but a part of his "scientific" morality. Still less does he see that to suggest mo-

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tives for doing things is not the same thing as showing what you ought to do; and still less, again, that he has begged the whole question, which he thinks he is discussing, and is throughout proceeding on the "hypothesis" that he knows what ought to be done. The fact is, it has never entered his head that there can be any "hypothesis" as to what is good; his objection to the "categorical obligation of past times" is merely that any theory as to what the "unknowable" may force us to do can be only an "hypothesis;" he does not see that the "categorical obligation of past times" was (on the interpretation most favorable to him) merely an hypothesis as to what we ought to do, not as to what we may be forced to do. Accordingly, his objection to Mill's use of "desirable" seems merely to be this: that it substituted what was possible for what was necessary; and hence he declares his belief in the immediate context, that this defect was largely supplied by Mr. Spencer's larger understanding of what was necessary, which is deficient only in that it cannot reckon with the "unknowable."

The main part of the book is therefore purely biological, psychological, or psycho-physical. In this part (pp. 71–151), Guyau tries to establish what he calls "equivalents of duty," *i.e.*, the motives which insure the performance of what he considers to be virtuous action. The first three of these are apparently "scientific,"—so-called because they are what is "desired;" the last two appear to be equally actual motives, but must apparently be considered as merely "desirable," because they are beliefs of which the truth cannot be proved. Guyau's "scientific" motives appear to be "life," which he says is at the same time "cause" and "end" of action, and is naturally altruistic as well as egoistic (both "expansive and intense"). He substitutes "life" for "pleasure," on the two grounds (which he confuses) that "pleasure" cannot be a "cause" of action in an unconscious being, and that it is not always the "end" of conscious action.

The concluding book, on "Sanction," was distinguished above as more in the nature of an appendix, because it does not appear to have much logical connection with the preceding discussion. Its nature is, indeed, chiefly ethical; for it consists mainly in attacks on various justifications of retributive punishment. Guyau's own view seems to be that no one ought to be punished, except for the preservation of social order in our present state, because everybody wants to be happy and therefore (of course) ought to be.

This "Sketch of an Ethics" would hardly have needed so long

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a review, but that its author appears to have some reputation. It must, however, be admitted that it contains some acute observations in the analysis of motives, and, in general, that the intelligence displayed in details is quite out of proportion to the utterly unscientific character of the whole. Its justification of the need for "metaphysical hypotheses" against "the English utilitarians and evolutionists" seems even to show some vague notion of what is the proper object of ethics. But its merits, considerable as they are, seem to be almost entirely literary.

G. E. MOORE.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

LA DOTTRINA DELLA COSCIENZA MORALE NELLO SPENCER. By Dr. Giuseppe Zuccante, Professor of the History of Philosophy in the Royal Literary and Scientific Academy of Milan. Lonigo, 1896. Pp. 199.

L'ASPETTO BIOLOGICO DELLA CONDOTTA SECONDO LO SPENCER. Dr. Giuseppe Zuccante. Roma, 1896. Pp. 25.

CONDOTTA BUONA E CONDOTTA CATTIVA SECONDO LO SPENCER. Dr. Giuseppe Zuccante. Roma, 1896. Pp. 48.

INTORNO ALLE ORIGINI DELLA MORALE UTILITARIA DELLO STUART MILL. Nota del Dottore. Giuseppe Zuccante. Milano, 1897. Pp. 21.

The first of these monographs, a work of almost two hundred closely printed pages, has no table of contents, no index, no headings to the thirty-one sections or chapters into which it is divided; though Sections i.–xvii. are put under the general heading of "Part I., Exposition of the Doctrine," and Sections xviii.–xxxi., under that of "Part II., Criticism of the Doctrine." There is a list of *Errata* at the end, which omits "*noumeni*" (p. 7), "Schelley" (p. 87), "Pichard Porson" (p. 111), "Vundt" (p. 120), "Mackinthos" (p. 189), and some other similar curiosities of the press. It is a pity that the Essay has not been put before the public in a more convenient and more carefully revised form; for exposition and criticism are both excellent in their way, and the style strikes even a foreign reader as lucid, flowing, and eloquent. The work has been awarded a prize by the revived "Accademia dei Lincei."

The author treats Mr. Spencer's ethics historically as the latest form of English empiricism and naturalism, tracing the doctrine so far as it is hedonistic or utilitarian back to Hobbes, and so far as it

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is naturalistic back to Bacon. The exposition of Mr. Spencer's doctrine of conscience deals not only with what is said in the seventh chapter of *The Data of Ethics* ("The Psychological View"), but also with other connected parts of Mr. Spencer's system, and with the other English authors from whom his ethics are more or less derived, especially Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Professor Bain. While it is quite true that the "positivism" and "empiricism" which culminate in Spencer's "naturalistic utilitarianism" are the characteristically English ethics, the author seems hardly to recognize that other types of moral philosophy have been widely represented among English writers. He quotes "Sidgvvick" (*sic*) in one place (p. 180), but refers to no English defender of Intuitionism or of Idealism except Mr. Llewelyn Davies (p. 169). There are frequent references to the works of Ribot, Guyau, and Fouillée; and the last two seem to have influenced Dr. Zuccante very much, and to have helped to determine the character of his criticisms of Spencerian ethics. These criticisms, though "full of respect and deference for the profoundest and most comprehensive thinker of modern times" (p. 8), are directed mainly to showing the inadequacy of Spencer's account of moral obligation and the inconsistencies between different parts of Spencer's own teaching. The theory of evolution is used by Spencer to get over the difficulties in which utilitarian ethics had been placed by J. S. Mill. Evolution seems to enable Spencer "intrinsecare l'estrinseco,"—to show how what were originally external lessons of experience come to be innate moral instincts in the individual. Dr. Zuccante argues at some length that the theory of heredity cannot explain conscience; but, though he minimizes the power of heredity, he takes no notice whatever of the possible untenableness of the whole Lamarckian doctrine of use-inheritance which lies at the basis of Spencer's psychology.

The great defect of evolutionary naturalism, according to Dr. Zuccante, is that it ignores individual spontaneity. He asserts a doctrine of free-will, however, not in any way inconsistent with psychological determinism; like M. Fouillée, he holds that "Ideas are forces" (p. 140),—ideas, except in purely abstract and impersonal matters, being always accompanied by emotion, and so capable of affecting conduct. The contradiction is pointed out between Spencer's exaltation of individual initiative as against the state and his theoretical reduction of individual action to the outcome of mechanical processes (p. 95). In several matters Dr. Zuccante

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recognizes the inconsistency between the individualistic politics of Spencer's *Social Statics* and the evolutionary naturalism of his developed system. The defence of the doctrine of "natural rights" in *Justice* is cited as a crowning proof of the way in which the evolutionary positivist falls under the sway of metaphysics (p. 187).

The need of recognizing a metaphysical or non-experiential element in morality is put in a somewhat curious but interesting way. Spencer, it is urged, admits the Unknowable as the absolute reality; why then does he assign no place to it in morality? (p. 167. When Dr. Zuccante says "the Unknowable,"—using Spencer's phrase,—does he not really mean "the incompletely known"?) When Spencer speaks of "absolute ethics" as distinct from "relative ethics," he is really admitting the metaphysical into morality; for his analogy between absolute ethics and abstract mechanics, etc., is fallacious. In astronomy, *e.g.*, it is reality that leads us to modify the abstract laws we start with; but in morality the laws of absolute morality lead to the modification and alteration of facts (p. 182). What precisely Dr. Zuccante means by the metaphysical element in ethics is left somewhat vague. His rather questionable identification of the "divine sign" of Socrates with the voice of conscience (pp. 158 *seq.*) seems to suggest a doctrine like that of our old-fashioned Intuitionists, which is not easily defended against the psychological analysis of the evolutionary utilitarian.

From the same author come two articles reprinted from the *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia* of 1896 and 1897 (Rome). They are on "The Biological Aspect of Conduct according to Spencer," and on "Good and Bad Conduct according to Spencer." They are critical expositions of the same kind as the larger Essay. Another pamphlet is an extract from the transactions of The Lombard Scientific and Literary Institution: "Concerning the Origin of the Utilitarian Ethics of Stuart Mill." It deals with the development of Mill's altruistic ethics out of Benthamism, and is based mainly on what Mills himself tells in his *Autobiography*. The author does not go behind Benthamism. One would like to have had from a Milanese writer a discussion of the question whether Beccaria derived the famous formula of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" directly from Hutcheson or not. But what Dr. Zuccante gives is merely an admirably written account of Mill's own ethical ideas.

D. G. Ritchie.

University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

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DANTE'S TEN HEAVENS: A Study of the Paradiso. By Edmund G. Gardner, M.A. Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co.

This volume contains a very good account of Dante's Paradiso, and brings together many interesting illustrations of its theological and philosophical ideas. It is in the form of a detailed description of the argument of the poem with interjected commentary, and thus it may form a very good companion to the reading of the Paradiso. The author takes special pains to bring out what we may call the architectural structure of the poem, to mark out its main divisions, and to trace the correspondencies of its different parts. He also gives at the proper places references to or quotations from Dante's other writings as well as from Aquinas, St. Bernard, Boethius, and the other writers to whom he owes his main theological conceptions. From a literary point of view this is perhaps all that was necessary; but from the point of view of this JOURNAL we could have wished for a more thorough discussion of the many philosophical or semi-philosophical questions which are raised by the interpretation of the Commedia. Thus in the first chapter there are some interesting remarks on the different senses—literal, ethical, allegorical, etc.—which Dante authorizes us to seek for in the poem; but the subject is not pursued very far, nor is any attempt made to explain to us the strange complex attitude of Dante's mind, which at first seems so alien to our conceptions of the sensuous directness of poetry. Yet the key to this problem is not very difficult to find. The scholastic philosophy with its hard and irresolvable distinctions had for its necessary counterpart a mysticism in which all distinctions were lost. Now the method of allegory, in which everything, we might say, was treated as a symbol of something else, formed a sort of link between the two. It was a means whereby, without giving up the fixity of distinctions which hid the relativity of the ideas of human and divine, of secular and sacred, of material and spiritual,—without rising to a really organic view of things,—the presence of the whole in every part could yet be anticipated, prophesied, or hinted at. It was a means, in other words, of suggesting what could not be directly stated without contradicting acknowledged premises. It enabled Dante as a poet to accept the logical system of dogma, and even, as it were, give it visual manifestation in the definite material structure of Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, and yet to suggest to us that all these hard

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divisions were but presentations of different aspects of the same thing, which ultimately in some mysterious way fuse together into one, as at the end of the poem the human figure of Christ is declared, in Dante's mystic vision, to coincide and identify itself with the three circles of the Trinity. It is, perhaps, through this complex series of correspondences, beginning with the exact parallelism of the division of the three parts of the poem into cantos, and rising to the curious echoes of sound and sense, which we find between them, and also between the different cantos of the same division, but gives to Dante's poem its peculiar ambiguous charm. With Purgatory and Paradise they are held apart in startling distinctness of outline, yet seem, the more we study the poem, to swell into one as different sides of our complex existence. And we with Dante are in all three, without for a moment leaving the cold earth.

In this point of view there is considerable disadvantage in an attempt to treat of a division of the poem separate from the other two, a disadvantage, however, which Mr. Gardner minimizes by frequent references. Especially we may note his careful treatment of the correspondence of passages in the Paradiso to others in the Purgatorio. (See *e.g.* p. 170.) Altogether we may say that, if Mr. Gardner has not given us a philosophical discussion of the ideas of the poem, he has done much to provide the materials for any one who wishes to undertake it.

The book concludes with an interesting chapter discussing the authenticity and import of the letters attributed to Dante.

EDWARD CAIRD.

BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

BERNER STUDIEN ZUR PHILOSOPHIE UND IHRER GESCHICHTE. Band viii. Herausgegeben von Dr. Ludwig Stein, Professor an der Universität, Bern.

DER ÄLTERE PYTHAGOREISMUS. Eine kritische Studie von Dr. Wilhelm Bauer. Bern, Steiger & C^ie^, 1897: 8vo, pp. viii, 232. (Preis, Mk. 1.75.)

There is something about Pythagoras and his teachings that is particularly provocative of curiosity. Nor is this wholly unjustified; for Pythagoras, strange as it may sound, stands to the Greeks in much the same relation as Zarathushtra stands to the Persians, Moses to the Hebrews, and Mohammed to the Arabs. If his influence is less obvious than that of these men, it is equally profound

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and pervasive, and more varied and fruitful in character. He is not only, like them, a religious reformer; he is also a philosopher, scientist, and founder of an order of social life. Unfortunately, the "brotherhood" founded by him came early in conflict with the political institutions of the time, and was so persecuted and disorganized that it had to exist as a secret society for many centuries. It thus became what Islâm might have been, had the *hijrah* never taken place. Its doctrines, being controlled by no central authority, assumed numerous forms, often very different from those of the master, and, as no Avesta, Torah, or Koran came into existence, he was at last credited with almost every known doctrine, and elevated almost to the rank of a divinity, around whose name clustered myths and legends without number.

To penetrate this dense overgrowth and reach the true teaching of the philosopher, is a task as tempting as it is difficult. Many attempts have been made to do so, among which the most noteworthy thus far are those of Zeller, Röth, and Chaignet. To these must now be added the work before us, perhaps the best of all, both in method and in results. It is no secret to any student of Greek philosophy to-day that Zeller's monumental work on that great subject is already, in many respects, outgrown. Röth's work on Pythagoras, in its effort to avoid the common German fault of hypercriticism, errs in the other direction, and is uncritical, while that of Chaignet suffers from French mathematical neatness. The present work combats—successfully, I think—many of Zeller's views, is severely, and even somewhat pedantically, critical, and makes no attempt to prove Pythagoras the author of a perfectly harmonious system. It is divided into three sections, headed, (1) Pythagorean Metaphysics, (2) Pythagorean Cosmology, (3) Pythagorean Ethics; and there are two appendices, (1) on Aristotle and Philolaus, (2) an Attempt to Determine Pythagoras's First Principles. Though the author does not seem to have hit the mark on all occasions, he has certainly contributed to illuminate for us the figure and import of Pythagoras, and to render his far-reaching influence intelligible.

And, from an ethical point of view, this influence has the profoundest interest; for Pythagoras was perhaps the first man in history who completely grasped the full significance of the ethical problem, and sought to find for it a practical solution. He saw that, since ethical life involves man's relations to the universe, its laws can be learnt only through a study of these relations and of

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the nature of their terms,—man and universe. He, accordingly, undertook this study with a vastness of conception that is truly surprising, and, when he had reached certain results which seemed to him well assured, he founded a society in which to put them in practice,—a society to be subjected to the severest ethical discipline. In all history there are few things more interesting than this society. Its influence not only extended to all the schools of Greek thought for a thousand years, but passed over into Christianity, Judaism, and Islâm, and is an important element in those religions to-day. Unfortunately, its character and history are still, to a large extent, hidden from us, and it will still take much scholarship, much sifting and interpreting of texts, and many new discoveries to make them clear to us. But the result, once obtained, will be well worth the labor; for no history of human culture can be complete, or even intelligible, without a full understanding of the Pythagorean movement.

The fact that such understanding has not been reached is, I believe, largely due to assignable causes, three of which are these: (1) in their eagerness to exalt the original genius of the Greeks, historians of philosophy have sought to set aside those traditions which connected Pythagoras with the East, and thus have deprived themselves of one important means of understanding him; (2) they have given far too much weight to the testimony of Aristotle with regard to the "Pythagoreans;" and (3) they have neglected Arabic sources of information. I believe it will be found that Pythagoras derived his doctrines, as well as the spirit of his activity, partly from Egypt and partly from Syria. After a careful examination of Aristotle's testimonies to the teachings of earlier philosophers, I am convinced that they are, in many cases, and particularly in that of Pythagoras, unreliable, and must be discounted in any estimate of his system.* Finally, there is evidence to show that Arab thinkers of the ninth and tenth centuries possessed works on Pythagoras which are lost to us. The famous Society of the "Brothers of Sincerity" (about A.D. 1000), to whom we owe the famous *Cyclopædia*, was modelled upon the Pythagorean brotherhood. I cannot but feel that, if due account were taken of these

* It is to be noted (1) that Aristotle never speaks of Pythagoras, but only of the Pythagoreans; (2) that what he says of them occurs almost entirely in the "Metaphysics," a work which a long and careful study makes me believe to be only in part from the pen of Aristotle.

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facts, it might still be possible to write the history of the earliest "Society for Ethical Culture," and to show how much we owe to it.

In this connection, I may perhaps be allowed to call attention to a recent discovery, which bears upon the subject in hand. Last year there was found at Civita, near Pompeii, a well preserved mosaic, representing a meeting of the heads of the Greek philosophic schools.* The scene of the meeting is a garden, with a portico (στοά), a tree, a sundial, and an exedra, and with an acropolis—doubtless, that of Athens—in the distance. There are, in all, seven philosophers. Four of them are seated on the exedra,—one on the back, with his feet on the seat; three are standing, one at each end, and one behind the middle of the exedra. Beginning at the left of the spectator, they are arranged in this order: (1) Zeno, the Stoic, *standing*, with crown and Jewish features, by the stoa; (2) Aristotle, *sitting*, with bald head, and in his hand a roll (Zeno's left hand rests on his shoulder); (3) Pythagoras, *sitting* and pointing with a rod to a celestial sphere, placed on the ground before him; (4) Epicurus, *standing* under the tree; (5) Plato, *sitting* on the back of the exedra and in front of the sundial; (6) Socrates, *sitting*, with very plain features; (7) probably, though not certainly, Pyrrho, *standing*, or, rather, walking off. Thus, we have the heads of the Stoic, Peripatetic, Pythagorean, Epicurean, Academic, Socratic, and Skeptic schools. What interests us here is the important place assigned to Pythagoras even in Roman times. Pythagoras and Plato, Socrates and Aristotle, are seated, a sure sign of distinction. But the first two hold the central position, and Plato is elevated above all the rest. This seems to imply that he holds the first place and Pythagoras the second,—an intelligible enough estimate.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

THE RELIGION OF BABYLONIA AND ASSYRIA. By Morris Jastrow, Jr., Ph.D. (Leipzig), Professor of Semitic Languages in the University of Pennsylvania. Boston: Ginn & Company, 1898. Large 16mo. Pp. xii, 780.

In this volume (the second in the series, edited by Dr. Jastrow, entitled "Handbooks on the History of Religions") Professor Jas-

* *Ein jüngst bei Pompeii freigelegtes Mosaikbild der "Schule von Athen."* Von Alessandro Chiappelli in Neapel und Ludwig Stein in Bern. Sonderabdruck aus dem *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Bd. xi., Heft ii.

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trow has given us the first real history of the old cults of the Tigris-Euphrates valley. Of former books on the subject some are inadequate by reason of the paucity of materials at the author's command, some go over only a part of the field, and some are lacking in accuracy and sound judgment. The material has of late increased enormously, and the value of this old faith for the history of religion, especially of Semitic religion (including the Hebrew), has become apparent. There are still regrettable gaps (as our author observes), and many points on which opinions will be modified, but enough is known to enable the student to form an intelligent conception of the religion, and Dr. Jastrow has done the science of religion a great service in collecting and expounding the existing material. His reading embraces all of value that has been written on the subject, and to the criticism of the facts he brings the knowledge of an Assyriologist and the training of a student of general religious history. What we desire to know of an old cult is the religious life of the people: the attitude of the man towards the supernatural powers, the origin and the ethical character of the deities, the customs and institutions in which religion expressed itself, and the influence of the religious faith on the moral life of men. Suggestive discussions of all these points will be found in the present volume, the larger part of which is devoted to the consideration of incantations, prayers and hymns, oracles and omens, festivals and burial-customs, mythic and legendary poetry, the ritual of the temples, and the constitution of the Underworld; the pantheon is, of course, treated at length. Special attention may be called to Dr. Jastrow's ingenious and suggestive analysis of the Gilgamesh epic (which includes the story of the flood) and the great cosmogonic poem, and to his consistent chronological treatment of ideas and persons. Regarding the history as an evolution, he undertakes to show how the functions and characters of gods and priests and the religious conceptions of leading minds have grown with the growth of society. As the Babylonian religion (of which the Assyrian was little more than a copy) contains material of all grades, from animism and zoolatry to something approaching ethical monotheism, it offers an excellent opportunity for the study of the genesis and development of the most important religious ideas, and for such study this volume furnishes abundant material. The biography of the goddess Ishtar (Astarte) might make a book in itself: beginning as a deity of the soil, the creator of productiveness, she ends by ascending to

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heaven, and becoming the embodiment and the source of all that is morally pure and strong. Other deities, as, for example, Marduk and Nergal, undergo similar transformations. An interesting fact in the Babylonian-Assyrian religious history is the part taken by learned men, who edited old documents and modified old beliefs in the interest of later and more rational ideas; similar tasks were undertaken by the Hebrew priests and prophets and the Greek poets and philosophers.

The close resemblances between the Babylonian and Hebrew religions are taken by Dr. Jastrow to show that the two were originally one, and that the Hebrews brought with them, in their migration from Mesopotamia to the West, a large part of the traditions which they, at a later period and in modified form, included in their national literature. Would the Babylonian religion have reached a pure monotheism if its existence had been prolonged? It is impossible to say. It was cut off untimely, and it was handicapped by a great pantheon; but it would appear that Nebuchadrezzar was substantially a monotheist. The ethical developments of the two religions do not differ materially. So far as the ethical code is concerned, it was taken, here as in all cases, by religion from society, and the moral standard of Nineveh and Babylon probably did not differ from that of Jerusalem (though the Hebrew prophets paint the latter in darkest colors). The sense of sin expressed in the Babylonian penitential liturgies is commonly compared with that which we find in the Hebrew psalms. Dr. Jastrow remarks of the former that it is rather a sense of the deity's displeasure than sorrow for offence against the moral law, and the same remark must be made of a great part of the Hebrew psalter, though some late psalms rise to a higher plane.

Dr. Jastrow's volume cannot fail to be intensely interesting to all who care to study the history of ancient religions. He has collected an immense mass of material, which he handles with marked ability. His tone is fair and judicial, and he has the gift of clear and fresh exposition. At the end of the book are added an index and an extensive bibliography.

C. H. Toy.
Harvard University.

The State and Charity. By Thomas Mackay. London: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

That the aim of charity is not to alleviate distress, but to cure it, is the key-note of this book. The only effective charity is that

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which strikes at the cause, not that which seeks to counteract or remedy or modify the effect. The methods, however, which legislators and pious founders have almost invariably adopted have been such as to deal inadequately with the effect, while at the same time increasing the cause of the evil.

The fault, according to Mr. Mackay, lies in the disregard of that sound economic theory which ought to underlie our practice. Society in its present stage of development is based upon the principle of contract and free exchange. These conditions have proved themselves the most conducive to moral and material progress. In such a system there is obviously no room for pauperism. The existence of a class with a right, born of their own incompetence, to maintenance at the hand of the others, is a survival from an earlier stage, and an incongruous element in our civilization.

The attempts to deal with the problem of poverty in the past are but a chronicle of failures. The forms of relief, both legal and voluntary, devised by generations of statesmen, have almost invariably succeeded in increasing the pauperization they were intended to cure. They have, indeed, shown themselves to be an effective demand for pauperism. In his second chapter, Mr. Mackay gives an interesting sketch of the early history of endowments, followed by a very clear and excellent exposition of the views of Turgot, and later economists on the subject. Their attacks on endowments in general and the revelations made by Lord Brougham's notable commission of inquiry produced a considerable change in the public regard of charities. The chapter which discusses these points is perhaps the most important in the book, and it is with some disappointment that the reader finds that Mr. Mackay does not claim to offer a solution of the main problem. "We have at least made it clear that it is not possible to formulate any universally acceptable theory of charitable endowments." The main question is: "What useful purpose can be served by endowments in a society where for the most part wealth is distributed by means of the principle of private property and exchange?"

The accumulated experience of the past leads him to the conclusion that endowments are on the whole beneficial in so far as the goods they bestow can be enjoyed in common by a large number of people, and that they are pernicious in proportion as these benefits are more or less susceptible of personal appropriation. Thus, museums, public parks, and cathedrals may be placed at one end of the scale, while dole charities are an example of the worst type at

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the other end. Between these two extremes—between the cathedral and the dole—lies the whole "debatable ground" which Mr. Mackay does not attempt to discuss. We have thus a clear statement of the problem, a well-reasoned economic basis of action and an indication of the lines on which the solution of the problem may be sought, but unfortunately, after this admirable clearing of the ground, the author refrains from giving his own solution of the case that he has set before us.

The subject of endowed education is one of the most important issues raised by the question. Here again Mr. Mackay states the problem succinctly, and leaves it for the reader or "that enlightened judge, the future," to decide. "The reader must in fact decide for himself whether education partakes more of the character of a cathedral or of a dole." But it seems to us that the peculiar considerations attaching to education remove it completely from the ordinary run of commodities, where a high standard is guaranteed by the forces of free competition. Mr. Mackay quotes Dr. Chalmers's comparison between "endowment for the relief of indigence and endowment for the support of literary and Christian instruction."

"The two cases, so far from being at all alike in principle, stand in direct and diametric opposition to each other. We desiderate the latter endowment because of the languor of the intellectual or spiritual appetency, . . . we deprecate the former endowment because in the strength of the physical appetency we have the surest guarantee that men will do their uttermost for good."

It must be remembered that the effects of education and of the lack of it are among the most "cumulative" in the whole field of human phenomena, and that the spread of education, even on an uneconomic basis, in one generation, may be the only way of securing that enlightenment which will enable it to be successfully carried on, on a basis of free contract in the text.

After a somewhat technical description of existing legislation with regard to trusts, the author proceeds to discuss the co-operation between legal and voluntary agencies of relief, and gives an interesting sketch of the origin of charity organization. The great desideratum is a sufficient test for destitution, and Mr. Mackay insists that the adoption of the rough and drastic "Workhouse Test," and the gradual abolition of out-door relief are the only ways of dealing effectively with pauperism. The evidence adduced to prove the inefficiency of local administration and the mischievousness of the whole system of compulsory relief is irrefutable; on the

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other hand we cannot but think that he takes too hopeful a view of the comparative innocuousness of private charity, and of the moderation with which people are likely to avail themselves of it. In the concluding chapter Mr. Mackay draws an analogy between the promiscuous medical relief given in the out-patient departments of our great hospitals and the indiscriminate dole charity. The inefficiency of our system of out-door relief is now almost universally recognized. But there is, as Mr. Mackay points out, a new source of danger in the growing socialistic opinion which confuses the charity wherewith the state seeks to provide for its most incompetent members with the first instalment of a great inheritance which they consider to be their due. The whole book is an admirable criticism from the economic point of view both of lingering ancient fallacies and of the sophisms of modern socialism. It is matter for regret that Mr. Mackay has not given the constructive side of the question fuller and more systematic treatment.

H. REINHERZ.

LONDON.

THE PROPHETS OF ISRAEL: Popular Sketches from Old Testament History. By Carl Heinrich Cornill, Doctor of Theology, and Professor of Old Testament History in the University of Königsberg. Translated by Sutton F. Corkran. Third edition. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.), 1897. 16mo. Pp. xiv, 194.

Professor Cornill's volume is a chatty but acute and vigorous sketch of the progress of prophetic thought from Amos, of the eight century, to the second Zechariah (Zech. ix.–xiv.), of the third century (as Cornill puts him), B.C. He adopts not the dogmatic method of W. Robertson Smith's "Prophets of Israel" or Duhm's "Theologie der Propheten," but the historical method of Darmesteter's "Prophètes d'Israël," describing the times, the life, and the leading thoughts of each prophet. The dates he gives are in general those favored by the great majority of modern critics. His estimate of the prophets as a body is high, but discriminating. Renan thought them amiable enthusiasts, antique socialists, whose main object was to secure the "poor" their rights; Darmesteter holds that they have solved the social problem once for all, not in the modern socialistic way, but by insisting on earthly justice, and that Christian additions to their view (as by the introduction of the idea of immortality) have not been an im-

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provement; Cornill contents himself with saying that they represent, though with certain ethical limitations, the conception of a just divine government of the world. His is no doubt the correct view; the prophets were morally strong and great, but they were intensely nationalistic (as, in the world of that time, they could not help being), and their theory of moral obligation dealt, for the most part, only with their own people; Ezekiel, severe moralist as he is within the bounds of Israel, shows no conception of the rights of other nations (Ezek. xxv., xxxv.), and it is doubtful whether Amos (Amos i., ii.) has the advantage of him in this regard. Dr. Cornill depicts happily the characters and ideas of the individual prophets, so that they stand before us in clear outline, living men of their times, yet above their times. The contrasts of character and tone are great, as, for example, between Amos (eighth century) and Joel (fourth century), and particularly between the two contemporaries, Jeremiah and Ezekiel; of all the prophets Jeremiah is the most human, and the deepest and most varied in his ideas.

In addition to the sketch of the prophets the volume gives many glimpses of the political and religious history of Israel. It need not be said that Professor Cornill is not only learned and sympathetic but also critical. In a few cases, however, he makes his statements more definite than the facts appear to warrant. Thus, it is not probable that the common Semitic word for "god," *el*, denotes etymologically the "goal" of human longing (p. 7), nor is it an historical fact (p. 39) that Amos forced his way through the crowd of merrymakers in a festival and there delivered his message, or that, having fulfilled his charge, he returned home to Judea (p. 41), or that he originated the title *Yahweh Sebaoth*, "the Lord of hosts" (p. 46). It may be added that Elijah's famous question (1 Kings xviii. 21) is not, "How long will ye halt [like a man lame in both legs] between two opinions?" but, by an easy emendation of the Hebrew, "How long will ye leap over two thresholds?"—that is, serve two gods, leaping over the threshold of a temple being an act of worship (Zeph. i. 9). These, however, are points of small importance in comparison with the great mass of valuable matter in the book.

C. H. Toy.

Harvard University.

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PROBLEMS OF MODERN INDUSTRY. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. Pp. viii, 286.

To the student of the literature of Economics—or shall we say, of Socialism?—it is a great assistance to have collected in one volume a number of articles previously hidden away in many and diverse periodicals. For purposes either of education or controversy, the magazine article pays for its rapid circulation with a brief life, and every month sees it buried one deeper under the weight of successive numbers until author and publisher conspire to endow it with a second and more dignified existence. The essays in the volume before us have all appeared before, and their present form makes a very acceptable book.

Some of them, notably those signed B. W., are original studies of great interest and permanent value. The chapter entitled "The Diary of an Investigator" is a graphic picture of one side of the life of working-women, though a picture which does not convey quite the lesson which the remaining articles endeavor to enforce; and the "Jews of East London" (originally contributed to Mr. Charles Booth's "Life and Labor of the People") is an account of the "Chosen People" and their relation to modern history which we could wish to see expanded into a volume by itself. "Women and the Factory Acts" is an eloquent plea for the position that "in the life of the wage-earning class, absence of regulation does not mean personal freedom;" that "it is the law, in fact, which is the mother of freedom." The position would, we think, have been a stronger one, if another had taken what is perhaps the bolder, certainly the more general, ground of claiming that no one can say *a priori* whether more law means more or less freedom, but that every proposed law must be carefully judged on its merits and on the success or failure of similar laws in similar spheres of action. This is, indeed, the line of argument to a great extent adopted in support of Factory Legislation in general; but Factory Legislation "in general" is just what no accumulation of arguments can ever justify, though very little may be needed to show the righteousness of some particular measure. Nor, indeed, is there any need to limit the possible enfranchising effect of law to the wage-earning class; there is no class in the community which does not benefit by law, just as there is no class in the community which may not be oppressed by it.

A characteristic feature of the whole book, and one which espe-

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cially mars the more controversial chapters, is the tone of hostility towards certain sections of the community and of favoritism towards certain other sections. The effect of this is perhaps not quite what the authors would have wished. We have all of us read novels where the villain is so bad and the heroine so superhumanly good that our sympathies have been diverted into the wrong direction, and we have begun to suspect the author of calumniating the villain. So the effect of reading conscientiously through two hundred and seventy-nine pages (the rest is index), plentifully besprinkled with the tyranny of the employer, the greed of the wine-drinking plutocrat, and the oppression of down-trodden slaves, is to make us scent fiction and turn from the lurid coloring in search of some more impartial representation of our social life, and of the relations between the different classes composing it. But the most serious blot upon the book, and one which is likely to discredit it with all fair-minded students, is the deliberate reproduction, in the essay entitled "The Reform of the Poor Law," of figures and misinterpretations of figures which have already been subjected to a searching and annihilating criticism. Many of the so-called facts quoted in that essay originally appeared in a Fabian tract, and were exposed in a paper read before the British Association in 1892; and to offer them again in support of seriously suggested reforms without a word of explanation or justification is, to say the least of it, a grave oversight.

To an outsider, with no claim to the title of "comrade" which gives such an esoteric flavor to the last chapter, perhaps the most astonishing thing will be the glimpse given in "Socialism, True and False" of the "true inwardness" of the Socialist position. That after fourteen years of vigorous propagandism the Fabian Society should wake up suddenly to the necessity of "hard thinking" and realize how little attention they have paid to "unsettled questions of democratic administration," is a very desirable event; but surely the author must be aware that the Philosophic Radicals, to whom he compares himself and his party, did their hard thinking *before* they undertook to spread their opinions abroad, and did not wait until afterwards to begin.

We may, perhaps, sum up by saying of these essays, what indeed we might say of any work, that they are valuable just in so far as they are in real contact with facts. And after all, each reader must ultimately decide for himself how far that is the case.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

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THE STANDARD OF LIFE, AND OTHER STUDIES. By Mrs. Bernard Bosanquet, author of "Rich and Poor." London: Macmillan & Co., 1898. Pp. viii, 219.

This is a very interesting book, a worthy successor to "Rich and Poor," and full of valuable thoughts and facts. It consists of eleven essays, or, more correctly, of ten essays and the translation of an aptly chosen passage from Xenophon's "Memorabilia," in which Socrates is represented as laying bare the ignorance of the ardent Glaucon with the least possible damage to his reforming enthusiasm. The moral, a most suitable one for this work, is that analysis of conditions must precede reform.

Of the ten essays, the first two, on "The Standard of Life" and "The Burden of Small Debts" respectively, seem to us to be of the greatest value. The reader is made to feel that they are founded upon very full information fully digested. The third and fourth essays ("Klassenkampf" and "The Lines of Industrial Conflict") are suggestive, but they are one-sided, and not so thorough as the first two. It is quite certain that the lines of industrial conflict are neither entirely horizontal nor entirely vertical (p. 113). The Birmingham experiment (p. 104) is quite recent, and we are not told its extent. To build much upon it is dangerous, though it does illustrate a tendency to which the Labor Commission drew attention.* But even if "combines" were general we could not say that "'the antagonism of interests' as between capital and labor has proved itself to be not permanent" (p. 113). Before this can be laid down it must be proved that real wages will ultimately suffer from an increase at the expense of profits; and such a proof is yet to seek. Of course it is equally false to say that the only lines of industrial conflict are those between "Capital and Labor." The industrial world is shot throughout in all directions with antagonisms of interests. It has never yet been demonstrated that all, or that all of one class, are appearances only. Those who believe that they are have to trust a very large hope indeed. To raise a question of terminology, it is not desirable to use the term "capital" in the sense in which it is employed above. Such usage has led, and can only lead, to confusion.

In the first essay Mrs. Bosanquet sets out to develop Ricardo's statement that "the natural price of labor" (*i.e.*, normal wages)

* "Final Report," p. 35.

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"essentially depends on the habits and customs of the people."* This quotation is given here because there is an implication in the first essay that the conception of the standard of life is new (p. 42 *et seq.*). It certainly "would be rash to formulate any theory of wages as predominant at the present day," if the formula is to occupy only one or two pages at most. Was it not rash to attempt it of the earlier theories in so small a space? The result was inevitable. Of the standard of life Mrs. Bosanquet says, "Every man (above the lowest residuum) has a standard of life. . . . The standard in England of to-day is the same for all to a certain extent; . . . it is essentially progressive; . . . it varies greatly from class to class, and according to differences of occupation" (p. 16). The hard line drawn by the first sentence is objectionable. What is intended of course is that the lower the type of life the less influence has anything like a standard in shaping it. But why "standard"? In the answers given to this question the ethical element is not made sufficiently prominent; and in consequence the meaning assigned to "progressive" is not quite clear. The significance of "progressive" may be ethical or it may be simply "ophelimous," to use a convenient term introduced by Professor Pareto. If it is the latter, then a progressive standard means in effect that consumption is becoming more productive. There is a net-work of difficulties enclosed in this expression, but they must be left. Is the greatest progress in the ophelimous sense necessarily the greatest in the ethical sense? Is the most economic necessarily the most moral? These are important questions involved in that of the standard of life which are overlooked in the essay under examination. The results which are reached, however, we judge to be correct and important; the following, for instance, to quote but one: "We cannot force interests . . . upon men from without, however desirable we may think them; they must grow. . . ." From this truth it immediately follows that "social work" must consist largely in the removal of obstacles and the provision of opportunities. The economic operation of the standard of life is treated as clearly, and in as great detail as is possible in an essay of this size; but certain far-reaching questions which are opened up by a consideration of its effect on population are not faced. A quotation from Professor Marshall's "Principles" will indicate one of them: "Those who are strong are tending . . . to limit the

* "Works," ch. v.

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number of children whom they leave behind them. . . . We must affirm with Mr. Galton that if the doctrine" (the limitation of families) "were to be acted on generally by the upper part of the nation, including the great body of the more intelligent and capable artisans, but not the lowest classes, it would go far towards arresting the progress of the race."*

In agreement we can go much farther with Mrs. Bosanquet than in disagreement. All the essays are interesting, well-written, and full of good things; but the later ones are of lighter texture than the earlier, especially the first two; all, however, excellently serve the purpose for which they are intended.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

MANCHESTER.

PURE ECONOMICS. By Professor Maffeo Pantaleoni. Translated by T. Boston Bruce, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Macmillan Company, 1898.

Professor Pantaleoni's "Economia Pura" has been well known to the lovers of abstract economics from its first appearance in 1889. It is an application of hedonic measurement to economics by a man well conscious of the limitations of hedonism. "Economic science consists of the laws of wealth systematically deduced from the hypothesis that men are actuated exclusively by the desire to realize the fullest possible satisfaction of their wants, with the least possible individual sacrifice" (p. 3). Pantaleoni sees that desire is not pleasure or pain (p. 41); he does not allow that "the sole motive of every action is self-interest;" and he admits that the common proof offered in favor of this thesis is "now tautological, now a petitio principii, now a ὕστερον πρότερον, always a paralogism" (p. 13). Even the economic man, too, may be a "tribal egoist" rather than an "individual egoist" (p. 22). But the hypothesis of egoism is enough for the work on hand.

The exposition of the theory of value, especially of final utility, takes up a great part of the book, and is well illustrated by diagrams. Ten years ago the book had not many rivals on this field; and it has still an honorable place of its own. It seems a pity that the author should retain his *animus* against some of the Austrians, with whom he has much in common. He was among the first to make the remark that capital is not a fund but a flow (*un flusso e non un fondo*), a mode of speech much in vogue now. He is a

* Page 260, second edition.

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keen, subtle, and instructive writer; and Mr. Bruce has done good service by presenting him to an English public in his careful and readable translation. Kines for Knies is perhaps the worst of the inevitable misprints (223, 252).

J. BONAR.

LONDON.

LUXURY AND SACRIFICE. By Charles F. Dole. New York and Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company, 1898.

This new booklet will surely increase Mr. Dole's circle of readers. It has the same temper which characterized the last book, "The Coming People." It has the same daring quality of faith, eager to justify itself by appeal to every variety of human experience. The universe is not only good when rounded out in some far future; it is through and through good here and now. The most sombre of all illusions is that the goodness is deferred or elsewhere. This thought, together with the essential oneness of things which a rationally good universe implies, is at the basis of all the author's hope for the world. This unity, which science, business, education, alike assume, carries with it the explanation of such problems as are raised in "The Coming People" and in the present study of "Luxury and Sacrifice." Luxury is seen to be a shifting and extremely relative term, but is recognized as a fact. It is at bottom the expenditure of "stored force," of which there is "not enough to go round." One is much helped, in puzzling over the issues raised by luxury, to think of this expenditure (as we are now taught to think of capital) as the use and direction of hoarded life or energy.

We say that any force—electricity, for example—is good according to its use. It is good as it is made to subserve worthy human ends. Competition is probably in itself neither good nor bad. Its goodness or badness depends upon the direction of the enormous forces which work through competition. Luxury, too, is good if the extra expenditure which the word implies raises the tide of happier and more vigorous life. This is no Stoic solution through the cultivation of few wants. The satisfaction of an ever larger number of wants defines civilization as it defines growth, if only the wants are those upon which increase of faculty depends. The old revolt against many wants was rather against desires which were believed to degrade life. The development of economic thought has made it ever clearer that "productive" consumption required the satisfaction of increasing wants, but also required relatively

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large expenditure upon a certain class of wants,—*i.e.*, the æsthetic. This is not thought of as blameworthy because of its issues in a completer individual and social life. This is everywhere the test.

In the best Greek days nearly one-third of the national budget was spent upon art. The proportion is extraordinary. It was strictly luxurious, but its justification is in terms of welfare. It was *public* expenditure, from the enjoyment of which no slave was excluded. The same expenditure upon a purely private satisfaction would doubtless meet with instinctive disapproval because of its selfishness. To use so much of what was "insufficient to go round" upon a lucky few is primarily condemned because it is felt that the best life suffers. The synthetic word is thus life,—life at its highest and best. All unusual spending that makes for such life is its own excuse. If it is called luxury, it is good as better life is good. So with sacrifice. "It has been often supposed that to sacrifice anything was to give it away, forswear, or renounce it. The real as well as the literal meaning is to make a thing sacred. You lift it out of the narrow, animal, material, or selfish level into the higher, divine, and universal order." "To make the thing sacred is to make it, like all God's works, beneficent." Thus, joy and sacrifice, even luxury and sacrifice, are in no way incompatible. This is the spirit of General Armstrong's utterance, "What is commonly called sacrifice is the best possible use of one's self and one's resources."

This little volume is so full of wholesome and elevated thought that every reader will feel impelled, by loaning or by gift, to pass it on for the widest possible reading.

JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY: TWO SUPPOSED OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE. By William James, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, and Ingersoll Lecturer for 1898. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1898. 12mo. Pp. 70.

The two objections which Professor James, in his usual lively style, has treated in this little volume are: (1) Thought being admittedly a function of the brain, immortality is impossible. (2) If immortality be true, there will be "an incredible and intolerable number of beings" immortal. His aim is to destroy the force of both.

The second objection is neither weighty nor widely entertained, and is easily answered. The first seems more cogent, and the writer meets it by pointing out that there are three sorts of function,—(1) productive, (2) releasing or permissive, (3) transmissive,—and

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maintaining that the objection has force only when the first is meant, but breaks down when only a permissive or transmissive function is attributed to the brain. The gist of the argument is contained in the following passage:

"Suppose . . . that the whole universe of material things—the furniture of earth and the choir of heaven—should turn out to be a mere surface-veil of phenomena, hiding and keeping back the world of genuine realities. Such a supposition is foreign neither to common sense nor to philosophy. Common sense believes in realities behind the veil even too superstitiously; and idealistic philosophy declares that the whole world of natural experience, as we get it, is but a time-mask, shattering or refracting the one infinite Thought which is the sole reality into those millions of finite streams of consciousness known to us as our private selves.

"'Life, like a dome of many-colored glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity.'

"Suppose, now, that this were really so, and suppose, moreover, that the dome, opaque enough at all times to the full super-solar blaze, could at certain times and places grow less so, and let certain beams pierce through into this sublunary world. These beams would be so many finite rays, so to speak, of consciousness, and they would vary in quantity and quality as the opacity varied in degree. Only at particular times and places would it seem that, as a matter of fact, the veil of nature can grow thin and rupturable enough for such effects to occur. But in these places gleams, however finite and unsatisfying, of the absolute life of the universe, are vouchsafed. Glows of feeling, glimpses of insight, and streams of knowledge and perception float into our finite world.

"Admit now that *our brains* are such thin and half-transparent places in the veil. What will happen? Why, as the white radiance comes through the dome, with all sorts of staining and distortion imprinted on it by the glass, or as the air now comes through my glottis determined and limited in its force and quality of its vibrations by the peculiarities of those vocal chords which form its gate of egress and shape it into my personal voice, even so the genuine matter of reality, the life of souls as it is in its fulness, will break through our several brains into the world in all sorts of restricted forms, and with all the imperfections and queernesses that characterize our finite individualities here below.

"According to the state in which the brain finds itself, the barrier of its obstructiveness may also be supposed to rise or fall.

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It sinks so low, when the brain is in full activity, that a comparative flood of spiritual energy pours over. At other times, only such occasional waves of thought as heavy sleep permits get by. And when finally a brain stops acting altogether, or decays, that special stream of consciousness which it subserved will vanish entirely from this natural world. But the sphere of being that supplied the consciousness would still be intact; and in that more real world with which, even whilst here, it was continuous, the consciousness might, in ways unknown to us, continue still."

This is, of course, not an argument, but a picture meant to aid us in conceiving the permissive or transmissive function of the brain. The difficulty is that one does not know what point of view to adopt in order to obtain its full significance. Questions like these persistently suggest themselves: What is the nature of the "whole universe of material things," that "mere surface-veil of phenomena hiding and keeping back the world of genuine realities"? How does it stand related to them? Is it independent of, and opposed to, them, so that there is an ultimate Manichæan dualism in the universe? Are the phenomena phenomena of something, or do they stand for themselves? In the latter case, would they not be realities? From whom does the material universe hide the world of genuine realities? From itself? From us? But where and what are we all this time? Are we part of the veil, or part of the reality? In either case, how could the reality be hidden from us? If the "finite streams of consciousness, known to us as our private selves," are mere rays of the absolute thought, who or what is the subject of them? Does not a stream, in order to be known as a stream, imply an on-looker, to whom its various successive moments and undulations are simultaneously present? Who is that on-looker? Are the phrases, "whole universe of material things," "whole world of natural experience, as we get it," and "life," equivalent expressions? If so, what is the meaning of "we" in the second? On which side of the dualism do "we" come? Granted the appositeness of Shelley's poetic metaphor, which should be taken along with its context,* for whom is the dome opaque? For the rays that

* "The One remains; the Many change and pass:
Heaven's light forever shines; Earth's shadows fly.
Life, like a dome of many-colored glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity,
Till death trample it to fragments."

ADONAÏS.

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penetrate it? Or for those it holds back? For whom are the gleams that pass through unsatisfying? How is "our finite world," into which "glows of feeling, etc., float," different from the dome through which they struggle? Would there be any "our finite world" at all, apart from "glows of feeling, glimpses of insight, and streams of knowledge and perception"? When "the white radiance comes through the dome," where does it come, and to whom? Why, when "a brain stops acting altogether, or decays," does "that special stream of consciousness which it subserved" "vanish entirely from the natural world"? Why does it not rather pass through the hole left by the decay of the thin, active brain-glass, with full splendor? What comfort is there for those who long for individual immortality, in the surmise that, after the decay of the brain, and the withdrawal of the consciousness individuated by it, "the consciousness might, in ways unknown to us, continue still"? Even if it did continue, would it be as an individual ego, or merely as the unstained "white radiance of eternity"? In the former case, what would be its individuating principle, and what would be its content? Has Professor James proved more than that, after death, the individual "consciousness might, in ways unknown to us, continue still"? Would not those who assert that thought is a productive function of the brain admit as much? Is not consciousness existing as individuated a way known to us? If it exists otherwise, is it, in any way, satisfying to us?

I must confess that I do not understand Professor James's position in this work; and I have written down these somewhat numerous questions, in the hope that he may be induced to give a clear statement of his views on the important question treated in it.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

DYNAMIC IDEALISM: AN ELEMENTARY COURSE IN THE METAPHYSICS OF PSYCHOLOGY. By Alfred H. Lloyd, Ph.D., Author of "Citizenship and Salvation." A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago.

Incompleteness is a necessary attendant upon any attempt to state even the outlines of a philosophic system within a compass of two hundred and forty pages. Within such narrow limits one can hardly hope to do more than to indicate his point of view, and it is this rather than a more extended treatment of his subject that Professor Lloyd has sought to accomplish in his "Dynamic Idealism." The book was prompted by the reception accorded a course

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of lectures upon a similar subject by a popular audience. It was written "for readers who are not strictly technical students in psychology." Prefaced by such statements it is hardly amenable to the criticism which would know more of the nature of *activity*, nor to the charge that the details of proof are not sufficient to make a case.

The core of the author's thought is "real pyschology is metaphysics. . . . Only the metaphysical principle can make any fact or any process really concrete." Psychology has been an ontological science, is treated in large part at present as an epistemological science, but must be recognized as a biological science; for it is not interested in the self as mere being, nor only as knowing, but as living and doing. It is action which unifies soul and mind. Psychology is the science of self-expression; consciousness is born in friction,—with the tension of self-expression; intelligence is but the natural self-activity of a world of relations. Things are not related but are themselves relations, and relationship is not formal but dynamic. Relationship which is merely formal is dualism, for it necessitates a sphere of things quite distinct from the relations which obtain among them. Change is the ever-fulfilling expression of what always is, and is inevitable in a relational whole. The name for such an animate system of relations as this our world, is organism. The inorganic does not exist save as a reminder of a fulness as yet unrealized, which is constantly being recognized as organ in the including organic life. In psychology this is but the recognition of the unity of subject and object which only a functional relation has divided. Space and time are but the captions of self-relation, mere by-products of the activity which gives them birth. As such they remain the eternal designations of a ceaseless activity, while only the formalist has need for timeless realms and unextended spaces, to account for the two-sided world which he thus creates. Ideas are not forms but forces; to say that they are forms is to split the world in two,—to confess that it is not amenable to consciousness. It is this alien existence of ideas as unrelated forms that is responsible for the barrenness of religion, for the scholasticism of education, and for the general impotence of thought to shame the practices of men. It is here that the great worth of the book appears. Professor Lloyd has contributed a statement which has the merit of being itself a "tool." Measured by the principle of instrumentalism, which is in the last analysis the only measuring rod, aside from mere curiosity, his book must be hailed as a needed

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contribution,—needed especially by the workers for reform, who have sought so patiently to understand a practice which has worked, and beside which all others have failed.

The chapters on historical and educational illustrations are especially to be commended. Possibly no clearer proof of formalism's necessary suicide could be adduced than that which the reference to dead languages supplies. The difference between education as a discipline and education as a vocation, between philosophy as form and as force, this is the difference upon which Professor Lloyd insists, and in so doing he has pointed new ways for the educator and opportunity to the reformer. The entire book is a protest against the evils of abstraction of every sort. Is an attempt to see the world whole. It is a contribution to practical ethics which should deepen the faith and enlarge the hope of those who labor directly for social betterment. A defect which should not go unnoted is found in the author's failure to indicate the process value of the scientific analyses which he criticises. Not to have done so may be a failure to apply his own tests, but is more likely due to the limits which he has set for himself. His too frequently unmeditated sentences may prove troublesome, but to him who persevereth he offers much that cannot fail to provoke thought and enrich both theory and practice.

E. C. Moore.

University of California.

Studies in the Psychology of Sex. Vol. I., Sexual Inversion. By Havelock Ellis. London; Watford: The University Press, 1897. Pp. xvii, 204.

An Unknown People. By Edward Carpenter. London: A. & H. B. Bonner, 1897. Pp. 37.

The aim of Mr. Carpenter's pamphlet, reprinted from the "Reformer," is to give a popular account of sexual inversion. He presents the main facts in an accurate and agreeable form, saying little, of course, about their darker side. His chief point is that the class of inverts may have a useful function in society as reconcilers and interpreters between the two sexes.

Mr. Havelock Ellis's study is a solid and valuable contribution to the psychology of the same subject. As his book has been made the occasion of a criminal prosecution, it may be as well to put it on record that his mode of treatment is unexceptionable. He writes with equal self-respect and thoroughness, and gives the im-

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pression that he is a genuine scientific man doing his best to illustrate an obscure and important province of human nature.

At present there are two main theories about sexual inversion; according to the first it is congenital, according to the second it is the result of habit and suggestion, and therefore curable through counter-suggestion by the hypnotic physician. Mr. Ellis adopts the congenital theory with due allowance for the secondary influence of the other factors. "In sexual inversion we have what may fairly be called a 'sport' or variation, one of those organic aberrations which we see throughout living nature, in plants and in animals."

In the practical conclusions with which he ends his work Mr. Ellis is commendably cautious. The whole study is yet in a somewhat elementary state, and more data must be accumulated before any conclusions can be more than probable. He speaks, however, with some emphasis in condemning the hypnotic methods for the "cure" of sexual inversion. They are, he argues with reason, both futile and repulsive. It is a mistake to encourage inverts to marry and perpetuate an abnormal stock. "Sometimes, indeed, the tendency to sexual inversion in eccentric and neurotic families seems merely to be Nature's merciful method of winding up a concern which, from her point of view, has ceased to be profitable." It is useless, he says, to try to change the invert's nature. It is better to influence him to a good life and to direct his homosexual sympathies into channels which will make him a useful and happy member of society.

Mr. Ellis further recommends a relaxation of the severe English law against unnatural vice. Here he is less convincing. Our present law is not very logical, but, from the general common sense of those who administer it, seems to work fairly well.

There are some who would raise the general question whether a subject like the present can fitly be made the matter of a published treatise. Many excellent persons have a horror of everything related to the homosexual tendency. Their feeling commands our respect, and yet it seems better to have the subject brought out into publicity. That all sorts of immature and half-educated people should read Mr. Ellis's book is, of course, most undesirable. But in view of the prevalence of sexual inversion it is necessary that every schoolmaster, every criminal lawyer, we had almost said every head of a family, should be acquainted with its phenomena. Were the subject better understood, mistakes would be avoided that have ruined thousands of lives. H. S.

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THE WONDERFUL CENTURY: Its Successes and Failures. By Alfred Russel Wallace. 8vo. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898. Pp. 400, twelve diagrams, portrait.

This is an interesting appreciation of the successes and failures of the nineteenth century by an illustrious veteran who has spent his life in the service of science and his fellow-men. Railways, steamships, electric telegraphs, the telephone, lucifer matches, gas illumination, electric lighting, photography, the phonograph, Röntgen rays, spectrum analysis, anæsthetics, antiseptics, the theory of the conservation of energy, the molecular theory of gases, the measurement of the velocity of light and the earth's rotation, the uses of dust, the principle of chemical combination in definite proportions, the study of meteors and the meteoritic theory, the study of the glacial epoch, the discovery of the antiquity of man, the establishment of the idea of organic evolution, the cell-theory and the foundation of embryology, the germ-theory of disease and the discovery of the function of leucocytes,—these are the achievements of the nineteenth century in science and its applications. The author contrasts them with what was gained in *all* preceding ages, so as to justify his title, "The Wonderful Century."

On the other hand, there are failures,—the neglect of phrenology, the depreciation of hypnotism and psychical research, the delusion of vaccination, the failure to perceive the fallacy of militarism, competitive individualism, and earth-plunder. The general conclusion is that the material and intellectual advance has been unprecedented, but that ethical and social development has not kept pace with this.

J. A. T.

NEO-MALTHUSIANISM: An Inquiry into that System with Regard to its Economy and Morality. By R. Ussher. 8vo. London: Gibbings & Co., 1898. Pp. 325.

This book is intended to show that recourse to Neo-Malthusian methods is morally and economically pernicious. It is argued that the counsels of the Neo-Malthusians tend to reduce marriage to monogamic prostitution, by suggesting a method whereby the sexual passions may be indulged irresponsibly as far as the possibility of progeny is concerned. It is also argued that the methods are economically fallacious, since they do not touch the social evils which have led to their adoption. Raise the moral ideals of control, chivalry, and chastity; let the human character have a chance

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to develop into its rightful supremacy over the animal instincts; press on with economic reforms, and the morbid practices of the Neo-Malthusians will cease to find even an excuse: this is the author's position. But does not this solution seem very far off, while our problem is one of to-day? We agree with the author that the Neo-Malthusian suggestions *may* lead to even worse evils than those which they are intended to obviate, and we distrust any solution which does not rest upon slow organic changes of constitution and character. On the other hand, for particular cases we see at present *no* solution but the *pis aller* of Neo-Malthusianism. We doubt if the author has quite realized that there are many Neo-Malthusians whose appreciation of the sanctity of marriage, the responsibility of parentage, and the fundamental, ethical, and social importance of the family, is quite as strong and clear as his. Neo-Malthusian methods *may* become loop-holes for lasciviousness; but so may the most conventional marriages. It appears to us certain that there are many cases where it is *in every conceivable way* better for a married couple not to have more than two or three children, and we cannot believe that this restriction can be attained by continence except in a very small percentage of cases. Neo-Malthusian methods *may* lead to an abyss of immorality, but they may also be consistent with and conducive to a high-toned morality, —everything depending upon the ethical pitch of the whole life.

J. A. THOMSON.

EDINBURGH.

STUDIES IN LITTLE KNOWN SUBJECTS. By C. E. Plumptre. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

This book is a reprint of various Essays that Mr. Plumptre has published during the last thirteen years. The Essays are quite detached. The author divides them into Studies in Times Past and Studies in Times Present. The best Essays in the first division are the two upon Bruno. The writer is very appreciative of the great Italian philosopher, and very severe upon a Scottish reviewer who had devoted two articles in the *Scottish Review* of 1888 to an onslaught upon Bruno. Mr. Plumptre, however, does not manage to throw any fresh light on Bruno's philosophy. He deals rather with Bruno as a man. The position of Plumptre in this respect seems good as against that of the Scottish reviewer who represents Bruno as a worthless "creature." The Essays in the second part deal with more popular subjects, such as the Progress of Japan,

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Thackeray's Letters, Charles Bradlaugh, etc. The author's observations are a little trite. For example, he discourses on the duty of being true to our convictions, on the advantages of looking on the best side of things, and so on. Every one knows all these things. The difficulty lies in carrying them out in practice. But doubtless there is no harm in reminding people of them. The author, it may be noted, is very agnostic.

W. F. TROTTER.

EDINBURGH.

FOOTSTEPS IN HUMAN PROGRESS, SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS: A Short Series of Letters to a Friend. By James Samuelson. 8vo. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898. Pp. 113.

Mr. Samuelson seeks to show that the course of civilization, in spite of its many apparently devious and deeply shadowed turns and twists, has been "slowly but surely towards a far distant goal designed and prepared for the human race by a higher Intelligence." The book might be described as a series of concrete illustrations of the theological doctrine of Providence, or of the philosophical doctrine of the rationality of history. After reading the genial chapters, one feels sorry to be unable to accept the author's protest that he is not optimistic.

J. A. T.

COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE TIME OF THE REFORMATION. By Karl Kanbsky. Translated by G. L. and E. P. Milliken. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 16 shillings.

This volume, which originally formed part of "Geschichte des Socialismus," deals with the history of heretical communism. In it the history and customs of the Bohemian Brethren, the Taborites, and the Anabaptists are described at considerable length. The descriptions bear evidence of much learning and research; the book is full of curious information, and the events which are related in it have been little known or studied, although they have no unimportant bearing on many problems and theories of the present time. Unfortunately, the style of the author does not do justice to his material; if what he has to say interests the reader, it is in spite of the way in which it is said.

Throughout the book Herr Kanbsky sets himself to prove that the popular representation of the period has up to the present time been a false one. For example, he says, "according to the usual popular representation of history, the only question at issue

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during the gigantic struggles of the Hussite war was essentially whether or not the Holy Communion ought to be administered in both kinds;" but, according to his view, "what the various flags are to the nations of to-day, the chalice was to the Hussites. It was their standard, round which they rallied, and which they defended to the last; but it was not an object of strife. It was precisely the same with the different forms of the Holy Communion which made their appearance in the Reformation of the sixteenth century." Such statements seem to indicate that the point of view from which Herr Kanbsky interprets the period is also limited, though from the opposite side to that taken by the historians who are responsible for the "popular representation."

F. M. BUTLIN.

LONDON.

THEORIES OF THE WILL in the History of Philosophy. By Archibald Alexander. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898. Pp. 365.

METAPHYSICS. By Borden P. Bowne. Revised Edition from new Plates. New York and London: Harper & Bros., 1898.

Mr. Alexander's "Theories of the Will" is a valuable contribution to the study of philosophic problems. The author adopts the method of historical exposition, and traces the development of metaphysical thought on this subject from its first beginnings in the primitive Greek philosophers down to the last theories of Lotze. Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic doctrines are fully described; the Satristic, Scholastic, and Reformation teachings are fully given; and, finally, the theories of Locke, Hobbes, Hume, Reid, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer are minutely described; closing, as we have already stated, with the latest theories of Lotze.

An immensely valuable feature of the work is its wealth of accurate references; on each page are foot-notes giving the exact references on each point in the works of the author under discussion; while in the body of the work itself a free use is made of the very "ipsimma verba" of the philosopher himself in Greek, Latin, English, and German; it need scarcely be pointed out how very valuable such features are for the accurate student and for reference. Mr. Alexander's work deserves a high place in the literature on this subject for its high scholarship and vast amount of information.

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"Metaphysics," by Borden P. Bowne, President of Philosophy in Boston University, is also a noteworthy book. For while primarily adapted, we should imagine, for class work, yet its clear and cogent thinking on some of the deepest problems of philosophy will commend it even to the specialist in these lines. Mr. Bowne's style is lucid and plain, and his philosophical acumen of a high order.

ALAN S. HAWKESWORTH.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE METAPHYSIC OF EXPERIENCE. By Shadworth H. Hodgson, LL.D., etc. In four books. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1898. [A complete account, in four large volumes, of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's System of Philosophy. Book I. contains a "General Analysis of Experience;" Book II. is on "Positive Science;" Book III. is an "Analysis of Conscious Action;" Book IV. is on "The Real Universe." The part that chiefly concerns readers of this JOURNAL is contained in Chapter VI. of Book III., entitled "The Foundations of Ethic." It comes at the beginning of the fourth volume. Some account of this will be given in a future issue. In the mean time the work may be welcomed as certainly the most voluminous and possibly the most comprehensive and systematic (though hardly the most lucid or profound) discussion of metaphysical questions that we have had in English in recent times.]

AN OUTLINE OF PHILOSOPHY, with Notes Historical and Critical. By Professor John Watson, LL.D. Second edition. Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1898. [The first edition of this useful work was entitled "Comte, Mill, and Spencer, an Outline of Philosophy." For a review of it, see Vol. VI. of this JOURNAL, No. 1, p. 129. The new edition has been considerably enlarged by the addition of twelve long notes (occupying about one hundred and eighty pages) on various philosophical questions. It is to be hoped that in future editions the book will be welded into a somewhat more systematic unity. It is not as yet quite what one would expect from the title. The general impression that it makes is that, while the lectures on which it is based were probably admirable (especially when accompanied by the actual reading of the philosophical works that are referred to in it), it has not been quite successfully transformed into a book. Still, it is probably the best general introduction to philosophy that we have in English.]

THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE: A Study of Epistemology. By St. George Mivart, M.D., Ph.D., F.R.S. (*The Progressive Science Series.*) London: John Murray; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1898. [Contains chapters on the "Catalogue of Sciences," "The Objects of Science," "The Methods of Science," "The Physical Antecedents of Science," "The Psychical Antecedents of Science," "Language and Science," "Intellectual Antecedents of Science," "Causes of Scientific Knowledge," "The Nature of the Groundwork of Science."]

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ORGANIC EVOLUTION CROSS-EXAMINED: Or Some Suggestions on the Great Secret of Biology. By the Duke of Argyll, K.G., etc. London: John Murray, 1898. [Three Essays, mainly in criticism of Mr. H. Spencer, reprinted, with slight alterations, from *The Nineteenth Century*.]

LEIBNIZ, THE MONADOLOGY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS. Translated, with Introduction and Notes, by Robert Latta, M.A., D. Phil. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1898. [An important contribution to the history of philosophy.]

THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND POLITIC. By Thomas Hobbes, of Malmesbury. Edited, with Preface and Critical Notes, by Ferdinand Tönnies, Ph.D. To which are subjoined selected extracts from unprinted MSS. of Thomas Hobbes. London: Williams & Norgate, 1898.

BEHEMOTH, OR THE LONG PARLIAMENT. By Thomas Hobbes, of Malmesbury. Edited for the first time from the original MS. by Ferdinand Tönnies, Ph.D. London: Williams & Norgate, 1898.

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO DARWIN. By Woods Hutchinson, A.M., M.D. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1898. [The writer holds of the Gospel in question that "its faith is as steadfast, its 'consolations' as great, and its spirit of worship as profound and as powerful as those of revealed religion."]

THOMAS REID. By Professor A. Campbell Fraser, D.C.L. (*Famous Scots Series.*) London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1898. [Mainly biographical. Of very little philosophical interest.]

METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL REMUNERATION. By David F. Schloss. Third Edition, revised, enlarged, and almost entirely rewritten. London: Williams & Norgate, 1898.

ON THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF PSYCHICAL EVENTS. (The Wilde Lecture.) By Professor Michael Foster, Sec. R. S. Reprinted from the "Memoirs and Proceedings of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society," Session 1897–98. Manchester, 1898. [The closing paragraph has some ethical significance. "In the lower tissues, in undifferentiated protoplasm, in muscle and the like, spontaneous activity, automatism seems to be the direct outcome of nutrition, the direct effect of the blood-supply working on the molecular machinery, and to be independent of the play of external influences on the tissue. But if there be any truth in the views which I have been urging upon you, we cannot transfer this conception to the working of the brain. If in nervous tissue, as I have urged, the influence of the blood-supply is wholly subordinate to the influences of incidents, the more so the higher the elements, we must attach but little importance to the play in it of such a direct nutritional automatism. We must regard that psychical spontaneity which we call the will, as, at least in the main, the outcome of complex influences." But the transition here from the physical to the psychical seems a little abrupt.]

JOHN RUSKIN, SOCIAL REFORMER. By John A. Hobson, M.A. London: Nisbet & Co., 1898. [A complete systematic and critical account of the social philosophy of Mr. Ruskin. A work of great interest and importance.]

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THE LAW OF CIVILIZATION AND DECAY: An Essay on History. By Brooks Adams. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1898. [A reprint of the second edition. The first edition appeared in 1895, the second in 1896.]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PEOPLES: Its Influence on their Evolution. By Gustave Le Bon. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1899.

RICH AND POOR. By Mrs. Bernard Bosanquet. Second edition. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1898. [The new edition of this excellent book has been revised, and is enriched by the addition of a chapter "On Giving Money." It is hardly necessary to say that the advice given is exceedingly useful and well put. "In giving our money," she concludes, "let us as far as we can give within the range of our personal experience. Where we go beyond this, let us know enough of the charities we select to be able to judge about the effects of their work, and let us use our influence to promote wisdom and humanity in their management."]

THE SANCTITY OF LIFE. A reply to Sir Henry Thompson. By Henry S. Salt. Manchester: The Vegetarian Society, 1898. [An argument for vegetarianism, meeting the criticisms of Mr. Leslie Stephen, Professor Ritchie, and Sir H. Thompson. Rather arrogant in tone and not very clear in statement. The main point seems to be an attempt at a *reductio ad absurdum*. If the breeding of animals for slaughter can be justified, the Turks would be justified in breeding Armenians to slaughter them. This hardly seems cogent. Armenians are persons, and so have a claim to be regarded as ends, not mere means. Also, it would have to be shown that the lives of the Armenians so produced contained a surplus of pleasure over pain; and, as the Armenians are reflective beings, "looking before and after," this would be difficult to show in the circumstances. Again, can it be held that, for men, the worth of life can be measured simply by amount of agreeable sensation, as balanced against disagreeable? For mere animals this may be plausibly maintained, but hardly for men. Writers of the school of Mr. Salt seem to have an acquired incapacity for distinguishing between men and beasts. The Hedonistic School of Ethics has no doubt done much to produce this confusion.]

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY. A Text-Book for Colleges and Schools. By Franklin Henry Giddings, M.A., Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1898.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY. Essays and Letters. By Thomas Judge. Edited by his son, T. G. Judge. London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1898. [Essays on Workmen's Dwellings, Strikes, etc.]

TO-MORROW. A Peaceful Path to Real Reform. By E. Howard. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898. [A plan for the improvement of social life by preventing the drift of labor from the country to the town.]

WHAT IS SOCIALISM? By Scotsburn. London: Isbister, 1898. [An attack on socialism. Seems worthless.]

VALUE: The First Cause in Political Economy. A pamphlet. By Henry Rawie. Indianapolis: The Smith-Iliff Stationery Co., 1898. [Seems confused and badly written.]

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THE SOCIAL MIND AND EDUCATION. By George Edgar Vincent. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

A DIALOGUE ON MORAL EDUCATION. By F. H. Matthews, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

INTRODUCTION TO THE HERBARTIAN PRINCIPLES OF TEACHING. By Catherine I. Dodd: With an Introduction by Professor Rein. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1898.

ROUSSEAU AND EDUCATION ACCORDING TO NATURE. By Thomas Davidson. (*Great Educators Series.*) London: Heinemann, 1898.

THE TEACHING OF CHRIST ON LIFE AND CONDUCT. By Mrs. Sophie Bryant, D.Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SCHOOL-ROOM. By T. F. G. Dexter, B.A., B.Sc., and A. H. Garlic, B. A. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

THE ART OF TEACHING. By David Salmon. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

DIVINE IMMANENCE: An Essay on the Spiritual Significance of Matter. By J. R. Illingworth, M.A. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BUTLER'S "ANALOGY." By the Rev. Henry Hughes, M.A. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1898.

DOCTRINE AND DEVELOPMENT. University Sermons. By Hastings Rashdall, D.C.L. London: Methuen & Co., 1898.

UNIVERSITY ADDRESSES: Being Addresses on Subjects of Academic Study, delivered to the University of Glasgow. By the late Principal John Caird, D.D., LL.D. Edited by the Master of Balliol. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons, 1898. [The subjects dealt with in these Addresses are: The Unity of the Sciences, The Progressiveness of the Sciences, Erasmus, Galileo, The Scientific Character of Bacon, David Hume, Bishop Butler and his Theology, The Study of History, The Science of History, The Study of Art, The Progressiveness of Art, The Art of Public Speaking, The Personal Element in Teaching, General and Professional Education. Addresses by Principal Caird need no commendation.]

UNIVERSITY SERMONS, preached before the University of Glasgow, 1873–1898. By John Caird, D.D., LL.D., late Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Glasgow. MacLehose & Sons, 1898.

PRINCIPAL CAIRD: An Address, Delivered to the Students of the Moral Philosophy Class on the Opening Day of the Session, 1898–99. By Professor Henry Jones, LL.D., University of Glasgow. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons, 1898. [A very appreciative account of the famous Principal.]

THE CONFESSIONS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE. Edited, with an Introduction, by Arthur Symons. London: Walter Scott, 1898.

"I WAS IN PRISON." By F. Brocklehurst, B.A. Cantab. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1898. [A short account of prison life in England by one who has had experience of it. A book of very considerable interest.]

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A STUDY OF MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT and the Rights of Woman. By Emma Rauschenbusch-Clough, Ph.D. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE. By Wesley Mills, M.A., M.D., etc. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1898. [Contains valuable discussions and illustrations on instinct and kindred topics.]

ETHICAL SONGS. Compiled and Edited for the Union of Ethical Societies. Second (enlarged) edition. Contains two hundred and ninety-two selections in verse on—I. The Inner Life; II. The Social Life; III. Nature. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

LES LOIS SOCIALES. Par G. Tarde. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1898.

L'EDUCATION RATIONELLE DE LA VOLONTÉ. Par P. E. Lévy. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1898.

LA MORALE DE KANT. Par André Cresson. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1897.

NATURE ET MORALITÉ. Par Charles Chabot. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1896.

LA VIE SOCIALE MODERNE. Par Maurice Heins. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie., 1898.

GRANDEUR ET DÉCADENCE DE LA GUERRE. Par G. de Molinari. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie., 1898.

L'ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE. Publiée sous la direction de Émile Durkheim. Première Année (1896–1897). Paris: Félix Alcan, 1898.

ÉTUDES DE PSYCHOLOGIE SOCIALE. Par G. Tarde. Paris: V. Giard and E. Brière, 1898.

ETHISCHE STUDIEN. Von E. von Hartmann. Leipzig: H. Haacke, 1898.

DER BEGRIFF DES ABSOLUT WERTHVOLLEN. Von F. Krüger. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1898.

UEBER DAS SOLLEN UND DAS GUTE. Von F. Bon. Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1898.

DIE ENTWICKELUNG DES ARMENWESENS IN ENGLAND SEIT DEM JAHRE 1885. Von Dr. P. L. Aschrott. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1898.

LA LÉGISLATION SOCIALE EN HONGRIE. Par J. Szterényi. Budapest: Société anonyme d'imprimerie, 1897.

PHILOSOPHIE UND LEBEN. Von Robert Schellwien. Leipzig: Alfred Janssen, 1898.

METAFISICA, SCIENZA E MORALITÀ. Studi di Filosofia Morale. Di Francesco de Sarlo. Roma, 1898.

ELEMENTI DI SOCIOLOGIA GENERALE. Di E. Morselli. Milan: Ulrico Hoepli, 1898.

FILOSOFIA DEL MONOPOLIO. Di Allessandro Garelli. Milan: Ulrico Hoepli, 1898.

THE EVOLUTION OF CHRISTIANITY. By Ramsden Balmforth. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898. [A somewhat slight treatment of a great subject.]

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HANDBUCH DER MENSCHLICH-NATÜRLICHEN SITTENLEHRE FÜR ELTERN UND ERZIEHER. (Ein Versuch im Sinne der von der Deutschen Gesellschaft für ethische Kultur gestellten Aufgabe.) Von A. Döring. Stuttgart: Fr. Frommans Verlag (E. Hauff), 1899.

SYSTEM DER WERTTHEORIE. (I. Band.) Allgemeine Werttheorie, Psychologie des Begehrens (1897). (II. Band.) Grundzüge einer Ethik. Von Dr. Christian v. Ehrenfels. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1898.

SOCIALPÄDAGOGIK. Theorie der Willenserziehung auf der Grundlage der Gemeinschaft. Von Paul Natorp. Stuttgart: Fr. Frommans Verlag (E. Hauff), 1899.

NEUE GEDICHTE. Von Arthur Pfungst. Zweite vermehrte Auflage. Berlin: Fred. Duemmler's Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1899.

LA FAMILLE DANS LES DIFFERENTES SOCIÉTÉS. Par C. N. Starcke. Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1899.

THE GOSPEL FOR AN AGE OF DOUBT. By Henry Van Dyke. Sixth Edition revised, with a new Preface. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1898.

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Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
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Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Merchiston, Llanishen, near Cardiff, Wales.
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THE RELATIONS OF THE SEXES.

THERE is no department of life where there seems at present to be more need for authoritative ethical guidance than that which involves the relations of the sexes. On this subject metaphysical philosophy has nothing whatever to say; supernatural religion has been content with giving its sanction to prevailing custom; and social science speaks as yet with an uncertain voice. The lack of initiative on the part of religion can be sufficiently explained. In the historic faiths that are based on primitive misconceptions of nature, the codes of precepts concern mainly the ceremonial observances that are associated with the belief in supernatural beings, and what is left for rules of conduct in the affairs of the present world, deals almost entirely with the most obvious and universal conditions of social order, such as the protection of life and property. Of the ten commandments, for example, on which Christian morality is founded, scarcely more than half can strictly be called *ethical*, and only one deals with the domestic relations on their own merits. That one is not the seventh, forbidding adultery, which is really an adjunct of the eighth, "Thou shalt not steal," but the fifth, enjoining children to honor their parents, where there is some recognition of the social stability that is furthered by strengthening family ties. Not only, however, do both these precepts merely confirm

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arrangements that must have already existed, without any attempt to justify them, but they contain no suggestion of any form of marriage more advanced than the polygamy or union of several women with one man, that was current among the Hebrews, and was apparently not unsuited to their stage of civilization. The eyes of theocratic law-givers have seldom been turned far either into the past or into the future; but it is worthy of notice that in the comments of Jesus upon the Mosaic law, while there is still no endeavor to support arbitrary precepts by a reasoned appeal to the realities of life, there is at least evidence of some approach to the monogamic ideal. On the whole, however, it is fair to say that Christianity, like all other transcendental religions, accepted the prevailing type of sexual relationship, just as it accepted slavery, without seeking to do more than give a mystical character to its sanction.

I have said that there is as yet no clear deliverance on this matter from social science, but I should rather have said "from the interpreters of social science," for it will be my aim to show that in spite of the conflict of opinion among experts there is ample material in the natural history of our race for a doctrine of marriage that will embody the authority alike of *a priori* principles and of experience. I shall not spend time on the general thesis that monogamy is a more highly evolved form of sexual union, and one more suited to the circumstances of advanced societies than any other kind of marriage that is known to have existed. The arguments that support this judgment have been presented by Mr. Herbert Spencer with such irresistible force that there is no need to do more than refer to them in the briefest terms. It is undeniable, in the first place, that if we make a sufficiently wide historic retrospect,—a retrospect that includes *pre*-human as well as human evolution,—we shall find a general though somewhat irregular progress from promiscuous and temporary relations of the sexes to unions that approximate more and more closely to a strict monogamy. This important fact, that our species seems slowly but steadily to have moved in the direction of a certain ideal by an unconscious and em-

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pirical discovery of its advantage, is strongly reinforced by two arguments of a more abstract nature. One of these is drawn from the general theory of evolution. When it is realized that every process of development—inorganic as well as organic—means a passage from conditions and relations that are indefinite to others that are relatively definite, and admit of more exact prevision, there is a strong presumption that domestic institutions, like all other social products, will conform to the general rule, and that the most evolved form of marriage will be that which is most durable, and gives scope for the greatest variety of coherent relationships. A more convincing argument still is based on a rational study of the inevitable effects of different forms of sexual union upon the welfare of societies and of the race as a whole. Recognizing, as we must, that the sexual instincts have their *raison d'être* in the preservation of the species,—an end to which all others must be subordinate, in the eyes of society, at least, and therefore eventually of the individual,—we are constrained further to admit that whatever kind of marriage favors most the successful upbringing of children is on that ground alone to be judged the best. Now, whatever advantage a polygamous union may have in regard to the care of offspring in the condition of life determined by a militarist *régime*, there can be no question that in all the more advanced communities of the industrial type, children have by far the best chance in a home where the exclusive attention of both parents is bestowed upon their family. We find here the root of the whole matter. Whatever superstructure of convention, and law, and sentiment may have been built up on the relations of the sexes, the corner-stone must always be the well-being of the next generation. Directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, this paramount consideration will force its influence backward on the institutions of every community. Where it is ignored or inadequately realized, natural selection will inflict the penalty of extinction, while those societies which are most deeply impressed by its significance will be the torch-bearers of evolution. In this aspect it might be thought safe to assume that monogany was sufficiently justified as at least the

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theoretic limit of progress in the domestic relations, whatever difference of opinion might exist as to its implications and its practicability; but I cannot make even this assumption without referring shortly to a curious argument used by M. Letourneau in his book on "The Evolution of Marriage." As this work forms one of the volumes of a well-known scientific series, and is therefore endowed with an authority even beyond what it may fairly claim as the embodiment of much careful and acute research, it will be worth while to see what is the author's summing-up and what is his prophecy for the future, especially in view of the fact that he poses as a thorough-going evolutionist.

"The matrimonial contract will end," he writes, "by being the same kind of contract as any other, freely accepted, freely maintained, freely dissolved." And again: "The doctrine has been firmly held that the family, as we have it instituted in Europe, . . . is the *beau-ideal*, the sacred and immutable sociological type. Ethnography, however, and even history, teach us that the present familial type . . . has not always existed, and that it is the result, like everything else, of a slow evolution; *from whence it is reasonable to infer that it will still continue to be modified.*" It is the argument contained in these last words that calls forth an emphatic protest from all who are interested in saving a half-instructed public from a travesty of the Evolution Theory. M. Letourneau may have other grounds more valid for anticipating the dissolution of the family, but at the outset he must be debarred from any support from the grotesque notion that evolution means incessant change without any limit. There is, of course, a point in the equilibration of the forces affecting any aggregate where evolution ends and disintegration begins, but no one, so far as I am aware, except M. Letourneau, has ever regarded this kind of change as one to be hailed with satisfaction. If it can be shown that there is any form of sexual union, as yet unsuspected, which is likely to further the continued existence and development of the species, or of any advanced society, more efficiently than monogamy, by all means give it recognition and a fair trial; but let us at least be spared the

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suggestion of hypothetical competitors based on a misunderstanding of the law of evolution. Monogamy now holds the field as the ideal form of marriage, and a much more profitable task than speculating as to what other conceivable form of union might supersede it, will be that of considering what is implied by its full acceptance, and in what degree the ideal can ever be attained.

What, then, is required, and what is forbidden, in the commandment that each man shall have one wife, and each woman one husband? But first it may be asked whether any commandment at all is necessary. Granted that it is a supreme principle of social ethics that the sex-relations of the present generation shall be determined with reference to the well-being of succeeding generations, and granted that this end is in the main most fully secured by individual unions of a lasting character, cannot the principle be sufficiently maintained by trusting, if not to the social sentiment of each member of the community, at least to the constraining effect of the general opinion? Is it necessary, is it even desirable, that sexual relations should be subject in any degree to the sanctions of law and religion? Many in our day are clamoring for greater personal freedom in regard to sexual ties. They do not seek to overthrow monogamy, but they wish some relaxation of its despotism, some allowance for exceptional cases, and they press for either a looser control by the State and the Church, or for complete liberation. Is this a reasonable claim? I believe not. There may be much, there undoubtedly *is* much, that is unsatisfactory in the position which marriage holds both as a civil contract and as a religious sacrament; but while there are any public institutions at all to give definite expression to the general opinion, there can be no matter of which it is more important that they should take cognizance than the control of sex-relations. What the exact nature of this control should be is a point that will be referred to presently; but what I wish to urge just now is that it is of the highest moment that marriage should be subject to a universal rule, and that we dare not forego the chance of investing it with all available sanctions. However jealous we may be of encroachments on personal

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liberty, we dare not trust the conscience of the average man with the entire control of those animal passions and vagrant fancies that have been transmitted from stages of development where a prodigal excess of energy in the sexual instincts could alone guarantee the survival of the type. There are weighty reasons, moreover, why we should not be satisfied in this matter to rely even on the outward conscience that is constituted by the approval and disapproval of the community, in so far as that is expressed informally. One reason is that a public opinion, however general and assured, which is not crystallized into definite enactments, or at least registered in some permanent form, could not have the necessary continuity to hold the balance justly between the interests of one generation and those of the next. Social sentiment, even of the vaguest kind, is often effective enough in affairs that come within easy reach of its apprehension, but it is not to be depended on when any degree of imaginative insight is required. Besides, in sex-relations there is a lack of opportunity both for acquiring sufficient information and for exerting adequate pressure on individuals. In a matter which immediately concerns two people only, and which they may have reasons for keeping as secret as possible between themselves, it is difficult for the general public either to know enough or to feel strongly enough to justify interference. On all these grounds I maintain that those have no case who would set sexual unions free from all responsibility to universal principles, clearly formulated and sanctioned in some sort by recognized social institutions.

Before considering what is implied in the full acceptance of monogamy, it will be well to ask how matters stand at present. In the course of social evolution the sanctity of the family has been hedged round by many bulwarks, most of which have arisen without any conscious direction on the part of society. The legal sanction required for the marriage-bond, though devised probably more to regulate the transmission of property than to secure the general care of offspring, has naturally come to have a wider significance by allowing no status to children born out of lawful wedlock. The marriage ceremonies which

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in one form or another are found in all communities except the most barbarous, whether they are associated with religious rites or not, offer further evidence that society, as a whole, feels itself concerned in the family arrangements of each individual unit. The wedding feast, the wedding gifts, the wedding calls, must all be regarded as marks of tutelage over every two members of the group who publicly join their lives together. Nor does this effective though unorganized supervision begin only with the determining event. In all the relations that lead up to marriage the pressure of social opinion may be discerned. Chastity is indirectly enforced by the penalty of losing one's good name, which, indeed, may be imperilled even by the appearance of any irregular sexual act. More than this, a code of manners has been evolved, none the less coercive because it is unwritten, which expresses the monogamous ideal with a measure of sway over personal conduct that depends on the level of refinement reached by each social circle. In its most developed form this code enjoins a certain reserve of behavior in all intercourse between the sexes, an avoidance of every word or sign that could by any possible construction be thought to suggest or favor irregular relations. The virtue of modesty, which in this sense is, theoretically at least, applicable to both sexes alike, is cultivated as a guarantee of chastity. But there is a further refinement still. A perfect monogamic union is to be secured not only by continence before marriage but by constancy after marriage, and this latter requirement throws back its influence on the earlier period in another way. The welfare of society, in so far as it depends on the constitution of the family, cannot be assured by negative conditions alone. It is not enough that two people should be reserved for each other; no less important a consideration is that they should be well suited. A union that fails in this aspect is not only unstable, but even if it be preserved it is ill-suited to provide the proper conditions for the successful up-bringing of children. Society can of course do little of a positive nature to determine choice in marriage. It asserts itself, however, in two ways. It exercises a veto or rather a moral dissuasion in cases where there is an obvious

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unfitness that is likely to tell unfavorably on the next generation, and in the second place it indirectly exacts a certain deliberation from those who are about to marry. This latter influence is expressed not only in condemnation of marriages or engagements hastily contracted, but in a much more effective manner by the convention, as it may be called, of courtship. Although this institution is to be found throughout a great part of the animal kingdom, and has a natural origin in what Darwin has termed "the greater eagerness of the male," it has in human societies gained a peculiar importance as a means of conveying social pressure. What was in the beginning the comparative indifference of the female in the choice of a mate has been transformed into maidenly coyness, a quality to which there has been gradually and unconsciously assigned a highly significant social function. Coyness is something quite distinct from modesty in the sense in which it has been used above. It is a somewhat inadequate name to express the fact that to women has been granted the right to the final word in the expression of personal preference, and therefore that they have been constituted the guardians of dignified behavior in the preliminaries of marriage. Public opinion has turned this opportunity to account by imposing a standard of manners which has the practical effect of delaying decision, and thus securing some guarantee against a hasty and ill-judged assortment.

When a union is once formed or is about to be formed, the mechanism of the law may be employed, and by stress of social opinion is commonly employed, to register the contract, and law being once invoked retains its hold on those concerned, both by enforcing the penalties of a breach at the instance of the aggrieved party, and by punishing bigamy as a crime against society. But the legal insistence on monogamy is partial even in theory, and in practice has still more serious limitations. The control lasts only while both parties are alive, and, even while it is nominally binding, it admits of evasions that partly weaken its effect. The release which is claimed as compensation for a breach of contract gives freedom to the wrong-doer as well as to the sufferer, and in some

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countries the facility with which divorce may be accomplished directly encourages collusion between contracting parties who have tired of their bonds.

The social sentiment that is expressed informally is more pervading and consistent than the law, but it is difficult to compare the nature of the two forces, as the former varies so greatly in the different strata of Society. If, however, we may take those circles where serious reflection and refinement of feeling are most prevalent as expressing the true authoritative voice of the community, we find that public criticism, especially coming from those who are in the closest relations of sympathy with any married pair whose conduct may be in question, has a powerful influence in preserving the sanctity of the monogamic union. It is true that the severity of its judgment, even at the highest level, is often tempered by a self-interested indulgence towards failures in constancy, especially among men with regard to their own sex; but this attitude is not often defended on grounds of reason, being rather a tolerant concession in feeling towards the weakness of the flesh. In its most deliberate and impartial expression public sentiment tends distinctly to the view that when a man and a woman have once chosen each other for better, for worse, they must cleave together till death parts them. Though divorce may be tolerated, it is held to require strong justification, and the marriage of a divorced person is regarded with some disfavor. We may further trace a growing feeling against remarriage, even after the death of the first wife or husband. Such a union is not absolutely condemned, but if it is made hastily, the lack of respect for the dead is resented, and in any case the whole circumstances are weighed before even a modified approval is given. Those who marry more than twice run a serious risk of forfeiting altogether the good opinion of their society.

Such, I believe, is the present position of this question. The duty laid on individuals is, as in the case of all other ethical principles, imposed by the general sense of the community constraining its members to act in the interests of the whole, and therefore as much in the interest of each unit as accords

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with the welfare of all the others. The obligation is not of course at every point consciously referred to its source. The feeling that prompts a general conformity to social demands has become largely instinctive, and the particular conduct associated with this feeling in regard to the relations of the sexes has been gradually evolved into its present form, which is impressed on our manners and customs, our legal systems, our literature and art and religion. But it is the province of scientific philosophy to analyze every moral tradition or convention, however imposing its authority may be, in order to discover its rationale and the law of its development, so that true progress may be made surer in becoming more intelligent.

We may now consider the existing customs, laws, and sentiments which I have indicated as determining the relations of the sexes, with the purpose of judging how far they are based on sound principles, how far they succeed in expressing these principles, and in what direction changes should be sought that will be in harmony at once with the ultimate ideal and with the limiting conditions of progress in human nature.

The answers to these inquiries have been in part already anticipated. We have seen that the paramount consideration in determining the best form of sexual union must be the successful nurture of the succeeding generation, and that a process of selection has brought monogamy to the front as the ideal kind of marriage for attaining that end,—a result which might have been forecast on *a priori* grounds. It has further appeared that, apart from the general nature of the union, an element of the highest importance is that the parents should be so well suited to each other as not only to produce vigorous offspring, but to co-operate harmoniously in their upbringing. We may pass then to examine the efficiency of the mechanism by which these ends are served at the present time in our own and other civilized countries.

As the legal enactments of a free people must always lag behind the general sentiment, and even where they reflect that sentiment faithfully, can only express a part of it, it will be convenient first to criticise the prevailing social con-

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victions as to the proper relations of the sexes under their widest aspect, and afterwards to consider at each point how far the physical constraint of the law should be invoked to enforce compliance or exact penalties, and how far reliance should be placed on moral suasion. I have already offered what I hold to be weighty reasons why we can never seek to dispense with legal sanctions altogether; but while this position will be assumed, there is room for controversy at special points as to whether the authority of the law should be extended or relaxed.

Beginning with the period before marriage, we may ask first whether the means now adopted for securing a satisfactory choice are the best that can be devised. The tendency in recent times, among the English-speaking races at least, has undoubtedly been towards lessening interference with individual liberty, even on the part of family and friends, and trusting more and more to the action of the "elective affinities" that assert themselves with ever increasing emphasis. The marriage of convenience or arrangement is discredited, but this change of feeling must not be interpreted to mean that all idea of regulation has given place to a doctrine of *laissez faire*. Society has never in any degree given up its concern with individual unions: indeed, it is more busily interested in them now than at any former time. But it has come to recognize that its efforts can be more wisely expended in providing the conditions for a suitable choice than in dictating decisions based on superficial judgments. There is a wide difference between the new *régime* of personal liberty and the primitive anarchy in sexual relations. The regulation by the community is still present, though it has gradually become less direct and mechanical, and freedom of choice can be trusted to produce good results only in the degree that individual members can be made to realize their responsibility. I have already referred to some of the more palpable guarantees that Society has provided,—its inculcation of the virtue of modest reticence in behavior, and its establishment of the convention of courtship, but it will be well to look into the matter a little more deeply. The conditions of a wise choice

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in anything are a sufficient variety to choose from and sufficient opportunity of comparison before a decision has to be made. In the development of domestic institutions the unconscious action of Society in providing both of these conditions has hitherto been mainly negative, though more or less imperfect attempts have always been made to maintain something equivalent to a marriage-market. The efficiency of this machinery will be considered presently; but I must first ask attention to a factor which, if not strictly positive in its nature, has yet assumed the highest importance both in aiding the selective process and in strengthening the final decision. I refer to the idealization of animal appetite into the complex but very definite emotion of sexual love. That this motive, as we now understand it, is a product of social evolution, is clear from its comparative insignificance even in such advanced societies as those of Greece and Rome; that it is a powerful determinant in sex-relations scarcely needs to be demonstrated. If, however, we are to use it aright and turn it to its full account, we must analyze its nature and influence more closely than is usually attempted. There may be some to whom the scientific analysis of romantic love will seem a desecration. They may be inclined to fancy that if the mystery of its genesis is penetrated, its imaginative charm will be lost, and its power weakened or destroyed. But this is surely a needless fear. Instead of seeking to blind ourselves to the undeniable fact that certain feelings which are now among the most exalted have their roots in instincts that are common to all organic nature, shall we not rather find reason for pride that so noble a superstructure could be reared on the elemental basis of life? If sexual desires in their rudiments seem to us now gross and unworthy of socialized beings, it is only in contrast with the transfigured forms they have assumed in their association with less egoistic impulses. For this is the essence of the idealizing process that has purged the reproductive instincts of their crude and brutal selfishness, and turned them into a potent instrument of social organization. The familiar contrast between love and desire is not always clearly conceived. It is the glory of

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love not that it excludes desire, but that it includes it, only so combined with the sympathetic emotions, and in such moderate proportion to them, that it remains no longer a disintegrating force. It is unnecessary to trace at any length the course of development by which this transformation has been accomplished. I will only point out how supremely natural it has been. Every sexual union, however casual and temporary, admits an element of common interest; and even the smallest use that may be made of such an opportunity of sympathy offers a vantage-ground for further progress. Every extension of the connection, however it may be caused, makes possible a closer knitting of the bond; the joint efforts for the rearing of offspring affording the fullest scope for the growth of a mutual affection. But while this unconscious natural selection and individual adaptation have been manifestly operating towards greater definiteness in sex-relationships, it is doubtful if much permanent headway could ever have been made against the anarchic tendencies of sexual passion if a powerful auxiliary had not been found in the control exercised by social opinion. There is a subtle but all-important reaction of the community—of the whole race, indeed—upon its members in this matter, quite apart from the physical or moral constraint that coerces the will of individuals for recognized public ends. I refer to the place that has been accorded to the sentiment of love in the traditions of culture that are transmitted from age to age, and form our most precious inheritance from the past. Though it is a product only of the latest era of civilization, the imaginative conception of a chivalrous worship of the ideal type of womanhood and of a standard of conduct in harmony with such devotion has proved to be the most potent factor in human progress that history has yet revealed. Every child that is now born in any advanced society enters sooner or later into an atmosphere of thought and feeling on the questions of sex that is filled with the glamour of poetic fancy and romantic idealism. Even those who live most like the beasts that perish cannot remain wholly insensible to the influence, and its power over all who are capable of any refinement of sentiment makes it one

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of the chief determining forces of life. If we seek for the essential character of this emotion as it is expressed in literature, in art, in religion, we shall find it in the insistence on the beauty of a whole-hearted absorption in a single affection. The chaos of impulses that fill the mind on the threshold of the world of action is conceived as reduced to order under the control of an overmastering passion which gives a permanent direction to the whole nature. It is true that in romantic love there is an impersonal element; it is the emotion itself that attracts us as well as the loved one. But this exaltation of feeling that seems in a measure to withdraw us from the object and throw us back upon ourselves, in no way resembles the primitive indifference to personal qualities that precluded all constancy of attachment. On the contrary, the reaction of love upon the general springs of conduct can only attain its full power under the two conditions that the concentration of feeling on one object shall be strong enough to overbear all wayward desires, and that the common ground of sympathy between the two natures shall be the widest possible. It may be seen then that the ideal love which is the theme of poetry and romance is no primary emotion to be reckoned with as a transcendental element in human experience, but is simply the ultimate form, as anticipated by the imagination, which sexual appetite assumes when its full bearing on social development has been realized. The aspirations of the highest natures throughout the later stages of evolution have gradually crystallized into a definite ideal, which has become a potent factor in the social environment that so largely moulds individual members of the race into harmony with the laws of progress. That the sentiment of love which seems to rise so spontaneously in the breast of each of us is, in its nobler refinements at least, a creation of humanity in the interests of its aggregate welfare, cannot in any real sense detract from its beauty, or lower its rank among the springs of conduct. Rather must we feel that, if its origin has been rightly described, a far more worthy place is assigned to it as the central motive of life in its widest aspect, than could ever have been claimed while its *raison d'être* lay unrecognized.

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From the practical stand-point, at least, the interpretation afforded by the deeper analysis should be welcome. For if the ideal of love has been evolved, each one of us whose opinion and feeling form elements in the social judgments of the race, is called upon to accept a measure of responsibility for its preservation and enforcement. It may even be that the evolution of the ideal itself is not yet complete, and therefore that we must help to determine in what direction further progress may be made. But to keep for the present to the more proximate question, we may ask what can be done to press the more consistent acceptance of the ideal in its existing theoretic form. The influence we may bring to bear is twofold; it may find systematic expression in educational methods, and it may less formally by example and precept affect the general tone of sentiment in the community. Though there are signs of a more rational attitude than has hitherto been held in regard to the cultivation of the sexual instincts in the upbringing of children, the vast majority of parents and teachers alike are as yet wholly without any intelligent principle in the treatment of this most important matter. At the critical period when sexual feelings begin to assert themselves, instead of watching for every opportunity of guidance through the frank satisfaction of natural curiosity, and the suggestion of the higher aspects of the passion of love, we too commonly follow a timid and shiftless policy of evasion and *laissez faire*, if not of actual repression. By such a course we directly tend to bring about that isolation of the purely animal instincts from all the wider human affections, which it has been the priceless service of romantic idealism so largely to prevent. It is not by fostering an artificial mystery about the simple facts of sex-relations that we can hope to stimulate the nobler imaginative developments of the sentiment of love; rather do we by such ill-judged reticence encourage the growth of morbid and ill-regulated desires. When this conspiracy of silence is reinforced by the effects of our conventual system of education, whereby youths and girls spend their years of adolescence in an unnatural separation from each other, and too often are removed even from the influences

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of family life, we cannot wonder that the entire lack of preparation for a worthy and reasonable love becomes painfully apparent when the limits of authority are reached, and conduct and feeling are subject only to the less definite control of public opinion. A good deal of the criticism which a rational doctrine of the relations of the sexes would direct upon our educational methods must involve changes in the general fabric of society that are too wide to be discussed within the limits of this paper; but there is one measure, presenting no difficulties of arrangement, that surely demands more attention than it now receives. If the true preparation for love and marriage is, as I hold it to be, to learn to associate physical passion with the higher emotions developed by social sympathy—with a single-hearted devotion that demands courage, and self-sacrifice, and considerate forethought and tenderness; if we wish to bind all these qualities together in the imagination of the young and clothe the conception with every attribute of beauty that fancy can devise, how can we forego the precious opportunities that lie to our hand in the persuasive witchery of art? The power that may be exercised in the formation of character by the presentment of ideal types is as yet very imperfectly utilized. Love is *par excellence* the theme of the artist, and young people will soon find this out for themselves; but there is a wide difference in the degrees of idealization, and, while we concern ourselves to exclude the grosser forms, we neglect the only effective means of accomplishing this, namely, the persistent presentation of the sentiment in its noblest examples. It is the prevalent idea that the longer we can keep all notions of love, even in its romantic guise, out of children's heads, the better it will be for them. Surely it would be a wiser policy to fill their minds as soon as they are able to receive them, with the creations of art in which love is represented in its sublimest aspects. The youth who is familiar with the love-stories of Shakespeare, and George Eliot, and Meredith, will suffer little harm from the gilded sensualism of the Restoration drama. Let us hasten to implant the images of beauty that will keep the soul sweet and wholesome, and free from the taint of any

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later influences, however sordid these may be. Let it be one of the chief aims of education to gather from history and fiction, from poetry and the drama, such notable instances of pure romantic devotion as will consecrate forever the passion of love in the imagination of those who study them.

When we turn from these opportunities of direct and systematic influence through the emotional training of the young to consider how the ideal of love can be more deeply impressed on the mind of the community by informal methods, we shall find no lack of occasion for the efforts of those individual members who may find courage to brave public opinion in expressing their feelings and convictions on this subject. We know how many arduous steps have yet to be taken before the consecration of sexual desire to the ends of a perfect marriage-bond can become a reality. The sentiment of society has reached the point of decreeing that *women* shall be chaste, on penalty of hopelessly losing caste; it has still to pass the same law for men. There are some who profess to hold this an unattainable aim, urging that the two sexes are subject to different conditions, and cannot, therefore, be made amenable to the same rule. It is true that in the case of women the social prohibition of every act that would forestall the issues of a permanent union was at once more easy to enforce and more essential to the establishment of family ties. But even when it is granted that men are by nature more strongly tempted to allow sexual passion to break through both inward and outward restraints, and, further, that the more obvious penalties of transgression, as well to themselves as to the community, are comparatively slight, we are none the less bound to press onward towards the ideal by demanding that the same standard of personal purity shall be applied to both sexes alike. Though it should have to be admitted that this ideal is, for men, a counsel of perfection, it is still the goal towards which all true progress must tend. But there is good reason to hold that its attainment is not so chimerical as many would profess to believe. It is no doubt hopeless to expect that in any large and heterogeneous society prenuptial chastity will ever become an absolute and universal rule; until the mil-

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lennium is reached there will always be individuals who recognize no control but that of physical force, and who in the absence of any practicable legal restraint will follow their own impulses with little regard to consequences. But it is perfectly reasonable to anticipate a time, which our endeavors may bring sensibly nearer, when all sexual intercourse that is not associated with a genuine sympathy of nature, and acknowledged in the outward bond of a permanent union, will be accounted treason to the community and to the race, and those who defy public sentiment in this matter, be they men or women, will be treated as social outcasts. Already a strong feeling exists, *in our own country at least*, in favor of applying a uniform standard to both sexes; and it is clear that a principle of conduct which many are able to follow is, as an ideal of effort, beyond the reach of none. I need say nothing of the power of example in supporting the convictions that a scientific sociology bids us hold on this question, but I would refer to one means of advance that implies no marked changes in the prevailing type of human nature, except that we should all have the courage to let our opinions and feelings be known. It is not easy to realize how greatly progress is impeded in every line of social development, but especially in this matter, by a want of openness in the expression of moral sentiments. Whether it be from a morbid fear of any appearance of hypocrisy or pharisaism, or from an unworthy affectation of the cynicism that is deemed in keeping with a knowledge of the world, there is, among men at least, a laxity of speech in regard to sex-relations which must tend to blunt the edge of the finer sensibilities, both of those who indulge in it and of those who consent to listen without protest. It may be that the reaction from the narrowness of an ascetic "mortifying of the flesh" has not yet been exhausted; it may be that the want of a rational theory of marriage leaves undue license of jest and comment to the average man who does not perceive the roots of his feelings; it may be that the measure of conformity to the ideal that we are induced to offer in our conduct, imposes a strain on our imperfectly disciplined natures for which we take revenge in conversation when fitting oppor-

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tunity occurs. But whatever be the reason, it must be admitted to our discredit that it is part of what may be termed the "freemasonry of the smoking-room" for men to profess a lower degree of respect for women than they really feel. I do not mean to urge that those who recognize the unworthiness of this convention should set themselves to preach to their neighbors, in season or out of season, but surely there are many unobtrusive yet effective ways of raising the tone of conversation, even in its least formal moments, without either the assumption of moral superiority, or interference with any reasonable liberty in the play of humor and worldly wisdom.

Before passing from the influences that belong to the period before marriage, we must glance at those social institutions for aiding the choice of mates which are of a more definite and positive kind. Some of these are of a distinctly commercial type, and are deservedly ridiculed and condemned on the ground that their mechanism admits a reference only to the more material elements of the contract. But the fact that there are people who have recourse to the advertisement columns of a newspaper or the services of a matrimonial bureau in their search for a suitable mate points to some failure in our social arrangements which should not escape attention. In a large and complex community there must no doubt be always a number of lonely men and women who have few chances of forming friendships that may lead to marriage, but is there any reason why these should be so numerous as they are? The evil is mostly due to what I have already described as our conventual system of education. In all the serious business of life we insist on an unnatural separation of the sexes from childhood onward,—in the school-room, in the university, in the workshop,—while even in the hours of recreation any real freedom of intercourse is seriously limited. To some this lack of opportunity means perpetual celibacy; to others—what is no better, and may be infinitely worse, both for themselves and for the community—a marriage determined by the mere accident of proximity, and affording none of the conditions of a well-assorted union. In recent years the establishment of social clubs

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and other similar devices have done something towards remedying this state of matters among the working-classes, whose want of leisure and resources places them at a special disadvantage, but little improvement can be expected till we grow out of the medieval superstition that the forcible repression of the sexual instincts at the very period when they should be subject to the natural discipline of association with wider impulses, is the best guarantee for their wise exercise at the critical moment of choice. Even apart from questions of education and work, however, there is surely something unsatisfactory in the nature of the provision we make for the social intercourse of young people. In those circles where definite arrangements are possible almost the only kind of reunion on which any reliance is placed for fostering acquaintanceships that may lead to marriage, is a dancing-party. It may, indeed, be said that such entertainments are given not for any ulterior end, but simply to afford a harmless enjoyment to young people. This is, of course, the immediate and ostensible purpose, but as they offer by far the most frequent opportunities of meeting, they have undoubtedly come to fill the place of what I have called a marriage-market. This term is used in no opprobrious sense; it is not only a legitimate function, it is the *duty* of every society to secure to its members ample facilities for the free choice of friendships, and though the formation of lasting ties is not obtruded as a professed object, it is none the less to be recognized from the sociological stand-point as the true *raison d'être* of all social gatherings in which the interests of young men and maidens are specially considered. How far then is wisdom of selection in marriage aided by the institution of the dancing-party? It has, no doubt, some advantages. The frequent change of partners offers in a natural way the variety of introductions that forms one important requisite in the preliminaries of acquaintanceship, while the excitement produced by the music and the rhythmical motions of the dance breaks the ice of reserve, and allows further advances towards intimacy than would be possible under more constrained conditions. But in actual experience it is very seldom that these services are not

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seriously outweighed. It is only the more external qualities that can be revealed or appreciated in the ball-room, for, though in theory there is no bar to reasonable conversation that might disclose sympathy in taste and opinion, the circumstances are not commonly favorable. The physical excitement of late hours and large numbers, even if it be not artificially stimulated, is not likely either to display or to develop the finer elements of character, and except in rare instances it must be an entirely superficial impression that young people get of each other in such an atmosphere. It is, indeed, easier to point out the defects of the current type of social entertainment than to suggest what might replace or supplement it, but even destructive criticism may not be without value if it leads us to discourage the least satisfactory features in our existing arrangements.

I have passed in review the various means, direct and indirect, by which society influences the marriage choice of individuals, but the question is still to be asked whether, in regard to this preparatory period, there is any room for legal interference. The attitude of the state towards irregular sexual relations where no express contract is broken has varied in different times and countries, but there has been a general progression towards a policy of non-intervention, which will probably not be arrested before it is completely accomplished. In our own land, certainly, recent experiments, both in the way of regulation and of repression, have failed to justify themselves, for the onus of defence must lie with those who trust more to the physical constraints of the law than to the pressure of public sentiment, and very marked results in the decrease of sexual immorality would be required to outweigh the evils of interference. The protection of youth comes, of course, under another category, and there are certain enactments that would fairly be included in the necessary preservation of order, but where the state attempts to do more, it only brings discredit on itself by assuming a function which it is unable effectively to discharge.

When we turn to consider the period after a contract of marriage has been made, I believe we shall find little difficulty

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in applying the principles to which appeal has already been made. If the paramount consideration be to secure a stable and harmonious union in which the upbringing of the children can receive the fullest justice, then it is imperative that the choice once made should be irrevocable. Every mitigation of this condition is an encouragment to haste and levity in making the final decision. No measure can be neglected which will help to enforce the truth that marriage is the supreme event in the life of every one, whether in its bearing on personal happiness or on social welfare, and that the selection of the most suitable husband or wife demands the most careful deliberation. If the penalties of mistakes can be evaded, and a second or a third chance may be offered to any one who likes to take it, marriage will become an affair of experiment without any finality, and we shall be launched on a retrograde course towards the promiscuous relations of our prehistoric ancestors. This is no vain imagination: already in some parts of the United States and in some Continental countries there has been in recent years a marked tendency towards the position of affairs anticipated by M. Letourneau, where marriage is to become a contract for a stated period, or is to be terminable at any time on statutory notice being given by either party. When we hear of divorce being granted on the plea of incompatibility of temper, we may expect soon to find that a pretext is no longer thought necessary, and that any act of repudiation, however arbitrary, can claim the sanction of the law. In this country we are happily as yet far from such a lax interpretation of the marriage bond; but I hold that we have not only to set our faces against the growing license of opinion on this matter; we must retrace our steps towards the ideal of the Catholic Church, which, in theory at least, has never agreed to recognize divorce for any ground whatever. Even unfaithfulness must be held no sufficient reason for dissolving a tie which not only joins husband and wife together, but binds each of them in their own persons to assert a principle involving the highest interests of their community and of their race. It is not, of course, implied that the integrity of a household must be maintained before

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the world after its elements have proved to be hopelessly discordant; although in many cases the knowledge that no complete release was possible would go far to restrain the impatient egoism that so often disturbs the harmony of married life, and to lead both parties to make the best even of an unpromising situation. It may sometimes be better for all concerned that husband and wife should live apart; and where the custody of children and questions of property are to be considered, the terms of the separation may have to be adjusted in the law courts, but the public sanction thus given to the arrangement should carry with it no permission to form other ties. Society cannot, of course, attempt to prevent such second unions, even when formed while both parties to the original contract are still alive; but it can at least withhold all legal recognition of them, and this attitude I believe it is bound to assume if the full establishment of monogamy is ever to be realized. Though the abolition of divorce cannot be pressed at once as a measure demanded unconditionally by accepted ethical principles, it will take place in time in expression of the sentiment of every nation that leads the van of social progress. Whether the doctrine of the indissolubility of the marriage-tie will ever be held to enjoin perpetual widowhood, cannot be so confidently assumed, but the prophecy may be hazarded that though so strict an interpretation may never win universal acceptance, it will come to be held by more and more as the ultimate ideal.

I have tried to forecast the true course of development in the relations of the sexes, as it must be determined by the essential factors of human progress that are disclosed in the study of history and social science. I am fully aware that the point of view which I have represented has as yet received little sanction from authoritative opinion. Those who would most readily accept my general analysis will demur to my conclusions, and most of those who share my hopes for the future will be repelled by the nature of the arguments on which they rest. But this unfortunate conflict of judgment and sentiment cannot disturb the confidence with which I would urge the main contentions of this paper; rather, indeed,

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would I seek support and confirmation from it. In so vital a matter it is unlikely that scientific reasoning and the apparent teaching of experience should both be altogether mistaken. Cannot the two positions be reconciled by the closer scrutiny of the natural basis of marriage, on the one hand, and the more careful application of scientific principles on the other? If it be useless to appeal to the so-called advanced thinkers who take the name of evolution in vain in their irresponsible outcry against the social control of individual destiny, it may yet be possible to prevail on the true conservators of the highest traditions of marriage to end the present dangerous anarchy of opinion, and make their position impregnable by adopting the naturalistic stand-point that can alone secure for them the alliance of the coming generation.

JAMES OLIPHANT.

EDINBURGH.

THE ETHICS OF INTELLECTUAL LIFE AND WORK.*

BY "intellectual life" I mean the habitual desire and effort to discover the truth for ourselves in matters rising above the sphere of our ordinary interests and occupations. Such subjects of investigation are to be found in nature, in man, in society, in those ultimate forces which underlie and penetrate, or those ultimate pre-suppositions which are employed to explain, the universe of things, whether we conceive them in terms of the finite or the infinite, of the natural or the divine. By "intellectual work" I mean the process of co-ordinating and affiliating these truths, when once ascertained, for our own satisfaction and information, and of communicating, explaining, and enforcing them for the instruction and guidance of others. Thus, the intellectual life may be regarded as a continuous habit; intellectual work, as an intermittent process.

To begin with the Ethics of Intellectual Life. The prime, essential, and indispensable virtue in this relation is obviously

* A lecture delivered before the Cambridge Ethical Society.

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the love of truth,—truth for its own sake, not for any advantages which may accrue from its discovery either to ourselves or others, but simply because it *is* the truth, and because truth is the one and only legitimate object of intellectual activity, regarded as an independent element in human nature. This simple love of truth, and the desire and effort to attain it for ourselves, must, of course, be distinguished from veracity, or the virtue of "speaking the truth,"—that is, what we ourselves believe to be true, whether on these higher matters or in the ordinary intercourse of life—to other men. It is plain that this latter virtue, important and indeed essential as it is, may coexist with an extremely limited intelligence, and with almost an entire lack of intellectual curiosity. Its exercise is confined to the occasions of our intercourse with our fellow-men, whereas the love of truth is mainly elicited in our own investigations or our own thoughts. We *speak* the truth to others, we *seek* the truth, incidentally indeed for the sake of others, but primarily for the sake of ourselves. The love of truth is concerned with this simple issue, Is this fact or theory true or false? or Which of these statements is the more likely to be true? and though these questions may be the subject of discussion or controversy with others, they must, in the last resort, be decided by each man for himself and on his own individual responsibility.

Now, this simple desire to get at the truth, irrespectively of all other considerations, merely for the truth's sake, appears to have been a virtue more common in ancient than in modern times. The Greek and Roman philosophers, to whom, with our extended knowledge of ancient religions, we may now add many of the Indian and Chinese sages, seem to have been actuated by this pure love of truth in an undiluted form which is rarely to be met with in the world in which we live. I am not speaking, mind, of the character or value of the results at which they arrived, but of the method and spirit in which they were sought. Except in strictly mathematical, scientific, or linguistic investigations, the object of the modern teacher or writer seems to be to establish some foregone conclusion, and that often with a view to some practical issue, rather than, in

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the words of Plato,* to follow the argument whithersoever it may lead, or, in accordance with the maxim of Aristotle, to base on data, carefully and indifferently selected from all quarters and then compared and sifted, the inference which best sums up their total result.† This spirit of *parti pris* specially dominates theology and philosophy, and from these subjects has spread by contagion to others standing in more or less intimate relation to them, as, notably, history, criticism, and certain departments of practical ethics.

When we come to ask for the causes of this diminished regard for truth as such, in modern as compared with ancient times, I fear that we cannot escape from the conclusion that, greatly as morality is indebted to Christianity for deepening, widening, and, if I may so say, consecrating many of the moral virtues, the declension in this particular intellectual virtue, the love of truth, is largely due to the repressive influences of the Christian Church. Already towards the close of the second and at the beginning of the third centuries of our era the message of the gospel and the writings of the apostles had begun to be employed for the purpose of extracting from them a consistent and systematic body of doctrine concerning the mysteries of the Godhead, the nature and person of Christ, the conditions of membership of the Catholic Church, the rewards and punishments of the future life, and other kindred topics. With the increasing influx of Greek philosophers during the third century, and the growing tendency to harmonize Greek metaphysics with Jewish and Christian thought and to clothe the rapidly forming body of Christian doctrine in the terms of the Greek philosophy, subtle distinctions began to be made which had not occurred to the earlier and simpler followers of Christ, and a more and more definite line of demarcation to be drawn between what was regarded as orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the one being dignified as the saving doctrine of the Catholic Church and the other stigmatized as the dangerous aberrations of heresy. In the fourth century, a series of Fathers of the Church, men who combined the highest gifts

* Rep., Bk. III., p. 394 D. † Eth., vii. 1 (5).

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of eloquence and the most subtle powers of intellect with the most stubborn determination of character,—among whom there stand prominently out Athanasius, Chrysostom, Jerome, and Augustine,—drew the bonds of orthodoxy tighter and tighter till any freedom of inquiry within the domain of theological speculation became impossible, except at the risk of being denounced as a heretic and driven from the communion of the Catholic Church. Meanwhile, the domain of Christian theology had received a vast extension by the inclusion within it of a new order of questions (or, perhaps, more strictly, the new importance attached to these questions) connected with the freedom and responsibility of man, the origin and nature of sin, the conditions of pardon and of reconciliation with God through the atoning blood of Christ. Thus, directly or indirectly, almost every question that could be started, which was connected with metaphysics or ethics, as well as with theology proper, could be swept within the theological net, and, consequently, admitted of an orthodox and a heterodox answer. To any one, therefore, who valued the privileges of the Catholic Church, or to whom the deprivation of these privileges might entail serious inconvenience or loss in his civil capacity, the free discussion of these questions was practically interdicted, and, where discussion is interdicted, the majority of men, we know, are too cowed or too timid to allow to themselves the free exercise of their thoughts.

As time went on, we know that, with some few rare exceptions, as exemplified in the comparative toleration shown to the bold speculations of Abelard, at the beginning of the twelfth century, and to the widely spread Averroism of the latter part of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries, the repressive action of orthodoxy became still more stringent, while it was less tender and less scrupulous in the methods by which it pursued its ends.

But, before I quit this topic of the repressive influence of ecclesiasticism, there is another mode in which it was exercised, which it is at least as important to notice as the ever-increasing rigidity of the determinations of the doctors of the Church. With the accession of Constantine, in the early part

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of the fourth century, began, for good or for evil, the history of the Church as a State establishment. Thus, while Fathers and Councils were engaged in multiplying dogmas, in formulating more and more stringent definitions of theological expressions, and in extending the range of possible heresy, the State joined its forces with the Church; and, as for the heretic there were added civil disabilities and material penalties to spiritual anathemas, so the orthodox professor was encouraged in his path by material rewards and the countenance of the sovereign and his ministers. It would be beside my purpose to enter on a discussion of the merits or demerits of Church establishments, much more on the course of their history; but there can be no doubt, I take it, that they have been largely instrumental, wherever they have obtained, in producing uniformity of opinion, or, at least, in diminishing the extent of divergency, which there might otherwise have been. The ambitious young ecclesiastic, and for a long time, throughout Christendom, learning and speculation were almost confined to ecclesiastics, would hardly be likely to encourage in himself a spirit of inquiry, which, even if it did not lead to disgrace, would certainly bar him from preferment. And when by the outspoken boldness, not to say the excesses, of the Albigenses, the Lollards, and similar sects, the spirit of persecution, culminating in the reign of terror inaugurated by the Inquisition, had been thoroughly aroused, there were added to these milder deterrents the terrors of the prison, the fagot, and the stake, arguments which appealed to all classes of society alike, and which few would be brave enough to contravene. It is true that men might still think as they liked (for thought, as Hobbes says, is free); but there are few men who are sufficiently reticent and unimpassioned to systematically conceal what they conceive to be important conclusions on vital questions; and, undoubtedly, the safest plan was to avoid the initial step and not to think at all. In this repressive influence of ecclesiasticism the Reformation, in those countries where Protestantism became the established religion, made little difference. The doctrines, it is true, were changed, and private judgment was recognized

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within certain limits; but the spirit of intolerance and repression still remained, and for the old standard of orthodoxy there was only substituted a new one, fenced round by the same sanctions,—favor, reputation, preferment to those who respected it,—neglect, contumely, bonds and imprisonment, perhaps even death, to those who had the temerity to disregard it. In our own times, the increased mildness of manners and a more humane and tolerant spirit have asserted themselves in this as in other respects, but even still it is only at a grave risk to his prospects, his reputation, and his social position that a man (unless he be of marked eminence) can venture to maintain any opinion widely diverging from the sentiments of society at large, or of the particular profession to which he belongs, or of the particular circle in which he moves. Orthodoxy, and that not in ecclesiastical matters only, still holds in her hands rewards and punishments which are sufficient to deter the wary, the timid, and the ambitious from venturing too far, on their own account, in the independent search for truth.

The prudential avoidance of thinking for themselves, or of anything which may stimulate so dangerous a habit, is far more common than men who move only in intellectual circles commonly suppose. I recollect an old clergyman, who once, when he was asked if he had read some recent theological work of a suspicious character, replied, "No! I never read books of that kind. I am afraid, if I do, that they may make me think." And what this old clergyman naïvely confessed is probably a maxim on which many men consciously or unconsciously act, who would shrink from risking their reputation for independence and enlightenment by so candidly owning up to it.

Perhaps I have dwelt too long on these considerations; but as I believe that the main obstacle to free inquiry and to that simple and unchecked love of truth which, as I have said, was more common in the ancient world than the modern, has been ecclesiastial repression exercised in the interests of orthodoxy, —that is to say, of the received opinions of the clergy, often enforced by social penalties and the strong arm of the civil

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power,—I have thought it desirable to make it clear that I do not attribute these evil effects to the pure and spiritual religion which was taught by the divine founder of Christianity and his earlier followers, but to the rigid and often intolerant ecclesiasticism which was the natural outcome of that pharisaical spirit that, in process of time, came to be the canker of the Christian Church as it had previously been of the Jewish.

There are, of course, other causes of this anomaly, or, as it might be called, this regressive step in the history of morality. One is, no doubt, to be found in the mental characteristics which distinguished some of the races of antiquity, notably the Greeks, the Romans, so far as they were tinged with Greek culture, and the Hindoos, from the races of modern Europe. Speaking of the Greek race, Bacon, not intending the remark to be complimentary, says, "Erat autem sapientia Græcorum professoria, et in disputationes effusa." * But we may take the liberty to paraphrase this dictum in a favorable sense, and then it might stand thus: "The Greeks were a reflective race. They tried to fathom the meaning and causes of things, and to get at the truth independently, each for himself. As a necessary consequence, when they came to compare their conclusions, they fell into discussion and disputation." But this spirit of inquiry and independence of thought are no more to be detected in all ancient races than their absence is an equal characteristic of all modern races. In Jewish literature, for instance, the reflective element, except so far as it is directed to ethical and practical questions, is almost totally absent. That literature abounds in prudential maxims, in heroic examples, in lofty flights of poetry, in a deep religious spirit, in what may truly be called an inspiration of divine love, but of the independent spirit of inquiry into the nature and causes of things, of speculation, of philosophy, in the true sense of the term, it bears hardly a trace. And we Britons, too, like the Jews, are pre-eminently a practical people. We have, indeed, produced four philosophers of the first rank, Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, besides many others who

* Nov. Org., Bk. I., Aph. 71.

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occupy no mean niches in the temple of thought. But, taken man for man, the average Englishman is probably less given to speculation and free inquiry than the average Frenchman or German on the same level of education.

Now, this practical characteristic of our own countrymen in particular, and of modern society in general, brings me to what I conceive to be a third cause of the lack of speculative interest, and of what Locke called "bottoming" things, in modern as compared with ancient times. This is our pre-occupation with practical interests. There, perhaps, never was a time or a country in which the cares of this world and the deceitfulness of riches were more effective in choking the intellectual and spiritual life than here and now. The life of the ancients, till luxury invaded the Roman empire, was comparatively simple. Except in barbarous countries, there seem to have been no monster fortunes; the occupations were mainly agricultural, and the complex business transactions of modern times appear to have been almost unknown. The political interest, indeed, specially among the citizens of the Greek city states, was undoubtedly intense and constant, but I doubt whether, on the average, the *business* of politics absorbed so much time and attention as in any modern free state. And, similarly, though the organization of amusement was a special characteristic of Greek and Roman life, it can hardly have occupied so much time and thought as in the England of to-day. Thus the Greek or Roman, and still more, probably, the Oriental, who really cared for the things of the mind, could, at least, secure the *leisure* for study and reflection, and for interchanging ideas with those of like tastes with himself. But when one contemplates the mode of life in the England of to-day, with its incessant correspondence, its frequent meetings, its absorbing political or business interests, its social distractions, its feverish love of amusement, one wonders how any one, engaged in the rush and whirl of life, can find time for any serious thoughts, much more realize it as part of his duty to himself to attempt to fathom the purpose of his being and to struggle towards a knowledge of the truth.

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One reason more for this lack of speculative interest and of any earnest desire to get at the truth in important issues, which seems to be one of the notes of modern society, and then I will pass on to other topics. We read a great deal, in fact, we probably read too much, but how far is this reading calculated to result in wisdom, in the better conduct of our lives, in the truer appreciation of ourselves, or of our relations to society, to nature, or to God? It may safely be said that of the adult reading in this country the greater part is undertaken merely for the sake of amusement, or to while away time, or from the love of gossip, or to satisfy a morbid curiosity. And the reading of the young, though of a more serious and informing character, is so completely dominated by the prevalent examination system and by the desire to win distinctions or posts of profit that, though it may fill the memory with a number of facts and even theories, it has little effect in stimulating thought, or in exciting intellectual ambition, or in inspiring the mind with any genuine love of knowledge or of truth. And yet it is the love of knowledge and of truth, for their own sake, that constitutes the crown and perfection of our intellectual nature, without which man is but a mutilated being, and with which he already participates in one of the highest attributes of divinity. If I may slightly deflect them from their original application to art, I would conclude this part of my subject in the noble words of Ruskin: "It is, indeed, marvellous to see what power and universality there is in this single principle," of the love of truth, "and how in the consulting or forgetting of it lies half the dignity or decline of every art and act of man." *

Another virtue connected with the conduct of the intellect is intellectual honesty. This may, indeed, seem to be implied in the love of truth, or rather to be a condition of its effective exercise. If we would get at the truth on any question, we must examine that question on all sides, we must seek for evidence from every quarter, we must specially attend to any

* Ruskin's "Seven Lamps of Architecture," Lamp of Truth, first edition, p. 30.

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considerations which seem to make against our own bias, or our interest, or our preconceived opinions. It is just this disposition which distinguishes the love of truth for its own sake from that apologetic attitude which simply looks out for reasons to support the side which it has already embraced or which it wishes to be true. And we should take special care that this intellectual honesty be extended to the views or reasons of opponents, or to new discoveries, or to any new considerations which may have been brought forward since we formed or stated our own theories. This is often, indeed, a hard task, a lesson which is far more easily preached than practised. Our theories seem so rounded and complete, and we have applied them, with such apparent success, to the solution of practical problems or speculative difficulties, and, perhaps, we have so often committed ourselves to them in print or taught them to others, that we feel instinctively that we cannot surrender them without a struggle, and so we begin to qualify and restate them and support ourselves by authority, and look out for subtle and recondite arguments. But, when it has come to this pass, surely there is an opportunity for reconsideration and for the action of a candid and open mind; and intellectual honesty requires that, if need be, we should sacrifice our consistency and our favorite dogmas on the altar of truth.

Closely allied with intellectual honesty is the virtue of intellectual tolerance. And it is a virtue equally difficult to practise. When, after a prolonged investigation and serious reflection, we have convinced ourselves of the truth or falsity of some fact or theory, it is very hard to believe that some one else, taking the opposite or a different view, is not deficient in intellectual power, or has not been guilty of indolence or carelessness or partiality; or, peradventure, that his judgment has not been warped by some moral obliquity. And these wounded susceptibilities of the author or thinker are too often apt to develop into feelings of personal hostility or even of settled enmity. But, surely, there are few of our opponents to whom, on a charitable construction of their words and motives, we might not give, at least, the credit of

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honest intentions and of some amount of conscientious work; and, usually, any investigation or speculation conducted by a fairly competent writer contains some point of view or some argument or instance which is worthy of our consideration, and may lead to some modification or restatement of our own position; and, even if it is not attended by this positive result, its very errors and their causes may themselves be a source of instruction. Nor, it must be recollected, have we any guarantee of our own infallibility, or, except in some very few branches of knowledge, of the fulness of our information or the accuracy of our reasoning. History, science, and philosophy teem with instances of theories or statements once held, even by the most accepted authorities, with the most firm and unquestioning confidence, which are now regarded simply as curious instances of mistaken reasoning or the aberrations of the human intellect. Lessons, verily, written for our admonition as to the necessity for modesty in holding and stating our own opinions, and for tolerance and consideration in estimating the opinions of others.

Hitherto I have spoken of the Love of Truth and its kindred virtues so far only as they affect our own investigations and the formation of our own opinions. But suppose that, after due investigation, we have arrived at opinions on important subjects which materially differ from those ordinarily held by our neighbors and fellow-countrymen, how far are we required to communicate them to others, or even justified in doing so? It is plain that this question affects not so much history, linguistic, and the mathematical and natural sciences, as philosophy, theology, biblical criticism, and practical ethics. And, as applied to these latter subjects, it by no means admits of a simple or general answer. Perhaps the only rule, regardless of special circumstances, that can be laid down is that we have no moral right spontaneously to represent our opinions as other than they are. That would be a direct breach of veracity, without any justification. But, on the other hand, we are not bound to obtrude our opinions on others, nor, unless we thought it were for their benefit, should we be justified in doing so. To discuss freely the ultimate

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grounds of morality, the ultimate problems of cosmology, the fundamental difficulties of theology, or the composition and authority of our Sacred Books, with persons on a lower level of education, who had been accustomed to accept authority as their guide in all these matters, might, and, so far as they lent a favorable ear, probably would, simply result either in producing an unintelligent and undiscriminating scepticism or in upsetting those convictions which were indissolubly associated with the proper conduct of their lives. It is usually better to leave more philosophical theories and increased knowledge on matters of this kind to filter gradually from the upper to the lower levels of intellectual competence. But in determining questions of this kind, all must depend on special circumstances and on considerations of degree. In answer to a direct question as to our opinion on such subjects, supposing all along that our conclusions are opposed to or transcend those which are ordinarily accepted, we should properly, and I think also naturally, be guided by the character, mental cultivation, and apparent object of the questioner. If the questioner were a man of sufficient intelligence to enter into the difficulties of the subject, and the question were a *bona fide* one, asked simply for the purpose of information, without any ulterior object, and the respondent was not in a position which rendered it imprudent to give his confidence, it would be timid and churlish to withhold a candid answer. But if these conditions were not fulfilled, it ought to be perfectly open to remain silent or to decline to give an answer, or to give an evasive answer, or to turn the conversation. Passing, however, from these casuistical questions, I ought not to quit this subject without expressing my reverence and admiration for those exceptional men who are intrepid enough not only to attempt to penetrate to the core of truth for themselves, but boldly, in their addresses or their writings, to proclaim their conclusions to all who are capable of receiving them. To omit names too sacred to mention in this connection, Confucius, Buddha, Socrates, Plato, Wicliffe, Luther, the two Bacons, Spinoza, Locke, Wesley, Kant, Darwin, whom I select quite as much on account of their differences as their

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resemblances, and others like unto them, ensamples both of wisdom and of courage, have been the very salt of humanity.

I now proceed to the second division of my subject, which I must necessarily discuss much more briefly than that which has just been treated. The Ethics of Intellectual Work have, to a certain extent, been anticipated in my review of the Ethics of Intellectual Life. When a man, by the habitual exercise of his intellectual powers, and specially that of reflection, has arrived at what he conceives to be true conclusions on the more serious and important subjects of human interest, which I have distinguished as the sphere of Intellectual Life (for such a life is a continuous habit of mind, in which the thoughtful man lives, and moves, and has his being), he naturally proceeds to the attempt to co-ordinate and affiliate these truths for his own satisfaction, and, if he desires to communicate them to the world, to explain and enforce them for the instruction and guidance of others. These last two processes, which are intermittent, I have distinguished from the continuous habit of Intellectual Life by the term Intellectual Work.

Now, Intellectual Work, by which I may say that I have mainly in mind work which results in publication, ought to be thorough, honest, clear, and regardful of the rights of others.

First, it ought to be thorough. A man, who ventures to claim the attention of the public, ought to put his whole strength into the work, and to give of his best. All available sources of information on the subject ought to have been studied. All sides of the question ought to have been taken into consideration, and an impartial judgment pronounced upon them. Authorities for facts should, so far as possible, have been studied at first hand, and, wherever the issue is of sufficient importance, precise references given to them. References from other authors, it need hardly be said, should never be adopted without due verification. All exaggeration and superfluous rhetoric should be studiously excluded, while equal care should be taken not to minimize the importance of arguments or facts which may be adduced on the other side

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to that which we see reason to adopt. The meaning of every paragraph should be carefully weighed, so as not to baffle or confuse the reader, and, if we detect inconsistencies in our work, we ought not to grudge the labor of deciding definitely between them, and bringing the passages into harmony; or, if the inconsistencies be only apparent, we ought to recast the passages, and leave no doubt as to our real meaning. An author has no business to obtrude himself upon the public in undress, and, when he chooses to publish a book, he has no valid excuse for laziness, either in thought, investigation, or composition. He could, at least, delay publication till he has made up his own mind, sifted all the means of information open to him, and learnt to express himself in clear and unambiguous language.

The second condition which we may rightly impose upon intellectual work is that it be honest. Now, work is dishonest when an author attempts to conceal ignorance or imperfect information, or to slur over difficulties, which, if he has not the knowledge, or industry, or ability to resolve for himself, he might, at least, have the candor to acknowledge as to him insoluble, or as, in his opinion, not worth the trouble of solving. The suppression of adverse or inconvenient facts, and the omission to notice an opponent's arguments, and even the concealment of adverse arguments which have occurred to himself, are also, of course, cases of literary dishonesty. And under the head of dishonesty may also fairly be included the trick which some writers have of leaving it doubtful whether they are writing seriously or ironically. Hume is specially provoking in this respect, much as the charm of his style disposes us to condone the fault, and he has probably been open to much misunderstanding in consequence. Plain men may surely plead that, in addition to the intrinsic difficulties of the subject, they should not be left in doubt whether their author is treating them seriously or not, and that consequently, as they follow the line of argument, they should have a double problem to solve. Of Locke, on the other hand, one of the great attractions and great excellences is that he takes his reader completely into confidence; that there can never be any

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doubt of his candor, and that, when he comes abreast of a difficulty, he makes no effort to conceal or extenuate it, but honestly sets to work to state and discuss it.

Clearness of style and unambiguity of language are among the most essential requisites of intellectual, and specially of philosophical work. And yet there is no class of writers by whom these requisites are more neglected than by the authors of many of the philosophical treatises now in vogue, standing thereby, at least as respects want of clearness, in marked contrast to their Greek predecessors. The ambiguity of language is, I fear, to some extent, unavoidable, partly from our philosophical terminology having been almost entirely derived from foreign tongues, and more or less deflected in its meaning by the transition, as well as from having been used in various senses by those who first appropriated it, and partly from the fact, so often noticed, that most of the terms expressive of mental acts and affections, or of metaphysical conceptions, have been borrowed from the material world or our own physical organization. One or other of these causes, or both of them, are illustrated in such words as Sense, Intuition, Reason, Idea, Form, Matter, Substance, Essence, Person, and many others which will readily occur to you. The only remedy for this defect seems to be to state at the beginning of a treatise the meaning or meanings which will be attached to such terms; but even then it is difficult to avoid unwarily slipping into some other use of them. But if it is difficult, or almost impossible, to avoid altogether the ambiguous use of philosophical terms, one would think that we might at least succeed in attaining clearness of expression and ease of style. And these defects of lack of clearness and clumsiness of expression, one would suppose, might be the more easily remedied, as, in English philosophical literature, they are only faults of yesterday. How is it that we read with such delight the works of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Berkeley, and Hume, and that we wade with such difficulty and such anguish of spirit through the clumsy periods, the obscure enigmas, the forced epigrams, and the intolerable and often almost unintelligible jargon of so many recent philosophical writers? Is it that obscurity of

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diction covers confusion of thought? or is it that the ideas do not easily lend themselves to the English language? In this, as in other departments of literature, the increased study of German works, however stimulating it may have been to thought, research, and criticism, has not been happy in its influence on style. The popularity of Carlyle, of course, has worked in the same direction; and for much of the slovenly writing and slipshod English of the day, in this as in other departments of literature, we are, no doubt, largely indebted to the increased and increasing voracity for second- and third-rate novels. There is, however, really no excuse for the defects to which I am drawing attention. If a man writes a book, no matter what the subject, surely it is his duty to his readers to endeavor to present his thoughts, his researches, or his narrative in a clear, intelligible, and agreeable form, and not to inflict on them such weariness of the eye and the brain as it is now so often our unfortunate lot to suffer.

There remains for consideration one more topic, regard in our intellectual work for the rights of others. It is clearly wrong for one man to appropriate to his own credit the thoughts, words, or discoveries of another. And on this point literary morality in recent times is strict. But in ancient times, as Dr. Sanday has well said in his Bampton Lectures, the idea of literary property did not exist. The object of the author was edification, information, or amusement, and it seemed lawful to make use of any material, whether his own or that of another, which contributed to these ends. We most of us know how large a portion of the speculations of Aristotle are also to be found in Plato, but I do not recollect a single instance in which he expressly acknowledges the debt, and even the references to Plato by name in Aristotle's works are not very numerous. Plato, no doubt, was similarly indebted to some of his predecessors. All along the stream of philosophy, both Greek and Roman, we find the same habit of borrowing from predecessors, without any specification of the source. In other subjects it was the same. Works on mathematics and science, though they appeared under some individual name, generally incorporated

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the results of previous teachers or writers. This was also the case with collections of fables. History, both Oriental and classical, was often a mosaic almost entirely constructed out of the works of chroniclers or previous historians. And this habit, though somewhat modified, survived throughout the Middle Ages, and indeed long after the introduction of printing. In fact, it was not till the general introduction of the marginal or foot-note that proper acknowledgment of authorities, according to our present requirements, could conveniently be made. But, accepting the modern, or, rather, recent standard on this matter, as at once more just to authors and more conducive to the interests of literature and of historical accuracy, it may be worth while briefly to consider a few points connected with its practical application. Flagrant violations of the rule, such as the appropriation of a considerable portion of a book, with or without acknowledgment, or abridgments or translations, which may seriously interfere with the sale of the original work, are, for a considerable time after the publication of the original, subject to the law of copyright, and need not, therefore, detain us. It is from the ethical and literary, and not from the legal point of view that the question interests us. Now, from this standpoint, it appears to me that an author may legitimately make use of the labors of his predecessors, providing that he sufficiently acknowledges his obligations, and that he sees no reasonable prospect of his work interfering with the sale of the works which he lays under contribution. How far such a method may interfere with his originality is a question for him to decide in view of his own literary reputation. It must be remembered, however, that, in the present state of knowledge, there is, on most subjects, a vast mass of common material from which all authors alike have a right to draw, and that no one author, because he has been the first to make use of some portion of this material, has a right to claim an exclusive property in it, or to warn others off the ground. And, again, the objects of two authors writing on the same subject may be widely different, as is well illustrated in the controversy respecting Forster's Life of Goldsmith,

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where Prior's biography, the first in the field, had been a mere bald collection of facts and anecdotes, written in a dead and dreary style, without any reference to their historical and literary settings, while Forster's aim was to present a living portrait of his hero, and the result * a work of real literary merit, deserving to rank as an English classic. Usually, such matters adjust themselves with tolerable satisfaction to both sides, the one author feeling it his duty to acknowledge any opinion or information with which he was not previously acquainted and which he was not likely to have discovered for himself from any other source, and the other being contented with such acknowledgment and the favorable notice into which his book has been brought.

The right of priority to scientific, historical, or literary discoveries is often a matter of keen dispute. Such questions can only be settled by evidence, and, considering how often it has turned out that such discoveries were independent of one another and almost simultaneous, it would be well if these discussions could be conducted in a more friendly spirit, and with more disposition to look to the gain which has accrued to knowledge than to the personal reputation of the several claimants.

The question of appropriating the credit due to the labors of other men is not the only one which falls under the head of regard to the rights of others. Unfair criticism, garbled quotations, references to the works of an author which he is known to have repudiated as if he were still responsible for them, ill-natured sarcasm, exaggerated denunciation of small mistakes, personal allusions which are calculated to give pain, —these, to which others might easily be added, are instances of the temptations by which an author may be led to abuse his opportunities, and which, there can be no doubt, it is his duty to shun.

T. Fowler.

Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

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* See preface to the second edition of Forster's Life of Goldsmith, 1854, entitled "Life and Times of Oliver Goldsmith."

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THE TEACHINGS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE.

THE teachings of Friedrich Nietzsche appear, at first sight, so bizarre, so absurd, so blasphemous, that one is tempted to set them aside as simply unworthy of serious consideration. And if the matter is repellent, the manner in which it is presented is hardly less so. Nietzsche's style is uncouth and noisy, and wantonly paradoxical. There is, moreover, throughout, a scorn of consistency and contempt for argument worthy of Emerson, and a megalomaniacal conceit that outdoes Walt Whitman,—who is, by the way, a curious pendant and counterpart to Nietzsche. How is it possible to account for the vogue of such a writer? For Nietzsche has not only been welcomed as a prophet by the unthinking and uncritical crowd who are apt to mistake glitter for gold, and by the half-cultured youth, the pride of enlightenment, who feel a subtle pleasure in being shocked, and by the life weary decadents for whom a touch of the devilish is the one thing that can still give some zest to life. He has also been taken up in academic circles, particularly in Germany, and special courses have been devoted, in all seriousness, to the consideration of his views. And, what is still more surprising, a scholar * connected with the University of Glasgow, thinks it worth while to bring out in an English translation a complete edition of his works, eleven volumes long.

The reception which Nietzsche's works are being accorded shows that he is far from standing alone; that the feeling of discontent with all present moral standards, which he has made articulate, is shared by many of his contemporaries. They believe, with him, that what modern science demands is nothing short of a complete revolution in the realm of ethics. The doctrine which he proclaims stands in sharpest contrast,

* Dr. Alexander Tille. Three volumes have already appeared: "The Case of Wagner," including also "Nietzsche contra Wagner" and "The Antichrist;" "Thus Spake Zarathustra;" and "A Genealogy of Morals." The Macmillan Company, London and New York, 1898.

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in most violent opposition, to the notions which almost universally obtain about morality; its reception proves its significance. And, however shallow we may consider his creed, however revolting his irreligious religion, we shall find that they both spring from certain very wide-spread tendencies and favorite theories of this dying century, whose natural, whose logical, whose "all too logical" fruit they are. In the present paper I propose to set forth, as far as possible in his own phrases,* the evangel, or, if you prefer, the "dysangel," according to Nietzsche. I shall then suggest a few considerations in regard to its value and limitations, and the significance of its appearance at the present time.

I.

Nietzsche is not primarily a philosopher, not a scientist, but, rather, a poet, a poet with the mission to preach a new philosophy which shall be, as no other philosophy is, or ever has been, in accordance with science and reality. But this new philosophy is also a religion, and Nietzsche is its prophet. And the work in which it finds its proper and harmonious expression is the most unique of all Nietzsche's works, his "Thus Spake Zarathustra," a book which his admirers consider a great literary masterpiece. It is compared by Dr. Tille to "The Pilgrim's Progress" and to "Piers Ploughman." Zarathustra lives apart, with no companions save an eagle and a serpent, symbolic of pride and wisdom. He has no relations, no human ties, save those of friendship which bind him to his disciples, and these are not very close. He is the embodiment of the true ideal, the type of the man that is to be. As such he speaks with authority; he condemns what is bad—and everything modern is bad—in bitter and scornful and telling invective. In paradox and parable he proclaims the ideal from his vantage-ground, and condescends neither to give reasons nor to consider possible objec-

* That is, of course, in translation. The description of Nietzsche's ethical doctrines here given is mainly taken from the three volumes referred to. The references are to the English edition. In a few cases I have made slight changes in the translation.

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tions. Nietzsche, in fact, treats the public throughout with pity and contempt. He considers himself to be an "inopportune philosopher;" he is born ahead of his time, or, as he expresses it, he is one of those happy unfortunates who are doomed to a "posthumous birth."

Most prominent among his teachers were Wagner and Schopenhauer. What seems to have drawn him most strongly to these men, however, was their character as *révoltés*, even more than their philosophy, their titanic insolence, their contempt for convention and public opinion. But in Schopenhauer's pessimism he sees a survival of Christian morality, and in Wagner's doctrine of salvation a reappearance of the romanticism in which that morality bore its æsthetic fruits. They are both of them consequently hostile to life, both anti-natural. Nietzsche worships nature,—not, indeed, in a Rousseaulian sense. Rousseau, he tells us, marks the "return to nature *in impuris naturalibus*." *

For nature is not, as Rousseau supposed, sentimental. Nor yet is it hostile to life. It is only hostile to the weak among the living. And we can here at once seize the essential thought of Nietzsche's creed. The strong, the able, are to be pitilessly triumphant. Thus nature wills. "Our softening of manners," he writes, "is a consequence of *décadence;* severity, frightfulness of manners, may inversely be a consequence of superabundant life. . . . Vigorous eras, noble civilizations, see something contemptible in sympathy, in 'brotherly love,' in the lack of self-assertion and self-reliance. Eras are to be measured by their *positive powers;* the period of the Renaissance accordingly, so profuse and fateful, presents itself as the last *great* period; and we modern men, with our anxious self-nursing and brotherly love, with our virtues of labor, unpretentiousness, fair play, and scientific spirit—accumulating, economic, mechanical—we represent a *weak* period." † The cry for "equal rights" is another mark of decadence; "the gap between man and man, ... the multiplicity of types, the will to assert itself, to stand out in con-

* "Nietzsche contra Wagner," p. 161. † Ibid., pp. 196, 197.

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trast, that which I call the *pathos of distance*, belongs to every vigorous period." *

Nietzsche, in one word, knows no real save the world of nature, that is, the world which appears to the senses. Science is, or should be, merely the interpreter of that nature. Ethics and religion can then for the modern man mean no more than the discovery of, and possibly the glory in, the doom which nature is preparing for man, as also for all animals. But there is one striking defect in the writings of all scientists who touch upon practical problems, and its taint extends to the works of almost all men of letters. (Goethe and Emerson seem to be, in fact, for Nietzsche about the only exceptions.) This defect is the want of proper scepticism, of due critique, of our present human ideals. The consequence of this defect is that in all these writers we find science pointing in one direction, and sentiment, prejudice—in the guise of human ideals, which are supposed to be beyond the reach of criticism—continually dragging us in an opposite direction. In literature this shows itself in Carlyle, who is "an English atheist, who aspires to honor for *not* being one, ... who is continually irritated by the longing for a strong belief *and* the feeling of incapacity for it." †

So it is with the Romanticists generally. So it was with George Eliot, who, having "got rid of the Christian God," thought herself "obliged to cling firmer than ever to Christian morality." In this respect she was representative of her race, for "in England, for every little emancipation from divinity, people have to re-acquire respectability by becoming moral fanatics in an awe-inspiring manner." ‡

In political writers this same defect appears in all advocates of socialism, anarchism, or democracy,—three equivalent terms with Nietzsche. They are all, either from revenge or sentimentality, preachers of equality. But in very truth men are not, nor ever shall be, equal.

Most undisguisedly, however, does this fault appear in those

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* "Nietzsche contra Wagner," pp. 196, 197. † Ibid., p. 172.
‡ Ibid., p. 164.

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scientists who assert that there is an ineradicable divergency between the principles of development which apply to animal nature generally, and the principles of social progress which are to be found in our modern ethical ideals. The former make for the triumph of the physiologically strong, and the elimination of the physiologically weak; the latter for the repression, if not the elimination, of the physiologically strongest—and even their repression would mean their elimination in the long run—in the interest of the more numerous weak.

Now the reason why we apply these two different standards is that we persistently pit "the heart" against "the head," that we insist stubbornly that things shall be as we desire them to be. The part of the scientist and philosopher should be, on the contrary, to begin by explaining "the heart," by calling in question the validity of those ideals which we apply naïvely in our practical judgments. The principles which operate in natural evolution have resulted in the higher animal. Why should not the same principles in social evolution produce the higher man?

Nietzsche calls in question our human ideals as embodied in our ordinary morality, as expressed in Christian civilization, and that with an almost terrifying fearlessness, which marks him as the faithful follower of that great line of German free-thinkers which leads from Strauss and Feuerbach onwards. What is perhaps his most important philosophic work—his "Genealogy of Morals"—is an attempt to account for the origin of our present moral values. His conclusion is briefly this: they are the result of a revolt headed by the priestly class, that is, by the physically impotent. It was their act of sublime revenge. The question, you see, is as to the origin of our concept "good;" and the answer commonly found in the writings of the English moralists is: "Unselfish actions were originally praised and denominated 'good' by those to whom they were manifested, *i.e.*, those to whom they were *useful;* afterwards, this origin of praise was *forgotten*, and unselfish actions, since they were always *accustomed* to be praised as good, were as a matter of course also felt as such,—as if, in

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themselves, they were something good. We see at once that this first derivation contains all the typical traits of English psychological idiosyncrasy,—we have 'utility,' 'forgetting,' 'custom,' and, last of all, 'error.'" The origin is, however, entirely different. "The 'good,' *i.e.*, the noble, the powerful, the higher situated, the high-minded, felt and regarded themselves and their acting as of first rank, in contradistinction to everything low, low-minded, mean and vulgar. Out of this *pathos of distance* they took for themselves the right of creating values, of coining names for these values. What had they to do with utility! In the case of such a spontaneous manifestation and ardent ebullition of highest rank-regarding and rank-differentiating valuations, the point of view of utility is as distant and out of place as possible; for in such things the feelings have arrived at a point diametrically opposite to that low degree of heat which is presupposed by every kind of arithmetical prudence, every utilitarian calculation. . . . The pathos of nobility and distance, . . . the lasting and dominating, the integral and fundamental feeling of a higher dominating kind of man in contradistinction to a lower kind, to a 'below'—*such* is the origin of the antithesis 'good' and 'bad.'" *

It was etymological considerations which first put Nietzsche on this track, and he attempts to prove etymologically that "good" and "bad," "pure" and "impure," were at first caste distinctions. But with the ever widening separation of the priestly and warrior classes a change is wrought in priestly valuations. For the habits which prevail in priestly aristocracies "are averse to action, partly given to brooding, partly indulging in explosions of the feelings, and are almost inevitably followed by that intestinal morbidity and neurasthenia occurring . . . . in the priests of every age." † To remedy the peculiar diseases, consequent upon their way of life, they found certain specifics,—such as "abstention from meat," "fasting," "sexual abstinence," "the flight into the desert," and a "metaphysics inimical to the senses, sloth begetting,

* "Genealogy of Morals," pp. 19, 20. † Ibid., p. 28.

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. . ." (The poverty, chastity, and obedience of the Catholic orders are of the same sort.) The longing for the *unio mystica* with God, or for Nirvana, was the natural outcome. This is, in brief, the history of priestly decadence. Meantime the chivalric-aristocratic morality of the warrior class remains. The conflict between these two ideals was inevitable. In that conflict, the priestly code is triumphant,—not because of the greater strength of the priests, but because of their very impotence. They have "always been the greatest haters in history."

"That priestly people, the Jews, finally succeeded in procuring satisfaction for itself from its enemies and conquerors only by a transvaluation of their values. . . . It was the Jews who, with most frightfully consistent logic, dared to subvert the aristocratic equation of values (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God), and who, with the teeth of the profoundest hatred (the hatred of impotency), clung to their own valuation: The wretched alone are the good; the poor, the impotent, the lowly alone are the good; only the sufferers, the sick, the needy, the ugly are pious; only they are godly; them alone blessedness awaits; but, ye, ye, the proud and potent, ye are for aye and evermore the wicked, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless; ye will also be, to all eternity, the unblessed, the cursed, and the damned. . . . With the Jews the slave-revolt in morality began,—and it has been victorious." *

We are, in consequence of this victory, now suffering from universal decadence. Its characteristic is a certain life-weariness. Our civilization is the reverse of the realist civilization of early Greece. The Hellenes lived in the midst of danger, and had to be strong. With their "magnificently supple physique," their "daring realism," their "immoralism," they gloried in beauty, strength, life. They were natural. They "desired naught else but to feel themselves *dominant*, to *show* themselves dominant with their festivals and arts." Thucydides was "the great sum, the last revelation of that strong, stern, hard matter-of-factness which was instinctive in the older Hellenes. *Courage* in the presence of reality distinguishes in the end such natures as Thucydides from Plato. Plato is a *coward* in the presence of reality, *consequently* he takes refuge in the ideal; Thucydides is master of *himself*, consequently he maintains power also over things." † In fact,

* "Genealogy of Morals," pp. 30, 31.

† "Nietzsche contra Wagner," pp. 222, 223 *et passim.*

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this decadence set in with Socrates and Plato. In the fall of Rome and final ascendency of Christianity it became triumphant.

When "life *ascends* happiness is identical with instinct." The formula of a declining civilization is "to have to combat the instincts." * That which is regarded as the chief virtue at such times is sympathy, and naturally enough, for it is "a principal tool for the advancement of decadence. Sympathy persuades to nothingness, called, however, 'the other world,' 'God,' 'the true life,' 'Nirvana,' 'salvation,' 'blessedness.'" It is the multiplier and the conserver of misery. "Sympathy stands in antithesis to the tonic passions which elevate the energy of the feeling of life: it operates depressively. One loses force by sympathizing. The loss of force which suffering has already brought upon life is still further increased and multiplied by sympathy. Suffering itself becomes contagious through sympathy." But the worst of it all is that "sympathy thwarts, on the whole, in general, the law of development, which is the law of *selection*. It preserves what is ripe for extinction, it resists in favor of life's disinherited and condemned ones. It gives to life itself a gloomy and questionable aspect by the abundance of the ill-constituted of all kinds whom it *maintains* in life." †

Altruistic morality "which causes selfishness to languish is a bad sign. To choose instinctively what is *self*-injurious, to be allured by 'disinterested' motives, furnishes almost the formula for decadence. 'Not to seek one's own advantage,' that is merely the moral fig-leaf for quite a different thing,—for the physiological fact, 'one does not know any longer how to *find* one's own advantage.'" ‡

It would be a great mistake to suppose that Nietzsche is simply trying to read the facts in a way that would justify a course of self-indulgence. No, Nietzsche is a Stoic in morals. He feels himself "under deeper obligation to his hardest years than to any other." "It is great affliction that is the

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* "Nietzsche contra Wagner," p. 113. † Ibid., pp. 241-243.
‡ Ibid., p. 191.

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ultimate emancipator of the mind." It "compels us to descend into our ultimate depth and divest ourselves of all trust, all good nature, glossing, gentleness, and averageness, where we have, perhaps, formerly installed our humanity." One learns in affliction to question life and its ideals more profoundly. One emerges merrier, and with a new and more refined taste for pleasure. But one feels henceforth the full repugnance "of gratification, coarse, dull, drab-colored gratification, as usually understood by those who enjoy life—our 'educated' class, our rich and ruling class." * The ideal man is, of course, very far from being an ascetic; he is not ashamed of his natural sensuous instincts, but he is strong enough to rule them, not in obedience to duty, to a higher law, but simply in the interest of life and power. He believes in war, for he has "spiritualized hostility." He knows that a man is of no value who has not plenty of enemies. "People are *productive* only at the cost of having abundant opposition; they only remain *young* provided the soul does not relax, does not long after peace." Nothing is more alien to him than "the desirability of former times, that of 'peace of soul,' Christian desirability." Nothing makes him less envious than "the moral cow and the plump comfortableness of a good conscience. One has renounced *grand* life when one has renounced war." †

With all his denunciation of our civilization, Nietzsche is, however, by no means the complaining pessimist, the merely negative critic, for he believes in an inevitable future recognition of the true life values. "Life itself," he says, "I regard as instinct for growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces, for *power*. Where the will to power is wanting there is decline. My assertion is that this will *is lacking* in all the highest values of mankind,—that values of decline, *Nihilistic* values, bear rule under holiest names." ‡

Yet the occasional appearance of a Cæsar, a Napoleon, gives ground for hope. The "will to power" is strong in us all, and it will finally make itself felt. For the rest, in Russia

* "Nietzsche contra Wagner," pp. 87 ff. † Ibid., pp. 126, 127. ‡ Ibid., p. 241.

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lies our hope in the future,—Russia, the only state that has not yet succumbed to decadent ideals. The plain fact is, some men are born drudges and serfs. They are made neither better nor happier by their emancipation. They are the socially sick, and would find their wretchedness in every condition of life. By a misguided education, however, they would merely be misled into the belief that they were capable of governing. This would simply retard true progress. They are there, these weaklings, to be used up by the strong; and the harshness of this saying Nietzsche only tempers by adding that the strong will not hesitate to use themselves up either. They will count even their own lives cheap when they can be spent in the cause of the greater man that is to be.

For Nietzsche's positive creed is summed up in one word, *Uebermensch*,—beyond-man. The worship of, *i.e.*, the enthusiasm for beyond-man, for Zarathustra, the strong, the beautiful, the noble, the titan clad in all the truly Greek graces, the man that is to be, this is Nietzsche's religion. And a new renaissance will come when this ideal will not be smothered, as it was in the last renaissance by the work of Luther and Kant. Kant's antithesis between the real and the appearance world was the last resort of the old ideals.

Nietzsche's philosophical position may be thus summed up: He is a thorough-going sensationalist, empiricist, evolutionist. In him positivism has at last become completely positive, having sloughed off even the Unknowable, that ghost of the soul and of God. This view is at once atheistic and necessitarian, destructive of all hope in a future life, of all human responsibility, and of all that we are wont to call morality.

"No one *gives* a man his qualities, neither God, nor society, nor his parents, nor *he himself*. *No one* is responsible for existing at all, for being formed so and so, for being placed under these circumstances and in this environment. His own destiny cannot be disentangled from the destiny of all else in past and future. . . . We are necessary, we are part of destiny, we belong to the whole, we *exist* in the whole. There is nothing which could judge, measure, compare, or condemn our being, for that would be to judge, measure, or condemn the whole. *But there is nothing outside of the whole.*"*

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* "Nietzsche contra Wagner," pp. 142, 143.

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The freedom which remains for a man is simply,—

"the will to be responsible for one's self; to keep the distance which separates one from another; to become more indifferent to hardship, severity, privation, and even to life; to be ready to sacrifice men for one's cause, one's self not excepted. Freedom implies that manly instincts, instincts which delight in war and triumph, dominate over other instincts; for example, over the instincts of 'happiness.' The man *who has become free*, how much more the spirit which has become free, treads under foot the contemptible species of well-being dreamt of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen, and all other democrats. The free man is a *warrior*." *

II.

Such is the new religion of which Nietzsche is the prophet, and such is the ethical ideal which it involves. A harsh, cruel, brutal egoism, you will say, a doctrine fraught with the gravest dangers to society, and fundamentally wrong; and yet you have probably found yourself constrained from time to time to give an unwilling assent to conclusions drawn from it. Now the reason of this is not far to seek. Nietzsche belongs to the group of positivist writers. He represents their stand-point in the realm of morals. And positivism has in our day almost usurped the name of science. Nietzsche makes, in his pleadings, the familiar appeal; hence the abundant response. Moreover, his work is, by way of reaction, the natural and inevitable outcome of what is too often regarded as morality to-day, of the ordinary ethical ideal of the easy-going, comfort loving, sentimental optimist. Our present moral valuations do often seem merely to dress up in holy names cheap sympathy, and cheaper altruism, which easily degenerate into sentimentality; and to stand for a social order which, resting upon some shallow Rousseaulian notion of human equality, mistakes the tyrant rule of demos for self-government, and easily degenerates into socialism. Against these abuses of the moral sentiments Nietzsche's protests are wholesome antidotes, even if, in themselves considered, his doctrines are poison.

What Nietzsche says about sympathy, for example, exag-

* "Nietzsche contra Wagner," pp. 199, 200.

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gerated though it be even to the point of absurdity, is none the less a pertinent criticism of much modern philanthropy. And the very best of people, those who take a real interest in the welfare of humanity, are, in these days perhaps more than ever before, apt to allow their heart to run away with their head. It is well to be brought up occasionally at a sharp turn. Is it then so easy to discover what constitutes human welfare? Kindly feelings, when not directed by cool reason, may accomplish much mischief. That dear old anarchist angel, Louise Michel, has been spending her long life, and the lives of many others, that her kindly sympathetic heart may finally rejoice in seeing this troubled world settling down in peace and becoming *un nid de bonheur pour tous.* Worthy ideal of sentimental sympathy, and death to all that is worthy of life! It is well to emphasize the "tonic passions." But we do not need to go to Nietzsche to find this out. Nearly twenty-five hundred years ago Heraclitus discovered in strife the secret of life and growth. And the most religious poet of modern England sings of virtue that her glory is "to fight, to struggle, to right the wrong," that

> "She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just,
> To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky:
> Give her the wages of going on, and not to die."

Closely allied to false sympathy is the spurious altruism which fancies that one can live for others by neglecting one's self. If a man sacrifice himself utterly, that he may give himself wholly to his fellow-men, he will surely find in the end that he is not a self worth giving or receiving. "By all means," says Nietzsche, "love your neighbor as yourselves, but let me first see you such as love yourselves. . . . To learn how to love one's self, however, is the finest and cunningest of arts." So we cannot but feel the tonic effect of Nietzsche's effort to substitute for the ascetic ideal of self-mortification, and its epicurean counterpart—the dream of "plump comfortableness" and "peace of soul"—the ideal of strength, vigor, manliness. At the same time he meets exaggeration with exaggeration. To the sappy soulfulness of the ideal he

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is combating he opposes the physical giant. It may be true, as Aristotle said in effect, that the large soul is only found in the large, the vigorous, body. But the latter is hardly sufficient to insure the former, else were our Sandows and Sullivans our chief glory.

Similarly, Nietzsche's views on democracy may be regarded as a useful protest against what Henry Gaullieur calls the "lyric humbug of the French revolution." But, here again, the protest overshoots the mark. So we might take up the different doctrines which Nietzsche puts forward, one by one, and we should find that he usually hits real evils on the head; but that the ideal which he would substitute would entail even greater dangers than the one he is opposing.

There are, in fact, two very sharply contrasted ethical codes: the one, the other-worldly code, resting wholly upon supernaturalism; the other, the worldly code, resting wholly upon naturalism. For the other-worldliness of the brooding, longing soul, Nietzsche substitutes a live interest in the here and the now, in a practical work, in the service of "beyond-man," that is, of the man who is to come, and who will be all that we would be and are not, and who therefore compels our worship. Now the reign of other-worldly morality was doomed from the time when the renaissance dissolved the halos of the desert saints and hermits, and declared the *flagellantes* mad. Since then it has come to be recognized more and more that moral health is dependent upon the physical. Nietzsche takes the final step: the physical alone determines the moral. Now, our actual moral judgments largely echo the mediæval view. Hence we can easily understand why Nietzsche's doctrines should have their bracing influence, and why, at the same time, they do not convince us. What is needed is obviously a synthesis of these two contrasted ideals. This is a commonplace in ethical science. But Nietzsche does not give us this synthesis. By all means let us have a critique of our moral ideals, but let us go far enough to get upon some common ground from which these two opposing ideals may be reasonably judged.

When we turn to Nietzsche and ask him for the proofs of

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his ethical theory, we are not surprised to find them wanting. He attempts to throw discredit upon the opposed ethical ideal by showing its humble origin. And he would do this by resting his case upon philological considerations which no philologist to-day would accept, and upon historical considerations which prove to be merely Nietzsche's own romantic reconstructions of early history, lacking the solid support of fact, as much as the dreams of Rousseau. But even if he could make good his case here, the question of the relative value of these two ideals could not be settled by settling the question of their historical origin. Nietzsche makes his nearest approach to a proof of the validity of the *Helden moralität* for which he stands by falling back upon the alleged conflict between the principles which guide evolution in nature, and the principles which our present ethical ideal declares should guide the moral evolution of society. Now it is, in fact, incumbent on every thinker who recognizes, with Huxley, the existence of such a conflict between man and nature, to call in question either the one or the other set of principles. And the harmony can only be restored by showing that natural evolution itself is subservient to our present human ideals, which would simply mean that what we call moral conduct, including even the much despised sympathy, results in placing the moral man at home in the larger environment; or else that social evolution is, in fact, dependent solely upon the general laws which obtain in nature *minus* man, the ape and tiger laws. Either of these positions, could it be made out, would show that the conflict which Huxley pointed out in his Romanes Lecture does not exist. But the scholar cannot long rest content in Huxley's dualism.*

Nietzsche's solution of the problem is that of the true positivist. Physical force carries the day and determines all. And to the titan of future ages we joyfully sacrifice all, even our own lives. But whence comes our faith in this ideal,

* A large literature has already grown up around the Romanes Lecture. For two excellent brief discussions of the question, see Royce's "Studies of Good and Evil," fifth essay; and Dewey's article entitled "Evolution and Ethics," in *The Monist* of April, 1898.

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and why is it so attractive that we would joyfully lay down our lives for it? Nietzsche answers: nature, which works its way by evolution and the selection of the strong, points to beyond-man as her goal; and nature's will is our law, because we are fragments of nature. "We are parts of destiny, we belong to the whole, we exist in the whole." Recognition of our chains, he seems to say, makes us gladly accept them. Yet it is hard for a preacher, whether he be an Augustine, a Jonathan Edwards, or a Nietzsche, to be consistently fatalistic. Thus we find Nietzsche, after telling us that no one is responsible for being as he is, and that we are parts of destiny, going on to speak of freedom as "the will to be responsible for one's self;" and, elsewhere, speaking of "the man who has become free, how much more the spirit which has become free," as treading under foot certain ideals.

And here we can see at a glance the root of the difficulty with Nietzsche's doctrine and the source of its contradictions. The trouble is, as with all positivism, at the very starting point. What is the relation of man to nature? It is assumed as self-evident, by these thinkers, that man is a part, a fragment, and at the same time a product of nature,—a thing among things. But to put any meaning whatever into this answer it is at least necessary to get a clear and valid meaning into the word nature. It would be hard for a mere fragment of nature to accomplish this. It is easy to speak of it vaguely as a whole, a sum total of things, as destiny in which all events are locked, and then to go on to personify this vague notion and speak of nature as pointing to the triumph of the physically strongest, etc., as Nietzsche does. But is it not clear that nature thus conceived is merely a crude god? Nature, which is given a character of its own, which character determines all that happens in it, is simply a fetich on a grand scale.

Philosophy, indeed, in early Greece began, we may almost say, by making instinctively a God of nature. It is curious to see it ending in the nineteenth century with the same result. Yet this is precisely what is done by all of those thinkers of our time who plume themselves upon being followers of na-

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ture, and representatives of the scientific spirit in philosophy. Not without good reason does Nietzsche insist that his view antedates Christianity, and is connected with the realist civilization of early Greece. So far from its being true, as the positivists would have us suppose, that their view represents the third, and final, attitude of thought, the truth rather is that it represents the first, and instinctive, attitude of reflective man. But from first to last this conception of nature remains of all conceptions the most confused, and it leads to a doctrine of all doctrines the most tyrannical, to a creed of all creeds the most superstitious.

Nietzsche is in all this merely the natural consequence of the almost universal shallowness of modern philosophical thinking. The modern philosopher, in general, takes his task far too lightly. He either rests in this naïve, instinctive, dogmatic attitude in regard to nature, making of it his fetich; or else, he is like the gambler,—he wants to get his wealth without earning it. He accordingly seeks back-door methods to reach without hindrance his heart's desire, avoiding the arduous logical approach. Nietzsche is Comte minus the latter's "religion of the heart;" Spencer minus the doctrine of the Unknowable. His view is simply positivism shorn of all its illogical palliatives. Pure sensationalism, with empiricism for its sole and sufficient method, leads logically, once the initial difficulties are surmounted, to Nietzsche's conclusions. And there is no way of avoiding these conclusions save by attacking at the root philosophical sensationalism and empiricism, as the sole sound philosophic method. This can be done, has been done; and thus Nietzsche is rationally answered. But the popular trend in philosophy runs in quite a different direction. One follows Nietzsche as to data and method, one prates with him about "sense for fact" and "scientific spirit," but seeks to avoid his results by making the appeal to the heart or will to reverse or supplement them. But this is, as long as one stands by this philosophical method, a pure impertinence. "Heart" and "will" are here mere names for our present prejudices, for our likes and dislikes, which we insist shall triumph in our conclusions, whether or no. To make

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the appeal to them is simply to abandon the philosophical quest, to pretend that the desired results have been obtained philosophically, when, as a matter of fact, they have not.

And if modern philosophy has thus found its Nemesis in Nietzsche, so, too, has modern Christianity. Nietzsche is, as he calls himself, Antichrist, the outspoken enemy of Christianity in all its manifestations. Here again, barring his extravagance, his results are logically attained, once granted the adequacy of his starting-point and method,—that is, of his scientificism. It was, moreover, meet and proper that just in Germany such a thinker should appear at the present time. For criticism of matters theological has been freer, has gone to greater lengths, in Germany than in any other land; yet, at the same time, to all appearances, the church in its observances has remained entirely unchanged. Recently, I happened to be in Berlin when the Synod undertook to discuss the creed in the light of recent criticism. It was on all hands agreed that no intelligent man to-day could believe what all Christians are made to profess. Was the creed changed on that account? No; it was held that changes would be disturbing to the peace of mind of the people, and, consequently, to the stability of the Empire, and it was retained intact. "The people need plenty of illusions," said Renan. The Prussian clergy were apparently of the same mind. To be sure, their decision was said to have been "encouraged" by the Emperor, but that hardly releases them from their responsibility. The plain fact is, that the situation indicates a woful lack of candor, not to use a harsher expression.

The Christian theologian stands, at the end of the nineteenth century, at the parting of the ways. Only two paths are open for him. He must either turn his back on the so-called higher criticism which Germany has brought upon us, reassert the supernatural, the miraculous, origin of Christianity, the continuity and completeness of Christian tradition, the self-intelligibility of Christian teaching, with all that this involves, and in this way try to establish the finality of Christian ideals; or else he must become a complete rationalist, must prove that his ideals are valid because they satisfy the

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rigorous claims of reason. Does not Luther's step involve us in this latter course? The "soft" theologian may think that he can steer a middle course, be critical, agnostic, and at the same time Christianly pious. This is merely the comforting delusion with which the lazy mind finds excuses for its laziness. The theologian who would be of help in the present crisis has an arduous task before him. If he flinches in his undertaking, Nietzsche may be, after all, simply an *abschreckendes Beispiel* of twentieth century man.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

"THE MERCHANT OF VENICE" AS AN EXPONENT OF INDUSTRIAL ETHICS.

"THE Merchant of Venice," by its very title, claims connection with industrial life. It presents the problems of industrial morality and the solution of these problems, as viewed by one of the greatest intellects of all time. The intellect, indeed, is that of a poet, and his treatment of industrial problems is, of course, colored by the requirements of poetic art. But poetry, as Aristotle said long ago, gives a more philosophical and more earnest view of life than history. In some respects, we might add, it is more philosophical than philosophy itself. For if history may lose sight of the universal in mere particulars, on the other hand, philosophy is apt, in its universal abstractions, to lose sight of the infinite wealth of concrete life which it is the function of poetry to portray.

The materials of this noble comedy, as students of Shakespeare know, are drawn from old tales which the industry of critics has brought to light. But no work of the great poet illustrates more strikingly the singular clearness of artistic insight with which he discerns the fitness of an old tale for his purpose, and makes his appropriations. While following

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almost slavishly narratives that are as prosaic in style as the dullest chronicle, he quickens them into brilliant life as the vehicles of a noble idea.

Even if the poet had not been fettered by the sources of his plot, he could not have selected or invented a scene more admirably adapted for a great drama on the motives and the environment of industrial life. It is a commonplace of history, that the Italian republics took the lead in that new birth of humanity from which modern civilization arose. It is a significant fact, that the splendor of literary and artistic production, which is now most prominent in our memory of these old states, was associated with a corresponding splendor of industrial enterprise, just as in the ancient world it was among the industrial colonies of the Greeks in Asia Minor and Italy, that the first movements began of the glorious intellectual culture bequeathed to the world by the Greek race. Among the Italian states which were thus distinguished Venice took easily the first rank. In Shakespeare's time, it is true, her mercantile superiority was fast passing away before the new maritime activity of the Western and Northern nations, of Portugal and Spain, of Holland and England. But the mercantile enterprise of these younger nations was still too recent to have received any recognized place in the literature of the world; and consequently, even if Shakespeare had been obliged to construct a plot entirely from his own imagination, he could not have selected, for a story of industrial life, a scene more natural than one with the great traditions of Venetian trade.

The two most prominent characters also, given him in the old tales, are just such as fitted at once the mould into which his artistic aim required them to be run. The one embodies industrial morality as interpreted in the light of the ideal code of Christianity; the other exhibits, in full development, the degradation of industrial life when it is divorced from the inspiration of the Christian ideal. Yet neither is a mere abstraction personified. Both are concrete realities of human flesh and blood, of like passions with other men.

The Christian merchant gives its title to the play. And yet

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the propriety of this does not at once appear. As Mr. R. Grant White observes in his Introduction, "the merchant, except to a keener and more reflective observer, . . . is one of the subordinate characters of the play." Accordingly the significance of the merchant's part does not seem to have struck the popular mind, and the play was apparently at first known by other titles or descriptions, such as the Jew of Venice, or simply the Venetian Comedy. Such designations probably indicated the impression carried away from the theatre by the ordinary mind. But the title, by which the play is now known, appears in both the quartos of 1600. It is therefore to be regarded as having received the sanction of the poet himself; and the merchant must be taken to embody the central idea of the drama, its meaning or "lesson."

Antonio, however, plays this dominant part not as a lifeless personification, but as a living person. Though he embodies an ideal, it is by no means as an ideal that he is portrayed. He is tainted with infirmities which make him but a man after all. At the very opening of the play he is introduced as exhibiting a sadness of demeanor that is not always agreeable to his friends. Too much, indeed, has been made of this. It is often forgotten that the word *sad* had not yet been intensified to the expression of positive mental distress, which is its almost exclusive meaning at the present day. In Shakespeare's time its common usage still suggested merely that subdued disposition of mind which we denote by such words as "sober," "serious," "earnest." This is indicated, in some measure, by the fact that the only friends, who express themselves at all strongly in regard to Antonio's demeanor, are light-hearted gentlemen like Salanio, Salarino, and Gratiano, —men who evidently have never dreamt of taking a moment's share in any of the serious work of life. Their frivolous temperament carries their merry banter beyond the courtesies of friendship. They cannot penetrate the secret of Antonio's quiet manner. They ascribe it first to commercial anxiety, then to love. Gratiano even cannot restrain his impertinent chatter from the insinuation that Antonio's reticent earnestness is a mere affectation,—

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"As who should say, 'I am Sir Oracle,
And, when I ope my lips, let no dog bark!'"

These are obviously but shallow guesses. To the hint of love the reply seems to indicate a slightly irritated disgust, "Fie, fie!" The suspicion of commercial anxiety is belied by Antonio's whole career, and the unpleasant impression produced by Gratiano's rudeness has to be mitigated afterwards by Bassanio's assurance that his friend "speaks an infinite deal of nothing, more than any man in all Venice."

The truth in regard to Antonio's sadness is not far to seek. His brilliant industrial success has ranked him among the merchant princes of the great mercantile republic. "A royal merchant" he is styled implicitly by the duke. He spends with munificent liberality, lives in splendid indifference to the petty gains and losses of the very trade in which he is engaged. He can say with truth,—

"I hold the world but as the world, Gratiano."

But it is this very completeness of his success in life that produces the peculiar temperament of which his friends complain. This result is brought about, however, by a more subtle influence than any they could surmise. It is a very old truth that human joys in general derive their keenest zest from eagerness of pursuit, and are apt to become stale by ease of attainment and frequency of repetition. A position of superfluous wealth may thus weaken interest in the common enjoyments of life, and generate the jaded emotional condition of *ennui*, even in the extreme form of absolute life-weariness. Such a mood may well be described as sadness in the old sense of the term, especially if the etymologists are right in the theory that *sad* is primarily applied to one who is *sated* with the boons of life. But as the mood is not based on any positive suffering, as it arises rather from elevation above the common sorrows as well as the common joys of men, it will often appear groundless, inexplicable, even to its victim. It is therefore extremely natural that Antonio should open the drama, of which he is the theme, with the confession,—

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> "In sooth, I know not why I am so sad:
> It wearies me; you say, it wearies you:
> But how I caught it, found it, or came by it,
> What stuff 'tis made of, whereof it is born,
> I am yet to learn;
> And such a want-wit sadness makes of me,
> That I have much ado to know myself."

There is an incident in the play, akin to this, which is not often noticed. Portia, we shall find, is a sort of complement to Antonio in the exposition of Shakespeare's idea. She, too, is in the enjoyment of luxurious wealth. She is not called out of herself by the beneficent demands of any industrial occupation, and consequently she falls at times into moods of morbid *ennui.* It is surely significant that she bursts upon us in the play with a confession similar to that of Antonio, differing from it in fact only as the language of a woman of charming vivacity differs from that of a sober man of business: "By my troth, Nerissa, my little body is aweary of this great world." The secret of this life-weariness is revealed by the poet in the reply of Portia's maid, that "they are as sick that surfeit with too much, as they that starve with nothing."

It has been said that this temperament in Antonio stands in sharp contrast with that of the companions who twit him on the subject. It would almost seem, in fact, as if these somewhat trivial personages served merely as a foil to set off the character of their noble friend. They have, indeed, been hardly dealt with by some Shakespearian critics, who describe them as parasites of the wealthy merchant. This harsh judgment is clearly unjust when Gervinus carries it so far as to compare Antonio, amid this circle of friends, with Timon of Athens surrounded by flatterers, who fed upon him in his prosperity and deserted him in adversity. Antonio's companions, frivolous though they appear in relief against his earnest disposition, are genuine friends. In the darkest hour of his calamity not one of them betrays the sentiment of a parasite. They stand by him with manful sympathy, and are obviously ready for any sacrifice to save him. Their whole bearing proves that their language about him in his good fortune was not the language of parasitic flattery. Bassanio,

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indeed, must be put on a different level from that of the other three. His relation to Antonio is that of antique friendship. In our day, when the social relations of men are so often reduced to a mere "cash-nexus," we are apt to feel shocked at the cool borrowing of Bassanio. But the old ideal of friendship expressed itself in a proverb which is often quoted with peculiar relish by the great moralists of the ancient world, to the effect that the property of friends is common. Nor should it be forgotten that in Shakespeare's time the lending of money upon interest was not yet accepted in the code of industrial morality as legitimate even in trade, while such a transaction could not have been thought of without horror between friends.

> "For when did friendship take
> A breed of barren metal of his friend?"

There is another aspect in which Antonio appears as no mere ideal, but a man with the common frailties of humanity. He cannot rise above the un-Christian prejudices which Christians generally in the past have entertained against the Jewish race, and by which great sections of Christendom continue to be influenced in our own day. In fact, our sympathy is for a moment drawn away from Antonio to Shylock, when, on the merchant applying for the loan to Bassanio, he is reminded by the Jew of the scurrilous insults he had heaped on him, spurning him, spitting on him, calling him dog. With unrelenting harshness Antonio replies,—

> "I am as like to call thee so again,
> To spit on thee again, to spurn thee too."

All through the play Shylock feels keenly the injustice of these insults, and resents them at times in a tone of righteous indignation that appeals to our common humanity, "What's his reason? I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is?"

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In the very turning-point of the plot Antonio finds that he has to reap the fruit of the seed he has sown. The ruthless cruelty of the Jew, and the anguish which it brought upon Antonio and his friends, are but the inevitable retribution of those unrighteous insults. "What!" exclaims Shylock, on being taunted with his cruelty in seeking the life of Antonio,—

"What! wouldst thou have a serpent sting thee twice?"

From this alone, even if there were nothing else, it is evident that Shylock is no mere caricature. It does not appear even that he is intended for a representative specimen of the Hebrew race. Shakespeare may indeed have shared the current prejudices of the Christian world against the Jews. But there is nothing in the play to show it. It may be said that he might have selected a man of another nationality to embody his idea. But this would not have been easy. For, in the first place, Shylock was given in the old stories from which the plot of the comedy is drawn. Of course the character would have been rejected or altered if it had not fitted the poet's purpose. But for that purpose it happened that Shylock was admirably adapted. For Shakespeare had to go outside the community of Christians in order to exhibit an industrial character divorced from Christian inspirations. Now, the only community that kept clearly aloof from the Christian church, and yet came into trading relation with Christians, was the Jewish. The Jews were not only non-Christian, but (owing to restrictions placed on them in Christian countries) they were excluded from almost all industrial occupations that were regarded as honorable, and thus driven to the trade which was still generally considered, in a moral point of view, illegitimate. Even, therefore, if Shylock had not been furnished to him ready-made, Shakespeare would almost have been forced by poetic necessity to create a similar personage of the same race. In the portraiture of Shylock it is thus not the racial features that are most significant; they are obtruded mainly as serving to illustrate the moral character which it was the poet's aim to portray. This

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is evinced by an anonymous work,* whose very design is to show the extent to which the idea of race has influenced Shakespeare in the development of character and plot. Though the writer naturally makes as much as possible of Shylock's racial connection, he only proves that, having taken a Jew to embody his idea, Shakespeare had to make him speak and act like a Jew, while the other characters treat him in accordance with the common sentiments of Christendom in reference to the Jewish race. The truth is, that the coarser colors in which Shylock is painted in the old tales are toned down by the great poet into a picture with a truer likeness of humanity and a more dramatic consistency.

It has been observed that a sentiment akin to pity is excited by the effect which the cruel fanaticism of Christendom had produced on the Jewish nature of Shylock. It should not be overlooked, moreover, that Shylock is not the only representative of his race in this play. His daughter, Jessica, is not indeed the noblest type of womanhood; she is far inferior in womanly nobleness to the Rebecca of "Ivanhoe." Yet she is sketched in pleasing features which imply the absence of all her father's vices,—the very vices which some critics imagine the poet to be satirizing as the inseparable characteristics of her race. This contrast between father and daughter runs through the play. It finds voice not only in the enthusiastic extravagances of her lover,—

> "If e'er the Jew her father come to heaven,
> It will be for his gentle daughter's sake."

The indifferent Salarino is equally hyperbolical, telling Shylock, when he claims Jessica as his flesh and blood, "There is more difference between thy flesh and hers than between jet and ivory, more between your bloods than there is between red wine and Rhenish." The comical Launcelot puts the contrast in still harsher form by the coarsely jocular suspicions which his clownish nature does not shrink from uttering in the presence of Jessica herself.

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* "New Exegesis of Shakespeare: Interpretation of his Principal Characters and Plays on the Principle of Races." Edinburgh, 1859.

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Shakespeare's Shylock is thus a type, not of racial, but of moral characteristics. He represents a character in industrial life that might be met with in any nationality, but happened to be given in a Jew, and had, of course, to be developed under the forms of Jewish thought and sentiment. It is the character implied in elevating selfish competition to the place which it holds in the direction of industrial activity. This competition makes gain legitimate by any means not involving absolute plunder. Consequently Shylock does not feel any scruple in following a trade from which the greatest gain could be most rapidly obtained, even though it was still condemned almost universally by the moral sentiment of the time. Against this moral sentiment he is obliged to attempt a vindication of his trade, and one might almost fancy that Shakespeare had made a special study of the Talmud in order to put into Shylock's mouth a curiously typical specimen of Rabbinical dialectic. It is drawn, as will be remembered, from the well-known device by which Jacob won an advantage over his father-in-law, Laban. Antonio's criticism of this dialectic is one that goes back to Aristotle at least, and was familiar in all subsequent discussion of the subject. It pleads that money is not a living thing, and therefore cannot be made to breed. Shylock's reply is also a revelation of his character. It is thoroughly in the style of men whose thoughts never rise above the lowest morality of trade. They arrogate to themselves distinctively the title of practical men, and claim for their reasoning peculiarly the authority of fact. "I cannot tell," he says; "I make it breed as fast." The mere fact of Shylock's thriving as Jacob had done is, to his mind, a complete vindication of his thrift. For "thrift is blessing, if men steal it not." That is Shylock's ideal,—to keep within the restrictions of law. There is, for him, nothing higher.

"What judgment shall I dread, doing no wrong?"

Such a mind is not open to reason. For reason it pleads fact, even if it be merely the fact of a reasonless whim clamoring for gratification: "stat pro ratione voluntas."

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"You'll ask me why I rather choose to have
A weight of carrion flesh, than to receive
Three thousand ducats. I'll not answer that:
But say it is my humor: Is it answered?
. . . . . .
Some men there are love not a gaping pig;
Some, that are mad, if they behold a cat;
. . . . . .
As there is no firm reason to be rendered,
Why he cannot abide a gaping pig;
Why he, a harmless, necessary cat;
. . . . . .
So can I give no reason, nor I will not,
More than a lodged hate, and a certain loathing
I bear Antonio, that I follow thus
A losing suit against him. Are you answered?"

A mind of this type imposes no limit on its greed. Its insatiable craving for gold will swallow up every sentiment of humanity. In Shylock, therefore, not only is there left no ruth for the victims of his rapacity in general, or for Antonio in particular. Even his fatherly love for the gentle little Jessica is shrivelled up by the blight of his ruling passion. "I would my daughter were dead at my foot, and the jewels in her ear! Would she were hearsed at my foot, and the ducats in her coffin!"

All this is simply the spirit, which still dominates trade, carried to its logical issue. In industrial work it is still almost universally assumed that a man may practically ignore the essential principle of social morality. In other spheres of life it is admitted, in theory at least, that a man ought to labor for the good of his fellows. In trade no moral shock seems to be in general felt when a man bluntly gives it to be understood that his predominant motive is simply to make gain for himself. He may even get the credit of being a thoroughly honest fellow, peculiarly free from all hypocritical pretence. Is it any wonder that the ancient moralists, with singular unanimity, regarded trade as incompatible with the moral character of a free man, and would not admit the tradesman to the rights of full citizenship? Of course, the intrinsic goodness of human nature—the divine image that is never

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utterly defaced—commonly holds in check the inhuman tendencies of the trading spirit, and consequently a man in whom this check is to any large extent withdrawn seems an inhuman monster. But he is merely an extreme type of the character which is recognized as the normal qualification for industrial success. In every industrial community there are thousands of transactions every day, in which the necessities of others are not viewed as a pitiful call to loving service, but eagerly sought, and sometimes even ruthlessly brought about, as welcome opportunities of gain.

"The Merchant of Venice" gives dramatic interest to a nobler ideal of industry. Antonio, as the embodiment of Christian morality in trade, stands in complete contrast with Shylock. Shakespeare's exposition of his idea is in fact a happy dramatic antithesis. Shylock, as we have seen, represents a kind of trade which was regarded as incompatible with morality, as it exacted an addition to wealth lent when it seemed as if no addition could possibly be made by the loan. Antonio, on the other hand, represents that legitimate industrial enterprise by which the wealth of the world is really increased. But the spirit in which this industrial enterprise is carried on contrasts even more strikingly with the spirit of Shylock. Antonio's method of trade is not a rigid bargaining which confers an industrial benefit only while exacting a full equivalent in return. He indulges the sentiments of a generous, even heroic, friendship. He saves men in need of "accommodation" from the dire resort of borrowing from Shylock, and even delivers Shylock's victims from his clutches by paying their debts. "I oft," says Antonio,—

> "I oft delivered from his forfeitures
> Many that have at times made moan to me:
> Therefore he hates me."

All this is, to Shylock, unintelligible folly.

> "This is the fool that lends out money gratis,"

he complains. Such unbusinesslike methods are, in his eyes, an illegitimate interference with the gains of trade to gratify

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a mere whim. He feels them especially to be a wrong inflicted upon himself, for which he may legitimately seek revenge.

For a man who occupies such a moral attitude the higher life cannot be said to have begun. He has not yet been born of the Spirit. Such, at least, is the unequivocal teaching of the Spiritual Lord of Christendom; and it is this teaching, carried into the sphere of industrial work, that forms the leading idea in the "Merchant of Venice." In industry, as in every other sphere of activity, no divine life, not even a truly human life, is possible for men until they rise above the narrowness of a morality confined within the limits of bare justice into the sphere of a charity or mercy which does not wait till duty is exacted, but anticipates such exaction by going out in quest of opportunities of doing good.

The idea of this larger morality is embodied primarily in Antonio. But the requirements of dramatic art prevented him from being a complete exponent of the idea. He is essentially a practical man,—a man of action rather than of talk. He contrasts with his lively voluble friends by his silent and sad demeanor. Being a man of few words, therefore, he could not give adequate expression to the idea of the play. He expresses it merely in so far as it can be gathered from his conduct. He fails to give it articulate voice. His exposition has therefore to be supplemented by one who has caught the idea in its loftiest significance, whose life has not paralyzed her speech by absorption in practical affairs, whose general culture and eloquence render her a peculiarly effective interpreter.

It is significant, to begin with, that this interpreter is a woman. If there is one feature which distinguishes the Christian ideal of morality from all ideals of a distinctively Pagan type, it is the prominence given to the virtues of love, peace, gentleness, long-suffering,—virtues which represent in its finest efflorescence the feminine side of human nature. The idea of the poet, therefore, which aims at exhibiting a life in trade breathing this fine moral atmosphere, could not have found its happiest exponent so naturally in one with the sterner attributes of the masculine nature. Here, again, the

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person required by the poet was given in the old tale from which he drew, though here also we cannot fail to notice the clearness of that artistic insight with which he recognized the fitness of the given material for his purpose. It is an interesting circumstance, however, that the lady, who is made to embody the poet's idea, remains nameless in the old tales. Portia is therefore christened by Shakespeare himself. Apparently in his study for "Julius Cæsar" he had been impressed with the womanly nobleness of the Portia of Roman history.* It seems obvious that it was this impression that led him to give her name to the lady who stands out as the most charming figure in "The Merchant of Venice." When her name is first mentioned, she is explicitly said to be

> "nothing undervalued
> To Cato's daughter, Brutus's Portia."

Antonio is also described as a type of "ancient Roman honor;" and we may therefore take it for granted that, in giving her name to Portia, Shakespeare intended to recall what is noblest in ancient Roman character, but to refine its nobleness by adding the gentler features of a distinctively Christian womanhood.

The quaint legend of Portia's destination to marry in accordance with what appears a fantastic whim of her father, throws a strange glamor over her life. The Utopian scene, into which it transfers the plot of the comedy, elevates it for the time above the prosaic region of common trade into a fairy-land of romance. The father's will, also, by its very extravagance is found to be not without a subtle meaning in the development of the poet's idea, and loses the character of purposeless caprice by being made the vehicle of an earnest moral purpose.

To pass over a subordinate point which will be noticed im-

* It has been pointed out with truth by Mr. Stapfer ("Shakespeare and Classical Antiquity," p. 370, English translation) that Shakespeare's portraiture of Portia is not equal to Plutarch's, from which it is drawn; but Shakespeare's omissions may be vindicated by the subordinate part which Portia is called to play in "Julius Cæsar," compared with the place she occupies in a Life of Brutus.

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mediately, Shakespeare's interpretation of the father's will must surely be gathered from the reflections of the successful suitor while he is deliberating on his choice between the three caskets. Bassanio, as we have seen, is altogether of nobler nature than the other friends of Antonio, who have been treated by some critics as mere parasites. His worst fault is a spendthrift recklessness, by which his fortunes have been ruined. Even of this he is frankly aware, and is now seeking earnestly to be rid. The experience, which he has bought through his fault, stands him in good stead at the critical choice of his life. He has learnt that gold is, at best, but an outward decoration of life, concealing often a worthless interior,—"the beauteous scarf veiling an Indian beauty." He will therefore have nothing to do with the casket which tempts by this gaudy outside; and we know from an earlier scene that it covered a death's head. He has learnt, also, that silver, then still the metal of exchange, is but "the pale and common drudge between man and man." This likewise he puts aside; and he thus escaped, as we know, the fool's head enclosed in the silver casket. He, therefore, decides upon the casket of "meagre lead," convinced that in its plain exterior there is more promise of substantial value than in the glittering show of silver or gold.

The whole character and conduct of Portia fit her admirably for the poet's purpose. From the first explosion of her *ennui* there is a peculiar witchery about every word she utters, and when we reach the issue of the trial we are ready to follow little Jessica in her generous hyperbole that "the poor rude world hath not her fellow." But it is the lofty generosity of her nature that illustrates the significance of her part in the play. Even her behavior to Bassanio, in letting her love go out to meet him as far as maidenly modesty will allow, indicates that she will not let human custom impose a hard and fast rule to prevent a generous act. But this generosity of nature finds its noblest expression in the readiness with which she sets out, before her honeymoon begins, to place her fine intelligence at the service of her husband's friend.

It is the scene of this service that places Portia in her most

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brilliant light, and marks the culminating point in the development of the poet's idea. That idea, being the exhibition of a great moral principle in its actual working, could not find fitter exposition than in a scene which is a human imitation of the divine moral government. The trial in the Venetian court is not inferior to a sensational novel in the intensity of its plot-interest, while it is raised above all melodramatic trickery by the lofty tone of thought in which it is sustained and the noble end to which it moves. The scene gives a double exposition to the poet's idea. It shows the inadequacy for human life of any morality that is confined within the requirements of rigid justice, while it points, at the same time, to a morality of wider range, which embraces justice itself by emancipating it from the bondage of narrow rules into the freedom of the spirit. The first side of this exposition had been already foreshadowed in some subordinate scenes. In more than one way the poet had thus brought before his audience the contradictory claims which are apt to arise from the restricted requirements of justice being interpreted from opposite points of view by antagonistic interests. Thus the rights which a rigorous justice confers upon parents are brought into conflict with the rights of independent moral responsibility in children, when "the will of a living daughter is curbed by the will of a dead father." A similar conflict of rights arises between Jessica's claims and those of her father, Shylock. The perplexity of such conflicts is exhibited, on its comical side, in Launcelot's amusing debate with himself over his right to throw off the claims of his master and desert him for some more agreeable service.

All this illustrates the contradictions in which men become involved when they attempt to carry out rigorously the narrow ideas of mere justice. These ideas, by the very "determinateness" claimed for them by jurists, cannot represent the whole of the moral issue involved. It is therefore often possible, by logical inference, to found upon these ideas two requirements which neutralize one another by the impossibility of giving effect to both. This is obviously the source of that "glorious uncertainty of law" which has become a byword in

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society, as well as of the very old experience that an extreme wrong may arise from an extreme assertion of right,— "summum jus summum injuria." But the fact that the ideas of bare justice are inadequate for the guidance of moral life, proves the necessity of rising to a larger principle of conduct; and it is the exhibition of this necessity that gives a glory to the trial-scene. Here Portia shows at her best. There is, for her task, a pathetic significance in the fact that she will not at first believe Shylock to be wholly impervious to the inspiration of the nobler morality. With the patience, which is an essential feature of the charity she represents, she endeavors again and again to make him feel the force of this higher plea. Her patience appears in striking relief against the attitude of the other speakers in the scene. All, with the exception of the duke, give vent to their impatient irritation in language which, so far from being conciliatory, was evidently in the highest degree exasperating to the Jew. Her final appeal to Shylock in exposition of the higher plea has, unfortunately for our purposes, become a common-place in every sort of book in which it could be conveniently dragged in to point a lesson of mercy. Its phrases have woven themselves into the very thoughts of English-speaking people on the subject, and become thus

"Familiar in our mouths as household words."

It is perhaps necessary therefore for most men to overcome the effect of this familiarity in order to appreciate, with the freshness of a first impression, the noble eloquence of this famous appeal. To reach this fresh appreciation, it is most important to note the perfect fitness with which the appeal comes in as a natural part of the pleadings in the case. Portia had just admitted that the claim of Shylock could not be impugned on the ground of strict justice, and she urges accordingly that he must be merciful. "On what compulsion must I? tell me that," is the spontaneous demand of a mind which, as we have seen, never rises to the conception of any moral requirement beyond that which can be enforced by the strong hand of law. It is in reply to this demand that Portia bursts

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into that noble address which rings like a series of brilliant variations on the theme that "the quality of mercy is not strained."

Even after this Portia continues to appeal to Shylock on the claims of charity or mercy, but to all her appeals there is a reply of uniform tenor, that such claims are not in the bond. It is only after all efforts have failed to lift Shylock into the spiritual region of a higher morality, that Portia sees herself obliged to descend and join issue with him on his own moral plane.

> "For, as thou urgest justice, be assured,
> Thou shalt have justice, more than thou desirest."

Then with fine dialectical skill she turns his morality against himself, by showing that the claim, which he presses against Antonio on the ground of justice, cannot, on the ground of justice, be enforced, inasmuch as its enforcement would come into collision with an older claim of justice which forbids the shedding of blood.

In this way the cause of the higher morality is vindicated by the claims of the lower morality annihilating one another. But a little incident at the close of the trial is apt to be passed without appreciation of its significance for the part which Portia plays in the development of the poet's idea. Is it meaningless that she declines the liberal fee offered by Bassanio for her services as advocate? This can scarcely be our judgment, if we note the reason she pleads for her declinature.

> "He is well paid that is well satisfied;
> And I, delivering you, am satisfied,
> And therein do account myself well paid;
> My mind was never yet more mercenary."

These words point to a new attitude of moral sentiment towards industrial work. Already this attitude is adopted in regard to the more spiritual work of human life, or rather no other attitude has ever been deemed morally appropriate. That work is always conceived as something which cannot be paid in the ordinary sense of payment,—something which is not commensurable with any currency in the world. The

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degradation of industrial work is mainly due to the fact that it is not sustained by the highest and strongest inspirations of life. Here it is deemed not only allowable, but necessary, that men should cease to dream of the higher ideals, and court the corrupting influences which inevitably flow from working for pecuniary gain. There is no reason why the industrial life of the world should be thus divorced from the motives which are found to be most effective in other spheres of activity; and when it is made to thrill with the inspiration of these motives, it will find a sufficient reward in satisfaction with its own achievements.

It might be supposed that with the triumphant issue of the trial the poet's task was done, and the dramatic interest exhausted. But Portia's refusal of a fee leads to the incident of the rings; and this creates a new dramatic problem, awakening a fresh interest in its solution. The scene is thus, by a natural turn of the plot, transferred once more to Portia's home; and this ideal region becomes more than ever of a fairyland, as eye and ear are enchanted with the soft splendors of a moonlit night and the harmonies of delicious music. The features of external nature are thus in exquisite unison with the happy mood of the whole party returning from their recent triumph. The inspiration of the scene exalts thought and sentiment in all. Even the trivial circumstance of a light, seen by Portia in her hall as she draws near, has its solemn suggestions to her mind.

> "How far that little candle throws his beams!
> So shines a good deed in a naughty world."

The shallow Lorenzo himself is quickened for the moment to a more earnest depth of spirit, as he discourses to Jessica on the mystic power of music over the human soul, and tells her of an ethereal sphere-music sounded by the orbs of heaven,—

> "Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubim."

No more fitting scene could be imagined for closing a drama in the spirit of the finest comedy. The merry little

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by-play of the rings, which had been woven into the grander device of the trial, works its way, through an amusing mock-quarrel of the newly-wedded couples, to a good-humored explanation, while the grander device is by the same means unravelled in a manner that adds to the exultant feelings of the triumph.

It is a very stale criticism on the students of poetry, that they often find in the works of a poet a great deal more than he himself ever dreamt. The criticism may be just in some cases, but it is equally meaningless in others. A great work of poetic art cannot, in general, be less significant for the progress of thought than a new discovery in science or a fresh system of philosophy. Every step in the scientific or philosophic progress of the human mind brings into clearer view the organic connection of all truth, and must, therefore, as a rule, involve implications which could scarcely be surmised at the time. In like manner the artistic perfection of a poem depends on the completeness of its harmony with the best thought and sentiment of humanity, so that it must be directly or indirectly expressive of truth far beyond all that the author consciously intended. How far Shakespeare was aware of the teaching with which any of his dramas is charged, it is truly futile to inquire at this time of day. The task of the critic is rather to unfold the full significance of the ideas involved in the poet's plan and its execution. And if, in the case of "The Merchant of Venice," it be urged that Shakespeare did not, or could not, discern clearly the bearing of his splendid creation upon industrial morality, it does not seem irreverent to reply, that this spake he not of himself, but, being a great high-priest of humanity at the time, he prophesied for the guidance of that industrial era upon which the world was entering.

J. Clark Murray.

McGill University, Montreal.

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THE ETHICS OF PROHIBITION.

In treating of the Ethics of Prohibition, my object is to let a little light into a region of discussion which is especially notable for its heat. Mrs. Carlyle used to say: "The one big sin is mixing things;" and her doctrine seems to receive greater recognition in the practice of the patrons of the saloon than in the counsels of the other party to the temperance dispute. The modest contribution I wish to make to clear thinking is to discover the ethical conceptions which underlie the pro and con of Prohibitory Legislation. It is not my purpose to discuss temperance laws in general, nor even prohibitory legislation in particular, so far as its actual or possible effects are concerned. I shall not deal with the ethical aspect of the drink question in the broad sense of the term. That would involve an inquiry into the duty of the individual, not in isolation but as a member of the social organism, to regulate his conduct towards intoxicants in view of example and heredity; and a consideration of the duty of the state to provide legislation against a gigantic social evil; and these are matters to which only incidental reference can now be made. My sole aim is to examine the ethical theory which underlies *a priori* prohibition and *a priori* anti-prohibition respectively, and to find the common-sense ideas which must be the basis of all sober discussion of this vexed question.

It has been facetiously said that the temperance question is being given over for its solution to "ministers, women, and cranks." While I am proud to belong to this noble army of reformers, I must confess that there is too much truth in the saying, and that we too often seek a settlement of this question on a very narrow basis. The man, however, who makes an impartial investigation of the drink problem and is led to conclusions which run counter to the convictions and prejudices of these reformers, whose zeal is greater than their wisdom, takes a twofold risk; and this is specially true of the Christian minister. On the one hand, the mother who is con-

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tending for the purity of her boys, and who recognizes that the drink habit is the worst foe to the sanctity of her home, will probably hurl unpleasant epithets at the religious teacher who places intemperance in the same category as other social evils. It is nothing new for a minister to be called a "moderate," but the name gains nothing in beauty or favor in these days by having added to it the term "drinker." On the other hand, the man who is fighting for his vested interests in the liquor business will be ready to claim as a champion of a not too worthy cause the clergyman who does not absolutely endorse a form of legislation which means the extinction of his industry. To the one we can only say that the social student must have regard to all the best interests of the community, and not merely the besetting sins of her boys, and to the other that every friend of higher national life must be the uncompromising enemy of the saloon.

(1) Let us first examine, then, the ethical theory which underlies *a priori* prohibition.

Some men are out-and-out prohibitionists. That is to say, they believe that prohibition is absolutely the best form of temperance legislation,—the only right way of dealing with the liquor evil. Apart altogether from any consideration of the measure of public sentiment which may support the law, the proportions the drink habit may have assumed in any given community, the opposition to such legislation which may spring from race tradition, sense of freedom to regulate one's own diet, love of liberty or love of license,—total prohibition of the liquor traffic, for every time and every place, is the ideal legislation. Whether, if enacted, a prohibitory law will be enforced or not, whether the accompanying evils will more than counterbalance the good which shall be effected, are questions with which they have no patience. Prohibition is the one right method of dealing with the drink evil, and it is the duty of the state to place such a law on the statute books. However little he may suspect it,—and there are none of us who always consciously follow the logical processes by which we reach our conclusions,—there is an easily traceable line of argument which leads the *a priori* prohibitionist to such a

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definite creed; and that course of thought, however subconscious it may sometimes be, is as follows:

The liquor business is an essential evil. It is not merely a social evil, one of the greatest menaces, perhaps, to the national well-being, but it is an evil *per se*. The use of alcoholic beverages in any quantity is a sin. To make, to sell, to buy, to partake is essentially wrong, a violation of absolute moral law. Now, the licensing of an essential evil must also be in itself evil. Apart altogether from the question whether the aim of permissive legislation be to restrict the liquor business or to clothe it, with the state sanction, in the garb of respectability, it is absolutely wrong; and the duty of the state is to illegalize the whole traffic, to make that which is a sin a crime as well. This is a bald, but, I trust, not an unfair statement of the doctrine which underlies the movement in favor of absolute prohibition, that the entire business in intoxicating liquors as a beverage is a crime *per se*.

This doctrine is open to at least two serious objections. In the first place, it lays down a false basis for so-called moral legislation. It is a contradiction of every established principle of legislation, and if carried to its logical conclusions would require nothing short of a law embracing in the same sweeping condemnation the man who buys as well as the man who sells wine or beer. Even on the supposition, however, that the liquor traffic is essentially evil, is it, therefore, the duty of the state, in the exercise of its legislative function, to make it a crime? What is the only rational basis of legislation? Not absolute moral law, but the social weal. Obedience to the moral law on the part of the citizens may be the condition of the stability and lasting progress of the nation; but such obedience cannot always be enforced by the state; and, even where it is required by law, the legal commandment is based on principles not of pure ethics but of public policy. Let me illustrate what I mean.

Notwithstanding the practice of the ancient Spartans, who punished not the thief but him who stole so awkwardly as to be caught in the act, and notwithstanding the question which seems likely to remain the perennial problem of debating so-

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cieties, "Is lying ever justifiable?" we may safely say that the unsophisticated moral sense of mankind recognizes that honesty is absolutely right and dishonesty essentially wrong. The state, however, in its legislative capacity, knows nothing of absolute right and wrong. It takes cognizance merely of actions which hinder or favor the social well-being. It does not enforce a moral law as a moral law, but as good public policy. It does not legislate against lying as a sin. It takes no high-handed action against the orator who sacrifices truth to rhetoric, or against "My Lady" who is out when some uninteresting caller is at the door. But when any one's lying injures a neighbor's good name or hurts his legitimate business, when a falsehood is such as to interfere with the welfare of society, it is made a crime, not because it is a sin, but because it is hurtful to the community. The state acts solely in self-defence, and bases its action on expediency in the public interests. The moral law declares that "honesty is right," but the state can only know "honesty as the best policy." "Thou shalt not kill" is a moral law, and our moral sense teaches us that he who hates his brother man is guilty of the sin of murder. But the state does not legislate against murder as a sin. I may hate my neighbor most cordially, but I am in no danger of finding myself in gaol until my hate manifests itself in conduct which threatens my neighbor's life. It is doubtless true that absolute morality is the best safeguard of the nation, and that every violation of conscience has its more or less remote effect upon social welfare; but there is a whole region of the moral life of the individual and of society with which legislators can have no practical concern. There are many sinners among us who are in no danger of being arrested as criminals.

If drinking at the dram-shop is inimical to social safety, it may properly be made the object of legislative attack. If private drinking is poisonous to the system, and by the influence of heredity corrupting to the whole body politic, the strong arm of the law may rightly put a stop to it. It is not because drunkenness is a sin, but because it endangers the community, that the state takes cognizance of it. The only

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sound doctrine, therefore, on which prohibitory legislation can be founded is this—that the state, in the exercise of its police powers, has the right to suppress the liquor traffic as a social evil, and that its suppression is expedient in the interests of national well-being. Temperance laws are based not on absolute right but on expediency; not on principles of pure ethics but of public policy.

In the second place, the doctrine that the use of alcoholic beverages is an essential evil is one which outrages the moral sense of the great majority of men. This is all, indeed, that need be said for its refutation in an ethical discussion of this kind. For how are we to know what is absolutely right or wrong? Each man's own conscience must decide what is right or wrong for him; and the conscience of the prohibitionist may declare that in his case, at any rate, it is a sin to use intoxicants as a beverage. This, however, touches only the question of relative right or wrong. That which is right for one individual may be wrong for another, and that which is right in one set of circumstances may be wrong in another time or place. But absolute right and wrong must be sought in the deliverance of the universal moral consciousness. The declaration of the Moral Law is a "categorical imperative." It knows nothing of "the expedient," "the best policy," "the conducive to happiness;" it speaks in a tone of supreme authority of the absolute Right. Its demands are unconditional, unrestricted by the limitations of time and space. Now, does the moral consciousness of the race yield the deliverance that the use of alcoholic beverages is wrong? Of course not. Or does the individual conscience declare that it is an essential evil? It may decide that for many individuals total abstinence is a plain duty in view of personal safety, the welfare of offspring, the interests of others whose life is inseparably bound up in ours. It may declare that the gratification of the lusts of our lower nature for intoxicating liquors is wrong, inasmuch as it degrades and corrupts and hinders the free play of our higher manhood. But this is far from a declaration that the use of alcoholic beverages is essentially sinful. Nor will such a position be tenable, even if it be decided that

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alcohol is a poison and not a food, a question on which there does not seem to be a consensus of opinion among scientific experts. If alcohol is a poison, then, on the supposition that mankind is living a perfectly natural life, its use as a beverage might be classed among suicidal acts; but what would be injurious in such a case might be beneficial in moderation to some men in our modern civilization who are tired with overfatigue, or whose nervous systems are debilitated by overstrain or sickness. Here, of course, I speak as a layman. In these degenerate days we choose our food on medical advice, and alcohol might find a place in the prescribed diet. There is no doubt that indulgence in strong drink is the source of a great part of our poverty, vice, and crime; that a healthy person who lives naturally is far better without stimulants; that the total abstainer has great advantages over the moderate drinker in the keen competition of modern life. There is little doubt that in our complex society, where the life of each is essentially bound up in the life of others, the man who intelligently seeks to discover his duty will acknowledge that moderation and abstinence come so close together as to be scarcely distinguishable. But the dogma that the use of alcoholic beverages in any quantity is a sin *per se* is a rude shock to the popular moral sentiment. Many of the most refined consciences have not interpreted their duty as total abstinence, and the greatest ethical teacher of mankind not only drank wine, but supplied it for the enjoyment of others, and used it in the institution of the central sacrament of his church.

(2) Let us next examine the ethical theory which underlies *a priori* anti-prohibition. This part of our subject will not require any lengthy treatment, for we need not take seriously the high-sounding moral doctrine of the average professional anti-prohibitionist. Whatever reasons many good men may have for opposing prohibition as a practical means to temperance reform, I suspect that the opposition which is based on *a priori* grounds usually springs from a selfish unwillingness to be deprived of a much-loved luxury. The out-and-out anti-prohibitionist, however, presents a theoretical

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argument which is worthy of consideration. In brief, it is something like this:

Prohibitory legislation interferes with the moral freedom of the individual. It is the duty of the state to afford scope for the ethical development of all its members, and one condition of healthy growth is freedom of choice. Temptation is the *sine quâ non* of virtue. The man who cannot be tempted must remain non-moral. No legislation is ethically sound which allows the individual no chance of acquiring self-control; and temperance is possible only when over-indulgence is also impossible. Liquor laws should be educative; but total prohibition which removes temptation altogether affords no scope for the citizens to acquire the virtue of temperance. Where there is no liberty of choice there can be no true self-control. Where there is no moral freedom there can be no moral character. The state, therefore, in the exercise of its moral custody has no right to deprive its members of the necessary conditions of ethical development. Total prohibition aims at this, and is therefore essentially wrong.

In reply to this contention, we may say that the same objection may be urged in theory against every form of liquor legislation. They all interfere to some extent with the freedom of the citizens. They are all alike in their intention,—to lessen the evils of the saloon; and they all proceed from a common principle,—that there is no natural right to sell liquor. With the plea for "vested rights" which is sometimes heard, I shall not deal at all, for it is now generally recognized that as soon as these become antagonistic to the interests of society they are "vested wrongs;" but the plea for the natural rights of the individual deserves some notice. Now, the individual has no rights which conflict with the social welfare. Society is an organism. No man liveth unto himself. The individual has no life except that which is social, and he cannot realize his own purposes except by realizing the larger purposes of society. The modern ethical problem grows out of the recognition of this truth. "Ethics," as President Schurman has well said, "is a sociological science." "How ought I to live?" is at heart the question,

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"What is my proper adjustment to the other members of the body?" Under the natural and inevitable conditions of human life we are born into society, and we must interpret our duty in terms of the welfare of the whole community. If any individual has not sufficient *esprit de corps* to rightly adjust himself, socially, so as to allow the harmonious activity and healthful growth of the organism, he is a rebellious member which must be restrained. Freedom which may be a natural right to an individual living in isolation, is not necessarily a natural right to the same individual in his social relations. The state in its care for all the members may place upon individual liberty those restraints which are deemed essential to the well-being of society as a whole.

It is not so easy to defend what seems to be state interference with the moral freedom of the citizens; but in extreme cases even this is justifiable. If the removal of temptation is the only hope for the salvation of society, as it seems to be the only hope for the salvation of some men, such a violent measure may properly be resorted to in the public interest. If society perish, what becomes of personal freedom? Its existence is possible only so long as the body politic liveth; and circumstances might be such that the individual must lose his moral freedom in order to save it. Prohibition claims only to be an emergency measure; but given the emergency, given the crisis in the nation's history owing to the tremendous proportions of the drink-evil, and prohibition is justifiable. If the very life of the nation is at stake, if intemperance is threatening the pillars of society, even the freedom of the citizens who are capable of self-control must not stand in the way of radical reform. Liberty in such a case becomes license and must be bridled. Such freedom is not moral, and must be forbidden in the interests of social order. If the total prohibition of the liquor traffic is essential to tide the nation over a crisis, the state is recreant to its duty in allowing it legally to continue. Better far that the liberty of the citizen be sacrificed than that the whole nation perish.

(3) If the ground, then, is cut away from underneath all

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abstract *a priori* theories of prohibition and anti-prohibition alike, we have not far to seek for an answer to the question, "What is the best form of liquor legislation?" If all temperance laws represent the same thing,—an attempt to reduce the drink-evil in the interests of society as a whole,—then that legislation is the best which is most successful towards this end. The best liquor law, in short, is that which works.

License and Prohibition cannot be labelled absolutely bad and good respectively, or *vice versâ*. Each of them may be relatively bad or good. One has no sounder ethical basis than the other; and one is better than the other if it can be better administered to secure the desired end. That is the best form of law which will do the most good and the least evil in any special set of circumstances. The only standard by which laws may be compared is their utility. Prohibition is good or bad according as it can or cannot be made to yield beneficent results. We must test its worth by its fruits, and these may vary in various communities. No form of legislation is in itself redemptive. Every law is a means to an end, and its final test is its efficacy, its capacity, to yield good moral effects. This simple proposition is a two-edged sword cutting into the prejudices both of the *a priori* prohibitionist and of the *a priori* anti-prohibitionist; but if we are right in basing legislation on public policy, it is a legitimate conclusion. The preacher, then, who uses the sacred authority of the pulpit to command his people to vote for prohibition as an absolute moral duty, and who declares that to acquiesce in permissive legislation is to make a league with death and a covenant with hell, and the professional lecturer who appeals to his audience to oppose on principle a prohibitory law because it deprives citizens of their natural right of personal liberty, are both going on the assumption that absolute morality is the basis of temperance legislation, and they are both consistent with their own *a priori* theories. But those theories have no sound ethical foundation. The practical moral problem before the citizen is: "Is it my duty to vote 'yea' or 'nay' on the question of a prohibitory law?" and how is a man to discover his duty? Not by asking such a question as this: Is prohibition

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absolutely right or wrong? because no moral legislation has its basis in pure ethics. But the pertinent questions are: Will prohibitory legislation, if enacted, do harm or good? Will it educate the nation into a healthy temperance sentiment? or will it be so openly and flagrantly violated as to lower the tone of public morality and lessen respect for law and order? Will it promote self-control or breed hypocrisy? Will it bring a national blessing or a national calamity? If it will have both good and evil effects, will its advantages or disadvantages be greater? What will be its residuum of influence in moulding our national character? These questions it does not lie within my province now to answer. My task is completed, if I have made it clear that they are legitimate questions, and that the asking of them is the only way by which we can find our duty as citizens. A satisfactory answer to them cannot be given in any off-hand manner, but must involve careful study of our social conditions and of the actual results of prohibitory legislation in similar conditions elsewhere.

D. J. Fraser.

St. John, New Brunswick.

DISCUSSIONS.

BELIEF AND WILL.

Dr. James has long since fairly won the admiration and gratitude of all thoughtful persons, but certainly he has rendered them no better service than in the writing of his "Will to Believe." The philosophical student has been stimulated by it in no slight degree,—has been led to see how markedly the paths in which we follow the footsteps of the fathers of philosophy have been illumined by that awakening of psychological thought with which Dr. James's name is so closely identified; has been made to appreciate the value of this thought in relation to the problems of practical ethical life.

I am inclined to think, however, that Dr. James has conferred even a greater benefit upon that large body of active-minded people who are not philosophical students, but whose thought and influence are most strongly felt by those who are less intellectual, and to whom the philosopher speaks in an unknown tongue.

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Dr. James has a most rare gift of expression which enables him to arouse the sympathetic interest of his readers, and which impresses upon them the importance of the truths he so forcibly presents. For such readers he has done this one service, if all else of value in the book is lost to sight,—he has convinced them that to a great extent we are ourselves the active agents in the establishment of our own beliefs; and this conviction necessarily carries with it realization of the important fact that upon ourselves must rest the responsibility for these self-made beliefs, and for the trends of activity which are necessarily connected with them.

But just because Dr. James wields the power just spoken of, is it important, as Mr. Dickinson Miller says in his article in the January number of this JOURNAL, that we should not hesitate to turn the search-light of philosophical criticism upon the doctrines he enunciates; and I am confident that Dr. James joins with all ethical students in feeling under obligations to Mr. Miller for his eloquent and eminently friendly critical analysis in the article to which I have just referred.

In relation to this opposition of view, I have found myself altogether in sympathy with Dr. James; and I am impelled now to espouse his cause, not because I feel that his position will be strengthened by effort of mine (he may perchance not approve my defence, may beg to be delivered from the solicitude of his friend), but because I owe to him, and, I may add, to Mr. Miller, the arousing of an interest in the special problem he treats which has led me to search for the grounds of the sympathy I feel. In what follows, therefore, I shall state in brief some thoughts in reference to this subject which I hope may be helpful in clearing away the difficulties which have presented themselves to Mr. Miller's mind.

At the start, I would call attention to a difference of attitude which appears to me to be clearly exemplified in the two thinkers whose opposition we are considering.

A large part of modern philosophical thought is permeated by an assumption, usually implicit rather than explicit, which seems to me to be psychologically unsound: the assumption that clear knowledge is disparate from unclear knowledge; that it is possible to mark a line on the one side of which knowledge may be called "definite," and on the other side of which it must be called "indefinite;" and furthermore that a superior validity must be ac-

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corded to all knowledge which is on the side of the line to which we attach the words clear and definite. Upon this assumption is built up the structure of Positivism; upon it depends the notion of the Unknowable as distinguished from the Knowable, with which in our day Mr. Herbert Spencer's name is so closely associated. Furthermore, if this assumption be invalidated, the whole doctrine of Agnosticism seems to me to be swept away.

But surely no result of modern psychological thought is more clear than that this assumption is totally unwarranted. The whole teaching of our psychological masters, to-day, surely involves the notion that the process in consciousness is of a uniform nature; that the criterion of "definiteness" is an eminently artificial one, suggested by practical demands but valueless for philosophical purposes; that the distinction between "definiteness" and "indefiniteness" is purely relative; that what is "definite" knowledge for me at any moment is not necessarily or probably in all respects equally "definite" for any other mind; that what is "definite" knowledge for me to-day was not necessarily or probably equally "definite" for me in the past, nor will be in the same sense "definite" for me in the future.

Now, the more one studies Dr. James's work in general the more does it seem certain that he has cast to the winds all of this error of the past; it is incompatible with that broad appreciation of the fields of conscious life beyond the "field of attention" which one finds constantly appearing in his thought. On the other hand, the more one studies Mr. Miller's article, just referred to, the more does one feel that he has not broken away from this absurd assumption of "positivism," so contradictory to all the true teachings of psychology and to all introspective experience. This feeling, on the whole, is perhaps due not so much to what he says but to what he does, to the avidity with which he attacks Dr. James's position, which I shall presently attempt to show is necessarily involved with the doctrine of the unity of mental process: nevertheless, we do find him occasionally slipping into an expression which lends strength to my supposition as to his approval of the false assumption above mentioned, as, for instance, where he says, "The Will to Believe is a thing to be *absolutely** separated from the will to know the truth. The former is a desire for a purely subjective result, a state of our own consciousness that we seek in the first instance for

* Italics mine.

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its own sake. . . . The latter is a desire that our convictions may correspond with reality [Why is not this "a desire for a purely subjective result, a state of consciousness that we seek for its own sake"? H. R. M.], and naturally leads us to seek simply . . . for the fact." [But how does it appear that we do not also seek simply for the fact in the former case? H. R. M.]

But whether Mr. Miller holds this erroneous view or not, he stands in defence of those who display most markedly the very cowardice, the very unwillingness to face the facts, which he holds is the attitude of the one who would defend the "will to believe." For who is more averse to acknowledge the value of the influences from the "field of inattention," than the man who declines to believe unless he can be convinced by "definite" ratiocinative process?

And here we may note in passing that these very men, whose attitude Mr. Miller would defend, themselves display in the most distinct form the very type of willing to believe against which his shafts are aimed: for surely no men more clearly exemplify the rejection of evidence which is opposed to their desire than those who will listen only when they can gain the satisfaction attached to the knowledge that their beliefs can be verified by ratiocinative process. As Dr. James says, "it is only truth as technically verified that interests" them. Were not the subject too serious, one might be tempted to smile at finding so careful and acute a writer as Mr. Miller defending those who are so easily caught in the trap which he thinks he himself sets for his opponents.

But I feel too keenly the danger of misapprehension of Mr. Miller's position to pursue such criticism further. I prefer to devote the space at my disposal to the suggestions I have to make in favor of the position he opposes.

If at first we approach the subject from a biological point of view, it seems to me that we at once discover grounds for sympathy with Dr. James's position and opposition to Mr. Miller's.

Belief is our name for a state of mind dependent upon the pre-existence of a condition of relative mental stability. To this condition must correspond on the physical side relatively stable processes of reaction upon our environment. Now, it is a mark of the highly developed man that he does not lightly change these processes of reaction upon the reception of new or changed stimuli. The higher the development of the man the more persistent he becomes,

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the less vacillating, the less given to change abruptly, and in answer to slight changes of stimuli, the systematic reactions upon his environment which have become established within him.

No one can compare the highest type of men with the less developed of our race without noting at once the correspondence between the advance of man's character and the gain of this habit of selective rejection of stimuli to change of reaction; a gain which is co-ordinate with the tendency to persistent attention. And no one can study animal life without perceiving the gradual emergence of this characteristic of action as animal forms rise in scale.

No one, I imagine, will be disposed to deny that this habit is other than an advantageous one to the race; this habit which, when expressed in terms of subjective experience, is seen to consist in this, that having gained, in whatever way, a certain belief, we refuse to have it overthrown without the strongest of reasons. Nature by this means emphasizes certain trends of action, and thus after the manner of the skilled experimenter is enabled to test in her world-wide laboratories, as she could do in no other way, the value to life of various modes of reaction. This characteristic once acquired must almost necessarily be retained and strengthened, and in the long run those who have it not will tend to be eliminated as unfit for survival in the contest with those who have attained unto it.

But this persistence, as we have just seen, is a condition of what in its subjective aspect we call belief. And the psychic coincident of the act which enforces this habit of persistence, of avoiding disturbance, must be found in the "will to believe" in its most usual phase; and although, as we shall presently see, there are other modes of this willing to which this argument will not directly apply, even these will be found to be resultants of the acquisition of this widely advantageous habit.

That we all do persistently will to believe therefore cannot be gainsaid; and on the whole it appears an absurdity, from a biological stand-point, to make the claim that this willing to believe *per se* can ever be looked upon as an error, as a sin, when we consider that the act is the expression of a habit which has become essential to the development of our life from lower to higher forms.

Such an argument—as, indeed, is the case with all biological arguments of its kind—should, of course, be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive; but it tends to throw the burden of proof

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upon the opponents of the doctrine Mr. Miller combats, and gives to its advocates added ground for sympathy with Dr. James's contention. Let us now turn our attention to distinctly psychological considerations.

As we have above indicated, the existence of a state of mental stability in relation to a perception or conception is a necessary condition of belief in its reality. This condition of stability involves the whole of consciousness, both the ego and the field of presentation to the ego. It may be due to inheritance pure and simple: or it may be due to inheritance as modified by experience; by the influence of "tradition," of enforced conformity to artificial rules, or of mere imitation.

This condition of stability in itself, however, cannot, properly speaking, be called belief. It is true, indeed, that in careless speech we are wont to use the word belief incorrectly to refer to objective conditions. When we study in others the evidences of those states of mental stability which are the conditions of belief, we are led to say that these conditions themselves constitute their beliefs. We say, for instance, that all men believe in the reality of objects in the outer world, and this because they act as men would who entertained this belief: whereas nothing is more certain than that the average thoughtless man knows nothing whatever of such a belief: he is hardly able to understand what the psychologist talks about when he makes the distinction between subjective and objective, and is entirely incapable of comprehending the meaning of the questions in relation to reality about which philosophers wrangle.

But it is perfectly clear that we as psychologists must consider belief as a subjective phenomenon; and it appears to me that the major part of the divergence of opinion concerning the subject here under discussion is due to the failure on the part of the contestants to note carefully the distinction between the subjective and the objective points of view in this particular. Subjectively speaking, these states of mental stability are not states of belief at all, although they are the necessary conditions of belief. Until the existence of these states of stability is *recognized*, is apprehended cognitively, we cannot truly say that we believe. As Mr. Stout teaches us, belief necessarily implies judgment, and judgment is a phenomenon of cognition.

The existence of these states is not brought to our knowledge

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unless the stability is disturbed by doubt, and then we find ourselves making an assertion of belief, passing judgment upon the nature of the special form in which consciousness appeared before it was disturbed by the doubt.

Now just here we have the crux of the whole matter of this discussion. The condition of stability which determines belief is not only of the field of attention; it involves also the relation of the field of attention to the ego. We cannot but face the fact that in the very act which brings to us the consciousness of belief it is *we* who act, and our action consists in casting from us the contradictory suggestions involved in the condition of doubt; and in this very act, it will at once be seen, we "will to believe." I do not myself see how, subjectively speaking, we can in any case be said to believe at all unless at the moment we "will to believe." *

It appears thus that, in our experience, will is, indeed, of the very essence of the existence of belief; is implicit in each cognitive apprehension of belief. If I understand him correctly, it is this fact which Professor James expresses when he writes, "Will and Belief . . . are two names for one and the same psychological phenomenon." To this statement Mr. Miller apparently takes exception, although I must confess the grounds for his exception are not clear to me.

There are three possible cases in which the action of will is explicitly apprehended in relation to belief:

1. There are cases where we have a belief, and resist its disturbance by doubt; this is a constant characteristic of the process of human consciousness.

2. There are cases where we have before our minds two incompatible beliefs. We may allow these to remain balanced, or we may overthrow the balance by some influence from the ego,—*i.e.*, we may will to believe in one direction, and resist belief in the other. It is with this special case, if I understand him, that Dr. James deals. It may be that in the way of driving home his argument he has used language which may be interpreted to refer to the cases to be considered immediately below; but the impression I

* As Mr. Stout says, "doubt certainly seems to presuppose belief," and (I would add) actually first makes its existence apparent to us. This doubt may be naught but a questioning, whether we believe or no, without any definite suggestion of the grounds of opposition, but, be the opposition definite or indefinite, the process is always one and the same.

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gain from his writing does not convince me, as it seems to have convinced Mr. Miller, that his defence of the propriety of willing to believe is intended to relate to these cases now to be mentioned.

3. There are cases where we have a belief, and choose for one reason or another to establish within us an incompatible or contradictory belief. It is such willing to believe against which Mr. Miller pours out the vials of his wrath; but as I have said above, unless I am in error, Dr. James does not stand in defence of the man who wills to believe in this manner.

In this bare statement I have purposely said nothing of the ethical aspects of the willing in the several cases; of this I shall presently speak; but before doing so, I wish to call attention to the fact that in all these cases of willing to believe there is a unity of mental process.

In an objective sense, as we have seen, we speak of will in others where there is no consciousness on their part of the process, but we do not speak of willing in a subjective sense unless the act is brought clearly into the field of attention. In all cases of willing to believe the process is the same, and it consists in the appearance from within the ego of some influence which constrains us to resolve in some one direction the conscious opposition involved in doubt. It is from within the ego that proceeds the power to "load the dice."

Now, if I am correct in the view which I have defended in my "Instinct and Reason," this ego is but a huge bundle of instincts, or to state it more correctly, it is the psychic correspondent of a complex instinctive system, which throbs as a unit, but which is not differentiated by the excessive or emphatic partial activity of any part of the complex system: it is the mass of "feeling" so called by many, it is the field of inattention. When, therefore, there arises from within this complex system an influence which determines an act of will, this influence is due to the existence of instinctive tendencies of the most fundamental character, of the most complete co-ordination, which act without telling us (by attracting our attention) that they are acting or are going to act. This silent ego, this throbbing pulsating mass of inattention, is the resultant of our inheritance from the ages, and of only a relatively small increment due to our own experience in this life. It speaks of the experience of all our ancestors; of those who were men, and of that long line of living forms from whom the first of human beings were descended. These racial experiences have impressed upon us apper-

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ceptive systems, and impulse series, in which certain forms are implicit. When some new conception presents itself to us in which this form is *explicit*, then it is that the ego acts: it stands ready to assimilate this new conception, and when question is raised as to its reality it "loads the dice" in favor of the new conception. The existence of this form in the ego thus determines the *reality* of the conception, its relative permanence; and the conception thus becomes real for us through the influence of the ego.

As I have said above, the ego speaks of the experience of all our ancestors, of those who were men, and of man's long line of progenitors of diverse animal forms. It speaks with impressive force the voice of this racial experience. If it breaks down a hesitancy, a doubt, by determining an act of will it, in that very fact, raises objections from racial experience to the notion which is overthrown in the willing to believe. It says to us, "The elements which are present in the field of attentive consciousness represent but a paltry array of experiential effects; I who am the resultant of the experience of the ages judge that the belief which is appearing in the field of attention, and which I overthrow, has a dangerous outcome. It may be impossible to place my objection in the field of attention in ratiocinative form; but my experience from the vast æons of time leads me to see that the reality, the truth, is on my side, —that the essence of the statement which appears in the field of attention must be modified if it is to accord with this reality of racial experience. This reality is expressed in my act of will, and the doubt, if it recur and persist, should merely serve to emphasize the necessity of restatement, so that my act of will may appear to accord with the outcome of ratiocinative process."

The process as noted in experience is so concisely and vividly put by Dr. James in a private letter, that I have received his permission to transcribe his words here.

"We have a conception which being opposed by another is only **probable.** But we feel it is so good that it is **fit** to be true; it **ought** to be true; it **must** be true. And then we say 'it **shall** be true for me. It **is** true.'"

Let me attempt to interpret this in terms of the theory here upheld.

"*We have a conception which being opposed by another is only* **probable.**" In other words, a new apperceptive system appears which would become real were the opposition removed; but there is nothing at the moment to remove this opposition.

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"*But we feel it is so good that it is* fit *to be true;*" we feel that as a result of its reality if it could be realized, of its truth if it were true, either the conception would harmonize with our relatively permanent apperceptive systems, or the consequences of its reality would harmonize with our relatively permanent impulse series,—*i.e.*, would satisfy our consciences.

"*It* ought *to be true; it* must *be true,*" is the thought which then occurs to our minds. We perceive that, if it be realized, an apperceptive system of nobler type, or a reactive system more harmonious with our ideals, will be gained or sustained. The conception no longer is only probable; there is new ground for its acceptance. The reality of the ideal of nobler content cannot be abandoned, and we *must* cast aside the doubt of its reality which is implied in holding the originally considered conception to be merely probable.

"*And then we say 'it* shall *be true for me.'*" We will to believe; and behold "*It* is *true.*" The old opposition has disappeared; its harmony with the higher reality is established; it is real for me.

To this view it may be objected that there are constantly before us cases where the will to believe leads us to shift from one alternative belief to another; that indeed my argument, if carried to its conclusion, would involve the absurdity that beliefs are unalterable; but I think not. Change from one alternative belief to another does not occur without a change in the force of argument, or other influence brought to bear upon us; and in this very change is involved the alteration in the nature of the alternative belief which carries with it the modification of the essence of the statement appearing in the field of attention which is necessary to bring it into harmony with the ego-experience, and which brings the ego finally to throw its influence in favor of the belief which was formerly rejected.

So much for the psychological facts.

Let us now pass to the real question of interest in the discussion to which we are referring,—to the consideration of the ethical aspects of willing to believe.

In taking up this question, let us study in their order each of the cases of willing to believe of which we have spoken above.

We have to consider, in the first place, those cases where men have a belief and resist its disturbance by doubt. As we have

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already seen, this is a perfectly normal habit among highly developed men, and it is a habit which is generally held to be admirable in one in whom it is emphasized. It is thought to be especially noble, for instance, for a man to refuse absolutely to believe in the truth of aspersions cast upon the character of his trusted friend. Only do we consider this manner of refusing to doubt to be improper when it reaches the point at which it appears as an obstinate disregard of evidence, and then it is resolvable into an instance of those cases which we have enumerated above in the third class, viz., those cases where a man appears to hold a belief, but to deliberately endeavor to sophisticate himself, to choose the contradictory belief, because it will make him more comfortable to do so. Of such cases we shall speak after we have considered the second group of cases referred to above.

In this second group are included all those cases where men have before their minds two incompatible beliefs. These they may allow to remain balanced, or they may will to believe in one direction, and resist belief in the opposite direction. I think it will be generally agreed that where the man's convictions are nicely balanced, it is best and proper for him to reserve judgment, *in case it appears clear to him that this reserve of judgment can make no difference to him in relation to practical life.*

I acknowledge, of course, that it is theoretically impossible that even the slightest difference of belief can be without some influence upon practical life; but there are many cases where the effects are immeasurably small and entirely beyond our comprehension. In such cases there appears no proper course open to us but to reserve judgment, to hold the existing balance until some new light appears to guide our will. To contend that such reserve of judgment is unjustifiable would force us to the preposterous conclusion that all deliberation is immoral.

Evidently, we have thus a justification of all ordinary cases of the scientific reserve of judgment which Mr. Miller seems to think is not to be found if Dr. James's view is upheld. Whether, for instance, I accept the undulatory theory of light, or let us say Newton's emission theory, can so far as I am able to see make no appreciable difference in my conduct. I am willing to grant that it must make *some* difference; it must, for instance, prevent my assumption of a sympathetic attitude *in this particular* towards any of those whom I know to be defenders of these opposed theories. But it is clear that apart from this unimportant lack of sympathy the differences

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of effect upon my conduct, whether I take sides or reserve judgment, are altogether inappreciable. Moreover, as I have no inkling of the way in which these inappreciable influences will affect my character, no influence from practical life could reach me to guide my choice even were I convinced that it would be well to choose to believe in one of the rival theories. Under such conditions it seems to me clear that reserve of judgment is thoroughly proper.

Even here, however, we must note that a man is bound to guard carefully against over-confidence in his ability to judge how far his reserve of judgment may be without import.

But there are other and important cases where to hold a balance of conviction leaves the man cold where his heart should be warm, or stolid where enthusiasm is needful if he is to do his part in the struggle towards the higher life. Then it seems to me there can be little doubt that the voice of those whose opinions we all honor would be raised in defence of a deliberate dissolution of the deadlock by making a choice of one of the two balanced beliefs. For surely it is nothing short of rank cowardice to refuse to take sides in the contests of life merely because we cannot be certain which side will win. It is worse than that, it is deliberate choice of reserve of judgment when we perceive that such reserve curtails our activities in directions which we hold to be of the "nobler" type. To be sure, we may perchance choose the losing side; but, even so, we shall be no better off in the end if we remain inert and inactive. It is clearly the part of the courageous man to be willing to incur risk of failure in the interest of that forcing of divergent opinions to their issues which will the more quickly put their validity to the test of experiment.

We may well take as a test case of the position here maintained, the question of belief in the immortality of the soul. If reserve of judgment in relation to this ever-interesting subject tempts one to a life of self-indulgence, leads to a weakening of the sense of responsibility, or to a paralyzing questioning whether life be worth the living, then it were surely better for a man to solve his doubt, and to "will to believe" in the immortality of the soul. For there is this to be said for the belief,—that while one may feel that no satisfactory ratiocinative proof has been presented in its favor, that even the terms used in the statement of the doctrine are loose, and in large measure undefinable by those who uphold it; nevertheless, the continued persistence of the belief, such as it is, shows that at least it is not deeply at variance with our general trends of

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thought; and this is a strong argument in favor of holding that it is at bottom true; that while the doctrine may need re-expression to bring it into ratiocinative relation with our other beliefs, still, so far as it affects life, it is fundamentally correct.

But it appears to me that there are relatively few cases where the effect of belief or disbelief in the immortality of the soul upon moral conduct is marked: in most cases the interest in the questions involved is a purely sentimental one. It is because men long to feel again the presence of beloved companions who have died that they are led to wish for immortality of soul life.

Now, if some sceptically minded person finds himself in this position, and also impressed by the difficulties of harmonizing the belief in immortality with the dictates of Reason, I see no valid moral ground for objection to the reserve of decision. For if it is true that the soul is immortal, then no amount of disbelief in the doctrine will in itself affect our chances of realizing the communion in the future with our lost friends for which we long. It is, therefore, indifferent in this case whether we believe or disbelieve in the doctrine. If, on the other hand, the doctrine is not true, then no amount of belief in it can in the end make any difference in reference to our desire: for if the soul is not immortal, then with the dissolution of the body and of consciousness in death will also disappear the longing for the presence of the loved ones whose companionship we have lost. Consequently, in this case, also, it is indifferent whether we believe or disbelieve in the doctrine.

We may now turn finally to the consideration of those cases where a man has a certain belief and chooses to establish within himself a contradictory one. In some cases he may do this because he thinks the belief naturally held is incompatible with some nobler belief which on broader grounds seems to him incontestable. In such cases he really argues that the less noble belief naturally held must be possible of restatement in terms not inconsistent with the nobler belief. He, in fact, chooses in effect to cast aside a doubt which would disturb what he considers a nobler belief. The "scientist" to-day is constantly taking this very course with reference, for instance, to the phenomena which are being studied by the Society for Psychical Research, and priding himself often upon his attitude in refusing to consider evidence of facts which seem to him incompatible with scientific postulates of much more far reaching import. His act is evidently but a complex instance

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of that considered under the first class of cases above mentioned, and, as we then argued, is not to be considered improper.

But it is, of course, conceivable that a man may voluntarily alter his belief in the interests of greater comfort of mind or body. In such a case there can be no question that his act, as viewed by himself in retrospect, or as viewed by a moral critic, will fail to harmonize with that relatively permanent series of impulses which determines the higher moral standard. In other words, he will then be wrong in his act. But here his sin does not consist in the willing to believe *per se*, but in the willing to subordinate his "higher self" to his "lower self," which in all cases must necessarily lead us to denounce his action, whatever be its form or content.

From the purely subjective point of view we have here presented naught else than a particular case of the general ethical problem: we are merely dealing with an application of such a rule of conduct as we find to be of the most general moral value. In all cases the real question at issue is whether our willing to believe will be approved in retrospect after the act, whether it will satisfy our conscience.

The rule of conduct which I find most efficient to this end is that which I have lately considered at length in my "Instinct and Reason," from the last chapter of which I may perhaps be allowed in closing to quote the substance of a few paragraphs.

The whole drift of the argument there presented makes it apparent that the important consideration in the guidance of our lives is attention to, and the strengthening of, the more far-reaching and pervasive and persistent, although often less emphatic, impulses within us; that this is necessary, indeed, if we are to become efficient individuals in the racial group to which we belong, and which we hope will persist and develop in the future. Unless our habit of action leads to such results, we can never expect our acts as viewed in retrospect to harmonize, even approximately, with the relatively permanent impulse series which presents itself to our mind at the moment of retrospect; or, in other words, can never expect to satisfy in any degree the demands of conscience which are determined by the existence of this relatively permanent hierarchy of impulses.

It is apparent that, if we are to satisfy conscience, in each case we must so act that the remembrance of our act will show it to be harmonious with our ethical ideal,—will show it to have been one which was the outcome of a contest of impulses in which the rela-

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tive potency of the impulses involved corresponded with that of the series which determines our highest ethical ideal. If we so act, we shall find conscience satisfied.

HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.

NEW YORK.

"THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND THE DUTY TO DOUBT."

THE importance of some of the issues raised by Professor Miller in his brilliant and forcible observations on the Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt naturally call for some comment upon the state to which they reduce the question at issue between Professor James and himself. Mr. Miller certainly seems justified in his contention that the letter of Mr. James's Essay would have us believe upon confessedly insufficient grounds. Mr. James speaks, he points out, (1) as if the will to believe were the same thing as belief, and (2) as if our willing to believe effectually converted the hypothetical entities of belief into objective realities. That believing converts, for the believer, certain vaguely conceived entities into realities is doubted, to be sure, neither by Mr. Miller nor by any one else. But this, he rightly insists, is not a philosophy of the belief in objective realities. The Essay does not show that the logic of desire and courage is the same thing as the logic of the "upright intellect" or as the logic of *evidence*.

In the light, then, of Mr. Miller's insistence on evidence as a condition of belief, Mr. James's Will to Believe seems to reduce itself simply to the willingness to accept such evidence. This partly explains why this book has been so welcome to the apologist for religion (*e.g.*, to M. Brunetière and others): it puts the *imprimatur* of a master psychologist upon the contention that if men only took the pains to obtain evidence they might haply find it. Still, no man is logically justified in saying one positive word for belief, who has not in his mind more or less definite conceptions about some "world of reality," some "plane" or "universe" of discourse (as the logicians term it), that he knows to be real, prior even to his mere thinking about it or his staking his "all" upon its existence. After a short canvass of Mr. James's "specific articles of faith" (at one time an "unseen world" that "stretches beyond this visible order," but "of which we know nothing positive," at another a "power" which "not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which recognizes us") and of his account of the relations, or *absence* (for "immortality" is passed over, and there is little about any kind of

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"communion" of our spirits with the unseen) *of relations* sustained by our spirits to the realities (?) of belief, Mr. Miller has little difficulty in showing that Mr. James speaks of the world of religious realities as something that we make or unmake by our faith or by our doubt. We all, indeed, remember that Mr. James quite makes a point of doing this very thing. But, then, while admitting that "faith in a fact" may "help to create the fact," he also confesses that any "believer at the present day . . . can always doubt his creed." His logic of belief is, in short, always a subjective thing at best. We may *will* to believe, but we can "never allow that will to take effect." It may be only too true that few "believers" of to-day are free from doubt, and many of us may think with Browning that a certain amount of doubt is appropriate to our condition as mortal men, but then, as Mr. Miller says, the case for belief is not complete; and his contention is undoubtedly useful if it causes believers to base their faith on something more objective than desire.

If Mr. James could only incorporate Mr. Miller's point about evidence with his own theory of the will, we should then have a bridge between the subjective world of wishes and desires and the objective world of realities. My point is that he could do this by borrowing either from his own or from Mr. Miller's implicit philosophy of belief.* (1) Mr. James confesses to being an "absolute empiricist." This is hopeful. We are all absolute empiricists—Hegel as well as Aristotle. Psychologically speaking, a man's will may be said to be the sum of the tendencies to act that his experience has led him to regard as in conformity with the tendency of things, and (also psychologically speaking) a man's belief is his active sense of the realities with which his experience has brought him into contact. Psychologically, will and belief are two sides of the one phenomenon,—our active sense of that which our experience has brought us into contact. A man cannot will to relate himself to realities of which he has had no experience. If a man wills to relate himself to an unseen order, this implies that he has *experience* of that order in himself and in his life. And there is much in life and in philosophy and in literature to show that man has such experience; the will to believe implies it. (2) Mr. James could say that his will to believe denotes a man's power of testing by conscious

* See Mr. Miller's distinction between beliefs *found* and beliefs *made*. (This JOURNAL, preceding number, pp. 188–190.)

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experience the action-value or the organizative-value (*i.e.*, the value so far as the systematizing of his own "tendencies" and "nature" or of those of mankind) of the highest religious practices and ideas of his time and environment. Only, both Mr. James and Mr. Miller allow themselves to speak as if a man's adoption of the social or the organization [they are practically the same] stand-point were matter of arbitrary and conscious choice, and not of inevitable and unconscious volition. Professor Baldwin and others have shown (Mr. Balfour has hinted at it) that the self can be and is "organized" *only* through its unconscious adoption of the "social" or the universalizing attitude. Mr. Miller in particular admits, but only to disparage it, the fact of our falling in with the ways, and consequently with the beliefs, of society—"*cela vous fera croire et vous abêtira*," as it were. But then we are slowly coming to see the truth that the individual needs the stand-point of society to interpret the world of objective reality, to universalize his own experience, or even to analyze it into its fundamental elements. Hence the will to believe reposes upon the *belief* of humanity, and the belief of humanity expresses *reality*, expresses its sense of the reality of the World-Will and of the relations sustained by that Will to us. Reality as we know it consists of that which, or those things which, we know to affect or limit or sustain our activity. This idea of belief as a kind of *coefficient* of reality, as our subjective sense of that which our experience teaches us we can with impunity (or successfully) *will*, is unfolded as matter of scientific fact, not of mere imagination, in James's two volumes on psychology.

(3) Mr. James can deny the literal and the real truth of Mr. Miller's emphatic declaration, the declaration on which his [Mr. Miller's] whole argument rests, that the "will to believe is a thing to be absolutely separated from the will to know the truth." I do not take the word *absolutely* seriously, for Mr. Miller is too much of a philosopher to really think that anything can be absolutely separated from anything else. The will to believe cannot even for the purposes of argumentation be separated from the will to know the truth. Truth means, as Mr. Miller says, that which corresponds to reality; but by reality we can mean only that which sustains some relation to our *will* or our practical activity. That is true which affects our volition in a constant and invariable way. From neither a psychological, nor a logical, nor an ethical, nor a metaphysical point of view can the will to know the truth be separated from the will to believe. Most men will confess that they believe

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in and know only that which they have experienced. The will to believe (as the will to act in accordance with the conditions of one's experience) is susceptible of a rationalistic interpretation, an interpretation that glorifies knowledge, or, if you will, glorifies that criticism* or sifting or interpretation of experience in which true knowledge (and true belief, too) consists. I believe only in that which I know to be operative in my experience. With Mr. Miller, I refuse to believe in that which may possibly be untrue or unreal, *i.e.*, in that which forms no intrinsic part of my experience.

Speaking now in general, when Mr. James would have us decide such an option as that between the truth and falsity of the "religious hypothesis" by our passionate nature instead of by our intellect, what he implies and really means is that my actions (*e.g.*, the "preference of some things," the "eternal things," over "some other things") cannot be regarded as events outside myself, like events and happenings of the external world, to be explained as "a progressive integration of matter and a concomitant loss of motion;" but must be regarded as the manifestations of a will that is not a mere event or appearance, and that can never be "presented" or examined as such. He means that it is absurd to talk as if the realities of religion were things outside my inward, warm, living experience, and not that very inward experience itself, with its high "native resolution" and inward imperiousness and conscious immortality, that experience which causes us to look upon many of our mundane actions and all the pomp and pride of circumstance as

> "Fallings from us, vanishings;
> Blank misgivings of a creature
> Moving about in *worlds not realized.*"

Decide by my "passional" or by my entire nature, my inward will! Aye, verily! and why not? It is of that very nature with all its true inwardness and its non-spatial and its non-temporal character, that the world of moral and religious realities is an expression and embodiment. It is in the service of that very nature and its world that the categories of time and space and cause and reflex action and vital action are applied to the construction of the different planes or spheres of phenomenal reality, that are subordinate to the world of social and moral reality that man, by virtue of his inward and eternal will, has erected on his other-

* See Mr. Miller on the functions of reason, *loc. cit.*, p. 189.

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wise merely physical and biological environment.* That is, if any man puts before me the alternatives of regarding my actions as either determined by a physical and natural order or not determined at all, as "unintelligible," I shall object point-blank to the ground of his distinction. I shall refuse to put my actions *out there, outside* myself, and to say of them, as I do and must about all things in the world other than myself or my actions, "These actions are determined either by these causes or by these others." For everything outside myself, everything phenomenal (*Alles Vergängliche*) is only an appearance (*ist nur ein Gleichniss*), is only a "thing" among other things, only a *presentation*, only the meeting-point or intersection-point of a multiplicity of relations. That which is more than phenomenal, that which we can never see in the world of appearance and phenomenal causation (*das Unzulängliche, das Unbeschreibliche*), can take being and shape only in the world of my inward action (*Hier wird's Ereigniss; Hier ist es gethan*). Here in the world of my action, of my passional nature (when we think, to be sure, of passion in the sense in which Wordsworth conceives it in his "Ode," or Shelley in his "Skylark," or "West Wind"), here is the eternal translated into time—here, in my action, do I impart to momentary circumstance eternal significance and meaning—*dem Augenblick Dauer verleihen.* The will to believe, the will to express the absolute and the eternal in the otherwise phenomenal and transitory, is the *only* way to *reality*, to the truth of reality, to something to which everything else can be related, and which is not itself a mere thing whose reality lies outside itself. And so, again, the will to believe cannot possibly be separated from the will to know the truth from the will to know reality.

In the foregoing, I have not seriously considered the question of the literal correctness or incorrectness of Mr. Miller's interpretation of Mr. James. To try to do so would seem to me both gratuitous and irrelevant. I have rather tried to suggest that Mr. James's apparent reliance on volition and feeling, in the extremity of an intellectual *impasse*, is not necessarily the illogical and unwarrantable thing, the μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος that it seems at first sight to be,—not the attempt to "clear one's character as a man" by committing "folly as a thinker." When properly un-

* See my "Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance," chapters iii. ("theory of knowledge"), viii. ("metaphysic"), ix. ("religion").

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derstood, it may be compared to the attempt of Hegel to reach a point of view from which many of the apparent contradictions of "common sense" and of the critical understanding may be seen to disappear, or, more simply, to the effort to obtain that experience in which a truly rational basis may be found for belief. Mr. James's apparent *irrationalism* reduces itself to a protest against limiting either experience or philosophy to the plane of the understanding with its "either—or" antitheses and its enumeration of abstract possibilities; and his apparent *romanticism* to the contention that the truth of belief can and will and *does* (it seems to me) dawn upon the world only in consequence of right action, *i.e.*, of action that we will to be in harmony with a perception of the realities and probabilities of spiritual personality. This is, I think, a classical position of more than one of the world's great religions. Its application to ethical philosophy may be studied in Aristotle, to psychology in James and Stout and Baldwin, to logic in many recent treatises, and to general philosophy in Schopenhauer, whose doctrine that the world consists of *presentation* (outer "things") and will (the "inward," the *reality*) may be called classical philosophy. Still, we know from the fate of Nietzsche's philosophy how dangerous it is to separate will too rigidly from intellect. To Mr. Miller we are indebted for pointing out at least *indirectly* the lines along which Mr. James's apparent irrationalism must be interpreted if it is to receive credible meaning. *Experience* is the idea that connects will and belief.

WILLIAM CALDWELL.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, ILLINOIS.

THE OXFORD CHAIRS OF PHILOSOPHY.

IN *The Contemporary Review* for November, 1898, there is an interesting article by Professor J. H. Muirhead dealing with the above subject. What he seeks to bring out is the extraordinary way in which the most distinguished teachers of philosophy in Oxford have been passed over, one after another, in recent appointments to these chairs. The instances given are certainly very remarkable, —the latest and one of the most significant being the refusal of the electing Board to appoint Edward Caird to the Whyte's Chair of Moral Philosophy, in spite of the fact that his candidature was supported (and indeed specially invited) by nearly all the experts in the subject connected with Oxford. Earlier instances were the rejection of Green and Nettleship. Mr. Muirhead attributes these

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striking results to the way in which the electoral Boards are constituted, and suggests that certain reforms should be introduced with a view of securing a greater representation of expert opinion. Such reforms have already been carried out in Cambridge with the most beneficial results,—the two Chairs of Philosophy in that University being now occupied by Henry Sidgwick and James Ward respectively. This is a matter of considerable importance to all who are interested in the study of philosophy; and Mr. Muirhead's article may be commended to the careful attention of readers of this JOURNAL.

It is pleasant to be able to report that, since Mr. Muirhead's article was written, one thoroughly good appointment has been made in Oxford. The powers of darkness do not always prevail even there. Mr. Stout has been elected to the Wilde Lectureship in Psychology.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE METAPHYSIC OF EXPERIENCE. In four volumes. By Shadworth H. Hodgson, Hon. LL.D., Edinburgh, etc. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. Pp. xv., 459, 403, 446, 503.

"This work, to which the labor of eighteen years has been devoted, aims at setting forth, in outline, a complete system of philosophy. The idea upon which it rests is that analysis of actual experience, avoiding assumptions, is the only trustworthy guide in framing a conception of the nature of the universe of which we are a part, the framing of such a conception being the special aim and problem which philosophy proposes to itself. In adopting this idea, it breaks decisively with all *a priori* philosophy, and more particularly with the *a priori* philosophy of Kant, and the various idealistic systems to which it has given rise.

"Book I., occupying Vol. I., analyzes the experience which gives us our conception of an external material world, and by that analysis justifies our belief in its reality.

"Book II., occupying Vol. II., considers the connection of the series of positive sciences with philosophy,—mathematic, kinematic,

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dynamic, energetic, chemistry, biology, natural history, and psychology—to which latter science it falls to investigate the real *nexus* obtaining between the energies of the physical world and consciousness, thus treating consciousness in its character of a real existent; that is, as something which has a genesis and history in individual subjects. Metaphysic, on the other hand, treats consciousness in its character of a knowing; that is, in connection with its objects generally, all knowledge necessarily consisting of consciousness, whatever its object may be. And this distinction between consciousness as an existent and consciousness as a knowing, which is perceived only in and by analysis, is in a certain sense the pivot of the present work, by enabling a definite line of demarcation to be drawn between the two provinces,—psychology, which ranks as a positive science, and metaphysic, which is philosophy.

"In Book III., occupying Vol. III., and the first half of Vol. IV., the psychological processes of association, imagination, thinking, and willing, along with their emotional content, are first examined, —namely, in the first three chapters; the last three chapters of that book being devoted, by analysis of experience, to lay the foundations (1) of logic, (2) of æsthetic and poetic, and (3) of ethic, the three main branches of practical science.

"Finally, in Book IV., occupying the latter half of Vol. IV., and entitled 'The Real Universe,' are set forth (1) the grounds which our previous analyses supply for a speculative conviction of the reality of an unseen world beyond the material or seen world, and (2) the reasons which we derive, according to Kant's profound conception (which forms no necessary part of his *a priori* system), from our own practical and moral nature, for faith in the divine governance of the universe; thus laying, in the analysis of that practical and moral nature, combined with the speculative conviction of an unseen reality, the foundations of a theology."

This abstract is given by the author himself in an advertisement of his book, and may, perhaps, suffice to indicate its general character. It is a book which the student of philosophy can hardly afford to neglect, and yet it is probably not one from which such a student is likely to derive any great profit. Indeed, the abstract given above might almost suffice to show both these points. The comprehensive way in which the problem has been conceived, and the labor devoted to the working of it out, give the book a real interest for all those who have the time and patience to struggle through

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it. On the other hand, the contrast which the writer draws between his own method as "analysis of actual experience, avoiding assumptions" and what he calls "the *a priori* philosophy of Kant, and the various idealistic systems to which it has given rise," seems to show a complete and startling misconception of the significance of one of the most important lines of recent philosophic thought.

The comprehensive and systematic character of the work makes it impossible to give any adequate account of any particular part of it in a short review. The part that specially concerns this JOURNAL occurs in Book III., and is probably far from being the most interesting or original part of the work. It will be seen from the abstract given above that Dr. Hodgson groups Ethic with Logic, Æsthetic, and Poetic under the head of practical sciences. "Logic and Ethic," however, "are the only two sciences of practice which are strictly necessary to philosophy; Poetic having a jurisdiction which it holds of Ethic as its suzerain, over a province appropriated out of Ethic's wider dominions, although within that province it is supreme." (Vol. IV., pp. 3, 4.) "The cardinal and ultimate distinction between the domains of Logic and Ethic, as practical sciences, is this: that Logic speaks of the ways in which we must think, if we would avoid error in thinking; Ethic of the way in which we must choose, if we would avoid blame in choosing; both thinking and choosing being necessities of our nature." (*Ibid.*, p. 4.) The distinction between Ethic and Logic is further brought out in this way (Vol. III., pp. 9, 10): "The former . . . treats of purposive action in its widest scope; that is, including all special branches of practice, so far as the purpose is concerned at which they aim, and by which they are distinguished from one another; and the latter of reasoning, as an action at once directed to the ascertainment of truth of fact, entering into all the other conscious pursuits or branches of practice as the cognitive element in them, and capable in that instrumental character of being rightly or wrongly directed, and of attaining greater or less degrees of perfection. In short, Ethic includes Logic, so far as Reasoning is purposive action, and Logic includes Ethic, so far as Practice is rational and cognitive action."

It is further noted that both these sciences have their roots in positive facts of human nature. "Both kinds of action are . . . subject to laws of Nature . . . seeing that they fundamentally consist of physiological processes; but they are demarcated as a special

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class of those processes by the circumstance that the consciousness, with which they are attended, includes a perception of purpose more or less distinctly apprehended, whereby they become what may most properly be called both forward-looking and self-modifying actions." (*Ibid.*, p. 10.)

"The characteristic difference of a science of practice from a positive or speculative one lies in this forward-looking and self-modifying attitude of the action which is its object-matter. Like other sciences it is founded in analysis, the analysis of its object-matter. A science of practice is one which begins by analyzing practice. But since this forward-looking and self-modifying attitude of the action is the essential characteristic which makes it the object-matter of a special science, . . . it follows that every science of practice has to consider the aims, ends, or purposes which are or may be proposed to itself by the practice which is its object-matter, as well as the laws of nature to which it is subject as a physiological action. It has to consider not only what the practice is and must be *de facto*, as a physiological action subject to laws of nature, but also what it is best or most desirable that it should be; that is, to what aims, ends, or purposes it ought to be directed within those laws of nature." (*Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11.)

"In this way and in obedience to this necessity it is, that sciences of practice become themselves practical sciences; that is, their doctrines are the guides to right action. Ideals are part of their object-matter, since they are involved in the practice of which they treat, in its character of a forward-looking action. A positive science is directed simply to the discovery of what is *de facto*, whether in nature at large or in human action, which is part of nature. A practical science or science of practice . . . is directed, over and above this and in combination with it, to the consideration of what is best or most desirable in human action, considered as a forward-looking action the direction or aim of which is still to be determined. . . . In positive sciences the result is conceived as conformity of thought to fact; in practical sciences and in practice, as a conformity of fact to thought. The aim of the former is knowledge of reality, that is, truth; the aim of the latter is realization of an ideal or of a precept, that is, goodness or right." (*Ibid.*, pp. 11, 12.)

It appears from this that Dr. Hodgson by no means identifies himself with those recent writers who regard ethic as simply a science of the actually existent. He is thus led to contrast it with psychol-

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ogy. "All sciences of practice or practical sciences are, as such and in that character, part and parcel of metaphysic or philosophy, as distinguished from psychology, which is a positive science. To treat any practical science as a branch of psychology, or more generally still, of anthropology, or of (so-called) sociology, is a fallacy of the most fatal and destructive kind, because it denaturalizes the object-matter with which it deals, namely, practice, and transforms it into its opposite, a simply *de facto* process, subject to laws of nature only, and not subject to laws of conduct, laws prescribing the good and right, forbidding the bad and wrong, laws which, until they are obeyed, or when they are disobeyed, in any given case of practice, have for that case of practice a *de jure* validity only. The whole difference between good and evil is obliterated by regarding practice as the object-matter of psychology or any branch of it. Physiological psychology supplies, indeed, one-half of the whole theory of practice, dealing as it does with its proximate real conditions, but the fundamental conceptions and constitutive ideas of that theory are given by metaphysical analysis."

Such statements might perhaps lead the reader to expect that some metaphysical account would be given of the moral ideal, that some "Idea of the Good," like that of Plato, would be expounded, and that the particular duties of life would be derived from this. But this is not Dr. Hodgson's method of procedure. "All thinking," he says (*Ibid.*, p. 75), "is harmonizing, connecting, and relating this idea with that, under the Postulates of Logic. Now, just as all thinking governed by the desire of knowing more than at present about any given object-matter is an attempt to harmonize the given facts of that object-matter with themselves, and with others that may be given,—conformity with given facts of perception being the criterion or test of truth in the thought about the facts, whereby thought is raised into knowledge, and not any particular preconceived conformity or harmony of ideas or thoughts among themselves,—so all thinking about conscious action, or action consciously directed to change and modify the facts included in its object-matter *in futuro*, that is to say, all thinking about present desires, which are the springs of action, governed by the desire of knowing which of them will produce the best modification, is a judging which of them will best harmonize with, or tend to produce harmony among, the other desires or tendencies of the subject's own nature or character; and the thought of such a harmony is a thought by which our judgment is always more or less ex-

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plicitly, but necessarily to some extent guided, though it is not the thought of any particular ideal state, in which we may imagine the harmony to be realized. Such a particular ideal state of harmony would correspond only to an hypothesis, in thinking governed by the desire of knowledge. At the same time there is this great difference between the two cases of speculative and practical thinking, —namely, that the power of verifying truth which in speculative thinking is supplied by subsequently perceived facts, makes default in practical thinking, and leaves us with no other criterion but that which is supplied by the nature of thought itself, as a harmonizing process, together with the already known nature of the objects judged, that is, of volitions."

We are thus thrown back upon the voice of Conscience, as the form in which such harmony or want of harmony is apprehended; and "it must be noted, that what we can now define as an anticipated harmony inherent in the action of Conscience is not necessarily present explicitly, either in that form, or in the form of a conception at all, at the moment when Conscience judges. It is not a standard conception or idea, which, like an unit of measure, Conscience brings with it ready made, with which to compare alternative acts of choice. This is only the ethical theorist's description of the action of Conscience in comparing alternatives with each other. Conscience previous to Ethic judges in a way which, in Ethic, analysis compels us to call judging by anticipating and requiring a harmony in the choice which it approves. But it is not implied that Conscience recognizes this nature in its own judgments, though it is a nature which, as we perceive subsequently, that is, in framing a theory of practice, brings it into line with the other great departments of thought. Conscience approves and disapproves acts of choice, judging one really better and another really worse (and not merely apparently or for the feeling of the moment), long before any formulation of the mode or ground of its judgments can have been framed. Just in the same way, logical thought works, and has always worked, by the principles which we formulate as the Postulates of Logic, long before that formulation was possible, and quite independently of their being so formulated. In what may be called pre-ethical judgments of conscience, the subject asks himself, without reference to theory, with regard to any action upon which he may be deliberating, Can I do this action, or can I do any other but this, without being inconsistent with what I know to be at once the most abiding and the most valuable constituent of

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my nature, as a self-conscious being?" "The function of conscience . . . is simply to judge whether the adoption of a given desire will or will not be in harmony with the rest of the subject's own desires and tendencies in their entirety, when these are taken as a part of the known course of nature, supposing it to be continued into the future, and his own life continued with it." "There is," thus "a master-end set up, . . . namely, the production of a self-consistent character in the agent. This end it is which takes the place of happiness or welfare, both in moral practice and in ethical theory, when the facts are subjected to a strict analysis." (*Ibid.*, pp. 75–79.)

It is easy to see from the extracts that have now been given that there is a marked similarity between the ethical system of Dr. Hodgson and what is commonly known as idealistic ethics. Many of the statements that have just been quoted might quite well have been taken from an idealistic hand-book. The resemblance might probably have been still greater if Dr. Hodgson had not at the outset closed his eyes to the light coming from this quarter by setting idealism aside as *a priori*, apparently in complete ignorance of the fact that the idealism of Kant and his successors professes to be nothing else than an interpretation of what is involved in experience. Dr. Hodgson continues to be an adherent of the school of empiricism in the English sense,—*i.e.*, he ignores, or at least ignores as far as he can, the elements of universality contained in experience. Instead of regarding it as the work of thought to make experience intelligible by bringing out these universal elements, he thinks of thought as only introducing a certain "harmony" into the particular content of experience. This word "harmony" is characteristic. It is the same word that Leibniz used in his attempt to reconcile the unity of the world with the reality of its individual parts. It is the term that seems naturally to suggest itself when reason speaks "in the language of the understanding." "A 'harmony' . . . is what seems to come nearest to the satisfaction of the claims of reason without undue offence to the understanding. In such a compromise, however, the substantial victory is left in the hands of the understanding; its abstractions are treated as complete and independent realities, while their unity is reduced to a shadow." * It would almost seem as if Dr. Hodgson were seeking to introduce the same sort

* Caird's "Philosophy of Kant," first edition, p. 108.

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of compromise into English empiricism that Leibniz introduced into German rationalism.

As regards his treatment of ethics in particular, one might have thought that the analogy of logic, to which he refers so frequently, would have saved him in some degree from the position he takes up. It seems clear that on Dr. Hodgson's view there is a complete want of parallelism between the two subjects in respect of the objectivity of the standards involved in them. However true it may be—and the truth is probably apt to be a good deal exaggerated—that people thought correctly before there was any study of logic, yet the ultimate question, from the logical point of view, is not, What do you think? or even, How do your thoughts cohere together? but, What is the truth? A coherent body of thought which does not conform to the facts of the case is called fanaticism or prejudice, and is not treated with much respect from the logical point of view. Is moral fanaticism or prejudice any more respectable? If not, there must be an appeal from the moral conscience of the individual, as there is from his logical conscience, to some more objective standard. If Dr. Hodgson had worked out this parallelism, I cannot but think that he would have been led over completely to the position of idealistic ethics.

As it is, however, he rests in a kind of intuitionism, the ultimate appeal being to the conscience of the individual. Hence also he thinks of the moral standard under the form of duty rather than under the form of the good. His conception of duty, however, is not, like that of Kant, the conception of a universally valid categorical imperative, but rather that of a command, valid only for the individual who lays it down. "A great deal of the disrepute," he says (Vol. IV., p. 107), "and disfavor attaching to the idea of conscience in popular estimation comes from the false supposition that those who speak of it must necessarily profess to be able to form immediate or, as they are sometimes called, *intuitive* judgments on general questions of practice, say, for instance, such a practice as that of vivisection in physiological laboratories, and stamp the practice as morally good or bad, not only irrespective of the persons who practise it, but simply from the nature of the practice itself, whatever it may be." This is erroneous. "Conscience has immediate jurisdiction only over the acts of the individual conscious being to whom it belongs. It tells the individual only what he himself is to do and think in respect of any given practice, though described in general terms,—vivisection, for in-

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stance; and even this it does not tell him by simple apprehension of the meaning of the name describing it. For this purpose he has to inquire both what it involves and what its consequences are."

"Nevertheless," Dr. Hodgson proceeds, "the effect of these facts is not to preclude individuals, all or any, from forming probable judgments concerning the morality of the actions of other persons by analogy with those they form with certainty concerning their own actions, and on the assumption that those persons are also endowed with conscience." (What an assumption!) "It is in this mediate way and in this restricted sense that the judgments and classifications of ethic, relating to actions generally, are formed in the first instance, and become legitimately applicable to estimate the actions of persons other than the person who forms them. It is almost needless to add that such judgments are not judgments of conscience; they are more or less accurately formed judgments of a more or less rudimentary ethic." "It is only," he goes on, "by the consensus of individuals that ethical judgments become generally established, and that ethic itself comes into existence as a practical science of general applicability. Considered as the offspring of conscience, it may be said to purchase its applicability to general classes of action, to the actions of men in general and to the joint or combined actions of men in societies, by surrender of that immediate jurisdiction over the actions of individuals, which is the prerogative of its parent, the individual conscience alone. Ethic, therefore, is a generally applicable science, notwithstanding that conscience, which is its ultimate and most essential basis, has immediate authority over the individual alone."

This individualistic conception of the ultimate basis of ethic leads Dr. Hodgson to attach great importance to the question of the freedom of the will. "Without real freedom of choice there could be no real moral responsibility; and the sense of it, if it were still felt, would have, like the sense of freedom, to be classed as an illusion." (*Ibid.*, p. 120.) "The question of Free-Will and that of Conscience are together exhaustive of ethical phenomena, and to treat them in relation to one another is, therefore, the indispensable business of philosophy." The discussion of this question, however, is perhaps too metaphysical for consideration in such a journal as this.

In general, it seems to me that the significance of Dr. Hodgson's work lies in its being a final attempt to make the English empirical

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line of thought tenable by combining it with elements derived from other systems. In this respect it bears some resemblance—though certainly not a very close one—to Dr. Sidgwick's attempt to make Hedonism tenable. Perhaps it is almost inevitable that such an attempt should be a trifle long and tedious. Certainly Dr. Hodgson's work, which extends to more than fourteen hundred pages, reads, on the whole, more like a translation from the German than an original English production. And, indeed, in one passage he bursts into German verse (Vol. III., p. 397), but this is one of the very few points at which he relaxes the severity of a rather ponderous style. Still, there can be no doubt that his book is a work of vast labor and considerable interest. It is also well got up, and is provided with an excellent index. It is a pity that some of the labor devoted to the writing of it could not have been spared for its condensation.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

JOHN RUSKIN, SOCIAL REFORMER. By J. A. Hobson. London: Nisbet & Co., 1898. With Photogravure Portrait, demy 8vo, 12*s.* 6*d.* Pp. ix., 336.

Mr. Hobson may be justly congratulated on having produced a book of supreme interest and value to economic students and social reformers. To reduce the splendid disorder of Mr. Ruskin's reasoning to logical order and precision is an undertaking that requires no little skill and courage. Mr. Hobson's success is due to the admirable patience and judgment which he has brought to the task. The book represents much more than an exposition, systematic and extensive as this is: it is a critical estimate and appreciation; an attempt to place Mr. Ruskin as an economic and social teacher. For Mr. Hobson claims for the great art-critic the distinction of being "a philosophic thinker upon the nature and modes of social progress, particularly on its economic side." The motive of the exposition is stated in the following passage:

"My design is to render some assistance to those who are disposed to admit the validity of the claim which Mr. Ruskin has made to be first and above all else a Political Economist, and who are willing to give careful consideration alike to the strictures he has passed upon current economic theory and practice and to the schemes of social and industrial construction which he has advocated with zeal and persistency for over thirty years. The main

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part of this book is devoted to a statement and a vindication of Mr. Ruskin's claim to have placed Political Economy upon a sounder scientific and ethical foundation than it had hitherto possessed, and to have built upon that foundation an ideal of a prosperous human society."

The first chapter (on "Formative Influences of Early Life") gives a brief sketch of the outer circumstances of Mr. Ruskin's life and of the order of growth in his interests; in the second, Mr. Hobson traces the transition "from art to reform"—from criticism of art to criticism of life. "The root of Mr. Ruskin's theory of art is its service to humanity through the presentation of noble ideas." It is in this reference of art to the demands of human life that the germ of Mr. Ruskin's social teaching is to be found. The "clear and growing recognition of the organic relation between art and national character was the bridge from Mr. Ruskin's art mission to his social mission." Mr. Hobson traces the development of Mr. Ruskin's social teaching from "Modern Painters" to "Fors Clavigera" in a very interesting manner.

Chapters follow upon Mr. Ruskin's critical and constructive work in economics and social reform,—his indictment of the current "Political Economy" on the one hand and of the industrial system on the other, together with his own theory of "social economics" and industrial organization. The moment is certainly favorable for a dispassionate estimate of Mr. Ruskin's economics, inasmuch as the changes in economic theory and practice have (to a great extent) coincided with the direction indicated by Mr. Ruskin, though they may not be historically connected with his actual teaching. Mr. Hobson is as critical as he is sympathetic,—"the particular qualities and defects of Mr. Ruskin's criticism and constructive policy are examined in some detail,"—and one of his most instructive criticisms is directed to Mr. Ruskin's repudiation of democracy, whether in politics or industry. These chapters form the *pièce de résistance* of Mr. Hobson's book, and will be variously estimated; but as an instance of Mr. Hobson's judicial spirit the following passage may be cited:

"Our claim is not that Mr. Ruskin has formed a system of sociology, or that he has advanced far towards such a system, but that he has pointed the way to such a science, and has laid down certain hypotheses of fact and terminology such as are consistent with advances made independently by other scientific men. By insisting upon the reduction of all economic terms, such as value,

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cost, utility, etc., to terms of 'vitality,' by insisting upon the organic integrity and unity of all human activities, and the organic nature of the co-operation of the social units, and, finally, by furnishing a social ideal of reasonable humanity, Mr. Ruskin has amply justified his claim as a pioneer in the theory of Social Economics."

The real contributions of Mr. Ruskin to political economy are represented in the following manner:

"He has laid a solid foundation of social economics as the science of the relation of efforts and satisfactions in a society. By insisting upon the reduction of money-measure 'cost' and 'utility' to subjective or human 'cost' and 'utility' he has taken a truly scientific and not, as commonly supposed, a sentimental position." His work will hereafter be recognized as "the first serious attempt in England to establish a scientific basis of economic study from the social stand-point." In this respect Mr. Ruskin's teaching is on a line with the most progressive economic theory: "it is becoming more widely admitted that both the starting-point and the goal of economic activity is human life, and that all economic terms must be reduced to the standard not of money, but of man."

Special chapters are devoted to Mr. Ruskin's educational theories and experiments, his attitude towards machinery, and his views of the position of woman. Finally, some account is given of the Society and Guild of St. George, and of the industrial and educational experiments either directly associated with the guild or animated by the spirit of Mr. Ruskin's social teaching. In a final chapter on Mr. Ruskin's work and influence Mr. Hobson attempts the following summary:

"As social reformer he has conferred signal services both in criticism and in construction of the theory and the art of social economics. The three deepest and most destructive maladies of modern industrial society he has exposed with more intellectual acuteness and with more convincing eloquence than any other writer. These are, first, the prevalent mechanization of work and life; secondly, injustice as an economic basis of all bargaining; thirdly, the definite forms of waste and injury to work and human character arising from trade competition.

"On the constructive side he has laid a true scientific foundation of a science and art of social economics by insisting upon (1) the reduction of commercial to human 'costs' and 'utilities' as the true foundation of a theory of wealth; (2) the inclusion of non-

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commercial as well as commercial values,—*i.e.*, the maintenance of the organic unity of the related faculties of effort and enjoyment; (3) the establishment of a social standard of goodness or happiness as an ideal.

"To this it must be added that he made the most searching inquiry into the human processes involved in production and consumption.

"'Honest production, just distribution, wise consumption,'—these words summarize the reforms the necessity of which he labored to enforce."

This last extract may give some idea of the scope and significance of Mr. Hobson's book. It would, no doubt, be possible to take exception to some of his judgments; in particular, is not his scornful language about orthodox economists somewhat wanting in perspective? But it is eminently a book which a reviewer would rather recommend than criticise. No reader of this JOURNAL should neglect to read it, however much or however little he may accept some of its positions. The book is worthy of the subject; it is a very real help; and it is a contribution not only to the understanding of Mr. Ruskin's social and economic science but to social and economic science itself. But perhaps its highest praise is that, apart from its own intrinsic importance, it will prove not only a real help but a fresh incentive to the study of the original.

There are, however, some slips and misprints which should be corrected in a future edition,—*e.g.*, the quotation on page 41 ("only" for "not"), "Comptist," page 195, "longer" for "larger," page 307; and surely it was Lassalle not Schulze-Delitsch who advocated "state-assisted" industrial societies. Words like "spiral," "pivotal," "preachment," are not attractive, and some of the epithets attached to Mr. Ruskin's critics or opponents might be chastened without serious loss of effect. They tend to give a partisan flavor to what is in substance an eminently judicial and scientific exposition.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL REMUNERATION. By David F. Schloss. Third Edition, Revised and Enlarged. London: Williams & Norgate. Pp. xix., 446.

This third edition of a work which was first published in 1892 is in great part rewritten and in some part remodelled. It is need-

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less to say that it is a valuable book, and that Mr. Schloss was exceptionally well qualified to write it, both by his investigations in association with Mr. Charles Booth and by his position in the Labor Department of the Board of Trade. It is distinguished by the most rigorous analysis and by much acute criticism. Political economists are very much in need of very many more physiologies of industry of the same kind.

Mr. Schloss begins with four classes of wages,—namely, time-wages, piece-wages, task-wages, and progressive wages; all of which may be individual or collective. He points out that in actual practice time-wages have a piece element and piece-wages a time element. Of course it must be so. It is always understood that men engaged by time or piece have to get through a normal amount of work in a normal time. Task-wages are not very prevalent. They are distinguished from "time-wage piece-work"—the term sufficiently suggests what is meant—by the facts that there is no secure minimum and no reward for any output beyond the standard. We can quite believe the author "that it is scarcely necessary to add that the method of task-work is regarded by the working classes with extreme dislike." Progressive wages lead us into the details of gain-sharing, the main idea of which is that a portion of the gain resulting from the saving in cost of production, due to the $\frac{\text{quantity}}{\text{time}}$ output, should accrue to the operatives. Gain-sharing is distinguished from profit-sharing in that the former does not, while the latter does, provide for a division among the employees of receipts caused by the accidents of price within fixed periods. Mr. Schloss —rightly, I think—has a bias in favor of the progressive type of wage. Of course, an employer cannot always choose, as some forms of remuneration are impossible in some industries, and he may have to deal with a union with views of its own. Our author notices the chief objections to each form of remuneration, and also the objections, real or fancied, which have a hold on portions of the public, and so form economic forces. Of the latter class is the "theory of the lump of labor." The main objection to time-wages is the tendency to loitering. We must remember, however, in justice to trade unions, that the policy of "going canny" has been unhesitatingly denounced by the responsible trade union officials. But, though there may be no deliberate intention to loiter, it is quite certain that the time-worker will labor with less energy than the piece-worker, and experience shows that the difference,

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when the nature of the industry allows of it, is great. Among the objections to piece-work are the sacrifice of quality to quantity and the strain on the workmen, especially on the less efficient, which again may involve a sacrifice, that of the future for the present.

The book is full of interesting facts about the labor world; some of which have a direct and forcible bearing upon problems of social reform. For instance, our author, after giving evidence, concludes that "experience shows that the best results are obtained where it is possible to pay each man according to the results of his own labor" (p. 25). I shall have something to say of the concluding words hereafter, but they must be left for the present. It is, of course, not always possible to deal with each man in this way, and sometimes, if you are to have piece-work at all, you must have large groups. Our author points out that the larger the group the less is the stimulating effect of piece-work. This fact is used against profit-sharing. On page 303 we read: "under a profit-sharing scheme the group-unit is the whole body of employees,—a body so large that, since no one can be sure that while he is doing what he can to increase the profits of the firm by the display of special activity and carefulness, a number of his co-employees, employed perhaps in a distant part of the factory, are not taking things easy, and leaving it to him to earn a big bonus for them, it is in the highest degree probable that many men will not trouble themselves to work with more than normal diligence." Another suggested objection to profit-sharing is the want of certainty in the reward. I am not so sure about this. It seems to me very likely that the workman in the case supposed on page 300 might have chosen the twenty per cent. profit and not the two shillings. There is a gambling spirit abroad which exaggerates the chances of success,—doubtless it disappears with development: the history of insurance, at any rate, would seem to suggest it. Again, Mr. Schloss writes: "as experience proves, the sooner after a job is completed that you can pay your bonus, the more efficient will the bonus be as a stimulus" (p. 304). This is a well-known psychological fact. The really important question is, how great is the influence of propinquity *now?* Mrs. Bosanquet's investigations into pawnbroking lead her to suppose that the perspective in some workmen's lives ends before the end of the week. Our author also has quantitative views on the subject. He judges (p. 139) that the difference between a week and a month is sufficient to appreciably affect the stimulus given by some fixed premium.

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That cardinal principle of industrial remuneration "that every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor," might form the subject of a very long essay. Whether it is intended to be ethical or economic,—by economic is meant here that which tends to a maximum product,—it is equally disputable. If it is economic, how is it proposed to measure the quantity of product? If value is introduced, utility comes with it, and the investigator is thrown back into the difficulties treated by Professor Sidgwick in Book III. of his "Political Economy," and by Professor Marshall in the "Principles" (pp. 506–511, second edition, *et passim*). The "according to his own labor" conveys no clear and distinct idea. If it means that wages should vary directly as the quantity of labor, we want to know further the meaning of quantity of labor. Is it effort, energy, or product? But, supposing this point settled, we are still in the dark as to what wages should be, since the principle tells us, indeed, that wages should vary directly as labor, but gives no information about the standard or initial wage. If the principle means that the product of labor belongs to the laborer, then it states an insoluble problem, for, in most cases, the product is "joint," and you cannot say how much is due to each factor.

Upon productive co-operation our author has modified his views; but his criticism, though milder, remains generally on the old lines. The reason for the change lies in facts. That which was moderately correct at the close of the eighties is not at all true in 1898. The Labor Association was founded in 1883, and at the British Association, last year, the secretary was able to give figures which showed an increase, since that date, of 1600 per cent. in the sales, and of 1100 per cent. in the capital of copartnership societies. Mr. Schloss has, in consequence, been forced to the conclusion that the progress made by these "self-governing" associations, during the last few years, "has been very remarkable" (p. 351). It should be noticed, further, that the movement may even "succeed in that it seems to fail." The following evidence, given before the Labor Commission, by one who is no friend to co-operation in the cotton industry, will illustrate my meaning. "2552. . . . Several of the most successful firms in Burnley sprang from it" (The Harle Skye Commercial Co.). "They date their start from the breaking up of that company. . . . 2553. They gained their experience as manufacturers in this Industrial Partnership, and then they engaged in individual enter-

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prises and became successful men?—Yes, four firms in Burnley, within my own knowledge, have sprung from that business. 2554. And successful firms?—Yes, quite successful." Our author mentions important considerations with reference to the holding of shares by employees in the concerns in which they work. It might, says Mr. Schloss, do a great deal "to destroy the cohesion of trade union combination, where a union exists, and to delay or prevent the formation of a trade union where none exists, and might develop, in the minds of the employees, a spirit of submission, which would go far to secure the avoidance of industrial conflicts" (p. 360). The writer goes on to remark that the advantage of industrial peace on such terms is a "question of no little interest." Some might easily think that the disadvantages were beyond a doubt.

On the whole, Mr. Schloss has done very wisely in his revision. The work, as it stands, is extremely interesting, and it will prove most valuable as a book of reference. We hope that Mr. Schloss will be able to bring it up to date at each succeeding edition.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

MANCHESTER.

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY: A Text-Book for Schools and Colleges. By Franklin Henry Giddings, M.A., Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1898. Pp. 353. Price, $1.10.

There is a strong popular demand for a succinct, intelligible account of sociological theory. The various teachers of sociology have also felt keenly the need of an elementary text-book on the subject for use in connection with lectures in high school and college. Professor Franklin H. Giddings, of Columbia University, whose larger work, entitled "The Principles of Sociology," and his numerous other contributions to sociological literature, make him eminently qualified to undertake this task, has recently published a small volume entitled "The Elements of Sociology." This is not a condensation of Professor Giddings's larger work, but a new book, indicating some modification and further development of Professor Giddings's well-known theories. It is excellently written, and is destined to fill a large place in meeting the demands to which we have already referred.

Beginning with a discussion of the growth of population and of human society and of how and where aggregations of people are established, the author begins his theoretical discussion with an

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account of the practical activities of Socii, and follows this with a very clear analysis of the process of socialization and co-operation. The two most suggestive chapters in the book deal with the question of social pleasure and the social nature. The author's fundamental idea that like-mindedness, meaning like-responsiveness to given stimuli, as well as similarity in physical structure of the brain, constitutes the basis of social organization, is brought out very clearly in three forms:

1. Considered as sympathetic like-mindedness, which results in impulsive social action.

2. As formal like-mindedness, out of which tradition and conformity to existing social standards are developed.

3. Rational like-mindedness, in the development of which public opinion becomes a safe and intelligent guide to progress and social values are weighed and become the objects of planned efforts.

Some interesting material on the sociological development of human society is introduced in a form which is perfectly intelligible to the lay reader and to students who are beginners. The concluding sections on Civilization, Progress, and Democracy are suggestive in ways that make them indispensable reading for all to take an intelligent interest in modern problems concerning public life and social duty. The book is, by all odds, the best presentation, in small compass, of a general view of modern sociological theories and tendencies.

S. M. Lindsay.

University of Pennsylvania.

Divine Immanence: An Essay on the Spiritual Significance of Matter. By J. R. Illingworth, M.A. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. 212.

In this book Mr. Illingworth continues the line of thought which he followed in his Bampton Lectures on "Personality, Human and Divine." He writes as an apologist for Christianity, and his object is to show that a right view of the relation between spirit and matter leads inevitably to the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation as fitly expressing the nature of God and His relation to man and the world. The philosophical basis of Mr. Illingworth's argument is to be found mainly in the first chapter of his book, in which he discusses the relations of matter and spirit. "Spirit," he says (p. 9), "is what thinks and wills and loves; and

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matter is what moves in space: and whatever their ultimate relationship may be, we may fairly speak of two things whose modes of manifestation are so different, as for practical purposes two different things. . . . While matter is of use—incessant and inevitable use—to spirit, spirit is of no use to matter. Man can improve material things, of course, from his own point of view, by employing them for purposes of science or of art; but in so doing he only alters their relation to himself; he does not and cannot change their nature." This is the fundamental position of Mr. Illingworth's book,—that matter is a thing the nature of which is given, fixed, unchangeable, and that spirit is another thing the nature of which is not so absolutely determined, but which is able to make use of matter for its own alteration, improvement, or "realization." So far as our experience goes, matter and spirit are inseparable, "inextricably combined" (p. 5), and yet "as self-conscious and self-determined, spirit reigns in a realm apart" (p. 7).

The consequences of such a position as this are sufficiently obvious. Matter is God's tool and man's plaything,—God's tool which He uses when He likes and sets aside when it is in the way; man's plaything on which he "tries his 'prentice hand" and sharpens his spiritual skill. Spirit is left with a perplexing freedom to do absolutely what it likes. The nature of matter, after all, really does not count. "There is one department of the world in which demonstrably the reign of law breaks down" (p. 92). That department is the life of man, whose "whole body and soul are involved in one complex, composite disease, due to the violation of the appropriate and natural laws of his species" (p. 93), and accordingly the breach of nature's laws "is a fact" which "is daily before our eyes" (p. 94). And God intervenes for "the restitution of these laws when, obviously and beyond controversy, broken,—the counteraction of the 'miracle' of sin" (*loc. cit.*). In short, the wilful spirit of man does what *it* likes with matter, and then, to redress the balance, God does what *He* likes with matter. It is assumed, of course, that the spirit of God is good and the spirit of man more or less evil; but the presupposition is that the laws of nature are not statements of the actual nature of things, but rules which God has, with empty freedom, laid down, which man can, with as empty freedom, casually break, and which God can re-establish if, how and when, He pleases. If this be granted, then, as in Mr. Illingworth's book, the orthodox views (in any

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form or degree of orthodoxy) of the Incarnation, Miracles, Sacraments, and the Trinity can easily be justified. Indeed, all things are possible. We are "absolutely ignorant of the essential nature of God" (p. 86), and accordingly we must accept our knowledge of Him from Revelation. And as to ourselves, we must trust our religious instincts, our "persistent feelings," as well as our "consistent thoughts" (p. 59), for "there is no possible ground for elevating one element of our personality above another" (p. 61). Thus in two Appendices Mr. Illingworth emphasizes his view by maintaining the absolute self-identity and indeterminate freedom of the formal or abstract self, which he identifies with "the person or self-conscious subject," committing himself to such statements as that, "in proportion as our character determines us, we are not self-determined, we do not act as selves, consciously using our power of choice" (p. 194).

There is no need to enlarge on the unsatisfactory nature of such an argument as this. It goes, not "back to Kant," but "back to Descartes." If matter can be said to be of use to spirit in so far as it renders possible the development or realization of the potentialities of spirit, surely spirit must be said to be of use to matter in so far as it brings forth the possibilities that lie hid in matter. And this means that spirit is not free to do absolutely what it likes with matter, but merely free to act along the lines which the nature and laws of matter determine.

Mr. Illingworth writes excellent and lucid English and his book contains a great deal of interesting matter, especially in the second chapter, in which "the religious influence of the material world" is illustrated by a series of quotations from writers of all ages and lands.

R. LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

DOCTRINE AND DEVELOPMENT: University Sermons. By Hastings Rashdall, D.C.L., Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford. London: Methuen & Co. Pp. xvi., 288.

Mr. Rashdall and Mr. Illingworth have a good deal in common, although they belong to somewhat different schools of Anglican thought,—Mr. Illingworth being a High Churchman of the newer type, while Mr. Rashdall is a Broad Churchman. Mr. Rashdall's sermons do not make up so continuous a whole as Mr. Illingworth's book, and he has given them the title "Doctrine and Development"

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in order to indicate their general trend, which is to show that "all theology is the result of a development, and that the development of religious thought is not finished yet." Among the subjects of the sixteen sermons which make up the volume the following may be mentioned as of special interest: "Spiritual Theism," "The Holy Trinity," "The Unique Son," "The Historic Christ," "Revelation by Character," "The Christian Doctrine of Property," "Christ and Culture," and "Personality in God and Man." Perhaps the main object of the book may be said to be that of insisting on the value of finding a mean between "a Christ of dogmatic development" on the one hand, and "a Christ of philosophical theory" on the other, in "the Christ of the Gospels," "a Christ of flesh and blood" (p. 96). Putting the same thing in general terms, Mr. Rashdall declares (p. 108), "It is so much easier to believe in and to be loyal to a person than to an idea." This sharp contrast between "person" and "idea" is one of the points in which, as disciples of Lotze, Mr. Rashdall and Mr. Illingworth are at one. But their manner is very different. Where Mr. Illingworth tends to be mystical Mr. Rashdall is vigorous and aggressive. Mr. Illingworth is persuasive, while Mr. Rashdall is polemical. He conjures up a kind of devil under the name of "the Hegelian," whom he freely belabors "with apostolic blows and knocks," and he even allows himself to speak to the University of Oxford about Mr. F. H. Bradley's "savage hatred of Christianity," and to declare that Mr. Bradley attributes to his "philosophic divinity the truculent ferocity of a Moloch." If this kind of thing is to be justified at all, it can only be by the strength of argument that lies behind it. But the more one examines Mr. Rashdall's book the more confused and self-contradictory does it appear to be. He speaks as a "university preacher who happens to be a teacher of philosophy," but when he is found making such unqualified statements as that "solipsism is an hypothesis which can never be positively disproved" (p. 286), one does not know whether to wonder more at the dogmatism of the philosopher or at the scepticism of the minister of religion. Again, in the sermon on "Spiritual Theism," Mr. Rashdall maintains the "finitude of God" on the ground that if He is not finite—that is, outside of human souls and limited by them—the name "God" must be regarded as a "collective name for the sum of individual minds," while in a later and more "Hegelian" sermon he protests vigorously against "the atomistic view of human nature which can see . . . in

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human society nothing but a collection of isolated individuals, each of which is what he is entirely apart from his relation to the rest" (p. 112).

In a necessarily brief notice it is impossible to do more than touch upon one or two of the leading ideas of Mr. Rashdall's book. It will be enough to refer (1) to his sharp contrast between "person" and "idea" and (2) to the sense in which he uses the idea of "uniqueness." (1) "It is so much easier to believe in and to be loyal to a person than to an idea." *Can* one believe in a person without believing in an idea? Do we not believe in the person because of the idea which rules him? To say that it is easier to believe in the person than in the idea can only mean that the idea is a mere fancy or hypothesis of our own, not an idea which we have thought out and found to be a universal principle. Believing in the person means taking the universality of the idea on trust without sufficient examination. It is certainly easier to do this, because it is easier not to think than to think. But such a contention is hardly what one expects from a teacher of philosophy. (2) Mr. Rashdall says a great deal about the "unique character of our Lord's consciousness," about His "solitary sonship" (pp. 79, 105), and His "unique and, in a sense, final revelation of God" (pp. 81, 111). He is not to be regarded as "*merely* one among many saints or prophets or founders of religions," but as "the only one of His kind," "the Son of God in a sense in which no other being ever was or can be." I cannot find anywhere a clear statement of what Mr. Rashdall means by "uniqueness;" but his argument is in all respects similar to that of Mr. Illingworth, who also makes much of this idea. With a boldness which Mr. Rashdall would probably not emulate, Mr. Illingworth, referring to the incarnation, declares that "an event which by its nature is, *ex hypothesi*, unique—the sole and only possible occurrence of its kind—has no usual order with which to come in conflict." ("Divine Immanence," p. 84.) But an event which "has no usual order" can only mean an event which is out of all relation, which is not in time nor space nor consciousness, whether human or divine, for these are all "orders." It is therefore nothing, or rather, in professing to exist, it is self-contradictory. Now, although Mr. Rashdall, following Lotze, "cannot recognize any necessity of thought for believing that God works by general laws," he may perhaps object to Mr. Illingworth's account of "uniqueness." But in any other sense of the term, all events and persons are equally "unique,"

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to be alone in one's kind is another name for being an individual, and accordingly in any other sense of the term Mr. Rashdall's argument becomes untenable.

Yet Mr. Rashdall has a better and more "Hegelian" self, which appears at various points throughout the book, and more especially in the sermons on "Revelation by Character" and "The Christian Doctrine of Property," where the sharp individualism of other parts of the book is softened if not dissolved. Mr. Rashdall's style is clear and trenchant, but he occasionally allows himself a careless phrase, like "I will merely just commend" or "I only want just to point out."

Considering together the books of Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Rashdall, one cannot help noting the remarkable fact that the speculative influence of Lotze should have led one Oxford divine to defend the Christian religion on the basis of the unchangeableness of matter and another to support it on the ground of the finitude of God.

R. LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

LEIBNIZ: The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings. Translated, with Introduction and Notes, by Robert Latta, M.A., D. Phil. Clarendon Press. Pp. xii., 437.

Leibniz has hardly met with the consideration in England that the importance and charm of his philosophy deserve, and in that respect alone, if in no other, Dr. Latta's work would be justified. It is perhaps misleading to write, as he does, of Langley's and Duncan's volumes as mere translations; the latter especially contains all of the pieces edited by Dr. Latta, besides numerous others, and a few, admittedly meagre, notes. The want of the English student, however, was rather a guide through the confusing and fragmentary mass of Leibniz's lesser but more important writings; and this is precisely the place which the present work, with its admirable Introduction will now fill. The same service Boutroux has already performed for the French reader in his edition of the Monadology, which probably suggested the form of the English work, to some extent. There are wide differences, however, as might be expected, of order and of emphasis in the two expositions.

The Introduction is divided into four parts: I. The Life and Works, II. General Principles of Philosophy, III. Detailed Statement (showing how the main principles are exemplified in the

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theory of Infinitesimals, of matter, of organic life, and of man), IV. Historical and Critical Estimate of the Philosophy of Leibniz. To each of the separate writings also, of which translations are given, a note is prefaced, showing the circumstances under which Leibniz wrote it, and giving a short summary of its contents.

The work, as a whole, is scholarly in the highest sense, and is a gratifying proof that we in England are becoming alive to the value of exact and critical study of the sources and the historical influence of modern philosophical classics. Dr. Latta has evidently lived himself into the thought of Leibniz as few outside Germany have done, and the clearness and thoroughness of his reproduction of that thought leave little to be desired. The book would form an admirable text-book for a university or college course.

In the details of the Introduction one does not always feel satisfied with the writer's stand-point. There are occasional obscurities,—*e.g.*, in the treatment of self-consciousness (pp. 52 ff.). What is meant by the statement that "to Descartes the rational soul is the mind, and its reality comes only from its conscious certainty of itself?" Its reality? May self-consciousness, even in Descartes, be described as "the bare witness of consciousness to itself, its empty self-consistency"? One cannot help feeling that the meanings of "self-consciousness" as (1) mere awareness of the self as subject, and (2) knowledge of the self in its true nature, are hardly kept apart from one another. Each is justifiable in its own place, and the former is the light in which Descartes regarded the ego, the latter the point of view of Leibniz, so that it is hardly just to the former to condemn him for failing to achieve what he did not attempt. So it is not easy to understand how Descartes's standard of truth, "self-evidence or absence of contradiction in the ideas," is "simply another way of describing the immediate witness of consciousness to itself" (pp. 58, 59). To Descartes it was the knowledge not of *what* the self is, but *that* it is, that was fundamental, and from the form of this truth he inferred what must be the form of *all* truth,—viz., non-contradiction of the ideas involved,—a criterion which has not ceased to have value. Leibniz, on the other hand, taking for granted the existence of the self, was concerned to know *what* that self is, seeking its content in the eternal and necessary truths of reason which express the nature of God and therefore of the soul as a mirror of the divine.

In regard to the mechanical theories of the two writers, Descartes and Leibniz, there seems again too much emphasis laid on the value

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of the latter's achievements (pp. 89 ff.). Neither the one nor the other had quite clear ideas on the nature of force; the measures of force proposed by them (mv and mv_2) are equally erroneous from the modern stand-point, while their respective Laws of Conservation,—Descartes's that the quantity of motion (in any given direction) is constant, Leibniz's that the quantity of moving force or kinetic energy is constant,—are equally true, on the same assumption, that of a system not acted upon by external forces. The statement, on page 107, that "the body of every substance—*i.e.*, its matter, its confused perception, its passivity—is the physical or mechanical cause of the substance," hardly rings true of Leibniz. The confused perception of one moment is, no doubt, the mechanical cause,—*i.e.*, the necessary antecedent of the clearer perception of the next, but hardly of the substance itself.

In the fourth part of the Introduction there is a very suggestive comparison between Kant's *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience and Leibniz's "system of compossibles" as determining what exists; again, between Kant's thing in itself and Leibniz's choice of God among the possible worlds. Among the successors of Leibniz perhaps Herbart is awarded least justice;—"if we leave out of account the influence of Fichte upon his psychology, we may regard Herbart's work as a remodelling of that of Leibniz," and that not for the better. Surely we need no longer look at Herbart through Lotze's glasses. Is there not an assumption underlying Leibniz's philosophy,—of a real world, the world of ideas in the divine mind,—and is it not precisely this assumption which Herbart brings to light and transforms into the theory of a world of "reals," each independent in existence and entirely separate in quality from all others, which reveal themselves in the finite soul, but distorted through the imperfect medium, as Leibniz taught? And is not this, after all, the only possible interpretation of an ideal world? Neither unity nor continuity of life or of thought is possible without discrete elements, such as Leibniz's universal characteristic, for example, presupposes. Herbart's metaphysics represent the natural development of Leibniz's thought in an environment such as Kant and Fichte created.

These suggestions, however, are by no means intended to detract from the worth of a most careful and at the same time attractive study of Leibniz.

J. Lewis McIntyre.

University College, Aberystwyth.

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THE SCHOOL SYSTEM OF THE TALMUD. By the Rev. B. Spiers. London: Elliot Stock, 1898.

The adequate treatment of any subject connected with the Talmud demands not only a wide acquaintance with the Talmudic literature and a capacity to appreciate the rabbinical mode of thought, but also that the writer should possess enough of the scientific spirit for the critical sifting of his matter and for method in its arrangement. All who read Mr. Spiers's book on the "School System of the Talmud" will grant that the erudition of the author is fairly extensive, and that his close sympathy with the rabbis enables him to do them full justice. It is, however, less certain that the author deals with his subject from a sufficiently scientific stand-point. The one fact that he does not attempt to differentiate between the school system of Palestine, where the Hellenistic influence was never entirely impotent, and that of Babylonia is in itself sufficient to justify some doubt. The author would scarcely maintain that general instruction in Greek formed part of the curriculum in the Babylonian schools, nor would he venture to exclude from the scope of the Talmud reference to these. The author does not sufficiently distinguish between the work of the elementary schools and of the higher Talmudical colleges. His references to the historical development of the school system are inadequate. No allusion is made to the pioneer work of Shimeon ben Shetach (Yerushalmi, Ketuboth, Edit. Krotoschin, 32c) in elementary school education.

The author treats, among others, of these four subjects: first, the views of the rabbis concerning the value of education; second, the subjects of education; third, the methods of education; fourth, the relations of teacher and scholar. The first of these subjects is treated admirably. The quotations are profuse and excellent. Some of the remarks of the author are genuinely eloquent, and all are of interest. The author is less happy in his treatment of the second and third. He is far too general in his remarks upon the subjects of education, and much that he writes (Chapter III.) seems calculated to convey the impression that the study of the "various languages, the arts and sciences of their times," formed part of the ordinary school course. While it is perfectly true that individual Jews, and among them many famous rabbis, distinguished themselves by their scientific attainments, and also that some knowledge of certain of the sciences—astronomy, mensuration—is necessary

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for the complete mastery of parts of the Talmud, yet it cannot be maintained that the study of these subjects entered into the general prescribed course of school education. The statement of the Talmud is quite definite on this point. The subjects of instruction are the Bible, the Mishna, and the Gemara. It is very unfortunate that the author fails to lay true emphasis upon the precise nature of the subjects taught, since this debars him from treating adequately the methods of education. The education for which general provision was made in the schools was primarily and almost exclusively religious in character, and largely the work would be *learning by rote* Biblical verses and the dicta of the rabbis which form the "oral law." These dicta (Mishnaioth, Tosephtoth, etc.), the reduction of which to writing was prohibited, and the Bible were the stock-in-trade of the scholar. The storing of the memory would be the first concern; the cultivation of intelligence and acuteness would come somewhat later, and, from a certain point of view, would be of secondary importance. The Talmudic methods of education have primarily the storing of the memory in view. One of the more interesting and striking features of the Talmudic literature is the keen psychological insight shown by the rabbis. We can have no clearer exemplification of this insight than the completeness with which the rabbis recognized the conditions most favorable for retention, and the skill with which they sought to secure these conditions. They strove to insure the maximum of intensity for the impressions by the simultaneous affection of several senses. The word was not only to be heard, but also spoken and read. Visual, auditory, and muscular memory were all called upon to assist in the retention of the impression. The aid of musical memory, also, was enlisted, for the scholars sang or chanted their lessons. Great insistence was laid upon adequate and constant repetition; and above all, every device was adopted to secure the full attention of the scholar by rousing his interest. In the case of the more advanced scholars, the subject for which they asserted preference was alone to be selected. Of great interest in this connection is the system of mnemonics employed and recommended in the Talmud. The scholars are exhorted to make constant use of symbols, catch-words, and other mnemonic devices. In the Tractate "Shabbath" an interesting description occurs of a lesson on the alphabet. Words are selected of which the consecutive letters of the alphabet are the initials, and the words are grouped in easily remembered phrases conveying some moral injunction. Few would

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expect to find in the Talmud the prototype of the familiar "A was an Archer," etc. The fourth subject, the relation of teacher and pupil, has received excellent treatment at the hands of the author. A larger work by Mr. Spiers, dealing more exhaustively with the many-sided question of the Talmudic school system, and written with a fuller regard to method and arrangement, would be highly welcome to every student of the Talmud, and to every student of educational methods.

JOSEPH M. ASHER.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

A DIALOGUE ON MORAL EDUCATION. By F. H. Matthews, M.A., Head-Master of Bolton Grammar School. London: Sonnenschein, 1898. Pp. 257.

THE TEACHING OF CHRIST ON LIFE AND CONDUCT. By Sophie Bryant, D.Sc., Head-Mistress of the North London Collegiate School for Girls. London: Sonnenschein, 1898. Pp. 100.

Mr. Matthews's Dialogue is the work of an earnest man who has had much experience of education. He treats his subject not from the point of view of the philosopher, but strictly as a practical teacher. His work may be commended to the favorable notice of all who have to train the young.

His central maxim is that education should primarily be moral education. This is undeniable if understood in the sense that character is more important than learning. But it does not necessarily follow from this that the school-master should mainly devote himself to inculcating morality. Many parents would prefer to set their own moral stamp upon their children, and only send them to school for the intellectual education which cannot be given at home. They might even say of Mr. Matthews's system that it is too sentimental to be right. But Mr. Matthews has little patience with the British parent and his efforts to train his children. However this may be, it is a pleasure to recognize the healthy tone of the work, which is that of an optimist and a lover of children.

As to the manner of the work, the dialogue form is handled with much appropriateness and freedom. It is a pity that dialogue is not used oftener in works of this kind. Nor does the author let it run away with him; he seldom deviates into paradox and never ventures into epigram. If a second edition be called for, the reader would welcome a table of contents or summary.

Mrs. Bryant's book originated in a course of lessons given to one

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of the senior classes of her school. Under such headings as "The Fulfilment of the Law," "The Coming of the Kingdom," "The Sonship of Man," and "The Fatherhood of God," she has tabulated the teaching of the Gospels in a systematic scheme.

The little book is informed with Mrs. Bryant's well-known moral enthusiasm and expository power; though the language is at times needlessly abstract (*cf.* the beginning of Chapter III.), considering the audience to which it is addressed.

HENRY STURT.

OXFORD, ENGLAND.

A STUDY OF MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN. By Emma Rauscherbusch Clough, Ph.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. Pp. x., 234.

A commentary on the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, even if based on as careful and exhaustive a study of its subject as this is, is not likely to attract a great number of readers. The "Rights of Woman" is a book which to a certain extent has done its work and been superseded. Yet apart from its historical interest, it is a book which deserves more attention than it gets. In spite of its defects of style, the sketches which it incidentally gives of eighteenth-century social life, manners, and ideas, its quotations from contemporary books on etiquette and from fashionable preachers, and its caustic comments thereon make it amusing reading. It is impossible not to admire the large-mindedness and faith in the powers of the human mind of a woman who could draw such a severe and yet well-sustained picture of the mental, moral, and physical degeneracy of the prevailing type of female character, and yet could in the same breath assert her belief in the fundamental equality of the sexes and claim for women equality of educational opportunity and of civil rights.

In the short biography with which this volume begins, and in the succeeding chapters which summarize Mary Wollstonecraft's views on the principal subjects about which she wrote, one of the first objects of her exponent is to clear her memory from the charge of preaching dangerous and immoral doctrines. She shows, as all previous biographers have done, and as is, indeed, obvious to all readers of the "Rights of Woman," that its author upheld a high ideal of female character, and that the changes in the education and position of women proposed by her have many of them since been successfully brought about and are nearly all now conceded,

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in theory if not in practice, by most liberal-minded men and women. The most interesting part of the commentator's task is to show the relation of her subject's views to the general doctrine of Natural Rights, to the ideas of Godwin, and to the whole Radical and Rationalist movements. The chapter, however, on her relation to the Socialists seems to us rather thin and far-fetched. It does not amount to much more than saying that Saint-Simon and other early Socialists did in fact preach female emancipation, and that Mary Wollstonecraft felt the wrongs of the poor as of women and desired that they should be set right.

The book, as the author explains, is an enlargement of an Inaugural Dissertation written as part of the examination for the doctorate of Philosophy in Bern University, and it bears traces of this origin. The style, though careful and generally correct, is cumbrous, and suggests German influence if not a translation from the German. A chapter on the reception of Mary Wollstonecraft's work in Germany discusses at length her influence on authors little known in England. Lastly, there is something German about the conscientious and laborious care with which the commentator has analyzed her subject's arguments and has endeavored to trace every influence which moulded it, as well as in the painstaking which has furnished the book with an analytical table of contents, as well as with an index.

ELEANOR RATHBONE.

GREEN BANK, LIVERPOOL.

GLIMPSES OF MODERN GERMAN CULTURE. By Kuno Francke, Professor at Harvard University. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1898. Pp. 233.

Modern Germany, through her rapid development during the last thirty years, has become the classical land of the struggle between modern and classical conceptions and institutions in Europe. All the contradictory tendencies which produced the conflicts of modern European life have assumed there a more typical and even dramatic form than in any other country. Conservative and reactionary forces, while still alive and powerful, have provoked in Germany the strongest reformatory activity. For this reason every department of public life is pervaded by a spirit of war-to-the-knife for freedom, social and economical, as against patriarchal forms of government; so the only possible stand-point, even for literary criticism in behalf of contemporary Germany, is the social one.

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Professor Francke in his recent book gives a very complete account of the different manifestations of this situation. Although written at different times and each without regard to the other, the essays of his "Glimpses of Modern German Culture" form quite a unity, not only on account of the underlying fundamental convictions,—the same as in the author's well known and valuable book on "Social Forces in German Literature,"—but also for the almost encyclopædic diversity of subject matter. And if written under the fresh impression of the moment, they "disclaim explicitly the sober impartiality of second thought," they preserve the vividness of this very moment and its emblematical value. Impressions of the literary movement, which in Hauptmann's and Sudermann's and other works gave an artistic form to the claims of modern life, are interestingly related. Vivid and thorough statements of social life under its various aspects are given in the sketches dealing with university institutions (the Leibniz day of the Berlin Academy of Science), or with matters of wider and more general consequence (the Socialist situation; the conflicts of modern Germany, and impressions of industrial and patriarchal Germany). Although the author himself belongs to the elder generation, and is never blind to the greatness of the past and its representative men (as in his splendid chapter, Bismark as a national type), his position is emphatically for the champions of that "real struggle for civic freedom" whose beginning he thinks not far from us.

The book is an interesting contribution to what may be called descriptive sociology, and to be highly recommended to the student of contemporary European life in its social and artistic manifestations.

ALBERT HAAS.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

THE COMING PEOPLE. By Charles F. Dole. New York and Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company, 1898. Pp. 209.

"The Coming People" is the title of an attractive little volume containing twelve brief essays on current problems of thought, dealing chiefly with those that have a social and ethical bearing. The author starts out with the beatitude, "Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth," as his text, and interprets this to mean that by a process of natural, ethical, moral, economic, and social law, goodness and gentleness are destined to become supreme

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in all social relationships. With a very liberal theology, the author tries to translate some old religious and ethical doctrines into phrases that make them applicable to modern industrial and social life. His chapters on "Heroism, or Iron in the Blood," on the "Law of Cost," on the "Problem of the Prosperous," are the best in the book, and are full of wholesome, sound doctrine. The author is strongly optimistic without being sentimental and without any evidence of gross ignorance of the sternest facts in modern society.

S. M. LINDSAY.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

INSTINCT AND REASON. AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE RELATION OF INSTINCT TO REASON, WITH SOME SPECIAL STUDY OF THE NATURE OF RELIGION. By Henry Rutgers Marshall, M.A. London: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

LECTURES AND ESSAYS ON NATURAL THEOLOGY AND ETHICS. By William Wallace. Edited, with a Biographical Introduction, by Edward Caird. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898.

MY INNER LIFE: BEING A CHAPTER IN PERSONAL EVOLUTION AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By John Beattie Crozier. London: Longmans & Co., 1898.

OVER-PRODUCTION AND CRISES. By J. Rodbertus. Translated by Professor Franklin, with Critical Introduction by Professor J. B. Clark. (*Social Science Series.*) London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

MORALITY AS A RELIGION. By W. R. Washington Sullivan. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1898.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH THOUGHT. A Study in the Economic Interpretation of History. By Simon N. Patten, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1899.

DEMOCRACY. A Study of Government. By James H. Hyslop, Ph.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.

LABOR COPARTNERSHIP. Notes of a Visit to Co-operative Workshops, Factories, and Farms in Great Britain and Ireland, in which Employer, Employee, and Consumer share in Ownership, Management, and Results. By Henry Demarest Lloyd. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1898.

THE CITY WILDERNESS. A Settlement Study. By Residents and Associates of the South End House. Edited by Robert A. Woods. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1898.

LETTERS AND LECTURES ON EDUCATION. By J. F. Herbart. Translated by H. M. and E. Felkin. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

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THE TYRANNY OF CUSTOM, Parts I and II. By S. Fox, E. Pickard, and E. Tregelles. Flushing, near Falmouth: E. Pickard, 1898. [A pamphlet of 55 pages, insisting on the distinction between Custom, as what is merely habitual, and Law, as what is just and reasonable. Full of quotations and not uninteresting, but hardly systematic.]

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE, CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE CHARACTER AND HISTORY OF ITS PEOPLE. By A. W. Benn. London: Grant Richards, 1898.

CHARLES KINGSLEY AND THE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT. By C. W. Stubbs, D.D., Dean of Ely. (*Victorian Era Series.*) London: Blackie & Son, 1899.

VALUE, PRICE, AND PROFIT. By Karl Marx. Edited by his daughter, Eleanor Marx Aveling. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

RELIGION IN GREEK LITERATURE. By Lewis Campbell, M.A., LL.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

SOME ASPECTS OF PRIMITIVE CHURCH LIFE. By William Bright, D.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

A TREATISE CONCERNING THE RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS. By Jonathan Edwards. (*Books for the Heart*, edited by A. Smellie, M.A.) London: Andrew Melrose, 1898.

AN ENTRANCE GUIDE TO PROFESSIONS AND BUSINESS. By Henry Jones. (*Methuen's Commercial Series*, edited by H. de B. Gibbins, D. Litt., M.A.) London: Methuen & Co., 1898.

SURSUM CORDA: A DEFENCE OF IDEALISM. London: Macmillan & Co., 1898. [The author attacks Materialism on the ground of its connection with Agnosticism, Pessimism, and Anarchism. He argues that it is equally anthropocentric and equally baseless with Idealism. The "supreme tribunal" for the truth of Idealism is the "general heart of man." This requires us to believe in the Immortality of the Soul, and in the existence of God as Infinite Will and Infinite Love.]

THEOLOGY AS SCIENCE, AND ITS PRESENT POSITION AND PROSPECTS IN THE REFORMED CHURCH. By W. Hastie, D.D. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons, 1899.

ROMAN SOCIETY IN THE LAST CENTURY OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE. By Samuel Dill, M.A. London: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

VITALITY: AN APPEAL, AN APOLOGY, AND A CHALLENGE. By Lionel L. Beale, M.D., F.R.S., etc. London: Churchill, 1898. [A protest against the common belief among men of science that organic processes and their origin may ultimately be explained mechanically. The author is, no doubt, right in pointing out that the analogy between organic and certain inorganic processes is far from complete; but he has no arguments at all in favor of his thesis that the analogy does fail in the essential point,—that the former are not mechanical. He does not deal with the philosophical arguments that may be brought against his position. His pamphlet is disconnected, and contains a good deal of irrelevant and obsolete scientific matter.]

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THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D., Bishop of Cloyne. Edited by George Sampson, with a Biographical Introduction by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P., Vol. III. London: George Bell & Sons, 1898. [This volume completes the present edition of Berkeley's Works. It contains,—The Analyst; Defence of Freethinking in Mathematics; Reasons for not replying to Mr. Walton's Full Answer; The Querist; Discourse addressed to Magistrates; Siris; Two Letters on the Rebellion of 1745; Four Letters on Tar-Water; Appendix A. The First Edition of the Querist; Appendix B. The Contents of the Miscellany of 1752; Appendix C. A List of Principal Editions and Criticisms; Index.]

ANGELS' WINGS: A SERIES OF ESSAYS ON ART AND ITS RELATION TO LIFE. By Edward Carpenter. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

FRIENDLY VISITING AMONG THE POOR. A Hand-book for Charity Workers. By Mary E. Richmond. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1899.

ESSAYS ON THE HIGHER EDUCATION. By George Trumbull Ladd. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.

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Books to be reviewed, published in England, should be sent to
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INTERNATIONAL

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JULY, 1899.

THE NEW "ETHICAL" PHILOSOPHY.

In a former number of this JOURNAL (July, 1898), Professor Caldwell tells us that there is "some warrant for trying to think of what might be called a newer or ethical idealism, an idealism of the will, an idealism of life, in contradistinction to the older or intellectual idealism, the idealism of the intellect." This "ethical idealism," as he thinks, is taking the place of "the older conception of philosophy or metaphysic as an attempt to state the value of the world for thought." It is claimed, in other words, that recent philosophy has advanced beyond the earlier philosophy of the century by substituting "ethical" for "intellectual" idealism. The writer cites with approval the suggestion of Professor A. Seth that Mr. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality" "may be said, perhaps, to mark the close of the period whose beginning was signalized by . . . the publication of Green's 'Introduction to Hume in 1874;'" and, in harmony with this, his own view seems to be that the principles of "critical idealism" have been "absorbed and assimilated," and that the representatives of the new "ethical idealism" are now "bent upon applying these principles to the solution of concrete problems of art and life and conduct." There is, on the one hand, "an attempt . . . to include elements of *feeling* and *will* in our final consciousness of reality;" and, on the other hand, an attempt to "extend

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the philosophical synthesis so as to make it include the world of man's action and the world that is now glibly called the 'social organism.'" The writer admits that there are "many philosophers of to-day who are convinced that philosophy is purely an intellectual matter, and can never be anything else than an attempt to analyze the world *for thought*,—an attempt to state its value in the terms of thought;" but he thinks that "the predominating note of the newer philosophy is its openness to the facts of the volitional and moral and social aspects of man's life, as things that take us further along the path of truth than the mere categories of thought and their manipulation by metaphysic and epistemology."

It is not my intention to offer any specific criticism of the doctrine which seems to underlie these and other statements. Indeed, Professor Caldwell has cited so great a cloud of witnesses in support of his contention that I do not feel competent to follow him. Nor do I think that one can accept his somewhat sweeping generalization without a careful consideration of its precise sense. It is probably some misapprehension on my part, but his paper suggests to me that he does not always distinguish between special devotion to ethical and social investigations and the acceptance of "ethical idealism." No doubt it is true that such investigations have received increased attention; but we could say the same of all the special branches of philosophy,—physiological psychology, for example; and we could hardly infer from this latter fact that "ethical idealism" was taking the place of "intellectual idealism," but rather that both were giving way to materialism. Professor Caldwell seems to be so generously eager to sympathize with all shades of philosophic thought that he tends to ignore fundamental differences. Mr. Bradley, for example, is cited in support of the new tendency. And, no doubt, justly, in so far as he maintains that "experience" is wider than "thought;" but, on the other hand, Mr. Bradley roundly speaks of "ethical idealism" as a "refuge of the destitute." It therefore seems to me that Professor Caldwell's well-meant attempt at "redding the marches" is somewhat premature. We are still too far from having had our quarrel out to accept

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the good offices of the peace-maker. We may be quarrelling about nothing, but I fear we do not think so; and, until we are convinced, the fight will have to go on. For my own part, I may as well say at once that I am not as yet converted to this "new way with idealism;" nor do I believe that what Professor Caldwell calls "intellectual idealism" has by any means been either "absorbed" or refuted. I find, it must be confessed, a certain difficulty in making out what precisely the writer regards as the vice of the older idealism, and how the new idealism has superseded it. He tells us, indeed, that the former confined itself to "mere categories of thought," while the latter takes account of "the facts of the volitional and moral and social aspects of man's life." If this contrast could be made good, no doubt we should have a clear line of demarcation between the old and the new philosophy. But it is not plain how, in that case, the new philosophy could be correctly characterized as an "application" of the principles of the old philosophy to "the solution of concrete problems of art and life and content." I cannot help thinking that by "application" Professor Caldwell means "subversion," and that he is here speaking merely in terms of compliment; in any case, the new "ethical" philosophy seems to me to be, not an "application" of the old "idealism," nor, indeed, "idealism" at all, but a disguised scepticism, claiming, in Mr. Balfour's phrase, to be a defence of our "ethical needs."

The new "ethical idealism" to which Mr. Caldwell refers is that which is so ably expounded by Professor A. Seth in his recent volume of essays, both in its negative and its positive aspects. No doubt some of the subordinate positions there maintained might not be accepted by all its representatives; but I think that its fundamental view of things would be regarded by them as sound. I shall, therefore, not scruple, where occasion demands it, to cite Mr. Seth's words in support of my statement of the new "ethical idealism."

This form of idealism, to view it on its negative side first, is an uncompromising opponent of metaphysical monism. The fundamental defect of that system, it is held, is that it leads to the denial of man's individuality, freedom, and moral responsi-

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bility. The source of this defect is said to be the assumption that "experience" is reducible to "knowledge;" a doctrine which ignores "feeling" and "will," and dissolves the universe, including ourselves, into mere "objects" or "phenomena." Conceptions or meanings, by means of which metaphysical monism attempts to explain the world, can never really do so, for every conception excludes all others, whereas experience is essentially a unity of differences. Hence the importance of Mr. Bradley's protest against the identification of reality with an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." The Absolute in itself is not known to us, but transcends our being and thinking; and, therefore, the identification of the Absolute with human experience is indefensible, though we must interpret its nature in terms of what is highest in human experience. On its positive side "ethical idealism" maintains the individuality, freedom, and moral responsibility of man. Avoiding the defect of metaphysical monism, it affirms that "experience" is wider than knowledge, and that we lay hold upon reality "by a species of assurance different from knowledge,"—that "assurance" being given to us in feeling and action, or in the immediate certainty of our own existence, as accompanied by the "tinge of subjective feeling." With this "assurance," "certainty" or "conviction" of our own real activity goes the belief in an end or aim which the action is to realize. Knowledge is, indeed, the necessary condition of choice, but in itself it is nothing, nor can any analysis of it ever give us reality.

This is a bald but, I hope, not unfair statement of the main positions of "ethical idealism," for a fuller account of which I may refer to the suggestive volume of essays published by Professor A. Seth under the title, "Man's Place in the Cosmos." Now, it seems fair to assume that a theory must submit to the test of self-consistency. In whatever sense "experience" involves self-contradiction,—and there is a very true sense in which it does so,—at least "experience" cannot be self-contradictory in such a way that it entitles us to combine in one theory mutually discrepant statements. Had this distinction between the self-contradiction or self-opposition of

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"experience" and the self-contradiction of a *theory* of "experience" been kept clearly in view by Mr. Bradley in his magnificent piece of dialectic, it is possible that he might have reached a truer theory of the Absolute than that with which he presents us. In any case, it may fairly be maintained, as, indeed, Mr. Bradley emphatically asserts, that a theory which is not self-consistent condemns itself. Thus, it is not permissible to say, "God is omniscient," if you hold at the same time that "God is limited in knowledge." Nor does it matter whether you affirm the one proposition at one time and in one connection, and affirm the other proposition at another time and in another connection: a contradiction is not the less a contradiction because it is not formulated in one clear and unambiguous statement. We are entitled to bring together, in one proposition, whatever is maintained by the same writer, so long as we do not alter his meaning. Thus, in the case supposed, it would be legitimate to express the contradiction involved by throwing the writer's doctrine into the form: "The omniscient is limited in knowledge," or, "The omniscient is not omniscient." "Ethical idealism," as stated above, seems to me to be self-contradictory when tried by this simple test. It affirms that God is omniscient. By "omniscience" must at least be meant the comprehension of all reality as it is; in other words, the theory assumes that only God can know what reality truly is, or, in Mr. Seth's own words, "the truth is for God alone." But it is also maintained that God's knowledge "infinitely transcends" our "experience." Now, if the latter proposition is true, what we are, or what any other being is, so far as our "experience" goes, cannot be what we are, or what any other being is, as they are for God. But God knows reality as it is. Therefore, reality as "known" by us, "experienced" by us, "felt" by us, "believed" by us,—it matters not what term is used,—cannot be reality as it is. On the other hand, it is maintained that the "certainty" or "assurance" of our own existence and self-activity is the basis of all reality for us, without which our life is meaningless. Since, however, reality as it is for God is not reality as it is for us, this "certainty" or "assurance" of

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our own existence and self-activity is not the comprehension of what our own existence and self-activity really are. Hence we have two contradictory propositions: (*a*) We really are what we experience ourselves to be, (*b*) we really are not what we experience ourselves to be; or, in one proposition, "Self-activity is a real unreality."

No doubt the self-contradiction here pointed out will be indignantly denied. We shall be told that, though we do not know ourselves as God knows us, we are entitled to say that God's knowledge of us is not *contradictory* of our knowledge of ourselves, but only "infinitely transcends" it; our knowledge of ourselves is a true "analogue" of God's knowledge of us; it is not false, though it is inadequate. But this defence only shifts the difficulty without getting rid of the contradiction. Admittedly, we do not know, or we are ignorant of, how we appear to the omniscience of God. How, then, would this ignorance of ours appear to the omniscience of God? It would not appear to God as it appears to us,—*i. e.*, our ignorance of how we appear to God would appear differently to God from what it appears to us. Therefore, our ignorance of how we appear to God, will not be for God our ignorance of how we appear to God. Why, then, may not our ignorance of how we appear to God be, from God's point of view, our *knowledge* of how we appear to God? Our ignorance of ourselves as we appear to God is, by hypothesis, only what appears to us as that ignorance; why, then, may we not be in error when we suppose that we are ignorant of ourselves as we appear to God? May we not, in our apparent ignorance of ourselves as we appear to God, be really *knowing* ourselves as we appear to God? If this is denied, our proposition comes to be: "We are ignorant of ourselves as we appear to God, but we *know* that we are so ignorant." A claim is, therefore, made for knowledge of a certain kind. Hence, we now assert: "We know that we are ignorant of ourselves as we appear to God." But this again raises the difficulty: If we know that we are ignorant of ourselves as we appear to God, is this knowledge the same as God's knowledge of our knowledge that we are so ignorant? It cannot be so, because God's

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knowledge "infinitely transcends" our knowledge, whatever the object of that knowledge may be. We are, in short, launched on an infinite series; and that for the simple reason that we have been assuming the self-contradictory proposition, "We know that we do not know." On this fundamental contradiction "ethical idealism" is based; in other words, it is as a theory essentially sceptical. It has misinterpreted the indubitable fact of human ignorance. There is no escape from this contradiction, unless we are prepared to admit that God's knowledge of us is the same in *kind*, though not in *extent*, with our knowledge of ourselves. There is no absolute limit within our knowledge; what is known by us, so far as it is knowledge, is identical in nature with what is known by God. If we do not know ourselves as God knows us, we do not know ourselves as we really are, no matter how strong our "certainty," or "assurance," or "belief" may be.

The new "ethical idealism" thus seems to me to be a revival of an old theory, the fundamental contradiction of which has been repeatedly exposed, not an advance to a new and truer theory. It is not surprising that those who find comfort in it should sing the praises of "good old Dr. Reid," and talk contemptuously or patronizingly of Kant and Hegel. One cannot help thinking, in fact, that Professor James, when he calls Kant a "mere curio," * and commends to us Reid, Stewart, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, and Mr. C. S. Pierce,—all very worthy gentlemen, but not, I think, of the first rank in philosophy,—as the genuine philosophers, has for the moment lost that strong sense of humor which he usually displays. That Reid and Stewart have more to tell us that is worth hearing than Plato and Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, strikes me as somewhat ludicrous, unless Mr. James is again indulging in Aristophanic whimsicalities similar to what he elsewhere calls "Hegelisms." No doubt the English-speaking people have many sterling qualities, but I doubt if they have a monopoly of philosophic wisdom. This, however, by the way: let us see more pre-

* "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," p. 24.

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cisely what is the special claim of the new philosophy to make an end of the old masters in speculation.

It is claimed that, as "knowledge" is not "ultimate," being only of "objects" or "phenomena," to base a philosophy upon "knowledge" is to "dissolve the universe into objects or phenomena," without leaving any place for self-conscious or self-active subjects. And, no doubt, the conclusion follows, if "knowledge" is what the ethical idealists say it is. It is an identical statement that, when "knowledge" is defined as the consciousness *only* of "objects," it cannot be the consciousness of "subjects." But the old philosophy, as I understand it, does not admit that knowledge is *only* of objects; it maintains that "objects" separated from "subjects" are an unthinkable abstraction. From the point of view of common-sense dualism, "objects" separated from "subjects" are supposed to be known, and, indeed, to be the only things known; but surely we have outgrown this very elementary stage of thought. Whatever view may be taken of "objects," it is certain that there is no knowledge except for a knowing subject, and that while we can distinguish between what the subject knows and the knowing subject, we cannot possibly give any meaning to an "object" which does not exist for a knowing subject. If this is true,—and this, at least, is the contention of the "older" philosophy,—to say that "knowing and being are identical" is not to say that knowledge is only of "objects." Knowledge never being of "mere objects," but always, at least implicitly, of objects in inseparable unity with knowing subjects, to know what "is" can never be to know "objects" *per se*. The charge against the "older" philosophy of doing away with "subjects" thus recoils upon the "newer" philosophy, which sets up an untenable separation in knowledge between "objects" and "subjects," and then debits this false doctrine to its opponent. No doubt Kant put the knowing subject with all its interests, ethical and religious, beyond the sphere of "knowledge" as he conceived it; but we are not bound to accept a doctrine which led Kant into that fallacious opposition of theoretical and practical reason which the new "ethical idealism" is seeking to revive in another and a weaker form. A consistent ideal-

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ism includes within the sphere of knowledge the whole universe, with all its distinctions, not the least important of which is that of the free or self-active subject.

But, it may be objected, at least "intellectual idealism" affirms that "knowing and being are identical." No doubt it does; but one must take terms in the sense in which they are meant, or we do not refute, but merely travesty, an opponent's doctrine. In what sense, then, is it held that "knowing and being are identical"? It would be impossible here to enter at all fully into the difficult question as to the true meaning of "identity." Nor does it seem necessary; for the very writer who charges absolute idealism with falsely affirming that "knowing and being are identical" contends in another connection that "identity" without "difference" is unthinkable, and, in fact, is a false and unreal abstraction. When, therefore, knowing and being are declared to be "identical," what is meant is, not that there is no "distinction" between them, but that there is no such distinction as is incompatible with their unity. The "identity" of knowing and being is the identity in nature of the knowing subject and the known object. What is contended is, that the knowing subject, when he really knows the nature of the world, discovers that it is intelligible; in other words, that there is in it no insuperable limit or "matter" which prevents it from being understood. Whether this theory is true or false, at any rate it is not the reduction of "being" to "knowing," in the sense that to "know" is to "be." Any one who maintains that "being" is in some sense unintelligible by its very nature, as Mr. James seems to do, will, of course, deny the "identity" of being and knowing in the sense in which it is here affirmed; but no one who holds that "identity" is meaningless except as a unity-in-difference can legitimately contend that to affirm the "identity" of knowing and being is to say that all distinction between them is excluded. On the contrary, the "distinction" between the knowing subject and the known object is *essential* to their "identity." He who asserts that to affirm their "identity" is to say that "knowing" is only another name for "being" is assuming that there can be no "identity" except that of dead

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sameness,—*i. e.*, an "identity" of the abstract understanding, which supposes that significant judgments may assume the form, "Knowing is knowing" and "Being is being," and, therefore, that the proposition "Knowing and Being are identical" means either that there is no "knowing" or that there is no "being." One of the immortal contributions of Hegel to philosophy is the demonstration that there is no real process of thought which does not involve identity-in-difference, and hence that there is no opposition between the fundamental nature of experience and the fundamental nature of intelligence. Mr. Seth seems to think that Hegel was *opposing* experience to thought when he insisted that experience was in every case a many-in-one. It may be safely said that Hegel's main object in his Logic was to show that *there is no such opposition;* that, on the contrary, both thought and experience involve identity-in-distinction, and that it is just as impossible to think as to experience the one apart from the other. If this position is sound, as absolute idealism holds it to be, the doctrine that knowledge is "merely of objects" is a form of words which has no intelligible meaning. Knowledge cannot be "merely of objects," because there are no conceivable objects except those which exist for some knowing subject. What is denied is not the *distinction* of knowing and being, but their *separation*,—a denial which is, at bottom, the same as the affirmation of their "identity" in the only legitimate sense of that term. So long as no intelligible meaning can be attached to the proposition that knowing is of "objects" which lie beyond the sphere of a knowing subject, the "identity" of knowing and being will remain untouched.

It may be said, however, that, even admitting that knowing and being are inseparable elements in a whole, at any rate this whole cannot include feeling and will. But, it is said, "experience" includes the three absolutely "irreducible" elements of knowledge, feeling, and will; and, therefore, a philosophy which ignores feeling and will, thus reducing "experience" to one of its elements, can only give an abstract or partial and, therefore, a false view of the world. And, no doubt, it must be granted that a philosophy which is based upon knowledge,

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to the exclusion of feeling and will, is open to the charge just made. But here again we have to ask whether the abstraction of knowledge from feeling and will is made by absolute idealism; whether, in other words, it is not "ethical idealism" which sets up an unwarrantable opposition between knowing, feeling, and willing, and, on the basis of an abstraction which is denied, charges its opponent with a defect which really belongs to itself. Are knowledge, feeling, and will "irreducible" in the sense maintained?

Now, it may be safely maintained that, in any sense which makes for the support of "ethical idealism," it cannot be shown that knowledge, feeling, and will are "irreducible." It has already been maintained that there is no separation between the knowing subject and the known object; and it must now be added that there is no separation between the subject as knowing, as feeling, and as willing. The assumption that such a separation exists is simply a disguised form of the old faculty-psychology, the fundamental defect of which has not been so completely transcended as is usually supposed. The defect of the separation of mind into "faculties" was, that it supposed the self-conscious subject to be an aggregate of independent parts, each of which existed and operated by itself. Now, if knowing, feeling, and willing are "irreducible" in the sense that there is no unity which is differentiated in all three, how does this doctrine differ in principle from the old theory that knowing is a different and separate faculty from feeling and willing? The truth is, that knowing, feeling, and willing are simply different aspects of the one self-conscious being. To express this concrete unity Hegel used the term "spirit" (*Geist*); and when one reads that Hegel reduced the world to "mere categories of thought" one is tempted to wonder if the writer has ever even read the introduction to Hegel's "Phänomenologie des Geistes," not to speak of the other works in which he deals with those very "volitional, and moral, and social aspects of man's life," which, as Professor Caldwell seems to imagine, it has been reserved for the new "ethical idealism" to bring into notice. I do not say that Hegel has said the last word in philosophy; but, at any rate,

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he has not ignored feeling and will, though he has certainly denied that they can be separated, or are more than distinguishable phases in the total life of the self-conscious subject. Now, if knowing, feeling, and willing are indeed logically distinguishable, but really inseparable, modes of viewing the one self-conscious subject, what will happen if we take *any one* of these phases and proceed to build upon it as if it were the whole? Manifestly, we shall mutilate that totality of "experience" which it is the business of philosophy to interpret. Any philosophy, therefore, which separates knowing from feeling and will must of necessity be false, because the self-conscious subject or "spirit" is a concrete whole. Now, this mutilation is precisely one of the main things against which absolute idealism protests. And, indeed, it could not possibly fail to do so, because its fundamental principle is that there are no absolute separations in reality, but only distinctions within an identity. "Ethical idealism," on the other hand, is here again the victim of abstraction. Just as it opposes human and divine experience, so, even within the sphere of human experience, it opposes knowing, feeling, and willing; and, having set up this untenable opposition, it then proceeds to declaim against what it calls "intellectual idealism," because, as it falsely assumes, "intellectual idealism" is based upon "knowledge," to the exclusion of feeling and will. What a thoroughgoing idealism maintains is that "experience" is a concrete whole, in which the self-conscious subject is at once knowing, feeling, and willing. "Ethical idealism," ignoring the fact that "feeling" and "will" have no meaning except for a "knowing" subject, proceeds to construct a theory on the basis of "feeling" or "will" alone,—it is not very clear which,—with the inevitable result that immediate "assurance," "certainty," or "belief" has to be appealed to as a substitute for truth.

So far we have been dealing with the character of "experience," which, as it seems to me, is unwarrantably mutilated by "ethical idealism," one element of an inseparable whole being given a "bad pre-eminence," with the natural result that "experience,"—*i. e.*, the total self-consciousness of a

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rational subject,—is reduced to a blind belief. But there is another confusion into which this self-confident philosophy falls, which is, perhaps, the main source of its quarrel with absolute idealism. That confusion is between the uncritical belief of civilized man in the rationality of the world, including the reasonableness of morality, and an explicit theory of life. In other words, "ethical idealism" does not distinguish between what may be called a working-theory of life and that reasoned theory which it is the aim of philosophy to supply. Philosophy, as I understand it, at least aims at being a science, —*i. e.*, a connected system of truth,—and just in the measure in which it succeeds in being a science has it any proper title to be called philosophy. Hence it is not a means to any other end. If philosophy is conceived as a means to some other end, no matter what that end may be, whether the satisfaction of "ethical" needs, or vigorous and healthy activity, or religion, it ceases to fulfil the function which is characteristic of it. For the sole aim of philosophy is to arrive at truth, not to persuade men to believe what they cannot prove to be true. It is safe to say that this is the conception which guided the efforts of the first great speculative thinkers, and not blind trust in comforting, edifying, or inspiring beliefs. It is true that in periods of transition,—such as that from the earlier customary beliefs of the Greeks to the period of the Sophists, in the age of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, in the long toil of the middle ages, and in the end of last century,—the pursuit of truth was subordinated to preconceived ends; but the ideal of philosophy as the determination to follow truth at all hazards has never failed to reassert itself, and one may venture to prophesy that it will survive the temporary popularity of the new "ethical" philosophy. In saying that truth is the sole object of philosophy, I do not deny the value, in their own sphere, of eloquent addresses, essays, and treatises on the fundamental needs of our nature, and impassioned appeals to us not to root up these fair flowers of the higher life. Rhetoric of this kind may, and apparently it does, satisfy a number of people, and so far as it does so it no doubt fulfils its end. But it does not constitute philosophy, as I under-

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stand it. There might be some convenience, since the confusion between philosophy as a science and philosophy as a working-theory seems to be permanently embedded in popular language, in distinguishing various species of philosophy, according to the end which they set before themselves. Thus we should have a philosophy adapted to the stage of culture, or the social status, of different persons. The philosophy of that wise man, Private Mulvaney, was a very good working-theory for a man in "that sphere of life to which he had been called;" it told him "to keep himself and his accoutrements specklessly clean, to refrain from getting drunk more often than was necessary, to obey his superiors, and to pray for a war." The philosophy of Mr. Balfour, as a theologian and a statesman, seems to be to believe in God, freedom, immortality, and the Incarnation, because otherwise the stability of society is in danger. Then we might have the philosophy of the journalist, of the scientific man, and of the scholar, each with its own peculiar coloring and its own "sanctions." But, besides all these, and in a class by itself, there is still what might be called the philosophy of the philosopher, the one canon of which is truth.

Now, assuming that truth is the sole end of philosophy, it is obvious that there is a sense in which philosophy must be "intellectual." If philosophy is a science, or even if it only seeks to be a science, its whole content is truth, or whatever substitute there is for it; and truth, while it can have no existence except for a self-conscious subject, who at once thinks, feels, and wills, has a home only in the medium of thought. While it cannot be said, except in a wide sense, that "thought is judgment," we may at least say that there is no "thought" without judgment, and to judge is to frame a proposition which claims to be true. Hence it is not correct to say that "truth" and "reality" are the same thing. "Truth" is never "reality," and "reality" is never "truth." "Truth" is that aspect in the total activity of a spiritual being in which he comprehends in thought the *nature* of reality; it is the idea in the mind of a self-conscious subject of what "reality" is. "Truth," in other words, is the insight into the essence of

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"reality;" it is reality as present in the thought of a rational subject. When, therefore, it is said that truth and reality are "identical," it is not meant that we can reduce reality to truth or truth to reality. What is meant is that a thinking subject is capable of grasping in thought the nature of reality. If it is denied that reality can be grasped by thought, it is implied that the nature of reality is such that it cannot be understood, —*i. e.*, that it contains an irreducible element which cannot be comprehended by thought, but is essentially incomprehensible. Thus, if reality is only partially rational, as Professor James seems to hold, it is, of course, incomprehensible, and what we call "truth" will not be "identical" with reality. Similarly, if there is something in "feeling" or "will,"—or, more precisely, in the emotional and moral life of man,—which is incomprehensible, that "something" will fall beyond the region of "truth;" for nothing can be "true" which is not comprehensible. Now, it seems to me to be an inevitable consequence of the doctrine that there is an element in the self-conscious life of man which *cannot* fall within thought,—*i. e.*, the nature of which is incomprehensible,—that we have to fall back upon "immediate assurance," or "faith," or "belief." This is the doctrine of "ethical" philosophy. That doctrine is thought to be proved by pointing out that "experience" is wider than "knowledge." And certainly in one sense "experience" is wider than "knowledge." If in "experience" we include the whole spiritual activity of every rational subject, not only is it wider than knowledge, but knowledge is a very small element in it.* For what the objector really has in his mind is that a theory of "experience" is not identical with "experience" in this wide sense of the term. And this, of course, is true. There can be no theory of reality, no philosophy, which does not presuppose the reality of which it is the theory; and such a theory cannot be identical with reality, except in the sense of being the comprehension of what reality truly is. But, on the other hand, no theory of reality can be

* Cf. Aristotle's Eth. Nich., x. 7, 8: *εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει.*

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true which is based upon a particular aspect of reality. We cannot separate reality into compartments; it is a concrete spiritual whole, which must be comprehended as a whole if it is to be comprehended as it truly is. Philosophy, therefore, while it is not reality, must in its own way include the whole of reality,—*i. e.*, the whole of possible "experience." It comprehends the whole, and yet it is distinguishable from the whole. In other words, philosophy comprehends in thought the essential nature of the whole spiritual activity of man, or, what is the same thing, it is a system of true conceptions. Now, if philosophy is thus related to the whole sphere of experience, it is obviously incompatible with its very nature to limit itself to one phase of experience. Such a limitation is perfectly arbitrary, whether its object is external nature or the human subject either as knowing, or as feeling, or as willing. As we are all aware, "experience" has been limited in various illegitimate ways. By Sensationalism it was identified with a mere play of evanescent states in a sentient being; by Kant it was confined to that theoretical comprehension of reality which constitutes the limited realm of the special sciences; and now, by an equally arbitrary limitation, it is confused with the ethical activity of man. "Experience" is the totality of reality as it exists within self-conscious subjects, and within this circle is embraced the theoretical, ethical, artistic, and religious interests of man. A true philosophy must, therefore, give a true account of the essential nature of "experience," in the widest sense of that term. But philosophy can never *be* "experience"; it is a *theory* of experience, a system of ideas expressing in terms of thought the fundamental nature of experience. No doubt philosophy is itself a form of experience, but in this sense it is viewed simply as a mode of human activity, not in its character of scientific truth.

If this obvious distinction of truth and reality is admitted, it must be evident that the new "ethical" philosophy has confused two very different things. It charges the "older" philosophy with being purely "intellectual." But every philosophy, whatever its special tenets, must be, or claim to be, a body of *truth*, and truth is necessarily "intellectual" in the

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sense that it has no being anywhere but in the thought of a rational subject. Philosophy, therefore, embraces within itself the whole of "experience," not because it is in no way distinct from "experience," but because it expresses what experience must be thought to be. The test of a true philosophy is its ability to give a complete and self-consistent account of the principles without which experience is unthinkable. It is "intellectual" in the sense that it is a system of thoughts expressing the nature of experience as a whole, not in the sense that it confines itself to the intellectual side of man's nature, to the exclusion of the ethical and religious. Truth is neither intellectual, nor ethical, nor religious, because it is all and none of these: it is all, because it is the thinking comprehension of the principles underlying the whole complex spiritual activity of man; and it is none, because it is not that spiritual activity, but a theory of what in its essence it is. Philosophy is neither life, nor art, nor religion, nor can it take their place; but, on the other hand, life, art, and religion cannot take the place of philosophy. For philosophy is an end in itself, and is an integral element in the total life of humanity. It does not follow that every man should devote himself to philosophy any more than that every man should be a mathematician, or an artist, or a statesman. It may even be admitted that philosophy, especially if it is of an analytic type, may be a hindrance instead of an aid to a man like Goethe, whose genius was poetic and constructive. But this has nothing to do with the ultimate value of philosophy. Whether all men or only a few are to devote themselves to the search for truth, the search for truth is the sole end of philosophy. As there are men who prefer Rossini to Beethoven, and Ibsen to Browning, so there will be men who find more satisfaction in Reid or Stewart than in Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel; but the reason, as it seems to me, is that their ideal of philosophy is not that which has been the moving spring of all the great thinkers, the pure love of truth.

Philosophical truth, then, is "identical" with reality, not in being a substitute for it, but in being the comprehension of what reality in its essential nature is. At this point, however,

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we must be careful to avoid the easy pitfall that philosophy, like other forms of knowledge, is merely a picture or "copy" of reality, or that it "corresponds" to reality. This is a natural way of stating the relation between the two, but the history of philosophy has abundantly shown that it is apt to prove the fruitful mother of a whole brood of false doctrines. Knowledge is never reality, but neither is it a "copy" of reality; it is the evolution by and in thought of the meaning or essence of reality; and philosophy, as the highest form of knowledge, is the evolution by and in thought of the ultimate meaning or essence of reality. In this sense knowledge is "abstract,"—*i. e.*, it deals with the universal, though the universal comprehends within itself all the particulars. Knowledge has no existence except for a thinking subject, but it is only one phase of the total self-activity of the subject. The development of knowledge, therefore, involves and is conditioned by the total development of the subject. It does not go on in separation from feeling and will, but is a distinguishable element in the complex life of the self-conscious subject. On the other hand, there is no development of the self-conscious subject except within the one all-embracing reality, which from one point of view we call the universe and from another point of view God. For, if the individual self-conscious subject is to know reality,—to comprehend in thought the determinate and organic system of reality,—the universe must be intelligible, or transparent to his intelligence. There can, therefore, be no knowledge of reality unless the self-conscious subject is involved in reality. He may, however, be involved in reality without being explicitly conscious that he is so involved. To bring him to the explicit consciousness of this fact is the task of philosophy. Hence there can be no philosophy without the exercise of his intelligence as comprehending the universal and necessary principles involved in the totality of experience. There is no possibility of getting outside of reality, or, what is the same thing, there is no possibility of transcending the laws of intelligence. We may, therefore, either say that philosophy is the comprehension of intelligence or the comprehension of reality. In other words,

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philosophy is based upon the principle that intelligence, in comprehending itself, is comprehending the intelligible world. Philosophy is, therefore, not the arbitrary construction of this or that subject, but the recognition by this or that subject of what is implied in the fact that he is a member of an intelligible universe. There is no philosophy without self-conscious subjects, but unless these subjects are members of an intelligible whole and are themselves intelligences, philosophy can only be a collection of opinions or beliefs, not a body of truth. "Ethical idealism" accuses this doctrine of destroying the self-activity of individual subjects and identifying humanity with God. The charge is preposterous. The self-conscious life of man exists only in and through his self-activity, and, though he lives in an intelligible system, he is not that system, but an organ in it,—an organ whose specific character is not merely to be in the whole, but to comprehend in thought what the whole is. Unless there is operative in the intelligence of the individual man the principle which constitutes the nature of the whole, there can be no knowledge, and, therefore, no way of comprehending the nature of anything whatever. The "immediate assurance" or "belief" of the ethical idealist is nothing but the unreasoned anticipation of what philosophy establishes; and unless it can be established by philosophy it has no *philosophical* justification. It has been said that "if we are to lay hold upon reality and lift ourselves out of the flux of phenomena, we must do so by a species of assurance different from knowledge." In other words, we cannot know reality, we can only feel it. This is an abandonment of philosophy altogether. For philosophy has no existence except in knowledge; it is the comprehension of the essence of reality by a thinking subject, and if it is not this it does not exist. Further, how can immediate "assurance" be said to "lay hold upon reality"? Reality is not a particular thing confined to a particular moment; it is a complete organism, including all possible self-conscious subjects, and, therefore, it cannot be "laid hold" of except in the medium of thought. When it is added that "the immediate certainty of real existence attaches to . . . the accompanying awareness of subjective activity in

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the knowing act," the confusion is doubly confounded. If "immediate certainty of real existence" implies the "awareness of subjective activity in the knowing act," how can it possibly be "immediate certainty"? The "knowing act" in any given case presupposes the whole complex process by which the knowing subject has developed from a primitive stage of undifferentiated feeling to the stage where there is for him an ordered world, distinguished from and yet in unity with himself, and without this antecedent process there can be no "immediate certainty" of the "knowing act." The subject may, no doubt, be unaware that his "immediate certainty" of himself is mediated by the whole process of his rational activity, but this imperfect and hasty theory of himself is demonstrably false. There can be no "knowing act" which does not involve the development from immediate feeling into the consciousness of objects; and this consciousness of objects is impossible without the unifying activity of the subject. "Immediate certainty" of one's own existence can never establish the separate existence of one's self; all that it shows is that, when the subject has come to the consciousness of an ordered world and returns upon himself, he becomes aware that in any given act of knowledge the object is his and the act of knowledge is his. But, unless his whole self-conscious life were carried on within an intelligible system, in which he is a self-conscious organ, he could have no "immediate certainty" of himself. Not even the conversion of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* into *ago ergo sum* can save "ethical idealism" from philosophical bankruptcy. The self-conscious subject is certainly self-active; but it will never be proved to be so by the appeal to a belief which tacitly presupposes the abstraction of a separate self,—as if such a self were even conceivable.

Philosophy, then, is not experience, but the thinking comprehension of experience. No theory which takes a part of experience as if it were the whole—whether that part is called "object" or "subject"—can possibly be adequate. No doubt it will be said that this doctrine reduces the world to an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." I should think that Mr. Bradley must almost have repented his creation of this

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brilliant phrase,—suggested, as it probably was, by Hegel's "Bacchantic dance of categories, each of which is so drunk that the whole is sober,"—when he sees the use to which the new "ethical" philosophy wrests it. We are warned against "identifying" "mere categories of thought" with "reality." It ought to be clear by this time that no such identification is made. "Truth" and "reality" are not the same, though they are "identical" in the sense already explained. Philosophy is the comprehension of the universal and necessary nature of reality; but no philosophy can be reality. What philosophy tells us is how the rational subject must think a rational universe; it does not make the insane claim that in comprehending the rationality of the universe philosophy is constructing what it comprehends. What absolute idealism denies is that the universe is incomprehensible. It affirms that we *can* "reach the absolute substance," not by becoming that "substance," but by comprehending in our thought what its nature is. Green made a fatal slip when he declared, almost in the words of Philo, that "to know God we must be God."* It is admitted that "an Absolute which does not appear or reveal itself, and an appearance without something which appears, are correlative abstractions." But, it is objected, "the appearance of the Absolute *in itself* is not "identical with the appearance which the world presents to the Hegelian philosopher." It would thus seem that there are two "appearances": (1) the appearance of the Absolute *to us*, (2) the appearance of the Absolute *in itself*. The appearance of the Absolute *to us* is, I suppose, the experience which we as men have of the Absolute, including the "immediate certainty" of our own existence; and the appearance of the Absolute *in itself* is the appearance of the Absolute *to itself*. There are thus two "appearances" of the Absolute. What I do not understand is how we can know that the one "appearance" is different from the other, since by hypothesis we know only the "appearance" of the Absolute as it is for us. Is the "appearance"

* Philo's words are: Θεὸν γενέσθαι δεῖ πρότερον—ὅπερ οὐδὲ οἷόν τε,—ἵνα θεὸν ἰσχύσῃ τις καταλαβεῖν, II., 654.

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of the Absolute in itself revealed to us, like our own existence, in an "immediate certainty"? If so, the same difficulty will arise as before, viz., that "immediate certainty" is either no criterion of truth or it presupposes a truth which it affects to deny. In short, the assertion that we can know the Absolute to reveal itself, and yet not to be what it reveals itself as being, seems to me suicidal. How can that be a revelation of the Absolute which is supposed to reveal it as it is not? Moreover, we have no right to assert the existence of what is incompatible with the possibility of our asserting it. No one denies that the Absolute cannot be *completely* comprehended, but the theory in question is that it cannot be comprehended *at all* as it is in itself. I submit that this is the same as saying that there is for us no Absolute.

JOHN WATSON.

QUEEN'S COLLEGE, KINGSTON, CANADA.

GOOD CITIZENSHIP AND ATHLETICS.*

I TAKE for granted that we have a deep sense of our responsibility to the community as citizens of this great city —London; and my lecture is an essay upon the following theme: Is the spirit, temper, and energy of our people in regard to athletics turned to the best account for the individual and for the community? As citizens, what is our duty in this matter, and on what method should we work?

Strictly speaking, athletics is prize-fighting,—engaging in physical competition with the prospect of a prize to the winner. A word kindred in meaning to athletics is ascetics or asceticism,—the training, exercising, and ultimately, in the ecclesiastical sense, the disciplining or mortifying of the body. A third word is temperance. It suggests the tempered, modulated life, in which all the parts are compounded

* An address given at a meeting of the London Ethical Society at the Passmore Edwards Settlement, November, 1898.

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in a due proportion. It is the life of the healthy mind, the life that is safe and sound; and the former of these adjectives marks the ecclesiastical turn now given to this thought also. "The way of salvation" is strictly but the way of well being or safety,—a meaning which in ordinary thought has been entirely lost; so much so, indeed, that now, according to some religious theories, people might argue that he who would walk in what in religious matters is called "the way of salvation" need not live the tempered and duly proportioned life, the life which, in the simpler use of words, may most properly be called the way of salvation, since it makes the individual safe. But however this be, by athleticism and asceticism we seem to demand of ourselves something in practice too intense and in purpose too specialized to be described by the word temperance.

We have, then, these three words and the thoughts that underlie them,—athleticism, asceticism, and temperance: athleticism the worldly word, asceticism the ecclesiastical word, and temperance a word to be rescued alike from the world and from the churches, which seem intent on making it a synonym of restraint from drink.

There is an athleticism that is intemperate, and there is a similar asceticism; but before we go farther, let us consider whether we have any ideal before us of a manhood or a womanhood that would fulfil the demands of our thought,—the proportioned, the perfected being,—that "every man at arms would wish to be," or that every woman would wish to realize as herself, and yet would feel to be completer than herself.

All who are in earnest for the common good have, I suppose, some anticipation of the coming of an ennobled manhood and womanhood; as some would say, the man of the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ,—the ideal and supremely spiritual man, or, as others would say, of some other type of goodness. In thought we have our heaven like an overarching firmament above us and yet within us; and the visions of religion, in whatever form they may actually be expressed, we make our own. Our concep-

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tions may seem, on analysis, strangely heterogeneous; but in the blended unity of idealism we assimilate the inconsistent and draw differences into a harmony.

Of womanhood, then, what should we say? May we think of it as of some Demeter, mother of Proserpine, the Demeter of the great statue and the great legend, queen-like and strong, affectionate and home-loving, intense in feeling and persistent in purpose, loving the great folk and the people alike, whose acts are the witness of her true motherhood, and whose influence does not pass by as a momentary breeze roughening the surface of a quiet water, but deeply stirs all mortal things, affects the whole world of our life and the fate of mankind, and seems indeed to be destiny shaping itself in the flesh. In that ideal the whole seriousness and splendor of motherhood seems to lie,—the intensity of love, and the life that is true, because it is both a dying and a resurrection.

And of manhood, do we not long that we and every youth we know should be like that knight who

> "lovede chyvalrye,"
> "Trouthe and honour, fredom and curteisie,"
> . . . . . .
> "And though that he was worthy, he was wys,
> "And of his port as meke as is a mayde.
> "He never yit no vileinye ne sayde
> "In al his lyf, unto no maner wight.
> "He was a verray perfight gentil knight."

And when I think of London, my thoughts turn often to Milton as the prophet of our great city.

"Now once again by all concurrence of signs and by the general instinct of holy and devout men, as they daily and solemnly express their thoughts, God is decreeing to begin some new and great period in His Church, ev'n to the reformation of Reformation itself: what does He then but reveal Himself to His servants, and first of all to His Englishmen; I say as His manner is, first to us, though we mark not the method of His counsels and are unworthy. Behold now this vast city; a city of refuge, the mansion house of liberty, encompassed and surrounded with His protection; the shop of warre hath not there more anvils and hammers waking, to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed justice in defence of beleaguer'd Truth, than there be pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas where-

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with to present, as with their homage and their fealty, the approaching Reformation: others as fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and convincement. What could a man require more from a nation so pliant and so prone to seek after knowledge? What wants there to such a towardly and pregnant soile, but wise and faithful labourers, to make a knowing people, a nation of Prophets, of Sages, and of Worthies."

That there might be such a London as this upon the earth,—such a manhood and such a citizenship,—any of us, I think, would willingly give up their lives.

With such an ideal before us, we would turn again to asceticism and athleticism—true and false.

As Nettleship says, most people are in some degree ascetics: give up something to win by so doing a habit of life which they feel to be better and completer. But to some people, and even, it would seem, to some generations, this training or exercise of one's self does not seem enough. In their gloom men make of Christ a morbid, mutilated figure, and picture as the supreme moment for thought, not His death as the culmination and fulfilment of His life, but His death as in itself a sacrifice, the sacrifice of a victim, of an outcast punished by the wrath of God. Yet, if we think of it, we cannot associate debility or pessimism with Christ any more than we can, say, with Socrates. The brightness of health and joyousness as the expression of a soul that is seeking peace because it believes in it, and, as it seeks, finds,—this is the beauty of our vision. And yet, in despite of this, we find another long line of tendency. Asceticism, in the sense of mortification, is continually preached and practised as an essential part of religion, implying, or it would be meaningless, that the divine man, the man of our vision, is an ascetic, thinned by self-imposed starvation, not made rugged and hard fleshed by the roughness of the world and his contest with it, but weakened by the effort of his own will; for conscience' sake a kind of moral suicide. Of this vision endless pictures of Christ and of martys are evidence, and often one thinks that the very flesh tints are whitened down to the deathly tones of this asceticism. What, then, does this asceticism represent? It is wrong because it is the materialization of the idea—to die

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is to live. The dying, the mortification, comes to be all in all. The living is forgotten. A far-off end, the winning of a place in the galaxy of the saints, has to be purchased by the actual sacrifice of one's body, one's strength, by what is literally a suicide.

Contrast with this athleticism. It, too, is a fighting or struggling for a prize, and may be as much amiss as asceticism. It usually demands, first of all, not an average body, but a body of exceptional physical strength. Next it endeavors to concentrate thought and ambition upon one particular period of life when physical strength is greatest; and it tends to the cultivation of one form of physical activity only, and that without regard to the man as a whole or education as a whole. Like asceticism, it may provoke to some kind of intemperance as a reaction from its partial and selfish rigors. The natural man says, like the young barbarian in *Punch*, "I'll tell you what it is, old man; as soon as I go out of training, I'm going to have the finest dinner I ever had in my life. I'll have turtle soup, oysters." Athleticism thus may not represent a mastery of the powers of the man, but, on the contrary, the body may by it be made to master the man. The training may not enforce a vigor which is to be made available for life as a whole, nor add strength to strength. It may only add to strength animalism.

What, then, is the truth about asceticism and that which is, in a manner, its antithesis—athleticism? If each represent tendencies, how is each to be turned to the best account. No outsider can be a judge of the rigors of the individual will. He cannot estimate the rigors which as a kind of corrective it may impose upon itself. Yet he may fairly sum up thus:

Good education, the training of the whole being, should prevent morbidness. It should do so because it will give an outlet for the energy of each part in such a way that the attention is absorbed in the process, and simultaneously the body is used, tried, and tired. In the process of education the strength available in the creature is used up for the creation of ability in relation to every function. Education thus prevents morbidness by—to use the antithetical word—

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creating livingness, vitality, making the man alive. Then, instead of any part tending to disease and death, all parts tend to their true relative use, and so to life. The morbidity of asceticism disappears; the desire for it, in that sense, vanishes. The discipline of it remains. A knowledge of the conditions of life, a realized and not a superficial knowledge, a knowledge equally religious and equally earnest, has displaced it, not by suppression but by substitution. The good will is strengthened, not by the mutilation of the strength of the man or by its depreciation or diminution, but by adding strength to strength, by husbanding and expanding physical and mental resources, and by giving ample outlet for their exercise.

Similarly with athleticism. The prize will be nothing,—mere fourpenny points to make the game of whist more entertaining and to keep the attention alert. The game or the race will be its own reward,—giving in one large handful all the pleasures of sport and exercise,—the animation, the fun, the adroitness, the determination, and the joy of life, mere life. For exercise, true exercise, is of the whole being, and affects the whole. We "throw our soul into" it. Our soul seems to pass from us into what we are doing, to speed from us like the white sail of a dancing boat, which has the joy of driving before the wind through the roll of the water and the foam of the waves; and in the tumult of the game it is braced into toughness and vigor by infinite adjustments of thought at play in the quickness of motion and action.

Exercise is thus no small part of an education, which, beginning with the child of three, is continued through school-time into life. And asceticism and athletics rightly used help us to remake, renew, and complete ourselves, and to give different and nobler proportions to the temperance of the ordered and continuous life.

To what extent, then, does the instinctive love of athleticism prevail? and on what conditions can it be turned to good account throughout life—to men and to women, each according to their purpose?

It has been my habit to ramble on Sundays in the country

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round London. On Sunday the natural man asserts himself, the man does what he thinks he would like to do throughout the year or whenever he has a holiday. He is then expressing himself by his deeds quite unconsciously. I do not refer, of course, to the part of our community that attends public worship, but to that far larger population which lives, I believe, a decent life, and is vexed by no consciousness that it ought to observe the Sabbath by going to church. I am pronouncing no opinion. I am dealing with facts as they are.

Near us is a field, called the Plague Field, where bodies were buried during the plague. It is an ideal common field, where the village games of sweet Auburn might well be played. Large elm-trees shade part of it; and the grass is green and thick. At the end of it is a short cinder running track, and there you will find trainer or friend criticising the performance of three or four runners who spend the later hours of Sunday morning in practising spurts and starts. Pass on to the river. Can there be a more sporting character than the ground-bait fisher? Persistent and attentive in immobility, patient in all weathers,—fishing, baiting, baiting, fishing,—a very victim of the unconscious will, caring so much and catching so little. Or turn another way—to the canal. There a steep bank planted with trees, which expand into a small wood beyond, lies on your right hand, and as you pass along the tow-path you meet two sportsmen at their habitual Sunday shooting with guns and dogs, a retriever and a black spaniel. Suddenly there is a shower of shot in the trees; the dogs yelp and scurry down the bank and through the wood, and then, finding nothing, rush with great enjoyment back, to stand with open mouths and lolling tongues and look inquiringly at the performer, in the hope that he will do it again. Another day you will come across ferreting parties; one or two ferrets turned into rat-holes, over which sometimes a bag is set to catch the fugitive, while a small cross-bred bulldog stands by in excitement. Or you come across the whippat taken for his two daily walks; and if you talk to the owner, he will tell you perhaps that he has that and other dogs in partnership; that he paid five pound for it;

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that it is a rare beast, and that it is to run at Bromley next week. He or his partner or a trusted boy will be seen regularly day after day taking the whippats out for their long, slow country march, to keep them in good fettle. And once I came across a large basket of starlings. They were to give sport instead of pigeons at an inn some way off,—starlings to serve as a cheaper kind of pigeons. It was perhaps the worst sport I ever lighted on. Other days you find a lad with a lurcher. He is not to be passed by. If you spend a half hour with him you will have a new sense of geography. He will tell you how he can get through to Watford and out to happy hunting grounds in the country. He has a knowledge of counties and villages, by-paths and open spaces, that is not to be learnt from a school-mistress in any school standard; and, though it is very early on a foggy morning, he has had a journey already. He is evidently a sportsman in full enjoyment of the chances of a hazardous life. And you may even be consulted as an authority, if you have often passed along a country road. Two fellows will stop, talk to one another, turn their heads, and then one will come up with the question: "Have you seen anything about here?" A question that stands for much, though the answer may have to be, "No, nothing; only along that ditch there are a lot of rats, and if you lie low you may see some field mice." An answer which is taken good-humoredly by those who, you imagine, are dreaming of possible rabbits or, indeed, of real game. Other poor shrivelled country lovers you meet, vagrant creatures, no doubt, but very human,—the chickweed man with basket and stick, who touches his hat as he passes, like an old acquaintance, and that queer trader, the man who trowels out his little pats of earth from some forgotten grassy corner to provide the health of grass and earth to cage birds in the shops in the Seven Dials. These two men are, like others engaged in similar business, tenants from some common lodging house, competitors in the little trades that just keep them out of the workhouse. Poor devils, no doubt, wrecked of their own fault, like so many of us, but still making their struggle; or, in other cases, it may be just picking up enough for an extra

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glass. They don't naturally beg. They can live according to their ideas and their struggle. They, too, have perhaps loved sport and exercise in their day. If you care for them, you will exchange thoughts with them. They will like that,—without any gift of shillings or pence,—the usual sign, not of sympathy and knowledge, but the want of it.

Well, imagine this population in London, which finds its real pleasure in these pursuits, often it must be admitted mixed with drinking and gambling. These are their delights,—though the upper classes are too prim and the philanthropists are not humane enough to recognize the fact, and to sympathize with the perpetrators. To understand society, one must leave one's class. Thus only can one learn the purpose and qualities of other classes and the possible utility of one's own.

I have mentioned one phase of athleticism only. Others suggest themselves at once,—the playing fields that rim London round, where, as I have observed, the games are every year more numerous, the large attendance at great matches, and the general interest that may be marked and measured by columns in every newspaper. Do we turn this wide-spread instinct, which shows itself in all classes, to the best account, as a means of giving our people the health and the joy of the full, well-tempered life?

A glance at the tables of births and deaths published by the registrar-general will show that beside the population and the numbers and percentages of births and deaths is a column showing the density of population. This is a public recognition of one principal fact which affects us all. Every page of these tables suggests the question, If there are so many deaths, are they due to the overcrowding of the people? In some districts of London the persons to the acre are as many as from 250 to 500. Borough Road (District 22[4]) has 259; Mile End New Town (W), 269; part of Spitalfields, 304; another part, 362; part of Whitechapel, 523. The adjusted death-rate for Whitechapel (including Spitalfields) in 1881–90 was 29.61. In the city it was 28.01 per thousand. In St. George-in-the-east it was 25.09. In the more open

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Poplar and St. Olaves, it was 21.23 and 22.84. Excluding large crowded cities, one may take the crude death rate of a healthy town district at 16 or 17 in a thousand.

What density of population means may thus be stated:

"In towns overcrowding checks ventilation, makes drainage difficult, so that subsoils become saturated, clouds the atmosphere with smoke and dust, intermingles the sexes (among the lower classes), so that succeeding generations are stunted in their development, and in a variety of other ways predisposes to disease. . . . Overcrowding predisposes to moral, mental, and physical deterioration; to all communicable diseases, including all septic and parasitic conditions, and especially to typhus fever and tubercle, to pulmonary affections, and to a variety of nervous diseases. By lowering the *morale* of populations it increases all other predispositions, and, in fact, passes into an active exciting cause of disease." *

In this overcrowded existence all things become physically harder, and especially harder to the child. Not only are the natural defences of the creature against disease and death undermined, but he is degraded to a lower moral level. In every way he becomes less alive. If athleticism is to be of service to the community, these conditions must be altered.

A child in these circumstances is the less likely to attend school; and the careless parent may well say what a child repeated to me the other day, when it was suggested that he was a truant, "No, I ain't. When mother died, father said to me, 'You need not go to school any more.' That's why I haven't been to school." And, whatever the cause, absenteeism flourishes. In London, the percentage of the average number of children *present at all* in the schools during the year is 76.6 boys and 76.7 girls on the average number on the rolls. There is thus an average absenteeism of about twenty-five per cent. Speaking of the country generally, Sir John Gorst said recently, "that on an average, out of five children who ought to be at school, only four were there." Evidently, therefore, the school is not attractive. Nor is the knowledge it imparts retained. Mr. C. H. Wyatt, the Honorary Secretary of the Association of School Boards, writes that

* Quain's "Dictionary of Medicine" (1894), Article, "Causes of Disease," by J. Pearson Irvine and H. Montague Murray.

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"the country does not get anything like full value for the ten millions per annum it pays for education."

"Children leave school in great numbers at the age of twelve or even earlier, just at the very period of their lives when education can only be truly said to have had a real beginning. Then follows a speedy decline in the knowledge imparted during a brief school life. . . . Those only who encounter the boy in the night-school, a year or two after he has left the day-school, can fully realize the speed with which the very elements of education have been forgotten. . . . I find nearly half the grant (for evening schools) paid last year was for instructions in reading, writing, and arithmetic." *

We turn from this to what is also apparently a result of the failure of our educational system. Examining a large number of cases, in which demands were made for relief for school children, I found a large proportion to be families in which the parents had had the benefits of Mr. Forster's Acts, but in comparatively early manhood and womenhood they were becoming content to let their children apply for meals whenever they were to be had. Among the general causes that have led to this most unnatural state of things ought we not to number, I have sometimes thought, that "predisposition" to sickness and feebleness which the doctors report, and which might be prevented by municipal administration without kicking against the pricks of any economic laws? Lately the evil has taken a worse turn. The complaint sometimes heard of the roughness of the children, playing about the streets, breaking things ruthlessly, and becoming "a perfect pest," seems likely to be justified. The Police Courts in the past year have given many accounts of Larrikins and larrikinism, —gangs of young people, men and women, ready to lie in wait, attack, belay, and rob without compunction. There could be no better instance of brutal and untempered force. And, as is only natural, beside this undisciplined brutality we find that weakling population which, under the title of feeble-minded or defective, is now coming to be recognized as a class, not insane like lunatics, not witless like idiots or imbeciles, and yet with neither the sanity nor the wits of the aver-

* *The Times*, October 10, 1898.

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age man or woman. If we ask advice of the doctors, they tell us plainly what we ought to do.

From two to seven is the age of childhood. During that period the child should have twelve hours' sleep a day. From seven to fourteen he should have nine or ten hours, gradually reduced to seven. He should always have four hours' leisure. Work should slowly increase from two hours at the age of seven to three and four at nine and ten, and so by an hour a day more each year up to fifteeen, when a day's work of nine hours may be achieved. Of exercise eight hours are required from the seventh to the tenth year: then there may be a gradual lessening to five at fourteen, about five at fifteen years of age. "Two things are requisite for healthy growth and development and a happy childhood,—a playroom and a garden. Children need a place like an empty barn:" so the doctor says. For boys and girls from seven to fourteen there is presumably the playground. "Children do not thrive without the purest air: like the young of all animals, they are peculiarly sensitive to prebreathed air." Hence for all country air is recommended and a sufficient air-space to sleep and work in. And the claims of exercise are urged in the interest both of girls and boys,—the exercise that is a pleasure. Dr. Dukes thus puts it:

"In the performance of work energy is expended and finally exhausted, and this end comes sooner in the young than in those whose tissues are matured. Moreover, the young have to tread unbeaten tracks, which consumes more force than the pursuit of more or less accustomed studies. The opening up of new ground necessitates exertion, and unless the exertion is put forth with pleasure it is apt to become harmful, whereas information acquired by the young with pleasure rarely occasions injury. Hence the importance of likes and dislikes. . . . In fact, the appetite for work is very similar to the appetite of eating: the child will not only thrive, but get fat, on what it likes, while it will eat so sparingly of what is distasteful that the body will suffer. . . . As slow and regular development of the body produces the finest and most permanent results in strength and durability of the tissues, so it is with the brain itself. . . . The brain can never attain its largest growth nor the highest quality of nervous tissue from the exercise simply of its own functions, for it is dependent to a large extent upon the vigor of the body, which is the manufacturer of the material on which it lives. . . . Hence the importance of sufficient exercise. This exercise should take the form of games or recreation, in which refreshment the brain participates, rather than the form of a set lesson in the hands of the gymnasium instructor or

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the drill sergeant. . . . In physical exercise all the functions of the body are engaged: the circulation of the blood is quickened, more oxygen is inhaled, and the impurities of the blood are thereby oxygenated and destroyed, so that the excretory organs of the body may remove the detritus of the system." *

If, then, boy and girl are to be "saved," it must be largely through exercise; and if they are to learn, they will do so largely because they take exercise. And if this be so in boyhood and girlhood, it is even more to be desired in the period of puberty, from fourteen to twenty, for that is the age of all others, as Dr. Southey writes, "when good or bad habits of life are formed; the time, too, when the seeds of disease are sown broadcast, to spring up in the after-age of man and womanhood."

In a London, then, in which exercise and athletics had their true educational value, there would be old barns and playgrounds for the young children, good playgrounds for the elder, and in the suburbs those larger playgrounds where the adolescents would have their cricket, foot-ball, and hockey. The shouting and jumping of the children in the barnlike play-places would be succeeded by touch, prisoner's base, and hop-scotch, not necessarily played in the streets. Then would come the great games, in which the play is not for one's self, but for one's side, beginning at the age of eleven or twelve and lasting with men to thirty perhaps, if work allows. One friend tells me that he has given his clerks whole holidays on Saturdays, when business has been slack, much to their invigoration, and without detriment to the output of work during the week.

In a democracy there should be an even-toned population of men and women who form their judgment of each public issue from different stand-points, but with a similar circumspection and moderation. Suppose that there be a ratio between physical conditions and soundness of judgment. Then to promote the good judgment we would educate the physical powers.

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* Dr. Clement Dukes: "The Hygiene of Youth," in the "System of Medicine," Macmillan & Co., 1896.

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But now, if we compare the physical condition of different classes, the contrast between higher and lower is immense. Thus at eleven a boy belonging to the artisan class of a town population has an average height of 51.52 inches, and has grown 1.00 inch in the year. His weight is 69.46 lbs., and he has put on 3.15 lbs. in the year. The corresponding boy of public school status is 54.91 inches high; has added 1.51 inches in the year; weighs 72.9 lbs., and has put on during the year 5.50 lbs.* So at twenty years of age the latter is on the average nearly three inches higher, and weighs more than twenty-one pounds more. Difference of class, therefore, stands for much, physically as well as otherwise. Would the gradual equalization of physical conditions produce a better judging democracy? If so, exercise and athletics, accompanied by a gradually heightened standard of life, may work a social revolution.

To describe the position and insufficiency of the playgrounds of London, a map would be necessary. School playgrounds are opened from eight A. M. till the evening, all the year round; also during the holidays, and now sometimes on Sunday. They are larger relatively in the outer districts of London. In the centre they can hardly be said to exist. A correspondent describes the playgrounds of the schools of one "group." At one school "the basement was used in a limited way as a playground." At another there was "a sort of glorified back area," used by the infants only. "These schools are typical of the elementary schools of this very highly rented part of Central London."

"At one school the boys don't know how to play at any game except cricket; that they play occasionally when taken for an outing to the Battersea Park. In the girls' school, owing to want of space, there is no provision for daily exercise except the ordinary drill."

From another quarter on the outer edge of the metropolitan area, I learn that the playgrounds are little frequented after school hours. Cricket is played very little, hockey hardly at

* Dr. Clement Dukes. Ibid.

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all. There is a foot-ball challenge cup, for which thirty-two teams compete; but "probably where foot-ball is played at a school the players are in a very small minority." The playgrounds are little used by girls after school hours for skipping rope and other games: they are most of them wanted at home. A large asphalted recreation ground is, however, much frequented by boys and girls. At the newer schools the grounds are of a fair size, at the older ones they are very inadequate. With one exception, the voluntary schools have no playgrounds at all. A caretaker gave it as her opinion that "if the playgrounds were largely used, it would need some one present to keep something like order and to superintend, as many of the children were very rough and unruly. The playground was used to a certain extent by children who do not attend school. Sometimes it was necessary to close the gate and prevent very rough, noisy children, who would be unmanageable if allowed free play, from coming in." A teacher who would teach the girls to swim would be of great service.

From another district not far from the last there is similar information; the playgrounds are used in the "breaks," at some schools in organized games, in which the masters take part. Most schools have foot-ball clubs. The remark, however, is made that "the pressure of the time table is now so great that the tendency is to shorten breaks, and neither masters nor boys can get as much exercise as usual. The result is lack of sufficient exercise to the boys, and another result is that boys are now leaving school a year earlier than they did some time ago."

From another district, south of the river, there is a better report. There are parks near which are frequently used, though the foot-ball space is altogether too limited for the wants of the child population.

"In the church-yards the girls skip and play with hoops. Boys spin tops and play tipcat. These church-yards *swarm* with children in holiday times. Most of them have well-stocked flower-beds, with wide asphalt walks all round. No proper games can be played there. . . . On the whole, the boys seem fairly well provided for so long as they are at school. . . . For girls there seems to be no provision. They have no games in which *esprit de corps* is essential, very few that demand muscular exertion or involve healthy competition. . . . They seldom have any

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healthier ambition than to work in a factory and have their 'liberty' to run the streets in the evening."

Secondary schools are better, but seldom well, provided for; and generally, as a friend writes, who is connected with the London Playing Fields Committee, "the question of open spaces is a burning one, and they ought to be increased tenfold. . . . Speaking from memory, I should say that the Parks Committee of the London County Council have about two hundred cricket pitches on all the London Commons and parks, and for these eleven thousand applications were made last year (1897)."

To judge of the demand, or what should be the demand, we may take from five to twenty-five as the play and playground age. So measured, there is a population of 1,315,850 to be reckoned with. The boys from five to fifteen number about 432,100, the girls 438,400. Though considerable allowance be made for boys often leaving school at twelve or earlier, and girls leaving school early and being much "wanted at home," there still remains a large number of playground claimants. After fifteen, at present, play-time with girls is over, as a rule. The male population fifteen to twenty-five years of age numbers over 569,000, of whom those who are fifteen to twenty years old number more than 194,100. Shape it as we may, the demand then is large, far larger than is now provided for; the educational utility of play is now recognized by the education department. "Whenever circumstances permit, the best form of exercise is a healthy game," they write; but "in most town schools, even in those which possess large playgrounds, such games are impossible, or possible for only a few scholars." In the circumstances, they can only propose for the "physical development of the powers of growing boys and girls" "some scientific form of drill and gymnastics."

To remedy these evils many changes, great and small, would have to be made. If the population is to enjoy the primary conditions of health, there must be some standard of density which should not be exceeded,—say 90 or 100 persons to the acre,—and by degrees even a higher standard might be

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adopted.* Such a policy would entail on our rulers the constant exercise of foresight in endeavoring to meet the wants of London. Within the metropolitan area money might be expended on behalf of the community more advantageously in making playgrounds and open spaces than in building artisans dwellings. Whitechapel, with its dense population of 333 to the acre, is an example of what should not be done. There the population is crowded together by the dwellings of the philanthropist. Under the Artisans' Dwellings Acts the London County Council have expended about £2,076,300. This expenditure has no doubt opened out some crowded corners. Would it not have been better spent in giving the people the primary means of health, open space for air and for exercise? For a good playground at least two acres are required.

But apart from this process of thinning out within, there is the acquisition of land outside, the metropolitan area. A corporation which had powers of purchase within the twelve mile radius, with Purley on the south, Romford a little on the east, Enfield on the north, and Hayes on the west, might even now have at its disposal open space enough for new playgrounds. For the purpose, a body might be created like the Trustees of Public Reservations in Massachusetts, or some of our millionaires acting together might by judicious purchase help the community without incurring any considerable loss themselves, reserving part of the land for building, part for public purposes. Or, if the playground were considered as necessary as the school, a municipal authority might undertake the task, even though to do so would necessitate larger

* Of course there are other elements in the question, such as insufficient room ventilation, drainage, and unhealthy occupations. But I have thought it well to refer here to one point only. Good sanitary conditions in a crowded district compensate for much. The only district in the metropolitan area placed by the registrar-general in the list of "Selected Registration Districts" on which his "Healthy District Life Tables" are based, is Lewisham. The death rate in it was 13.5 per thousand; the density, 14 to the acre. In Paddington, with a death rate of 18 per thousand, the density of population is 90 to the acre. To adopt such a standard throughout the residential districts of a town would be a counsel of perfection, unless our method of town-making were altered and the utility of open space recognized.

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rates, and thus in the long run higher rents. The trend of the population is outward, and these measures, joined with improved locomotion, would stimulate it; and this in time should lower rent by diffusing the demand for accommodation. Spaces might be cleared in centres where poverty and overcrowding are greatest, and where, as Mr. Llewellyn Smith has shown, the inflow is less than the outflow. Indeed, a policy of playgrounds would aid the community in many ways.

The playgrounds, with play-masters and masters joining in the play, would be one means of giving an outlet to that rough love of sport which, unguided, may lead to sheer brutality. For boys another resource would be cadet corps, which may be joined at the age of twelve, or cadet battalions, in which the ages of cadets may range from fourteen to seventeen. The cadet corps might be linked to the schools, recognized and patronized by the military authorities, and, greatly to the improvement of the cadets in health and discipline, required to camp out every summer.

The facilities for exercise and athletics would make the schools more attractive. The boys and girls would attend school because they liked school, which is, after all, the only argument acceptable to the naturally unwilling scholar. Special schools for boys—truant, industrial, or reformatory—are only desirable in exceptional cases. The absenteeism of our schools can only be met by a readjustment of the whole system. It is too large to be met by any but general methods.

These are some remedies. It is better to spend the means of the community in adding to its health and vigor, and thus to the versatility and independence of its members, than to provide them with free meals and free physic, cheap houses, and money allowances. These they can provide for themselves better and better, if opportunities for healthy development are given them, and the chiefest of these is space for play, exercise, games, and athletics. One great advantage of the bicycle is that it provides exercise and some of the pleasure of a game upon the already available open spaces of the community—public roads. But to carry out a sufficient policy of

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open spaces, a worthy ideal of English manhood and womanhood has to be conceived by us as an incentive to our imagination and a guide to our action; and this guide we must follow. Then perhaps, where we now watch the gradual enfeeblement of the town population, we should see a stronger nature grow, better trimmed and balanced, trained to a higher temperance, endowed with a greater respect for plain living, ready to make the many small sacrifices that temperance and cleanliness entail, and withal more deliberate in counsel. Such a nature would "its own physician be."

> "Wouldst see a man all his own wealth,
> His own music his own health?
> A man, whose sober soul can tell
> How to wear her garments well?
> A happy soul, that all the way
> To heav'n hath a summer's day?
> Wouldst see a man whose well-warmed blood
> Bathes him in a genuine flood? . . .
> In sum, wouldst see a man that can
> Live to be old and still a man? . . .
> This rare one, Reader, wouldst thou see,
> Heark hither, and thyself be he."

That is the moral of my essay.

C. S. Loch.

London.

INSTRUCTION OF THE YOUNG IN SEXUAL KNOWLEDGE.

It would be impossible to name any subject of such general importance and interest as this, on which so little has been said; the reasons being that the interest and importance of the subject are outweighed by its difficulty, and that while the dangers of speaking are patent to the most superficial reflection, the infinitely greater dangers of reticence are not to be understood without prolonged observation and much thought. Hence in dealing with the question, How to instruct the young in sexual knowledge, I feel that I am entering an almost untrodden ground which craves the most

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wary walking, and, to drop the metaphor, it is one in which any brilliant or confident utterances would be singularly out of place. The matters with which we have to deal require tentative investigation, analysis, and balancing of opposite opinions. It is not so much guidance of others that I would attempt, but exploration.

It would seem then, *à priori*, that a young human being who, by the natural laws of growth, is to enter on the possession of certain powers and be exposed to the temptation of grievously misusing them, should receive timely advice as to the right use of these powers and the meaning of them. This broad observation applies to all boys and girls, and with more force to the former than to the latter. But no sooner does a parent or a teacher seriously contemplate the imparting of this advice than he is checked by a strong misgiving which agrees with a still stronger instinct. The misgiving is lest he may suggest to his innocent-minded children some of the darker facts of life before it is necessary or advisable that they should know of them. The instinct within him is his own reserve. So it has come about, though to a less extent than formerly, that a vast majority of the young of both sexes are left to gather the knowledge of sexual laws in a haphazard way, either from companions or from books, or from observation of the animal world. It is still very widely felt that instruction on this subject, however reasonable in theory, is such as the human mind has a fatal power of turning into poison, and so the instruction is not given. Let us consider the precise effects of this policy of reticence on the two sexes separately.

The case of boys differs from that of girls in two ways: there is a more decided and inevitable effect of school life on boys; also, their bodily growth is far more likely to generate animal desires. In the school life of boys, in spite of enormous improvements, it is impossible that sexual subjects should be wholly avoided in conversation. Much liberty is allowed, and general curiosity prevails, and a still more general ignorance, and, though in preparatory schools of little boys under fourteen, the unceasing vigilance of masters and constant super-

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vision combined with constant employment, reduce the evil of prurient talk to a minimum, yet the subject will crop up, and whatever is said about it will be the outcome of ignorance and probably morbidness of mind. And, even if this were not so, which is hardly conceivable, it is to be observed that the result is even then wholly negative. There is nothing gained or stored up in the way of sound knowledge to meet the manifold perils of the near future, but instead of that the mind is a chamber "empty swept and garnished," from which intrusive thoughts have been with the utmost difficulty kept at bay for a time. But in the public school, owing not only to freer talk and more mixed company, but to the boy's own wider range of vision, sexual questions and also those connected with the structure of the body assume prominence and begin to occupy more or less of the thoughts of all but a peculiarly constituted minority of the whole number. Moreover, without indicating at present the right way in which such matters should be handled, it will suffice if I point out that under the conditions of general ignorance and curiosity the treatment of the subjects of the propagation of life and the functions of the human body relating to that wonderful power is quite certain to be inadequate, misleading, wholly without proportion, and will probably be immoral, in that the boys most inclined to talk about them are those who have either gained a smattering of information from low companions or have pieced together with a morbid cleverness fragmentary and inaccurate observations culled from books and the animal world.

Moreover, and this is perhaps the most serious fact of all, the point of view taken by boys if left to themselves must inevitably be selfish. This will be seen at once if the second of the two conditions incident to boyhood be taken into account: the normal growth of animal desires, far stronger in the male than in the female, anyhow in England. At varying ages these desires make themselves felt, in a very large number of cases most imperiously, in some few quite irresistibly. Ordinarily at fifteen and sixteen years of age, the will power being still weak, the bodily desires are almost at their

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height; if they increase later on, so does the power of will and the sense of prudence, so that, normally, the dangers of misuse are less from seventeen years onwards. Now, this fact of growth, by itself, would make it difficult for a boy to contemplate what he has heard of sexual relations, paternity, sexual indulgence, and so forth, from anything but a selfish point of view. At the time of puberty, mysteriously and silently the great fact of personality, the sense of egoism, asserts itself, and often produces a puzzling shyness and a reserve which sometimes struggles for utterance but cannot find it. This causes the view of life to be colored and interpreted by the claims of self, and to this is to be attributed the not very uncommon lapse into *temporary* insanity at this period, which manifests itself in very various and often, of course, innocuous forms,—rowdiness, moodiness, silence, etc.,—but occasionally in deceptiveness, dishonesty, arson, homicide, or suicide. But how much more inevitably is this selfish coloring given to the facts of sex, etc., when no wholesome counterbalancing knowledge of any kind whatever is given, but when every single suggestion and hint on the subject has come from those who are under the same dominating influences of ignorance, curiosity, and the claims of self! It is significant to note that of no other subject whatever can this be said. Whatever else a boy learns is either impersonal and unexciting, such as Euclid or geography, or else vigorous efforts are made to present the subject from an altruistic point of view, such as when history is blended with patriotism; and, again, games are chosen for him which require co-operation and the subordination of self to the interests of the house or school. Only in sexual questions, where curiosity is, even in innocent-minded boys, very powerful, and where selfishness is almost insured by the violence of animal desires, frequently normal, frequently pampered by over-feeding, is ignorance permitted, and no attempt made to invest the subject in its proper dignity and in close relation to the welfare of others and to universal law.

It is not the purpose of this paper to dilate upon the manifold evils which are—as far as can be inferred—the direct

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outcome of the false and vicious opinion into which boys are allowed to grow, but there is one set of facts which illustrates clearly the deficiency here noticed and its inevitable result. The time comes when the young man faces the terrible phenomenon of the prevalence of fornication and the dedication of a whole class of women to a life of shame. Here again, colored as before by selfishness, the view of the young man of the world is that the question thus presented to him is one that concerns himself entirely: his health, his pleasure, his opportunities for marriage, his taste or his distaste. In ordinary conversation—at least in many circles of society—between young men on this tremendous question, there is rarely an allusion made to the fact that men's indulgence means the ruin of countless women, ruin of bodies and souls, and lives in thousands of cases shortened by the acutest possible misery. There is nothing whatever in a young man's bringing up to make him dream of the woman's side of the matter at all. It is a sexual question, and therefore for him a selfish one, because being a sexual question it is one on which reticence has been the order of the day, and the young man's inclinations have been his principal teacher.

Yet once more. After the stormy period of youth comes matrimony and the last phase of the deep and delicate subject of the relation of the sexes is entered upon. Again, quite inevitably, the man enters upon it as if his welfare and convenience were so far the most important matters for his concern that when problems come before him for solution, as they almost invariably do, demanding the finest adjustment of mutual conjugal claims and on his part real readiness of concession and discipline of will, he handles these problems not only selfishly but in a grossly uninstructed fashion: in ignorance of the possibility of continence and of the results of indulgence. It is true that good-heartedness, love, and a *felix temperamentum* will carry many safely through these perils. But still there is a vast amount of woful and preventable waste of married happiness, due to ignorance, which is the direct result of the prevailing reticence on sexual questions.

So much, then, for the effect on the notions of boys and men

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of the policy of reticence. It will hardly be disputed that of all the awful evils which attend the violation of sexual morality —used in its broadest sense—by far the larger portion are due to the initiative and motive power of the male sex. If, then, the reasoning is correct which points to the license of men as due to the falseness of their conceptions of all sexual matters from childhood onwards, it will be seen how tremendous is the indictment to be brought against the still common practice of leaving boys to gather in a fitful and uncertain fashion for themselves stray fragments of vitiated information on the most vital and most intimate of all truths of the natural world. And yet after a dispassionate view of the facts around us, and after much reflection on the inevitable effect of a multitude of young men being brought up in ignorance of sexual ethics, I can only say that so far from the cause not being adequate to account for the result, it is on the whole surprising that things are not worse than they are.

In considering the case of girls I should wish to speak with less confidence than about boys, owing to the want of first-hand experience. Some of the conditions are obviously very similar. We find the same curiosity and the same readiness to correlate the facts of sex with those of animal nature if the chance of so doing is given. And therefore it may be laid down that the withholding of wise instruction from this sex as from the other entails a serious intellectual loss. Whether the moral loss is anything like so serious may well be doubted. The answer to this question depends partly on certain conditions relating to the most obscure and most repulsive portion of the whole subject. It has been indicated that the ignorance of boyhood induces two main evils,—misuse of organs and selfishness of view. The second of these two resulting evils is certainly less visible in the other sex, in which selfishness is less pronounced and aggressive than among boys. As to the former, no certain information is to hand. If, however, the facts be anything like so dark as they are in the case of boys,—and certainly some very ominous statements are made by doctors,—then clearly there is something of an urgent reason for teaching girls no less than boys the laws of the

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treatment of the body and their connection with maternity. And the utmost that could be said on the other side would be that in most cases ignorance seems to do no harm, or that bad as is the tampering with boyish innocence, to enlighten young girls prematurely is even worse, and that in properly ordered homes everything goes well anyhow till marriage. This is all very plausible, but it begs the question whether everything does go well, and again much depends on how the teaching is given and whether prematurely or not. As to this more will be said later.

The argument, however, has introduced a very weighty and very thorny question. Granting that the need for instruction before marriage, though considerable, is less in the case of girls than of boys, yet when the time of possible matrimony is at hand, surely something should be said to prevent a young woman from entering on this great department of life ignorant of what marriage really means and of what is entailed by the step of giving herself bodily to her husband.

There is a trivial and offensive way of handling this particular topic which will best be avoided if in the following remarks only the broad principle is discussed. It should be remembered that the practical question is one peculiarly for a mother to deal with, and that in any particular case the mother's instinct with regard to the girl's temperament, her sensitiveness, and her capacity for deep feeling must of necessity be the chief guide not only as to the best way of acting, but perhaps as to the advisability of acting at all. And therefore of all that concerns the consideration of cases that may be called exceptional, as well as of all questions of detail, it would be quite beyond the scope of the present paper to speak. But there does appear to be a principle based on the broad ground of equity which should anyhow be not ignored. The question is, Should young women be to some extent enlightened as to the physical side of the marriage union, not before marriage but as soon as they are of marriageable age, before courtship? And the principle which seems entitled to respect is that in all relations of life a person who voluntarily or under inducement makes a contract, ought not deliberately to

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be left in a condition of ignorance with regard to what the contract inevitably entails. The freedom to make the contract is conceded to a young woman by society; but convention in many cases imposes an artificial ignorance of its full meaning. This does not seem right: and still less so if her entry into the contract is the result of inducement or persuasion by others. And if it is felt that one result of the removal or partial removal of this ignorance might be to deter from prudential marriages, whether such deterrence makes for convenience or inconvenience, the very misgiving is equivalent to a large concession of the truth of the principle; it is tantamount to an admission that many prudential marriages are now made in blindness which would not be made if some artificial hindrances to knowledge were removed. To the principle thus broadly stated I see no serious objection.

Such seem to be the evils with which we have to deal. No attempt has been made to set them out in any detail. All that it is at present necessary to observe is (1) that it is an entire mistake to suppose that the systems of boarding-schools or day-schools or no schools at all are the *cause* of these evils. Bad management at school or neglect anywhere will of course foster them; but a prolonged and careful study of boys, and a close consideration of each particular failure in its origin and development, lead irresistibly to the conclusion that children's minds in nine cases out of ten are so constituted that stray and piecemeal information given in the wrong tone breeds in them distorted and vicious imaginations prompting to self-indulgence, and powerfully assisted by the physical sensations of bodily growth. Further, that this result is generally as good as insured by the vacuous condition, as regards this subject, in which the minds of the young are left by their elders. (2) That the resulting evils are enormously more prevalent than is commonly supposed. Certain huge facts in our social life stand out in awful prominence, and if reflected on indicate a vast mass of unhealthy growth among the young; much of this, experts know, is preventable: serious-minded people have for some time reached the conclusion that there is hope in fortifying the innocence of childhood

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with some kind of sound instruction. But there still prevails even among these a great deal of doubt and hesitation as to the giving of the instruction; and to that problem I now address myself.

One or two broad principles may be laid down. The first is that matter is not evil. The time-honored doctrine which affirms the contrary is, it is true, less confidently stated than formerly, and the influence of Christian teaching on the destiny of the human body and the marvels of physical science have combined to save us from any formulated theory in these days. Yet it remains a fact that in the popular view of this subject there is much that tends to depreciate one of the greatest of all Divine or natural laws: the law of the propagation of life. To a lover of nature no less than to a convinced Christian the subject ought to wear an aspect not only negatively innocent but positively beautiful. It is a recurrent miracle and yet the very type and embodiment of law; and it may be confidently affirmed that in spite of the blundering of many generations there is nothing in a normally constituted child's mind which refuses to take in the subject from this point of view, *provided that the right presentation of it is the first.* Nothing can be more important than this, since there is in every child a native curiosity concerning every revelation of life, which leads to the first teaching about maternity and generation being eagerly absorbed and firmly stamped upon the mind at its most receptive age. It is nothing short of appalling to realize this simple psychological fact, and then to reflect on the tone in which the chance instructors of our children handle these sacred themes,—dirty-minded school-boys, grooms, garden-boys, any one, in short, who at an early age may be sufficiently defiled and sufficiently reckless to talk of them. No matter what palliatives may be applied later on, the poison thus imbibed never quite leaves the system. The only exceptions to this rule are the very rare cases in which the mind seems quite unable to take any interest in the matter; so innocent, in fact, as to be impenetrably dull, and children so safeguarded purchase moral immunity at the cost of a certain intellectual loss.

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This, then, is the first principle to be grasped, that there is nothing in natural law which may not be spiritualized in its presentation to a child. The second is that the first presentation of this particular subject is the one which prevails over all others.

The third principle concerns the procedure to be adopted. The truths must not be isolated, but presented as among the phenomena which illustrate laws of nature, when other not dissimilar phenomena are already known. And if the facts are to be imparted in conjunction with other facts, so also the methods of teaching should be in no way peculiar, but the same as those which are found effectual in other subjects. Observation and reflection will generally tell us when a child begins to feel a curiosity about the fact of birth: when he silently discards the fables or myths with which his questions earlier in life were satisfied. The time, in the case of an ordinarily apprehensive mind, will be somewhere between eight and eleven years; and it is no objection to this rule that some children in the upper classes pass through their teens in total and contented ignorance of the whole mystery. This discussion would never have arisen unless such children were the exception. We are considering the majority. And in proceeding from the known to the unknown we shall take into account that the fact of maternity is much earlier guessed at than that of paternity. Therefore the teaching on the former ought to be made the starting-point for the teaching which deals with the latter, but of this I will speak again later.

There is, however, a certain divergence of opinion and practice concerning the last two points of procedure. It may be noticed that if ever any recommendation as to sexual instruction is made by male writers emphasis is laid on the laws of generation and reproduction, which are illustrated by plant-life, and it is urged that the relation between these laws and those which govern generation and birth among human beings suggests an obvious method of instruction. So parents are advised to explain the fertilization of plants and proceed to the facts of sex among human beings. And assuredly this view commends itself to many who have had a scientific train-

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ing; they have known something of the mental expansion and uplifting which follows on the recognition of law in the universe, and they desire to make a young child a participator in their own enlightenment. On the other hand, in the very few cases which have come to my notice in which teaching of sexual facts has been carefully taken in hand either by the mother or the preparatory school-master, a different tone is adopted. Reference is made to the animal world just so far as the child's knowledge extends, so as to prevent the new facts from being viewed in isolation, but the main emphasis is laid on his feeling for his mother and the instinct which exists in nearly all children of reverence due to the maternal relation; in the hope that use may be made of the natural reserve which prohibits a light and careless handling of the topic among school-boys. Of the two methods the former is more scientific, the latter the more personal, appealing to the deeper emotions of the child's heart. Which is the best?

In answering this some account must be taken of the prevailing shyness or reserve which exists between parents and children, especially on the father's side, in relation to such subjects as this. It might be supposed that the more scientific method of instruction would, from its *quasi*-impersonal character, be less difficult for a father to employ than the other, which inevitably leads him on to sacred ground. But in practice this would not be found to be the case. The crux of the question is the personal application of the facts presented; and if that application is shirked the value of the lesson will be in many cases lost,—the boy will learn some interesting botanical laws, but he will not connect them with human beings until he is a good deal older, and by that time the mischief will have been done. It is true that a boy of scientific propensities and precocious reasoning power will connect the two subjects pretty readily at an early age, say fourteen, but something more is required than simply correlation with other facts. Knowledge by itself may suggest counsels of prudence, but it has long ago been discovered by school-masters that prudential warnings by themselves are quite impotent against an imperious appetite of any kind. And if a father,

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desirous of avoiding the most delicate part of the subject, adopts the botanical illustration in order to lead up to a personal appeal, he will find that his difficulty when he comes to the point has been very slightly diminished by the scientific preamble. Perhaps it may be thought that too much account is here taken of the shyness of a parent with his own son. Nevertheless, it is really incontestible that this national characteristic has always been the grand obstacle to the giving of salutary sexual instruction to the young.

The real answer to the question between the two methods is that they ought to be combined, and that by far the greater stress should be laid on the personal appeal, which certainly ought to precede any scientific teaching about the propagation of life. It needs no deep psychology to prove this. Granted that a father's lesson about plant-life is immeasurably better than the unclean hints gathered from other sources, which is all that most children have to be satisfied with at present; still, such a lesson would be grievously defective in its power of appeal, because it probably would leave out of account the two greatest influences which a child is capable of feeling,—religious reverence and his love for his mother; the first not necessarily, but very probably. It may reasonably be asserted that the wholesome impressions of childhood, which consciously and vividly last through life, are those made by one or both of these influences. And we want both.

The truth of these statements will, however, be easier to gauge if I now proceed to give more in detail the nature of the teaching which seems to be required.

At some time between eight and eleven years of age, in any case before a child is sent to school, the fact of maternity should be explained. Probably he will know that as regards domestic animals there is some kind of law of offspring being born from the mother's body. In any case, it is very easy to remind him of scattered facts, either within his cognizance or on the confines of it, which enable him to understand that this is a universal law. For some few years, in most cases, not in all, he will have been realizing that there is some mystery about the matter, and that his nurse and parents have ceased

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to put off his curiosity with tales of fairies, etc. So he is eager and fully prepared to hear that there is an explanation; and as far as the maternal side of the subject is concerned it should be simply stated, with emphasis laid on the suffering involved to his mother, and the wonderful fact given as a reason why the mother so dearly loves her son. And it would be well to go further and indicate the period of gestation, and explain the phrase in the Litany and some well-known passages in the Bible. It is a perfectly simple matter, and beyond all doubt a supremely natural process of instructing, and, as far as I know, never fails of its reward, to wit, a closer link of union between mother and child, and an implanting of a deep reverence in the child's mind for the greatest of all natural laws and for the parental relation.

But this last phrase is anticipatory. It will be at once felt by some that as to paternity there is a difficulty in touching on the subject at so early an age as under eleven years. Possibly, also, the difficulty would be felt to be more acute in the case of girls. If, however, this part of the subject is to be postponed, the questions arise, How is the curiosity about the connection between marriage and birth to be allayed? and, also, when is the supplementary teaching to be given? and, lastly, will the treatment be different in the case of children of different sexes?

I quite understand the idea that the more difficult part of the subject should be postponed. If left to the mother's instinct, probably this course would be often adopted. But I conceive that it would be at a heavy cost. In the first place, there must be risk in presenting any truth in fragments. Of course, it is necessary to present it in outline, but the outline should, if possible, be complete. To come to particulars, the best that could be done, if half of the truth is withheld, would be to say that after marriage God plants a seed in the mother which gradually grows into a child. But is it not obvious that this leaves great questions unanswered, or, rather, suggests a misleading answer? And, further, if, as I firmly believe, the result of the new knowledge is to deepen and hallow the child's natural feeling for his mother, it is a dangerous

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policy so to implant ideas that the bond which unites him to the mother is strengthened, while the relation with his father is weakened by being still left in the region of the unintelligible. One must remember that the impressions left on a child's mind at that age concerning a subject so vastly interesting and so intimate as this are very deep and permanent; and it seems as if the child's affection for the father might be to some extent impaired if any considerable time were allowed to pass before the child is permitted to conceive of him as the transmitter to him of his physical life. The enlightened affection should be fairly divided, one would suppose, between the two parents, and, as the mother during childhood is necessarily in closer touch with the child than the father, it seems that of the two there is almost more need for the affection for his father to be deepened by knowledge than his love for his mother. In addition to which the question is only postponed. When is the subject to be more suitably handled? The longer the postponement is the more room is given for silent surmisings, which, as we have seen, lead either to gross misconceptions or prompt to unhealthy talk; or, in the case of some peculiarly constituted natures, there is so little curiosity that the mind remains in blank, uninquiring ignorance for many years. But this can never be foreseen. The instruction ought, in any case, to be completely given before a boy goes to a school where there is any likelihood whatever of unclean talk; that means at so early an age, that there must always be a certain hesitation in the mind of an adult in conveying the first glimmer of knowledge on the most delicate of all topics. In other words, if the teaching is ever to be complete, there are strong reasons for making it so, in outline, from the very first.

In short, on reaching the point where the beginning of conception in the mother is explained, as indicated above, the parent can perfectly well add that the seed of life is intrusted by God to the father in a very wonderful way, and that after marriage he is allowed to give it to his wife, this being on his part an act of the love which first made him marry her. Seldom, I should fancy, very seldom would more than that be

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required, in the case of girl children. The only difference in the case of boys would be that quite simply and quite delicately use should so far be made of the innate instinct as to indicate more definitely what portion of his body will have the propagation of life intrusted to it as its natural function; and, based on this instruction, a most impressive and much needed warning may be given against misuse. But far more important even than this will be the fortifying the young mind with lofty and wholesome conceptions of this great mystery of nature's economy *before* the time comes upon him when he will be exposed to ribald jesting on the subject. The hope is that when once the facts of life shall have been implanted in the child, bound up with and hallowed by all the associations which combine to make his home precious and sacred to him, suggestive of the greatest and best thing he has yet known, his mother's love of him, and his parents' love of each other, at least one grand result will be secured,—he will feel that any rude handling of such a theme, even of only its outer fringe, is like the profaning of the Holy of Holies in his heart, and he will no more suffer it than he would permit a stranger to desecrate the innermost shrine of his affections and take his mother's or his sister's name in vain. All the goading curiosity which impels other boys to pry into nature's laws eagerly and greedily, in blank ignorance of their mighty import, their unspeakable depth and spiritual, unearthly harmonies, has been for him forestalled, enlightened, and purified. He has learnt the first great lesson of the religion of love, and what God has cleansed he will not call common or unclean.

E. LYTTELTON.

HAILEYBURY COLLEGE.

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THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO BE.

HEGEL, in the preface to his "Philosophy of Right," says,—

"Man cannot be limited to what is presented to him, but maintains that he has the standard of right within himself. He may be subject to the necessity and force of external authority, but not in the same way as he is to the necessity of nature, for always his inner being says to him how a thing ought to be, and within himself he finds the confirmation or lack of confirmation of what is generally accepted. In nature the highest truth is that a law is. In right a thing is not valid because it is, since every one demands that it shall conform to his standard. Hence arises a possible conflict between what is and what ought to be; between absolute unchanging right and the arbitrary decision of what ought to be right."

Thus, as Hegel goes on to show, this unique privilege which belongs to man, his rationality, would seem inevitably to lead to strife and discontent. Yet, if we are true to ourselves we must "openly meet and face our reason and consider the rationality of right."

Never more, perhaps, than at the present time, has there been need for the firm fixing in men's minds of logical principles of justice, in accordance with which they may test the rightfulness of existing social and political institutions and standards. For never before has the critical spirit been so wide-spread. As in the Sophistic period of Greece, so now the binding power of tradition, and the necessarily sacrosanct character of the demands both of the State and Church, are questioned. All things are tested, and only those pronounced good which are found rational, consonant with the critic's own canons of truth and reason. Hence the danger lest this decentralization of moral authority result in a decentralization of moral obligation, which, if not regulated by well established principles of conduct, will give free play to individual prejudices or passions, with a resulting loosening of the social and political bonds.

This danger assumes a very grave form when it is united, as it so generally is, to that other doctrine which declares that present social and economic conditions are inherently bad, as

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providing for a *régime* in which the many are pitilessly sacrificed for the good of the few. In the entertaining but sophistical work of Mr. Kidd, entitled "Social Evolution," the attempt is made to give to this declaration a pseudo-scientific form, and one apparently founded on the prevalent evolutionary doctrines of struggle for existence and survival of the fittest. As declared by Mr. Kidd, self-interest would urge the majority to put an end, if possible, to such a condition of affairs, even though so to do would possibly be to sacrifice the welfare of future generations. Why men have not done so, he says, has been due to the teachings of the Church, which has promised greater joys in a world hereafter, and enjoined subordination of self to society as the divinely appointed means of attaining them. In other words, it is argued that a supernatural sanction to social good has been made to overrule the purely rational demand for self-good. The necessary implication from this is that with the waning power of the Church to govern men's temporal action by simple *dicta*, and the corresponding increase in the tendency to elevate right reason as the true touchstone of all obligation, the present *régime* will be subjected to greater and greater criticism and attacks.

The assumptions made in the above, both as to the essential irrationality of social subordination and as to the peculiar characteristics of religion, are unwarranted, but the fact that they are made and widely accepted serves to show one of the tendencies of the thought of the age. The only way in which such appeals to the reason of man can be met is by the use of their own weapons,—namely, the demonstration of the rationality of the doctrines and institutions which they decry.

There are two distinct ways in which we may attempt the justification of social control. The one is the utilitarian; the other, the metaphysical. The one denies outright that self-interest, when enlightened, is an anti-social motive, the other seeks to show that man, by his very nature, is actuated by certain motive forces, and is destined to a certain end, which motives can only find free play, and which end can only be

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approached, by men when living in a social state in which mutual forbearance towards one another is practised, and a general subordination to some sort of social or political control recognized. Comte, Mill, and Spencer are probably the leading representatives of the first method; Hegel, Green, and their idealistic followers the chief exponents of the second. Both schools admit that the individual reason must, in the last resort, be the absolute judge of the rightfulness of a given control which is exercised or attempted to be exercised over one, but they differ both as to the character and the origin of the motives which should control the judgment. According to the positivists, social relationships provide not only the medium in which morality is exercised, but the instruments through which the moral instinct is itself created. The governing motive is held to be always utilitarian, though not in the bald Benthamistic sense, but in the universalistic sense of Mill, or the rationalistic, evolutionary sense of Spencer. According to the idealists, on the other hand, man is by nature, potentially at least, a moral being, and the social state, though not the creator of the sense of ethical obligation, alone furnishes the means through which is presented the possibility of its concrete application; while the motive is self-realization, the attainment of that personal perfection, the possibility, as well as the desire for the attainment of which, is innate in man, and is discoverable by a metaphysical inquiry into his spiritual and intellectual nature, and his relation to the Divine or Absolute Reason.

It is not necessary here to show that the positivists in effect render morality impossible, not only by failing to explain freedom of the will, and hence personal responsibility, but by furnishing forth a motive which can never, except in cases of self-deception, rise higher than that of enlightened selfishness; and that thus, for them, the question of the ethical rightfulness of the State's authority, or of any other form of social control, becomes an unmeaning as well as an unnecessary question. But for the idealist, this query is fundamental to his system of social philosophy, and it is to answer this question that the present essay has been prepared.

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Logically, of course, such an attempt, if it would be complete, would need to begin by demonstrating the idealistic assumptions as to the essential character of man, his participation in the Divine or Absolute Reason, and, as flowing therefrom, his power of velleity and actuation by motives not ultimately determined by objective environment,—the elaboration, in short, of some such a system as T. H. Green has made in his "Prolegomena to Ethics." But here in this paper, which is confessedly directed to the solution of but a special problem, it is allowable to assume the above positions as proven, and thence to advance to the establishment of a rational system of political right.

First of all, however, the disclaimer is to be entered that the assumption of such a metaphysical character of man does not carry with it the predication of the so-called "natural rights," which have played so large a part in *a priori* political speculation. It carries with it the declaration that there are eternal necessary principles of right and justice, but not that there are *rights* belonging to individuals in the sense that, apart from a state of society in which mutual restraints and obligations are recognized, there are certain spheres of action in which, under no circumstances, is it ethically justifiable that the individual should be restrained or constrained against his will. Right, apart from any social recognition or creation, exists, but not rights.

In that extremely interesting work of Mr. W. S. Lilly, entitled "Right and Wrong," it is said,—

> "Unquestionably, it is society alone that gives validity to right, for man is, in Aristotle's phrase, a political animal. If we follow the historical method only, we must pronounce the birthplace of right to have been the family, from which civil polity has been developed. But if we view the matter ideally, we must say that the experience of the race is merely the occasion, not the cause; it does not create, it merely reveals right. The social organism exhibits that which lies in the nature of man, deep down in the inmost recesses of his being, but which could never have come out of him in isolation. The idea of right unfolds itself in history as the vivifying principle of those public ordinances and political institutions whereby we live as civilized men; the justification of the common might which without it would be mere brute force."

Mr. Lilly has here stated in his usual delightful style an essential truth, and yet, I fear, enveloped it in some ambiguity

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by the use of the abstract term "right" to express two essentially different things. We may, and, in fact, do grant, as we have just said, that there does exist, apart from all human creation or control, an eternal distinction between right and wrong, and that similarly there are certain eternal canons of conduct or criteria, in accordance with which the morality and justice of every act is to be finally determined, and that these principles may be subsumed under the abstract term "right." In this sense, society or the State does not create right, but only renders more possible of realization the practical principles which are to be deduced from its recognition. But *rights*, that is, claims of the individual to certain spheres of activity within which they shall not be limited by other individuals,—these are not only rendered possible of realization by society and the State, but they are created by society and the State, and cannot be conceived as existing either actively or potentially apart from the social and political body. They have a significance only in connection with social and political aggregates. *Right*, as we have defined it, may exist apart from human association; *rights* never.

In another place where I have examined the reasoning contained in the doctrines of natural rights and of social compact, after discussing the impossibility of the existence of either moral or legal rights in a non-social State, or "State of Nature," I have written as follows:*

"Thus the entire difficulty in answering the question with which we have been so long dealing is the false manner in which the problem has been stated. Given, it has been said, individuals endowed by nature with a right to freedom of action, how can the compulsion that the State exercises be justified? But, as we have seen, the individual is not endowed with a natural right to freedom. Nature gives to him only powers, and in any non-political state, the amount of compulsion that he would suffer at the hands of others would far exceed that exercised by any government. By the creation of a political authority, there is merely a substitution of a general, definite, paramount force for an uncertain, arbitrary, individual force. With the social life of men, antagonism between their respective interests and spheres of activity is an absolute necessity. Complete freedom of every one to do as he likes is, therefore, out of the question. The only question is, whether these conflicts shall be settled by the particular

* "The Nature of the State," p. 109.

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strength given by Nature to each individual, or whether the compulsion shall be supplied by a general authority created by a union of strengths. Thus the only rational meaning that the word 'freedom' has in reference to the individual, apart from the freedom of the will, or of conscience, is in respect to a certain sphere of activity within which the individual claims the 'right' to act as he pleases, undisturbed by others. As already said, however, neither the recognition nor claim to recognition of such a 'right' can exist in a simple State of Nature. It is, therefore, only in a civil state that such a 'right' can be secured. In fact, the mere propounding of the question, 'Why should I be forced to do this or that?' implies that I claim a certain freedom that should be respected by others independently of my power to maintain it." . . . "In conclusion, then, of this entire subject," I continued, "we find that the demand for a moral justification of the State is an unnecessary one. If the political government does not render the individual any less free than he would be without it, its authority does not require a moral justification. There is no presumption of unwarranted interference to be rebutted."

Now I have been accused by a very able critic of confusion of thought in at least some of the points made in the foregoing paragraph. After quoting with approval the assertion that, paradoxical as it may seem, it is true that freedom exists only because there is restraint, this critic continues: *

"But because this is so, and more liberty is created than is abridged by the State, it does not follow that the problem he set out to resolve can be disposed of by saying that it was falsely stated, and that a moral justification of the State is shown to be unnecessary. The liberty that is the fruit of political organization is not that freedom of choice inherent in morality which as more or less limited by the State (so far as it is an authoritative institution) alone gives rise to any fundamental moral problem. There are really two senses of the word freedom. According to one, we are free when we can *do* what we will. According to the other, we are free when we can choose what we will do. The one relates rather to the act externally considered; the other to the psychological conditions antecedent to the act (neither, we may add, involving any metaphysical 'freedom of the will'). Because positive or external freedom is increased by the State, it does not follow that freedom in the other sense is not abridged, or, in some cases, denied. The individual does not *choose* what taxes he will pay, but he *has* to pay them. Both as to the amount and as to the paying, he is subject to an external authority, and the problem from the ethical side is, How is this authority to be justified?"

To the above it may be admitted in the beginning that the assertion that the demand for a moral justification of the

* INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1896, p. 116. Review by Mr. William M. Salter of my book "The Nature of the State."

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State is an unnecessary one is possibly too baldly stated. Still, I think that the argument which it concludes makes it sufficiently plain that that which was intended to be asserted was, that the demand for an abstract or *a priori* justification of the right of the State to be is an illegitimate one. It is not maintained that because more liberty is created than is abridged by the State its moral justification is not needed; but rather, I have held that, because, irrespective of amounts, the compulsion exercised by the State does not differ *in kind* from that which would exist without a State, and that therefore there is no *a priori* ground for demanding its ethical *quo warranto*,—no presumption against its moral right to be. When, however, this presumption is removed, it is then proper to ask, inasmuch as the activities of the State are within human control, whether in sum result a particular political power renders possible a greater amount of freedom than it curtails, and whether upon the whole it is an agency for the promotion of prosperity and civilization. If an affirmative answer be given to these queries, then the existence of that particular state is rationally justified. And, if the same results be true from the existence of all states in general, then the State in general may be said to be rationally justified. Thus it was that among the Greeks the State was not only justified but raised to the highest moral plane; for, according to them, only in the State was it possible to realize the higher potentialities of man; outside of the State man was not a person, he was scarcely more than a brute. So, too, similar in this respect, at least, is the idea of Hegel. In opposition to the unrealized and unrealizable theory of Kant, that morality is achievable only by an absolute disassociation from all interests,—an absolute detachment of motives from all outside interests and results,—in opposition to this utterly abstract idea, Hegel holds that moral freedom, *i.e.*, morality, is possible only when the will is controlled by an adequate object, such as pure reason itself constitutes, and that such a condition is only realizable in the State.

It undoubtedly appears to most of us as beyond all serious question that all states are justified,—that the existence of even

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the very worst of them is better than would be the anarchical condition that would result from its absence; but it is ever to be remembered that there is no theoretical impossibility of a State lacking such a rational basis.

In the same way the existence of any given State as actually controlled may or may not have a moral justification, according to whether or not its activities tend upon the whole to promote the realization of the moral ideal. The only way in which the moral element enters is as to the manner in, and the extent to, which the power of the State shall be exercised. The "code of morality" of a given community, as including those rules of human conduct that satisfy the general sense of moral right and justice of that community, whether founded on eternal, immutable principles of right and wrong, upon the dictates of man's conscience as completely autonomous, upon reason, or upon utility as revealed by inherited experience, is necessarily relative to the state of enlightenment, character of religion, economic conditions, and civilization in general of the particular people by whom its provisions are recognized. Taking any code of morality at any one time, the laws of a State are, in that light, morally justified just to the extent to which they coincide with its provisions. But even in this respect it is to be noticed that in approximating law to ethical commands reference must be had not only to the abstract ethical end to be obtained, but to the practical possibility of attaining that end by the physical compulsion supplied by the law and the very rough means at its disposal for evaluating moral merit or guilt. Also, the still further question is to be considered, whether or not the substitution of legal compulsion for voluntary action, while possibly securing more general conformity to the principle indicated, may not lessen man's feeling of moral obligation in the premises. For where men obey from necessity the ethical duty is soon forgotten.

In thus bringing a particular State to the bar of moral criticism, it is rather its activities than its own right of existence which is brought to trial. The right to be of the political authority itself is not in issue, for, as abstractly

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considered, that is, apart from any particular form of organization, or manner of operation, there is no basis upon which a judgment may be founded. It is not until the State manifests its power and authority that material is afforded to which moral estimates may be applied. Furthermore, it is to be remarked, though it can hardly be necessary to do so, that in considering the morality of a command of the State, there is no pretence that the fact that it is the command of the State enters in any degree as an absolutely determining factor. There is only to be asked by the individual in each particular case whether he, as a morally responsible person, should obey or disobey. The act has a moral or immoral character only as to the individual, and, what moral responsibility there is, exists only for him.

When, however, the State has commanded a certain line of conduct, that fact, though not determinant of the morality of the command, abstractly considered, is yet one which the individual is morally bound to consider in determining what his own actions shall be. While it must be held that the individual has at all times the moral right, nay, that he is morally bound, to refuse obedience to those laws which he deems to be unjust or immoral for any reason, yet he is also bound to take into consideration, in estimating all the consequences of an act, that disobedience to a command of the State will tend to weaken to some extent the reverence for law in general, and will thus have an influence in dissolving those social and political bonds that in the aggregate promote to such a degree the realization of morality as a whole. The moral right of resistance as well as of revolution cannot be denied, but it is a right only to be justified by a consideration of all the consequences, proximate and ultimate, individual and social, which attend its exercise.

As for the particular right or power of the State to exact enforced contributions from its citizens in the form of taxes, which the criticism that I have quoted mentions, it is to be observed that obedience by the individual to a law passed in pursuance of such a right or power is in itself a non-moral rather than either a moral or immoral act. The act of the

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State in enforcing the collection of such a tax, however, Mr. Salter would seem to think might be immoral, or, at least, it would be an act requiring a moral justification other than that to be derived from mere utilitarian or other considerations applicable to each particular case. This particular case of governmental coercion is rather unfortunately chosen, for considered as a violation of individual right of property, that is, of legal ownership, it needs only to be said that the right of property itself exists only by virtue of the State's existence and command; while considered as an infringement upon man's natural right, under certain circumstances to the exclusive possession and use of material things,—granting such a right to exist,—it is at most no different as an act of spoliation from that to which the individual would be at all times subject in a non-civic condition. The State is only able to enforce its demands against the objection and resistance of the individual because of its superior might, and thus, just as in the so-called "State of Nature," it is might that really controls, though it is a might exercise of which is, for the most part, according to uniform and predetermined rules.

Returning, now, to the criticism that a discrimination has not been made between the two senses of freedom,—freedom to *do*, and freedom to *choose*,—it would appear that the critic is himself, one might say, confused in mind. We admit that there is a real distinction between doing and choosing, and that morality attaches to the latter rather than to the former. But it is to be understood that this freedom of choice, as subject to ethical estimate, can only refer to that capacity of alternative choice of ends to which has been happily applied the term *velleity*.

As Professor Hyslop has said, the term "freedom" is susceptible of three distinct meanings, to which he respectively applies the names, Liberty, Spontaneity, and Velleity. Velleity we have already defined. Spontaneity refers to subjective causation; that is, to the origination of one's own act, whether consciously or unconsciously originated. Liberty is defined as exemption from external restraint,—restraint which "may

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be either physical or social, the latter being meant to include all political restrictions upon human action."

Professor Hyslop continues: "We may call a person free, or assert that he has liberty, when external forces either do not determine his action or do not determine the circumstances limiting the alternatives between which he has to choose. . . . A man who can do as he pleases without suffering a penalty for it is said to have his liberty, or to be free. . . . Climate, gravitation, seasons, geographical conditions, political institutions, economic conditions, and a thousand other influences are at work to limit the satisfaction of desire. To that extent we can say that we are not free, whereby we mean merely that we cannot do as we please without incurring disagreeable consequences. Hence, freedom or liberty, used to describe exemption from these restraints, means only a condition in which we act according to our natural desires. The term is used most frequently to describe a political condition,—political liberty, whereby we mean exemption from the laws, customs, and restraints which put one man in subjection to the will of others. But in this sense no man is absolutely free. Any one is under some restrictions, and perhaps ought to be. They do not compel him to act in a given way, but make the alternative so unpleasant that none except the permitted course will probably be chosen. In this sense freedom or liberty is a privilege rather than a power, a privilege to act with impunity rather than the faculty of alternative action. Thus a man is not at liberty to commit murder and escape the risks of punishment, but he has the power to commit murder and to accept the penalty, or not to commit it, and thus to be free from risk."

Now it will not be questioned that the essence of morality consists in the use of one's faculty of alternative choice,—granting such a faculty to exist,—for we are not to become involved in the metaphysical question of "freedom of will." But if this be so, does the State, or can the State, be conceived to be able to limit this freedom,—to restrain this power of conceiving of ends and of directing one's conduct to the realization of the chosen end? Is it not the most that the State can do to establish conditions which will influence choice? It may attach certain pleasant or disagreeable results to the performance of a particular act, but the choice itself, the exercise of the faculty of velleity, in which alone consists the moral element, it cannot determine or control. Yet my critic would seem to hold that it can. It is said that the citizen may not choose what taxes he will pay, or whether he will pay any at all. But surely I answer, he may. To be sure, he has to calculate the penalties which the State attaches to a disobedience of its commands, but what decision he does

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arrive at, whether of a positive or negative character, is his own decision, based upon all pertinent circumstances, and he is morally responsible therefor. A man has, in the same way, the power of choosing whether or not he will leap from the roof of a tall building, and that power of alternative choice and action is not lessened by the fact that bodily injury will result in the one case and not in the other. Would it be held that it is immoral, or at least requiring a moral justification, that the natural, *i.e.*, physical, laws should impose this penalty upon one who exercises his personal right of choice as to the exercise of his own saltatory powers?

But I should imagine that it will be maintained that there is an essential distinction between the restraints and penalties which Nature herself imposes upon human action, and those which human authority artificially creates. There is a difference, it is true, but is it one which has a bearing upon the problem we are discussing? Is there, in truth, any rational ground for maintaining that the individual has any *a priori* or presumptive right to a freedom from the consequences of his own acts, except in so far as such consequences follow from "natural" as opposed to human conditions? To answer this in the affirmative necessarily introduces the idea of "a right," and this, as has already been shown in the paragraph quoted earlier in this paper, implies, upon its negative side, a claim upon the forbearance of others, a restriction upon their freedom to interfere with the specific rights claimed. Therefore if one individual claims a "right" to demand that others shall refrain from certain actions, which, though prompted by their own natural desires, would interfere with his own freedom, those other individuals certainly could not be considered as free from all limitations other than those imposed by physical laws. The assumption, therefore, of an *a priori* freedom, or liberty in its socio-political sense, is self-contradictory. To maintain it as to the one individual is to deny it as to all other individuals, while to maintain it as to *all* individuals (which, if it be a "natural right," would be logically necessary) is to deny it as to any particular individual.

But now it is asserted that, "Even if there are no 'rights' to

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freedom independent of organized political society, freedom may be held to be better, more desirable, than constraint, and to be somehow inseparably connected with morality, since, as everybody would admit, a compelled action has no moral character whatever."

Repeating again the statement previously made, that the "inseparable connection" of morality is to the choice, the velleity, and not to the act itself, we may ask what is meant by a "compelled action"? If it is an act brought about by physical force actually and coercively applied, as where one by brute strength compels another, against his will and against his physical resistance, to commit a certain act, then that act certainly is such a compelled act as releases the compelled person from all moral responsibility. But if the compulsion consists merely in the threat of certain penalties in case of its non-performance, there still remains a moral responsibility upon the individual, though it is a responsibility that is to be determined in the light of the new conditions which have been introduced by the sanction of the State, and the threat of punishment in case of disobedience. But, aside from all this, it is admitted by my critic that under the State there is less restraint, less "compelling of action," than without it. In speaking, then, of freedom from restraint as *better* than constraint, what possible argument can this be against the presumptive right of the State to be? So far as it has any force at all, is its influence not exactly the opposite?

The question has been asked me by a correspondent whether the State itself has not moral duties. This may be answered in the negative. Considered in itself, the State is not a moral entity; it owes no responsibility to any superior being or power; it has no conscience. Nor has a People, when considered as a political unity as distinguished from the arithmetical sum of its constituent individuals. Morality applies only to human individuals. These have moral duties of a threefold character. First, such as belong to them, as independent and distinct individuals, that is, the duties which they owe to themselves alone. Secondly, they have duties as social beings; that is, duties not directly connected with per-

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sonal matters, but with the welfare of the society to which they belong. Thirdly, they are under moral obligations that arise from their society being politically organized; that is, constituting a State. From the common recognition by individuals that it is their duty to make the State subserve moral ends, there is created a moral ideal for the State which does not correspond exactly with the ideal of any one individual, but is rather a sublimation of all individual ideals. But the responsibility of seeing that this moral idea is striven for rests ultimately with the individuals. Not all contribute alike to the formation of the will of the State, and hence, just to the extent to which one does contribute by his influence to the formation of an effective political opinion, he is under moral obligation to make that political opinion moral in character and directed to the securing of the highest possible ethical ideals.

The moral responsibility for all political action may not, therefore, be shifted, either in whole or in part, upon an abstract political being, but rests wholly upon the individuals, whether they be public officials or private citizens; and this in exact proportion not only to the extent to which they actually do have an influence in directing the course of public affairs, but to the extent to which it lies within their individual powers, should they use their real opportunities, to direct the power of the State to the attainment of its proper ends.

Concluding now and summarizing these general considerations regarding the morality of political restraint: does it not appear that, in fact, just as according to Hegel's Dialectics, no conception is logically abstract, but has a meaning only in so far as it is distinguished from, and therefore implies, its contradictory; so, social freedom and restraint are but the obverse sides of the same shield,—that freedom has no meaning apart from restraint, and that thus metaphysically as well as practically the two conceptions are united. Just as the individual has no "right" to freedom as opposed to State constraint, so the State has no general right (except in the legal sense) to compel the individual. The presumption is neither way. In practice the assertion of an authority whether by

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the individual or by the State is limited by physical might, and in each individual case where there is a conflict, it is a proper subject for ethical inquiry as to whether the act commanded by the State or desired by the individual is morally the preferable. There is no distinction in ethical kind between the two authorities. The existence of the State can only be morally justified if, as a whole, its influence tends to promote the realization of moral ends. It is not to be justified in itself; that is, independently of the manner in which its might is actually exercised. Considered abstractly as a political entity, as simply an institution, it neither possesses moral responsibility, nor can it either determine the morality of an act or limit the moral freedom of the individual. Resting upon no superhuman basis, it cannot legislate in the ethical field. Unrelated to any superior being, and having no concrete existence apart from the individual beings of whom it is composed, and having a continued identity only as conceived apart from them, it is necessarily without moral responsibility. Limited in its means of coercion to physical penalties, it cannot limit man's velleity or freedom of alternative choice.

In the foregoing essay the discussion has been limited to the question of the rightfulness of political restraint. The same arguments, however, apply with equal force to all forms of social control, whether such control be exercised through the State, the family, the church, or merely through social disapprobation or ostracism. In each case the influence exerted may only be justified, as regards the person exerting it, if it be consciously recognized and intended to be for the ultimate best of the person controlled or of mankind at large. As regards the one controlled, it may be acquiesced in as just only in so far as that one can himself perceive in it such a tendency; and the same is true as regards the disinterested critic.

This may appear to be, in effect, a return to the utilitarian basis which was so expressly disavowed in the earlier portion of this paper. This may be so in effect as regards the larger number of the actions of mankind; but it is not such as regards the ethical criteria applied. In essential character this

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theory stands poles apart from such an evaluation of results as is implied in utilitarianism either of the universalistic or the rationalistic evolutionary type. The one expressly excludes the material self-interest of the critic and demands that every action shall be judged, as it were, *sub specie æternitatis*, that is, as tested by a principle which may rationally be universalized as a rule of conduct; the other avowedly predicates a self-interest—albeit an enlightened one—as the real determining motive to be followed by the agent. Right actions, according to the one, are founded ultimately upon eternal principles of morality flowing from the essential character of the Divine Reason; according to the other, ethical conduct never rises to a higher character than that of far-seeing prudence. The ultimate aim of the one is the attainment, as far as may be, to a likeness unto the true God; of the other, a more perfect adjustment to one's objective environment.

WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY.
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

AFFECTION IN EDUCATION.

THE place of Affection, and the need of it, as an educative force in school-life, is a subject which is beginning to attract a good deal of attention. Hitherto Education has been concentred on intellectual (and physical) development; but the affections have been left to take care of themselves. Now it is beginning to be seen that the affections have an immense deal to say in the building up of the brain and the body. Their evolution and organization in some degree is probably going to become an important part of school management.

School friendships of course exist; and almost every one remembers that they filled a large place in the outlook of his early years; but he remembers, too, that they were not recognized in any way, and that in consequence the main part of their force and value was wasted. Yet it is evident that the first unfolding of a strong attachment in boyhood or girlhood

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must have a profound influence; while if it occurs between an elder and a younger schoolmate, or—as sometimes happens—between the young thing and its teacher, its importance in the educational sense can hardly be overrated.

That such feelings sometimes take quite intense and romantic forms few will deny. I have before me a letter, in which the author, speaking of an attachment he experienced when a boy of sixteen for a youth somewhat older than himself, says:

"I would have died for him ten times over. My devices and plannings to meet him (to come across him casually, as it were) were those of a lad for his sweetheart, and when I saw him my heart beat so violently that it caught my breath and I could not speak. We met in ———, and for the weeks that he stayed there I thought of nothing else—thought of him night and day—and when he returned to London I used to write him weekly letters, veritable love-letters of many sheets in length. Yet I never felt one particle of jealousy, though our friendship lasted for some years. The passion, violent and perhaps extravagant as it was, I believe to have been perfectly free from sex-feeling and perfectly wholesome and good for me. It distinctly contributed to my growth. Looking back upon it and analyzing it as well as I can, I seem to see as the chief element in it an escape from the extremely narrow Puritanism in which I was reared, into a large sunny ingenuous nature which knew nothing at all of the bondage of which I was beginning to be acutely conscious."

Shelley in his fragmentary "Essay on Friendship" speaks in the most glowing terms of an attachment he formed at school, and so does Leigh Hunt in his "Autobiography." Says the latter:

"If I had reaped no other benefit from Christ Hospital, the school would be ever dear to me from the recollection of the friendships I formed in it, and of the first heavenly taste it gave me of that most spiritual of the affections. . . . I shall never forget the impression it made on me. I loved my friend for his gentleness, his candor, his truth, his good repute, his freedom even from my own livelier manner, his calm and reasonable kindness. . . . I doubt whether he ever had a conception of a tithe of the regard and respect I entertained for him, and I smile to think of the perplexity (though he never showed it) which he probably felt sometimes at my enthusiastic expressions; for I thought him a kind of angel."

It is not necessary, however, to quote authorities on such a subject as this. Any one who has had experience of schoolboys knows well enough that they are capable of forming

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these romantic and devoted attachments, and that their alliances are often of the kind especially referred to as having a bearing on education,—*i.e.*, between an elder and a younger. They are genuine attractions, free as a rule, and at their inception, from secondary motives. They are not formed by the elder one for any personal ends. More often, indeed, I think they are begun by the younger, who naïvely allows his admiration of the elder one to become visible. But they are absorbing and intense, and on either side their influence is deeply felt and long remembered.

That such attachments *may* be of the very greatest value is self-evident. The younger boy looks on the other as a hero, loves to be with him, thrills with pleasure at his words of praise or kindness, imitates, and makes him his pattern and standard, learns exercises and games, contracts habits, or picks up information from him. The elder one, touched, becomes protector and helper; the unselfish side of his nature is drawn out, and he develops a real affection and tenderness towards the younger. He takes all sorts of trouble to initiate his *protégé* in field sports or studies; is proud of the latter's success; and leads him on perhaps later to share his own ideals of life and thought and work.

Sometimes the alliance will begin, in a corresponding way, from the side of the elder boy. Sometimes, as said, between a boy and a master such an attachment, or the germ of it, is found; and indeed it is difficult to say what gulf, of difference of age, or culture, or class in society, is so great that affection of this kind will not on occasion overpass it. I have by me a letter which was written by a boy of eleven or twelve to a young man of twenty-four or twenty-five. The boy was rather a wild, "naughty" boy, and had given his parents (working-class folk) a good deal of trouble. He attended, however, some sort of night-school or evening class and there conceived the strongest affection (evidenced by this letter) for his teacher, the young man in question, quite spontaneously, and without any attempt on the part of the latter to elicit it; and (which was equally important) without any attempt on his part to *deny* it. The result was most favorable; the one

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force which could really reach the boy had, as it were, been found; and he developed rapidly and well.

The following extract is from a letter written by an elderly man who has had large experience as a teacher. He says:

"It has always seemed to me that the *rapport* that exists between two human beings, whether of the same or of different sexes, is a force not sufficiently recognized, and capable of producing great results. Plato fully understood its importance, and aimed at giving what to his countrymen was more or less sensual, a noble and exalted direction. . . . As one who has had much to do in instructing boys and starting them in life, I am convinced that the great secret of being a good teacher consists in the possibility of that *rapport;* not only of a merely intellectual nature, but involving a certain physical element, a personal affection, almost indescribable, that grows up between pupil and teacher, and through which thoughts are shared and an influence created that could exist in no other way."

And it must be evident to every one that to the expanding mind of a small boy to have a relation of real affection with some sensible and helpful elder of his own sex must be a priceless boon. At that age love to the other sex has hardly declared itself, and indeed is not exactly what is wanted. The unformed mind requires an ideal of itself, as it were, to which it can cling or towards which it can grow. Yet it is equally evident that the relation, and the success of it, will depend immensely on the character of the elder one, on the self-restraint and tenderness of which he is capable, and on the ideal of life which he has in his mind. That, possibly, is the reason why Greek custom, at least in the early days of Greece, not only recognized friendships between elder and younger youths as a national institution of great importance, but laid down very distinct laws or rules concerning the conduct of them, so as to be a guide and a help to the elder in what was acknowledged to be a position of responsibility.

In Crete, for instance,* the friendship was entered into in quite a formal and public way, with the understanding and consent of relatives; the position of the elder was clearly defined, and it became his business to train and exercise the younger in skill of arms, the chase, etc.; while the latter

* See Müller's "History and Antiquities of the Doric Race."

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could obtain redress at law if the elder subjected him to insult or injury of any kind. At the end of a certain period of probation, if the younger desired it he could leave his comrade; if not, he became his squire or henchman—the elder being bound to furnish his military equipments—and they fought thenceforward side by side in battle, "inspired with double valor, according to the notions of the Cretans, by the gods of war and love." * Similar customs prevailed in Sparta, and, in a less defined way, in other Greek states; as, indeed, they have prevailed among many semi-barbaric races on the threshold of civilization.

When, however, we turn to modern life and the actual situation, as for instance in the public schools of to-day, it may well be objected that we find very little of the suggested ideal, but rather an appalling descent into the most uninspiring conditions. So far from friendship being an institution whose value is recognized and understood, it is at best hardly acknowledged, and is often actually discountenanced or misunderstood. And though attachments such as we have portrayed exist, they exist underground, as it were, at their peril, and half-stifled in an atmosphere which can only be described as that of the gutter. Somehow the disease of premature sexuality seems to have got possession of our centres of education; wretched practices and habits abound, and (which is perhaps their worst feature) cloud and degrade the boys' conception of what true love or friendship may be.

To those who are familiar with our public schools the state of affairs does not need describing; but for the benefit of others I may quote the following passage from some notes which have been placed at my disposal:

"—— (a well-known school) in my day was a perfect stew of uncleanness. This is commonly termed "sexual vice"; but the term is really not correct, since it is merely the inversion of quite healthy and, for educational purposes, fundamentally right instincts. There was plenty of incontinence, not much cruelty, no end of dirty conversation, and a great deal of genuine affection, even to heroism, shown among the boys in their relations with one another. All these

* Müller.

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things were treated by masters and boys alike as more or less unholy, with the result that they were either sought after or flung aside according to the sexual or emotional instinct of the seeker. No attempt was made at discrimination. A kiss was by comparison as unclean as the act of *fellatio*, and no one had any gauge or principle whatever on which to guide the cravings of boyhood."

The writer then goes into details which it is not necessary to reproduce here. He (and others) were initiated in the mysteries of sex by the dormitory servant; and the boys thus corrupted mishandled each other.

Naturally in any such atmosphere as this the chances *against* the formation of a decent and healthy attachment are very large. If the elder youth happen to be given to sensuality he has here his opportunity; if on the other hand he is *not* given to it, the ideas current around probably have the effect of making him suspect his own affection, and he ends by smothering and disowning the best part of his nature. In both ways harm is done. The big boys in such places become either coarse and licentious or hard and self-righteous; the small boys, instead of being educated and strengthened by the elder ones, become the odious little wretches, the favorites, the petted boys, and the "spoons" of the school. As time goes on the public opinion of the school ceases to believe in the possibility of a healthy friendship; the masters begin to presume (and not without reason) that all affection means sensual practices, and end by doing their best to discourage it.

Now this state of affairs is really desperate. There is no need to be puritanical, or to look upon the lapses of boyhood as unpardonable sins; indeed, it may be allowed, as far as that goes, that a little frivolity is better than hardness and self-righteousness; yet every one feels, and must feel, who knows anything about the matter, that the state of our schools is bad.

And it is so because, after all, purity (in the sense of continence) *is* of the first importance to boyhood. To prolong the period of continence in a boy's life is to prolong the period of *growth*. This is a simple physiological law, and a very obvious one; and whatever other things may be said in favor of purity, it remains perhaps the most weighty. To

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introduce sensual and sexual habits—and one of the worst of these is self-abuse—at an early age, is to arrest growth, both physical and mental.

And what is even more, it means to arrest the capacity for affection. I believe affection, attachment—whether to the one sex or the other—springs up normally in the youthful mind in a quite diffused, ideal, emotional form—a kind of longing and amazement as at something divine—with no definite thought or distinct consciousness of sex in it. The sentiment expands and fills, as it were like a rising tide, every cranny of the emotional and moral nature; and the longer (of course within reasonable limits) its definite outlet towards sex is deferred, the longer does this period of emotional growth and development continue, and the greater is the refinement and breadth and strength of character resulting. All experience shows that the early outlet towards sex cheapens and weakens affectional capacity.

Yet this early outlet it is which is the great trouble of our public schools. And it really does not seem unlikely that the peculiar character of the middle-class man of to-day, his undeveloped affectional nature and something of brutishness and woodenness, is largely due to the prevalent condition of the places of his education. The Greeks, with their wonderful instinct of fitness, seem to have perceived the right path in all this matter; and, while encouraging friendship, as we have seen, made a great point of modesty in early life—the guardians and teachers of every well-born boy being especially called upon to watch over the sobriety of his habits and manners.*

We have then in education generally, it seems to me (and whether of boys or of girls), two great currents to deal with, which cannot be ignored, and which certainly ought to be candidly recognized and given their right direction. One of these currents is that of friendship. The other is that of the young thing's natural curiosity about sex.

* Cf. the incident at the end of Plato's "Lysis," when the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus come in and send the youths home.

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The latter is of course, or should be, a perfectly legitimate interest. A boy at puberty naturally wants to know—and ought to know—what is taking place, and what the uses and functions of his body are. He does not go very deep into things; a small amount of information will probably satisfy him; but the curiosity is there, and it is pretty certain that the boy, if he is a boy of any sense or character, *will* in some shape or another get to satisfy it.

The process is really a *mental* one. Desire—except in some abnormal cases—has not manifested itself strongly; and there is often, perhaps generally, an actual repugnance at first to any thing like sexual practices; but the wish for information exists, and is, I say, legitimate enough. In almost all human societies except, curiously, the modern nations, there have been institutions for the initiation of the youth of either sex in these matters, and these initiations have generally been associated, in the opening blossom of the young mind, with inculcation of the ideals of manhood and womanhood, courage, hardihood, and the duties of the citizen or the soldier.*

But what does the modern school do? It shuts a trap-door down on the whole matter. There is a hush; a grim silence. Legitimate curiosity soon becomes illegitimate of its kind; and a furtive desire creeps in, where there was no desire before. The method of the gutter prevails. In the absence of any recognition of schoolboy needs, contraband information is smuggled from one to another; chaff and "smut" take the place of sensible and decent explanations; unhealthy practices follow; the sacredness of sex goes its way, never to return; and the school is filled with premature and morbid talk and thought about a subject which should, by rights, only just be rising over the mental horizon.†

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* See J. G. Wood's "Natural History of Man," vol. "Africa," p. 324 (the Bechuanas); also vol. "Australia," p. 75.

† With the rapid rise which is taking place, in scope and social status, of the state day-schools, it is probable that some change of opinion will take place with regard to the wisdom of sending young boys of ten to fourteen to upper class boarding-schools. For a boy of fifteen or sixteen and upwards the boarding-school system may have its advantages. By that time a boy is old enough to

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The meeting of these two currents, of ideal attachment and sexual desire, constitutes a rather critical period, even when it takes place in the normal way—*i.e.*, later on, and at the matrimonial age. Under the most favorable conditions a certain conflict occurs in the mind at their first encounter. But in the modern school this conflict, precipitated far too soon, and accompanied by an artificial suppression of the nobler current and a premature hastening of the baser one, ends in simple disaster to the former. Masters wage war against incontinence, and are right to do so. But how do they wage it? As said, by grim silence and fury, by driving the abscess deeper, by covering the drain over, *and* by confusing when it comes before them—both in their own minds and those of the boys—a real attachment with that which they condemn.

Not long ago the head-master of a large public school coming suddenly out of his study chanced upon two boys embracing each other in the corridor. Possibly, and even probably, it was the simple and natural expression of an unsophisticated attachment. Certainly, it was nothing that in itself could be said to be either right or wrong. What did he do? He haled the two boys into his study, gave them a long lecture on the nefariousness of their conduct, with copious hints that he knew *what such things meant* and *what they led to*, and ended by punishing them both condignly. Could anything be more foolish? If their friendship was clean and natural, the master was only trying to make them feel that it was unclean and unnatural, and that a lovely and honorable thing was disgraceful; if the act was—which at least is improbable—a mere signal of lust—even then the best thing would have been to assume that it was honorable, and by talking to the boys, either together or separately, to try and inspire them with a better ideal; while if, between these posi-

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understand some questions; he is old enough to have some rational ideal of conduct, and to hold his own in the pursuit of it; and he may learn in the life away from home a lot in the way of discipline, organization, self-reliance, etc. But to send a young thing, ignorant of life, and quite unformed of character, to take his chance by day and night in the public school as it at present exists, is—to say the least—a rash thing to do.

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tions, the master really thought the affection though honorable would lead to things undesirable, then, plainly, to punish the two was only to cement their love for each other, to give them a strong reason for concealing it, and to hasten its onward course. Yet every one knows that this is the *kind* of way in which the subject is treated in schools. It is the method of despair. And masters (perhaps not unnaturally) finding that they have not the time which would be needed for personal dealing with each boy, nor the forces at their command by which they might hope to introduce new ideals of life and conduct into their little community, and feeling thus utterly powerless to cope with the situation, allow themselves to drift into a policy of mere silence with regard to it, tempered by outbreaks of ungoverned and unreasoning severity.

I venture to think that school-masters will never successfully solve the difficulty until they boldly recognize the two needs in question, and proceed candidly to give them their proper satisfaction.

The need of information—the legitimate curiosity—of boys (and girls) must be met, partly by classes on physiology—as is already, happily, being done at some schools—partly by private talks and confidences between elder and younger, based on friendship; and few boys are there who will not rise to appreciation of some sensible talk of this kind, or who, when matters are to some degree explained, and their common sense appealed to, will not be much more effectually influenced than they at present are by the ban of silence and mystery.

And the need of attachment must be met by full recognition of it and the granting of it expression within all reasonable limits; by the dissemination of a good ideal of friendship and the enlistment of it on the side of manliness and temperance. Is it too much to hope that schools will in time recognize comradeship as a regular institution—considerably more important, say, than "fagging"—an institution having its definite place in the school life, in the games and in the studies, with its own duties, responsibilities, privileges, etc., and serving to ramify through the little community, hold it together, and

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inspire its members with the two qualities of heroism and tenderness, which together form the basis of all great character?

And it is evident that if the need of teaching on sexual matters is to be recognized, the importance of friendship must also be recognized. For after all, though some rudimentary teaching on sex and mere lessons of anatomy and physiology may be given in classes in the usual way, it is obvious that any real help in the conduct of life and morals can only come through very close and tender confidences between the elder and the younger, such as exist where there is a strong friendship to begin with: it is obvious that effective help *can* only come in this way and that this is the only way in which it is desirable that it should come. If, therefore, boys and youths cannot be trusted and encouraged to form decent friendships with one another and with their juniors, we are indeed in bad plight, and involved in a vicious circle from which there seems no escape.

No doubt the first steps in any reform of this kind *are* difficult; and masters are greatly hampered by the confusion existing in the public mind—which so often persists in setting down any attachment between two boys, or between a boy and his teacher, to nothing but sensuality. Many masters quite understand the situation, but feel themselves helpless in the face of public opinion. Who so fit (they feel) to enlighten a young boy and guide his growing mind as one of themselves, when the bond of attachment exists between the two? Like the writer of a letter quoted in the early part of this paper, they believe that "a personal affection, almost indescribable, grows up between pupil and teacher, through which thoughts are shared and an influence created that could exist in no other way." Yet when the pupil comes along of whom all this might be true, who shows by his pleading looks the sentiment which animates him, and the profound impression which he is longing, as it were, to receive from his teacher, the latter belies himself, denies his own instinct and the boy's great need, and treats him distantly and with coldness. And why? Simply because he dreads, even while he

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desires it, the boy's confidence. He fears the ingenuous and perfectly natural expression of the boy's affection in caress or embrace, because he knows how a bastard public opinion will interpret, or misinterpret, it; and rather than run such a risk as this he seals the fountains of the heart, withholds the help which love alone can give, and deliberately nips the tender bud which is turning to him for light and warmth.

The panic terror which prevails in England with regard to the expression of affection of this kind has its comic aspect. The affection exists, and is known to exist, on all sides; but we must bury our heads in the sand and pretend not to see it. And if by any chance we are compelled to recognize it, we must show our vast discernment by *suspecting* it, suspecting it of being false! And thus we fling on the dust-heap one of the noblest and most precious elements in human nature. Certainly, if the denial and suspicion of all natural affection were beneficial, we should find this out in our schools; but seeing how complete is its failure there to clarify their tone, it is sufficiently evident that the method itself is wrong.

The remarks in this paper have chiefly had reference to boys' schools; but they apply in the main to girls' schools, where much the same troubles prevail—with this difference, that in girls' schools friendships instead of being repressed are rather encouraged by public opinion; only unfortunately they are for the most part friendships of a weak and sentimental turn, and not very healthy either in themselves or in the habits they lead to. Here too, in girls' schools, the whole subject wants facing out; friendship wants setting on a more solid and less sentimental basis, and on the subject of sex, so infinitely important to women, there needs to be sensible and consistent teaching, both public and private. Possibly the co-education of boys and girls may be of use in making boys less ashamed of their feelings, and girls more healthy in the expression of them.

At any rate the more the matter is thought of, the clearer I believe will it appear that a healthy affection must in the end be the basis of education, and that the recognition of

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this will form the only way out of the modern school-difficulty. It is true that such a change would revolutionize our school-life; but it will have to come, all the same, and no doubt will come *pari passu* with other changes that are taking place in society at large.

EDWARD CARPENTER.

HOLMSFIELD, SHEFFIELD, ENGLAND.

THE MISSION OF MUSIC.

"WE must have something light or comic." So say those who provide music for the people, and their words represent an opinion which is almost universal with regard to the popular taste. The uneducated, it is thought, must be unable to appreciate that which is refined or to enjoy that which does not make them laugh and be merry.

Opinions exist, especially with regard to the tastes and wants of the poor, by the side of facts altogether inconsistent with those opinions. There are facts within the knowledge of some who live in the East End of London which are sufficient, at any rate, to shake this general opinion as to the people's taste for music.

In Whitechapel, where so many philanthropists have tried "to patch with handfuls of coal and rice" the people's wants, the signs of ignorance are as evident as the signs of poverty. There is an almost complete absence of those influences which are hostile to the ignorance, not, indeed, of the mere elements of knowledge (the Board-schools are now happily everywhere prominent), but to the ignorance of joy, truth, and beauty. Utility and the pressure of work have crowded house upon house; have filled the shops with what is only cheap, driven away the distractions of various manners and various dresses, and made the place weary to the body and depressing to the mind.

Nevertheless, in this district a crowd has been found willing, on many a winter's night, to come and listen to parts of an

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oratorio or to selections of classical music. The oratorios have sometimes been given in a church by various bodies of amateurs who have practised together for the purpose; the concerts have been given in school-rooms on Sunday evenings by professionals of reputation. To the oratorio men and women have come, some of them from the low haunts kept around the city by its carelessly administered charity, all of them of the class which, working for its daily bread, has no margin of time for study. Amid those who are generally so independent of restraint, who cough and move as they will, there has been a death-like stillness as they have listened to some fine solo of Handel's. On faces which are seldom free of the marks of care, except in the excitement of drink, a calm has seemed to settle and tears to flow, for no reason but because "it is so beautiful!" Sometimes the music has appeared to gradually break down barriers that shut out some poor fellow from a fairer past or a better future than his present: the oppressive weight of the daily care lifts, other sights are in his vision, and at last, covering his face or sinking on his knees, he makes prayers which cannot be uttered. Sometimes it has seemed to seize one on business bent, to suddenly transport him to another world, and, not knowing what he feels, has forced him to say, "It was good to be there." A church filled with hundreds of East Londoners, affected, doubtless, in different ways, but all silent, reverent, and self-forgetful, is a sight not to be forgotten or to be held to have no meaning. To the concerts have crowded hard-headed, unimaginative men, described in a local paper as being "friends of Bradlaugh." These have listened to and evidently taken in difficult movements of Beethoven, Schumann, and Chopin. The loud applause which has followed some moments of strained, rapt attention has proclaimed the universal feeling.

With a knowledge of the character of the music, the applications for admission have increased, and the announcement of a hope that the concerts might be continued the following winter, and possibly also extended to weekday evenings, has brought from some of those present an expression of their desire for other high-class music. The poor quarters of cities

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have been too long treated as if their inhabitants were deficient in that which is noblest in human nature. Human beings want not something which will do, but the best.

If it be asked what proof there be that such music has a permanent effect on the hearers, the only answer is that people do not always know how they have been most influenced. It is the air unconsciously breathed which affects the cure much more often than the medicine so consciously taken. Music may most deeply and permanently affect those who themselves can express no appreciation with their words or show results in their lives. Like the thousand things which surround the child and which he never notices, music may largely serve in the formation of character and the satisfaction of life. That the performance of this music in the East End is not followed by expressions of intelligent appreciation or by immediate change of life is no proof of its failure to influence. The fact that crowds come to listen is sufficient to make the world reconsider its opinion that the people care only for what is light or laugh-compelling. There is evidently in the highest music something which finds a response in many minds not educated to understand its mysteries nor interested in its creation. This suggests that music has in the present time a peculiar mission.

"Man cannot live by bread alone," expresses a truth which even those will allow who profess themselves careless about present-day religion. There is in human beings, in those whom the rich think to satisfy by increased wages and improved dwellings, a need of something beyond. The man who has won an honorable place, who by punctuality, honesty, and truthfulness has become the trusted servant of his employer, is often weary with the very monotony of his successful life. He has bread in abundance, but, unsatisfied, he dreams of filling quite another place in the world, perhaps as the leader daring much for others, perhaps as the patriot suffering much for his class and country, or perhaps as the poet living in others' thoughts. There flits before him a vision of a fuller life, and the vision stirs in him a longing to share such life. The woman, too, who in common talk is the model wife

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and mother, whose days are filled with work, whose talk is of her children's wants, whose life seems so even and uneventful, so complete in its very prosaicness, she, if she could be got to speak out the thoughts which flit through her brain as she silently plies her needle or goes about her household duties, would tell of strange longings for quite another sort of life, of passions and aspirations which have been scarcely allowed to take form in her mind. There is no one to whom "omens that would astonish have not predicted a future and uncovered a past."

Beyond the margin of material life is a spiritual life. This life has been and may still be believed to be the domain of religion, that which science has not known and can never know, which material things have not helped and can never help. It has been the glory of religion to develop the longing to be something higher and nobler by revealing to men the God who is higher than themselves.

Religion having abdicated this domain to invade that of science has to-day suffered by becoming the slave of æsthetic and moral precepts. Her professors often yield themselves to the influence of form and color or boast only of their morality and philanthropy.

It is no wonder, therefore, that many who are in earnest and feel that neither ritualism nor philanthropy have special power to satisfy their natures, reject religion. But they will not, if they are fair to themselves, object to the strengthening of that power which they must allow to have been a source of noble endeavor and of the very science whose reign they acknowledge. The sense of something better than their best, making itself felt not in outward circumstance but inwardly in their hearts, has often been the spring of effort and of hope. It is because the forms of present-day religion give so little help to strengthen this sense that so many now speak slightingly of religion and profess their independence of its forms. Religion, in fact, is suffering for want of expression.

In other times men felt that the words of the prayer-book and phrases now labelled "theological" did speak out, or at any rate did give some form to their vague, indistinct longing

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to be something else and something more; while the picture of God drawn from the Bible history and Bible words gave an object to their longing, making them desire to be like Him and to enjoy Him forever.

In these days, however, historical criticism and scientific discoveries have made the old expressions seem inadequate to state man's longings or to picture God's character. The words of prayers, whether the written prayers of the English Church or that rearrangement of old expressions called "extempore prayer," do not at once fit in with the longings of those to whom in these later days sacrifice has taken other forms and life other possibilities. The descriptions of God, involving so much that is only marvellous, jar against minds which have had hints of the grandeur of law and which have been awed not by miracles but by holiness. The petitions for the joys of heaven do not always meet the needs of those who have learnt that what they are is of more consequence than what they have, and the anthropomorphic descriptions of the character of God make Him seem less than many men who are not jealous, nor angry, nor revengeful.

Words and thoughts alike often fail to satisfy modern wants. While prayers are being said, the listless attitude and wandering gaze of those in whose souls are the deepest needs and loftiest aspirations, proclaim the failure. Religion has not failed, but only its power of expressing itself. There lives still in man that which gropes after God, but it can find no form in which to clothe itself. The loss is no light one. Expression is necessary to active life, and without it, at any rate, some of the greater feelings of human nature must suffer loss of energy and be isolated in individuals. Free exercise will give those feelings strength; the power of utterance will teach men that they are not alone when they are their best selves.

The world has been moved to many a crusade by a picture of suffering humanity, and the darkness of heathenism calls forth missionaries of one church and another. Almost as moving a picture might be drawn of those who wanting much can express nothing. Here are men and women, bone of our

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bone, flesh of our flesh: they have that within them which raises them above all created things, powers by which they are allied to all whom the world honors, faculties by which they might find unfailing joy. But they have no form of expression and so they live a lower life, walking by sight, not by faith, giving rein to powers which find their satisfaction near at hand and developing faculties in the use of which there is more of pain than joy. The power which has been the spring of so much that is helpful to the world seems to be dead in them; that sense which has enabled men to stand together as brothers, trusting one another as common possessors of a divine spark, seems to be without existence. A few may go on walking grimly the path of duty, but for the mass of mankind life has lost its brightness. Dulness unrelieved by wealth and loneliness undispersed by dissipation are the common lot. In a sense more terrible than ever, men are like children walking in the night with no language but a cry. He that will give them the means once more to express what they really are and what they really want will break the bondage.

The fact that the music of the great masters does stir something in most men's natures should be a reason for trying whether music might not, at any rate partially, express the religious life of the present day.

There is much to be said in favor of such an experiment. On the one side there is the failure of existing modes of expression. The prettinesses of ritualism and the social efforts of Broad Churchism, even for the comparatively small numbers who adopt these forms of worship, do not meet those longings of the inner life which go beyond the love of beauty and beyond the love of neighbors. The vast majority of the people belong to neither ritualism nor Broad Churchism; they live, at best, smothering their aspirations in activity; at worst, in dissipation, having forsaken duty as well as God. Their morality has followed their religion. In the East End of London this is more manifest, not because the people of the East are worse than the people of the West, but because the people of the East have no call to seem other than they are. Amid many signs hopeful for the future there is also

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among East Londoners, unblushingly declared at every street-corner, the self-indulgence which robs the young and weak of that which is their right, education and protection; the vice which saps a nation's strength is boasted of in the shop and flaunted in the highways, and the selfishness which is death to a man is often the professed ground of action.

Morality for the mass of men has been dependent on the consciousness of God, and with the lack of means of expression the consciousness of God seems to have ceased. On this ground alone there would be reason for making an experiment with music, if only because it offers itself as a possible means of that expression which the consciousness of God supports. And, on the other side, there is the natural fitness of music for the purpose.

In the first place, the great musical compositions may be asserted to be, not arrangements which are the results of study and the application of scientific principles, but the results of inspiration. The master, raised by his genius above the level of common humanity to think fully what others think only in part and to see face to face what others see only darkly, puts into music the thoughts which no words can utter and the description which no tongue can tell. What he himself would be, his hopes, his fears, his aspirations, what he himself sees of that holiest and fairest which has haunted his life, he tells by his art. Like the prophets, having had a vision of God, his music proclaims what he himself would desire to be, and expresses the emotions of his higher nature.

If this be a correct account of the meaning of those great master-pieces which may every day be performed in the ears of the people, it is easy to see how they may be made to serve the purpose in view. The greatest master is a man with much in him akin to the lowest of the human race. The homage all pay to the great is but the assertion of this kinship, the assertion of men's claim to be like the great when the obstructions of their mal-formation and mal-education shall be trained away. Men generally will, therefore, find in that which expresses the thoughts of the greatest the means of expressing their own thoughts. The music which enfolds

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the passions that have never found utterance, that have never been realized by the ordinary man, will somehow appeal to him and make him recognize his true self and his true object. Music being itself the expression of the wants of man, all who share in man's nature will find in it an expression for longings and visions for which no words are adequate. It will be what prayers and meditations now so often fail to be, a means of linking men with the source of the highest thoughts and efforts, and of enabling them to enjoy God, a joy which so few now understand.

More than this, the best existing expression of that which men have found to be good has been by parables, whose meanings have not been limited to time or place but are of universal application. Heard by different people and at different times, parables have given to all alike a conception of that which eye cannot see nor voice utter; each hearer in each age has gained possibly a different conception, but in the use of the same words all have felt themselves to be united. The parable of the prodigal son has represented the God who has been won to love by the sacrifice of Christ and also the God who freely forgives. Such forms of expression it is most important to have in an age when movement is so rapid that things become old as soon as they are new, separating to-morrow those who have stood together to-day, and when at the same time the longing for unity is so powerful that the thought of it acts as a charm on men's minds.

In some degree all art is a parable, as it makes known in a figure that which is unknown, revealing the truth the artist has felt to others just in so far as they by education and surroundings have been qualified to understand it. Titian's picture of the Assumption helped the mediæval saint to worship better the Virgin Mother, and also helps those of our day to realize the true glory of womanhood.

But music, even more than painting and poetry, fulfils this condition. It reveals that which the artist has seen, and reveals it with no distracting circumstance of subject, necessary to the picture or the poem. The hearer who listens to a great composition is not drawn aside to think of some histori-

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cal or romantic incident; he is free to think of that of which such incidents are but the clothes. Age succeeds to age; the music which sounded in the ears of the fathers sounds also in the ears of the children. Place and circumstance force men asunder, but still for those of every party or sect and for those in every quarter of the world the great works of the masters of music remain. The works may be performed in the West End or in the East End,—the hearers will have different conceptions, will see from different points of view the vision which inspired the master, but will nevertheless have the sense that the music which serves all alike creates a bond of union.

Music then would seem fitted to be in this age the expression of that which men in their inmost hearts most reverence. Creeds have ceased to express this and have become symbols of division rather than of unity! Music is a parable, telling in sounds which will not change of that which is worthy of worship, telling it to each hearer just in so far as he by nature and circumstance is able to understand it, but giving to all that feeling of common life and assurance of sympathy which has in old times been the strength of the church. By music, men may be helped to find God who is not far from any one of us, and be brought again within reach of that tangible sympathy, the sympathy of their fellow-creatures.

There is, however, still one other requisite in a perfect form of religious expression. The age is new and thoughts are new, but nevertheless they are rooted in the past. More than any one acknowledges is he under the dominion of the buried ages. He who boasts himself superior to the superstitions of the present is the child of parents whose high thoughts, now transmitted to their child, were intertwined with those superstitions. Any form of expression therefore which aims at covering emotions said to be new must, like these emotions, have associations with the past! A brand new form of worship agreeable to the most enlightened reason and surrounded with that which the present asserts to be good would utterly fail to express thoughts and feelings, which, if born of the present, share the nature of parents who lived in the past. It is interesting to notice how

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machines and institutions which are the product of the latest thought bear in their form traces of that which they have superseded; the railway carriage suggests the stage-coach, and the House of Commons reminds us of the Saxon Witan-agemot. The absolutely new would have no place in this old world, and a new form of expression could not express the emotions of the inner life.

Music which offers a form in which to clothe the yearnings of the present has been associated with the corresponding yearnings of the past, and would seem therefore to fulfil the necessary condition. Those who to-day feel music telling out their deepest wants and proclaiming their praise of the good and holy, might recognize in the music echoes of the songs which broke from the lips of Miriam and David, of Ambrose and Gregory, and of those simple peasants who one hundred years ago were stirred to life on the moors of Cornwall and Wales.

The fact that music has been thus associated with religious life gives it an immense, if an unrecognized power. The timid are encouraged and the bold are softened! When the congregation is gathered together and the sounds rise which are full of that which is and perhaps always will be "ineffable," there float in, also, memories of other sounds, poor perhaps and uncouth, in which simple people have expressed their prayers and praises; the atmosphere, as it were, becomes religious, and all feel that the music is not only beautiful, but the means of bringing them nearer to the God after whom they have sought so long and often despaired to find.

For these reasons music seems to have a natural fitness for becoming the expression of the inner life. The experiment, at any rate, may be easily tried. There is in every parish a church with an organ, and arrangements suitable for the performance of grand oratorios; there are concert halls or schoolrooms suitable for the performance of classical music. There are many individuals and societies with voices and instruments capable of rendering the music of the masters. Most of them have, we cannot doubt, the enthusiasm which would

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induce them to give their services to meet the needs of their fellow-creatures.

Money has been and is freely subscribed for the support of missions seeking to meet bodily and spiritual wants; music will as surely be given by those who have felt its power to meet that need of expression which so far keeps the people without the consciousness of God. Members of ethical societies, who have taught themselves to fix their eyes on moral results, may unite with members of churches who care also for religious things. Certain it is that people who are able to realize grand ideals will be likely in their own lives to do grand things, and doing them make the world better and themselves happier.

S. A. BARNETT.

TOYNBEE HALL, LONDON.

DISCUSSION.

CHARACTER AND CIRCUMSTANCE.

SOME time ago at a *Symposium* of the Aristotelian Society in which I took part the question was discussed, whether Character and Circumstance are Co-ordinate Factors in human life, or whether either is subordinate to the other? My thoughts have often recurred to the subject since, with a conviction that the question is less simple, or, at any rate, less easy to answer briefly than it perhaps looks at first. There can be little doubt that we all acknowledge in action, though not always in express reflection, on the one hand the effect of Circumstance on Character, and on the other sometimes the triumph of Character over Circumstance, sometimes the failure of Circumstance to correct, mould, or sustain Character.

For all who are interested in the education or guardianship of the young, in the question of improving the condition of certain classes of the community, or again in the improvement of other individuals, or even of themselves, must have felt the enormous importance of circumstances, the influence on the future of children of the circumstances of their home and school life; the often incalculable effect on the young of their surroundings, of their companions, teachers, employers, of the economic, material, and social conditions under which they live; the way in which certain

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conditions of life and labor among the poor, seem to make many virtues and graces all but a sheer impossibility. Or consider the desperate anxiety which we sometimes feel about those whom we love when they are placed in new or difficult circumstances, especially when they are young, or, as we may think, "weak" and easily influenced; the fear we sometimes have about ourselves lest in given circumstances the nearness of some temptation, the continued recurrence of some irritation, should make us forget our better self or lose our self-control,—the way in which we feel that the presence of one man seems to raise us to a better level, while that of another puts us out of tune with all mankind and stirs up ill-feelings that we thought we had got the better of.

On the other hand, most of us have known cases where character, in its weakness or strength, seems to mock circumstances,—the most attractive virtue emerges from the most unpromising surroundings, and springs up like a lily among weeds; from the squalid, disorganized, demoralizing environment of the drunkard's home there comes forth a daughter who is a model of foresight and trustworthiness, a born organizer,—the very prop and pillar of the household to which she goes,—or a son pre-eminent in temperance, orderliness, gentleness, steadfast strength. These are, indeed, the exception, they are always a surprise, yet they are by no means unknown.

Or a home which seems adapted to be the very nursery of virtue produces hypocrites and wildlings. What is the explanation? "Train up a child in the way he should go and when he is old he will not depart from it." Is this true? *Will* the man continue in the way in which as a child he was forced to walk? Was Bacon right in averring that "men do after as they have been accustomed"? The answer here is probably, first, that life is not all a matter of habit; second, that habits that are acquired in one set of conditions may be more or less easily broken in another, or habits that were acquired with great difficulty and "against the grain" may be easily lost when the pressure that enforced them is removed.

We may observe on the one hand that it is common and seems reasonable to prefer to take a friend, a servant, a companion, a master, from a house that has a good record; but here, as far as any individual member is concerned, we only go upon this ground in as far as the individual member with whom we are concerned is personally untried or unknown; it would be a patent absurdity to prefer the proved "black sheep" from a good flock, or even an

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untried unit of it, to a tried and proved member of a family otherwise disreputable. Personal individual proof is the best we can get,—the only proof that is really satisfactory; indeed, if we trace it back, the good name of any house or neighborhood, any class or nation, is a glory reflected in the first place from individuals,—a name, good or bad, must be "made," and may be lost.

What makes the whole question of the relation between Circumstance and Character seem more difficult even than it is, is that owing to its complexity it is by most seen one-sidedly; and when we begin to discuss the matter we are confronted with epigrammatic expressions of partial and limited views, and our most frequent impulse is to take one or other of these limited views and try to find the whole truth in it. The region of proverbial wisdom in which so much of our thought about conduct still moves is a region abounding in brief and pointed expression of aspects of truth which are at once striking and narrow. They have the charm of vividness and picturesqueness, of being easy to grasp, to apply and to remember,—and they also have their use, as a record of past insight and a reminder of fragments of present truth. But while we are intent upon one bit of truth, it often grows before our eyes to disproportionate dimensions; and the result may be either distortion of our mental perspective or, when the scene changes and the other side of the shield is presented, doubt and disturbance, —the emergence into consciousness of contradictions which we do see.

I think this is what we find when we first begin to reflect on the relation between Character and Circumstance. On the one hand is a general recognition of the force of circumstances, in ordinary rules of life, in saws and maxims, in our own experience of particular cases; on the other hand (first) a conviction of the supremacy of character in striking instances of heroic triumph over pain and temptation, of love stronger than death, of fidelity that remains unshaken by fear or favor, of kindliness that survives ingratitude and contumely, of nobility and dignity which chance and change cannot affect. Here, at least, we think, is proof that "man is man and master of his fate."

But (second) we have here too that which seems worse than any subordination of character to circumstance,—namely, the prevailing badness and weakness of some characters in what seem the best sort of surroundings. Here, of course, it may be said that in such an instance it is only our ignorance of what really are the desirable

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circumstances for such a character that makes us call them in this case "the best." But this is no consolation—it is only to drive us from perplexity to despair, since such knowledge as we have is all that we can build upon.

What we seem to see in these wretched cases is, that circumstances which mostly tend to good are here powerless against ill,—just as in the previous case we saw circumstances which generally drag men down to a lower level, trodden underfoot, and triumphed over, made "stepping stones to higher things."

It may be asked here, What meaning do we give to the terms which constitute the two members of the antithesis? What is meant by Character, what by Circumstance, and what is the distinction between the two? Is it intended that Character and Circumstance together should include all the factors of human life? If so, the distinction is hard to draw; at any rate, there is a debatable borderland between the two. What we commonly mean by Character is, I suppose, that part of a man's nature which is, or may be, manifested in action; that more or less permanent complex of habits, feelings, dispositions, etc., of which conduct, good or bad, is the most direct and important outcome. I wish here to take it in this sense,—the sense of *moral* character,—not in Mr. Shand's "psychological" sense as meaning a man's whole nature and life.

What we commonly mean by Circumstance is all those elements or factors of a man's environment which make part of his life or experience, and which may, perhaps, be roughly summed up under the heads of Material, Economic, Social or Political, Moral or Religious, Æsthetic and Intellectual. We do also, I think, commonly regard physical health as a "Circumstance" in relation to Character. It is not perhaps so easy to say whether Beauty, Strength, and other physical endowments are so, and more difficult still to pronounce in the case of Temperament, Intellectual and Emotional endowments, and acquired skill. This difficulty of drawing the line is no doubt an indication of some kind or degree of unity. How this is to be understood or conceived we shall inquire later on.

In given definite cases it may be as easy to distinguish between Character and Circumstance as it is to distinguish between the food now on my plate and my bodily organism. And if we say that Character is moulded by Circumstance, we may mean very definitely that what a man is as an ethical being depends on the

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conditions of his human and material environment,—on food, climate, companions, laws, public opinion, current custom. Or in saying that Character triumphs over Circumstance we may mean quite decidedly that a man remains as honest when impoverished as he was when wealthy, is as just and kindly when wounded by ingratitude and misunderstanding as when cheered by admiration and general appreciation, is as pure in walk and conversation when forced to dwell in the tents of wickedness as when in the companionship of good and true men.

In discussing questions of the relation between Character and Circumstance we are thinking of both, for the most part, as we ordinarily find them in life, and not of the most extreme cases that are actual or possible: we are able to weigh one against the other, as it were, to some extent; to think of Character as stronger than Circumstance, *e.g.*, only because we take Character and Circumstance at a sort of average level—we do not take into account such natures as could hold their own against the unremitting pressure of truly desperate circumstances.

It is, of course, understood that circumstances are only *my* circumstances, when they affect my consciousness,—circumstances that do not touch me in thought or feeling are no part of *my* life at all, —and we never think that Character and Circumstance are without reciprocal influence; and when we say that Character triumphs over Circumstance, we mean that Character improves in spite of hindrance, or at least does not deteriorate, in circumstances where we might expect it to do so.

The question we are considering has practical importance, for most of us are in one way or other interested in the improvement of some other human beings and desirous of our own improvement, and we know or believe that modification is in many cases in our power, to some extent. How, then, is this modification to be effected? Is there any one anywhere who will go to the length of saying that circumstances are not a means, and a most important means? In as far as any one does believe in the unimportance of circumstances it must be because he means by *good* circumstances (which he holds powerless to improve character), circumstances which can only be called *good* from some outside and irrelevant point of view. To a person deficient in musical ear or taste or cultivation "good" music may be a circumstance indifferent or merely annoying; or great intellectual or social opportunities may for some sufficient reason have no attraction for a person to whom

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they are open, no response from him—to him they are no stimulus, and so can be neither help nor hindrance.

We may, of course, direct our effort to the improvement of material and other circumstances without much thought beyond the greater ease and comfort of existence which such improvement tends to produce; but is it possible to help to produce improvement in Character except by means of alteration of Circumstance? How else are we to set about it? I may, indeed, tell a man that Character is the more important, and that if he will improve himself and his mode of conduct, an improvement of his circumstances will infallibly follow; he will act upon his circumstances in as far as they are *his*, and replace them by a fresh set. I hope to succeed in my representations, and may do so; but if I do, is this anything but a case of affecting Character by Circumstance? the "Circumstance" here being myself and my exhortations?

Environment may be to Character what light, air, moisture, etc., are to the living, growing plant. Circumstance may be the means or instrument of change or development in Character. It may be possible or even easy at given stages of a man's life to distinguish between Character and Circumstance,* though some element of life which at one time comes under one category may at another time come under the other—*e.g.*, a passing intellectual denseness or alertness that can only be regarded as a circumstance may come to be a permanent condition, an intellectual aspect of Character. Or some previously fixed disposition may be broken down, and the manifestations which formerly might be regarded as an outcome of Character come to wear rather the aspect of Circumstance.

No doubt in all action the two factors are equally indispensable; but assuming a certain tolerable and modifiable condition of circumstances, we regard Character as intrinsically the more interesting, valuable, and important factor, while in our efforts to improve the world we lay more stress upon Circumstances, because it is they alone which are directly in our power. The popular estimation of the two, in relation to each other, is perhaps comparable to the current treatment of causes in relation to their effects. We take a Cause with more exactingness and lay more stress upon its details, but the Effect is what interests us most, and is that for the sake of which we are so particular about the cause.

If we pass from the relation which we seem commonly to appre-

* Cf. Montague, "The Old Poor Law."

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hend and accept to ask, How is the real, or underlying, unity between Character and Circumstance to be conceived? we may be told (as by Dr. Bosanquet) that "the self is character when regarded as an organized whole; it is circumstance when regarded as a congeries of details."

No doubt Character and Circumstance both have their relation to the totality of a man's life or nature, and no doubt the points of view are different; but in the "unity" here suggested Character is taken in a very much wider sense than in the foregoing remarks, and the unification with which we are provided seems just the attempt at a summary solution of the ultimate problem of differentiation in unity in the case of the individual mind. But the unity which Character induces upon Circumstance by means of organization is often exceedingly scrappy and imperfect, and also the unity due to systematization does not seem to be always in itself good and desirable in the case of an individual character. That is, Unity in the sense of organization is often unattainable (or at least unattained), and Unity *quâ* Unity can hardly be affirmed to be good or desirable.

I need not say that I make no pretension to have even suggested a solution of the difficulty that underlies the antithesis under discussion, either as a general philosophical problem or in its narrow practical sense, but have only recapitulated some of the difficulties which belong to it and some of the opinions which have been held about them. One necessary preliminary to understanding current views, and clearing our own, would seem to be as careful an analysis as may be of the senses in which *Character* is often used, the elements which it is held to include. We may say, in the first place, that Character is *psychical*,—we do not regard anything that is *material* as a part or element of Character.

Again, it is *Me* (or part of Me) as distinguished from the rest of the world, with which I am in interaction, but which is not *Me*.

In this rest of the world which is not Character may be reckoned causes or concomitants of Character.

And it is more or less lasting and more or less unchanging as contrasted with what is more transient and changing,—*e.g.*, we distinguish Character from its manifestations in transient and ever-varied action.

No doubt, also, we think of a man's nature as being intrinsically such that given certain conditions it will develop in a certain way, —"unless each thing had a nature of its own there could be neither

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Character nor Circumstance,—it is only definite special nature that can be affected in a given way by 'Circumstances,'—that is, by the nature of other things and their position in reference to it." Still, granting this initial nature and its continuity of development, we recognize that a character may, as we say, change,—that is, at a certain stage in its development or arrest of development its attributes and manifestations may differ from what they formerly were, in a way that is not explicable by reference to Circumstance alone. There is an analogy between *Character* as thus regarded and the nature of say an acorn which develops into an oak, or a robin's egg which develops into a robin. We may note further that it is important when we are discusssing "Character" to consider whether we refer to a point of time, or a limited period, or a whole life.

E. E. Constance Jones.

Girton College, Cambridge.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Instinct and Reason: An Essay concerning the Relation of Instinct to Reason, with some Special Study of the Nature of Religion. By Henry Rutgers Marshall, M.A. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1898. Pp. vii., 569.

As one lays down this elaborate and systematic volume two remarks are suggested. It is remarkable, first, for its sustained originality and constructive power. It is, indeed, a mass of original suggestion, with the form of a treatise and the inspiration of a single argument. We have here new theories of the nature of—too many things to be easily detailed; certainly of such fundamental matters as the physical basis of consciousness, spontaneous variation, instinct, impulse, the social organism, the ego, reason, morality, and religion; a variety of purely incidental theories making their appearance by the way. When it is added that the originality is real and reasoned, the importance of the book will be perceived. Into the soundness of its conclusions one cannot go far in these few lines to examine.

The second remark is that this, after the recent work of M. Tarde, Professor Baldwin, Professor Royce, and others, is another striking sign of the tendency to bring a physiological psychology

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to bear on social problems. The classic English psychologists, from Hobbes to James and John Mill, went into the science with a social interest, and were prolific in social applications. But, excepting Hobbes and Hartley, they devoted themselves to aspects of mental life that could be studied without attention to the body. On the other hand, the immense recent developments in psychology have been due to men who came in from physical science and had no marked social interest. They have condemned the premises from which the associational psychologists drew ethical and other social conclusions, but they have offered nothing instead. Meanwhile social science itself has been brought face to face with problems of human temperament. It is knocking loudly at the door of psychology for applicable principles, and in default of response is beginning in desperation to employ improvised psychological principles of its own. I need hardly refer to the Austrian school of political economy, with its psychology of demand, or to such sociological work as that of Professors Patten and Giddings. It is interesting that just at this juncture a spontaneous movement in psychology itself, this time under physiological and biological inspiration, should have turned to those problems of human faculty with which social science is most concerned.

Mr. Marshall's chief theses concern the relation of three human attributes,—instinct, reason, and the religious sentiment. He maintains the bold hypothesis that (in rough terms) reason is identical with what Darwin knew as the "tendency to variation." That is, our reasoning processes are the psychic side of a physiological occurrence which is likely to take place in all forms of organic life,—a variation from an established type of reaction to the environment. All reasoning is according to the accepted doctrine of psychology preparatory to action. When one of the organs involved in the reaction of a whole organism is over-stimulated, that organ is apt to react forcibly, according to its own private tendencies to reaction, unmodulated by the influence of the other organs, and thus the type of reaction of the whole is altered. The author accumulates instances and suggestions to support the theory that we have here the source of all biological variation. If this be so, the analogy between organic variation and the action of reason is clear. Mr. Marshall holds that this physiological occurrence is in all cases accompanied by consciousness, at least in the rudimentary form that he calls mere "mentality." Where an individual member of the social organism, under

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circumstances that arouse him, refuses to follow the instincts which would make him conform to the established ways of the whole, and, deliberating, acts "as he thinks best," he plays the part of an organ which, under special stimulus, varies from its appointed share of activity, and thus changes the form of a general reaction. And Mr. Marshall carries his analogy into the psychological analysis of reasoning itself. In the reasoning that precedes choice,—that is in all reasoning,—some impulses or ideas leading to impulses are emphasized which in the rapid instinctive mental passage that would otherwise have occurred would have had no such proportion of attention. This conception is wrought out with a fineness of detail that cannot here be rendered.

Reason is thus a peculiar case of instinct. The instinctive activity of the part breaks loose from the modulating restraint of the whole; but the tendencies to action involved are all of the nature of instinct.

Religion, too, is an instinct. It is not necessary to suppose that all instincts are wholly definite types of reaction upon the environment. The circumstances that call for action are so varying, and instincts so supplemented by imitations and habits that in many cases the truly instinctive (inherited and purposive) element is vague, consisting of a general tendency towards some species of action of which the organism may avail itself in different ways. Now the order of the ancestral establishment of our instincts influences their relative potency, and there is great danger that in cases of unrestrained action the "individualistic" instincts will take the lead and supplant the social. There is thus need for society's sake of some regulative device to restore the balance in our organization and make up for the defects of nature's workmanship. This corrective after-thought of nature Mr. Marshall finds in "the governing instinct,"—religion. Its function is to *restrain* us from following our instincts in their original order of precedence; to give us pause so that the social instincts may be heard in counsel and have their due weight. Religious seclusion in all its forms, from that of the hermitage to that of the protestant "retreat," ceremonies, devotions, hours of meditation, self-examination, etc., have the office—psychologically viewed—of *arresting* the individual in the round of his selfish activities so that the too frequent supremacy of the egoistic instincts, which they owe to their priority, is forfeited, and the whole assemblage of instincts have their say. The author is not here dealing with the origin of religious ideas, but

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with their function only, not with the source of a "variation," but with the reasons of its selection for survival. His social interpretation of religious expression, of conversion and of "phallic" religions, abounds in fruitful suggestion. Further, he is not attempting to round in his formula the entire significance of religion to the human spirit. The subject, he expressly remarks, has other profoundly important aspects; he (once more) is dealing with religion only as regards its evolutionary office and tenure.

In the development of the argument, religion and reason appear for the most part as opposite forces. For reason is in society the principle of variation from established social modes of action, and religion that arresting power which allows the social instincts to overtake and measure their ultimate strength against the egoistic instincts. But it must not, therefore, be assumed—so at least the present reviewer reads the argument—that reason is a purely individualistic principle; that the author, like Mr. Benjamin Kidd, conceives it as identical with enlightened selfishness. When an individual "varies" from the function which previous social organization has appointed for him, his action is, superficially speaking, anti-social and of his own individual initiative. But its ultimate ends may be the reverse of individual. An understanding of the author's drift here depends wholly upon one's noting which is the reacting whole, and which the variant part in question. In social matters the variant part is the human individual. But the human individual has many instinctive propensities,—some that have social purposes, others that have egoistic purposes, and when he "varies" from the *de facto* social system it may be his social instincts that are operative. He may be acting for the good of society on his own private judgment. If we should take as example some other reacting organism than society, some organism, for instance, standing "low" in the zoölogical series, we should be likely to find that its parts capable of variation were not in themselves of such complex structure as to contain "social" as well as self-preservative tendencies. And even in the individuals that compose the social organism the egoistic instincts "have the start," and in the absence of the religious restraint the danger is great that variation from the existing social "type of reaction" will prove to be selfishly inspired.

Little note can be taken here of the theories, incidentally presented, of the self, of impulse, of belief, of conscience, etc., which are likely to excite much attention in the psychological quarter.

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None of these is more interesting than the form in which Mr. Marshall holds the doctrine of mental and physical parallelism, denying that the cerebral hemispheres are the only physical parts whose action is directly correlated with our consciousness, and affirming that the action of various lower parts has its equivalent in "the field of inattention," and may rise into attentive consciousness. The theory of the ego which Mr. Marshall connects with this, identifying it with "the field of inattention" itself, has been called materialistic, but in reality it is a psychological analysis only, independent of metaphysical theory.

It is a merit, in the present state of psychological knowledge and controversy, that these imposing theories should be presented quite tentatively, as in their author's eyes the most fruitful and defensible working hypotheses. There is room here for but little critical or questioning remark. If one were asked to point out a logical deficiency of the work at large, one might suggest that the author seems content in each topic with proving that his hypothesis would explain the facts, or is at all events eminently consistent with many that we know, without taking any step to prove that it alone would explain them. This strikes one forcibly in his endeavor to prove that religion is an instinct. One is abundantly instructed by the discussion, but one cannot regard the case as made out, even to the establishment of the best working hypothesis. So, too, with the identification of reason—or its physical equivalent—with variation. Would it not require a somewhat elaborate excursion into the theory of heredity and the controversies now waging there to prove that what Mr. Marshall regards as the sole type of variation could ever be transmitted to descendants at all?

That the restraint or arrest on which Mr. Marshall most warrantably lays stress should be ascribed to religion as its function might seem again a result of looking only one way. It is the established practice in psychology to speak in much the same terms (the structure of the nervous system inevitably suggests it) of the function of—what but reason itself! The rational organization of a man interposes a delay in critical circumstances, so that all the man's instincts, memories, resources of wisdom in general may make themselves felt. There is much need that the author's theory should be adjusted to this and similar psychological principles which start to the reader's mind, but can hardly be reconciled with the author's scheme on the present showing.

As an attack on the supremacy of reason the work is highly

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interesting, not only as a fresh outcropping of strong tendencies in the philosophy of the century, but as an instance of the way in which psychology and physiology begin to be put forward as witnesses in this cause. The attack is unquestionably powerful, but the present writer must defer to another time and place any endeavor to deal with it.

D. S. MILLER.

PHILADELPHIA.

UNIVERSITY ADDRESSES AND UNIVERSITY SERMONS. By John Caird, D.D., LLD., late Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Glasgow. James MacLehose & Sons, 1898.

As at once the greatest preacher of his time in Scotland and the Principal of the University of Glasgow, Dr. John Caird occupied a unique position in his own country. These two volumes show, though only in an imperfect way, how he employed his position to turn the thoughts of the University to the "best things," both in literature and life. The "Addresses" were chiefly delivered on academic occasions at the opening and closing of the session, the "Sermons" in the Bute Hall, which on Sundays is used as a college chapel. Both are fittingly dedicated by the editor, the Master of Balliol, to the Students of the Glasgow University. All who, like the present reviewer, still consider themselves as such, will be carried back in reading them to the days when students and outside public alike crowded "to hear the Principal," and will be vividly reminded of the eloquent voice that is now still.

To the general reader the "Addresses" will, perhaps, be more interesting. They are the work of one who knew better than most what a university ought to be, and who, accordingly, strove to impress upon the members of his own "the greatness of the world and of man's mind." This he does not only by his catholicity, shown in the diversity of the subjects chosen (Erasmus, Galileo, Bacon, Hume, Butler, are some of them), but by his large grasp of the unity of all human endeavor. The editor has done well to bring this into prominence by assigning to the essay on the "Unity of the Sciences" the first place in this volume. Besides literature, science, philosophy, theology, which the above names suggest, the "Addresses" include one on "The Science of History," containing the important suggestion that the closer mutual intercourse of modern times secures individual nations from the corruption and decay which overtook most of the great peoples of antiquity; two upon

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"Art," breathing a like spirit of hope for the future of artistic production (*e.g.*, pp. 305–6); one upon the art in which Caird himself was so great a master, "The Art of Public Speaking," and one on the "Personal Element in Teaching." It is difficult to make selections where all is good, but the following perhaps puts more eloquently than has hitherto been done the ethical influence which a university, when it is of the sort he strove to make the University of Glasgow, exercises upon the lives and characters of the students:

"It is, I think, an immense advantage of university education as a discipline of mind and character that at an early period of life, ere we have entered on the struggle and stress of life, we should for a term of years be members of a society in which the sole bond of union lies in the things of the mind, in which the standard of merit is a purely intellectual one, and all arbitrary grounds of distinction are for the time at least in abeyance. It is the glory of our Scottish universities that they have never been places of education for a class, that no costly arrangements render access to them possible only for the rich or well-to-do, and that when once he has crossed their doors a young man finds himself in a community where intellectual resource is the only wealth that wins respect, brain power the only power that tells, and where honour and distinction await the ablest and worthiest, and await these alone. That surely is some approximation to an ideal society in which arbitrary and accidental claims to superiority are of absolutely no account, in which the idle, the superficial, the incompetent will not for any outward reason have a shadow of respect paid to them, and genuine intellectual power and application are sure to be recognized and honoured."

Caird's "Sermons," like those of Butler himself, are a contribution both to the religion and the ethics of the time. When a wave of agnosticism is sweeping over the sister church in England, manifesting itself in a recrudescence of ritual and priestcraft, a clear, strong voice like this is welcome, as showing that the spirit of Protestant Christianity is still alive as a wholesome and progressive force in Western Europe. Alluding to the "revelation" by Christ of the Kingdom of God "in the midst of you," Caird says in the sermon on "Things New and Old":

"It is this last thought which makes Christianity above all things the religion of aspiration, of hope, of progress, of unresting endeavour after a perfection that is yet to be. If there be views of life which lead to reaction or stagnation, to a false consecration of the past or despair of the future, it is not to Christ's teaching they can appeal."

The essence of that teaching he conceives to be the regeneration of man, through the awakening in him of an all-subduing sense of the

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"beauty of holiness." Almost any passage would illustrate this, the central idea in these sermons. I select one from the sermon on "Truth and Freedom":

"Christ declares that it is possible for a man to attain to such a temper and frame of spirit that doing the will of God shall be to him a kind of self-indulgence, the expression of an irresistible inward impulse, the gratification of the deepest passion of his soul. His moral life will no longer have the character of obedience even to a master whose authority his reason recognizes but that of the unconscious service rendered to one who has touched our hearts and captivated our affections, and awakened in us a devotion that binds us to his service by an imperious yet sweet and joyous enthralment. . . . Do not we know how work loses its irksomeness when a strong passion urges us to do it? . . . Or, again, that ardent love or patriotism taking deep hold of a human spirit will bear down before it without the sense of effort all other and meaner impulses, and make it no hardship to sacrifice self, to undergo pain, and toil, and danger, and disaster for its object. And so what Christ contemplates is the awakening of a new and commanding principle within the breast,—a love to Him who is the supreme ideal of all that is divinely fair, and holy, and good, more entrancing, conferring a superiority to self more magnanimous, more ennobling, more sustaining, more capable of arousing those who are swayed by it to labour, and sacrifice, and endurance that have lost all their severity and become transmuted into sweetness than any earthly principle or passion by which the spirit of man can be impelled. . . . To very many of us religion is a thing which has its source in our fears, our interests, our hereditary traditions, our social conventions, at best our intellectual convictions. How seldom has it gone deeper than all that to intrench itself in our affections, to become that for which such expressions as these are no longer exaggerations, 'I delight to do thy will, O my God; yea, thy law is within my heart.'"

From the same point of view the sermon on "Art and Religion" aims at showing that art and Christianity are one, in that both aim at revealing what is highest in nature and man. As specially suggestive to the student of ethics may be mentioned the sermon (should they not be numbered?) on "The Reversal of Nature's Law of Competition," in which it is shown that selfish appropriation of spiritual good is from its nature self-contradictory, and "Corporate Immortality," where it is shown that, as existences rise in the scale of nobleness, just in that proportion do they become incapable of any merely individual perfection.

How the exponent of this ethical Christianity expects that the church of the future which accepts these ideas as the basis of its teaching will be organized there is, of course, here no indication. But we may hope that these volumes will be followed by other memorials of a man who was so strikingly representative of the

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best side of the religious thought of our time, from which his views on this and other important questions here suggested may be gathered.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

MASON UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, BIRMINGHAM.

THE LAW OF CIVILIZATION AND DECAY: An Essay on History. By Brooks Adams. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. xiv., 393.

Mr. Adams believes that he has discovered a law which governs the movement of human society in its "oscillations between barbarism and civilization." The basis of his theory is that physics is the ultimate philosophy of things and energy the highest of categories. "The law of force and energy is of universal application in nature, . . . animal life is one of the outlets through which solar energy is dissipated; . . . and as human societies are forms of animal life, these societies must differ among themselves in energy, in proportion as nature has endowed them more or less abundantly with energetic material." (Pp. viii., ix.) Thought is a "manifestation of human energy," and Fear and Greed are conspicuous "among the earlier and simpler phases of thought." Energy appears as Fear in "primitive and scattered communities," which are imaginative, religious, military, artistic; but as society becomes consolidated and centralized, energy expresses itself not as Fear but as Greed, and a new type of man becomes dominant, the economic man, who is unimaginative, sceptical, unwarlike, inartistic, a monster of voracity with the cleverness of a fiend and without a redeeming quality. Every race must come to this sooner or later, and ultimately "intensifying competition appears to generate two extreme economic types,—the usurer in his most formidable aspect and the peasant whose nervous system is best adapted to thrive on scanty nutriment." (P. x.) This condition may last for a time, until it is "ended by war, by exhaustion, or by both combined, as seems to have been the case with the Eastern Empire; or, as in the Western, disintegration may set in, the civilized population may perish, and a reversion may take place to a primitive form of organism." In this last case, the energy of the race is probably exhausted, and it must wait to be refreshed by the infusion of barbarian blood.

In support of his thesis, Mr. Adams offers us an outline of the history of European civilization, from Rome to modern England, in its economic aspect, following the centre of exchanges from

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Rome to Constantinople, thence to Venice, and ultimately westward to London. The greater part of the book is devoted to the history of the Crusades (ending in Dandolo's capture of Constantinople and the ultimate suppression of the Templars), the rise of the Hanse Towns, and the history of England since the Reformation. Centralization and the supplanting of the martial by the economic type of man were the ruin of Rome. On this there followed decentralization and the reign of mystery, miracle, priestcraft, imagination, in the middle ages. The Crusades were the beginning of a centralizing movement, which showed itself successively in the economic power of Venice, the Hanseatic League, and the suppression of the Templars. This movement was continued and extended in the Reformation, which Mr. Adams regards as a commercial movement in favor of cheap religion. "As the tradesman replaced the enthusiast, a dogma was evolved by which mental anguish, which cost nothing, was substituted for the offering which was effective in proportion to its money value. This dogma was 'Justification by Faith,' the corner-stone of Protestantism." (P. 187.) So the savage and relentless march of Greed went on, ever quickening as it went; the church lands were seized, the convents were suppressed and despoiled, the yeomen were evicted, the adventurers and buccaneers were robbed of their gains, the Spanish Indies were swallowed more or less, and the hoards of the conquered Hindoo were drained. Finally appeared the bankers, notably the Rothschilds and other Jews of high finance, who forced the Western governments to adopt a fixed gold standard and, by thus preventing the currency from expanding to meet the requirements of trade, robbed and are robbing the commercial men, who robbed the landed proprietors, who robbed the convents and others, who were robbers of robbers back to the times when no one had much to be stolen. And now the financial aristocracy, the usurers, hold the rest of us in the hollow of their hands and are squeezing out of us all vitality and worth. Our architecture is the architecture of the ostentatious and parsimonious, sordid and niggling; "the present generation has drained to the lees the cup of realism; no poetry can bloom in the arid modern soil, the drama has died, and the patrons of art are no longer even conscious of shame at profaning the most sacred of ideals." (P. 383.) And so Mr. Adams takes leave of us with the warning that, "as consolidation apparently nears its climax, art seems to presage approaching disintegration."

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It is a sad picture and a grave indictment. And in his Preface Mr. Adams tells us that "all theories contained in the book, whether religious or economic, are the effect and not the cause of the way in which the facts unfolded themselves. I have been passive." This is a statement which gives us pause; for is it not a commonplace that to think oneself "passive" in such an investigation as this is to be greatly self-deluded? And the commonplace is confirmed by Mr. Adams's philosophy of energy, which I have already indicated,—a philosophy which reduces every human phenomenon to its lowest terms, and, as a consequence, inevitably besets us with metaphors behind and before. If all is energy, it would require a much larger book than this to explain the sense in which we are to understand such terms as fear, greed, war, imagination, art, religion, society, trade, and countless others; but Mr. Adams delivers his philosophy *ex cathedra*, and leaves us to make what we can of the terms. However, leaving its philosophy out of account, the book is of very great interest and suggestiveness. It is evidently the result of long and patient labor, and on the whole it is well arranged and clearly expressed. But the real moral of it appears to me to be the ultimate folly and futility of every attempt to rob a community of its wealth, whether it be by the unfair competition of slave labor, by the power of religious fear, by conquest, by confiscation, or by undue limitation of the currency.

R. LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

THE CROWD: A Study of the Popular Mind. By Gustave Le Bon. English translation. London: T. Fisher Unwin. Pp. xxiv., 230.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PEOPLES. By Gustave Le Bon. English translation. London: T. Fisher Unwin. Pp. xx., 236.

These two books are studies of the "collective mind," firstly, as it manifests itself in the crowd, and, secondly, as it appears in the race. Both are brightly written, acute and interesting, and both are, we should imagine, introductory to a later book just advertised, "The Psychology of Socialism." For these studies point a moral with great vigor, and the moral is a warning against the advent of Socialism which the author regards as imminent, and which means for him the breaking down of civilization into barbarism.

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To show how the author reaches his moral, and also to show how much there is of interest in what he says apart from that, we must give a short account of his argument.

The "crowd" to be considered is not a mere assembly of persons, but an assembly in which a "collective mind" has been formed. To such a crowd the author applies the epithets "organized" or "psychological," of which the first seems ill-chosen, since it is just its lack of organization which makes the crowd what it is.

Such a psychological crowd "forms a single being, and is subject to the law of the mental unity of crowds." Its most striking characteristic is that the individuals composing it will feel, think, and act quite differently from what they would do in their individual capacities, and for the following reasons: First, the individual in a crowd acquires a sense of power which allows him to yield to instincts which he must keep under restraint when unsupported by numbers; while, again, being as a member of a crowd anonymous, he loses the further control of responsibility. Next, he is under the influence of that contagion which it is easy to feel in a crowd, but difficult to explain. And finally, owing to the above causes, combined with excitement and the presence of some dominant interest, he is in the mental condition characterized by psychologists as suggestibility.

The author then considers the further characteristics of such a crowd, and his view may be briefly illustrated by citing a few of these, such as its impulsiveness, mobility, instability, credulity, suggestibility, exaggerations, intolerance, dictatorialness, and conservatism. That a "mind" possessed by these qualities should not be capable of much intelligence is not strange, and, indeed, the author is careful to compare it to the feminine mind. After that we are not surprised to hear that it does not reason, that it accepts or rejects ideas as a whole, that it tolerates neither discussion nor contradiction, and that suggestions brought to bear on it invade the entire field of its understanding and tend at once to transform themselves into acts. The rest of the book consists in developing and illustrating the consequences of these characteristics, and discussing the factors by which the beliefs and opinions of crowds are determined. An important distinction is drawn between the "great permanent beliefs which endure for several centuries, and on which an active civilization may rest," and "the transitory changing opinions . . . of which every age sees the birth and dis-

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appearance " The former are characteristics of a racial mind, and it is owing to them that the crowd becomes a people; as they disappear "the genius of the race entirely disappears; it is a mere swarm of isolated individuals and returns to its original state,—that of a crowd. . . . The populace is sovereign, and the tide of barbarism mounts." It is this Era of Crowds upon which, as our author gloomily surmises, we are now entering; for to him the people which has shaken off old traditions and is trying to understand and govern itself is synonymous with his "psychological crowd." It is probable that if M. Le Bon's experience had brought him more into contact with British stolidity he would have recognized that the hysterical suggestible crowd—though doubtless it exists—is almost as abnormal as the hypnotized individual; and that the hope of democracies rests on the real power of the "collective mind" to take its problems home and work them out to rational conclusions.

In the second book, "The Psychology of Peoples," the question of race characteristics is resumed, and their influence upon the evolution of the race discussed. A race is regarded by the author as a permanent being composed of the long succession of the dead as well as of the living. "The dead, being infinitely more numerous than the living, are infinitely more powerful. They reign over the vast domain of the unconscious, that invisible domain which exerts the sway over all the manifestations of the intelligence and of character." Centuries are needed for the hereditary accumulations by which is created the community of sentiments, beliefs, and interests which forms the identical and permanent mental constitution of a people; but comparatively few years suffice to break it down when once the process of decay has begun. "Like anatomic species, psychological species are subject to the action of time. Always slow in being formed, it is possible for them to disappear very rapidly;" and this decay takes place when forces are set in motion which break down the old beliefs and disturb the racial character. Symptoms of this decadence are showing themselves more especially in the Latin nations, which are losing initiative, energy, and will, and have for sole ideal the satisfaction of material wants. M. Le Bon, it will be seen, shares M. Demolins' apprehension for the future of the race to which he belongs, and is even more pessimistic in his forebodings.

H. BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

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DEGENERACY: ITS CAUSES, SIGNS, AND RESULTS. By Eugene S. Talbot, M.D., D.D.S. 8vo, xvi., 372 pp., 117 figs. Contemporary Science Series. Walter Scott, Ltd. London, 1898.

The author begins by sketching the strangely slow growth of the conviction that defects or disturbances in natural inheritance may result in the production of human beings who must be called "degenerate" when compared with the norm of the stock. The particular idea implied in the term degeneracy is, that the organism or its parts may change in a direction opposite to that of evolution, towards the indefinite and homogeneous, in short, and may become adapted to conditions of life less varied and complex than the normal. And the particular thesis of this book is that the factors inducing degeneration affect especially those checks on excessive activity which have been acquired as safeguards during the evolution of the race, without which, however, nervous exhaustion ensues in the parent and degeneracy in the offspring. As all biologists admit that nervous disturbances may bring about nutritive disturbances, and *vice versa*, and that the reproductive cells may be prejudicially affected by nutritive disorders in the parent, there is no particular difficulty in understanding that the neurasthenia of ancestors may mean the neurosis of their descendants. But the author complicates the question by running what seems to us an entirely futile tilt against Weismann's position, and by raising the whole question of the inheritance of acquired characters. He has allowed himself to believe that Weismann has insidiously departed from his position by admitting that the nutritive condition of the parent may prompt variation in the germ, but this necessary concession strengthens Weismann's position instead of weakening it. The point is whether a particular acquired modification of the parent is as such or in any degree transmissible, and, to be frank, Dr. Talbot has missed the point. He is himself strangely confident that acquired modifications are as such transmitted, but the evidence he adduces, from circumcision, mutilations, etc., is as inconclusive as that which he brings forward in support of the theory of maternal impressions. He deals with Weismann somewhat cavalierly, but he has failed to understand him.

Degeneration may result from germinal variations whose precise cause is unknown,—*e.g.*, in ill-assorted crossing, or from germinal variations which may be traced to a nutritive disturbance in the parent or parents. In both cases congenital degeneration results, and no one doubts its hereditability. But degeneration may also be

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brought about as a "modification," affecting the body of the offspring at some stage of development or growth. In this case the degeneration is acquired, and the transmission of its stigmata as such is unproved. The case seems to us quite clear, and the statement of it trite, but the author somehow mixes things up.

However it may arise, degeneracy is always with us,—degeneracy as to skull and brain, face and nose, lips and palate, eyes and ears, teeth and jaws, mind and morals, of all of which abundant illustrations are given in a manner eminently readable and vivid. It is a relief, indeed, to get away from the nonsense which has been talked about degeneration, and to listen to a matter-of-fact statement of the case. Yet we wish Dr. Talbot had been rather more critical, for some of his facts are barely credible, and there are some statements which are not facts. It is careless to speak of a worker-bee as the offspring of an unimpregnated queen, to say that "as a rule the parthenogenetic offspring are themselves incapable of procreating their kind," to cite the experiments of Maupas on Infusorians as bearing on parthenogenesis, to say that all albinoes are degenerate, and so on, for though these may be trivial mistakes there are too many of them, and they do not strengthen our confidence in the author in regard to weightier matters.

But after all the most important problem is the practical one, how is the production of degenerates to be stopped, and in regard to this Dr. Talbot has much to say that is forcible, tolerant, and plain-spoken. (1) He does not believe much in legal regulation of marriage, but he goes the length of saying, "it is certainly best for the stability of the family that unhealthy unions should have the least permanency possible." There is, however, much to be said in support of the position that the stability of the family (in another sense) is weakened by every relaxation of the marriage bond. (2) Nor does the author believe much in the prophylactic efficacy of castration, which, he says, ignores completely the rights of individuals under the English common law and the constitution of the United States, and ignores completely the principle of transformation in heredity, for the distance between the criminal (for whom castration is suggested) and the hysterical member of a good family is not so great that the progeny of the one may not be as degenerate as the progeny of the other. But while the surgical method applied to social problems does not greatly commend itself to many, it may be urged that the rights of the individual simply express a mutable social sentiment, and that it might be well to prevent hopeless

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cases who have become dependent on the state from continuing their kind. This is already to some extent done. (3) The author goes on to say that much better results are obtainable by guarding women from the factors of degeneracy during puberty and matronhood, and he refers not only to markedly unsuitable functions and environments, but to the routine prescription (in the hidden guise of nostrums) of alcohol, opium, and the like. (4) In general, the prophylaxis of degeneracy may be summed up as the prevention of neurasthenia in the parents, for that becomes the neurosis of the children. The preventive factors are numerous and well known. (5) But even an inherited bias may be sometimes counteracted, and the author concludes with some wise remarks on the prophylaxis of degeneracy in children,—a prophylaxis which should commence with birth, if not earlier.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

EDINBURGH.

LETTERS AND LECTURES ON EDUCATION. By J. F. Herbart. Translated and Edited by Henry M. and Emmie Felkin. Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

The translators precede their version of Herbart's Letters and Lectures by an analytic introduction intended to smooth the reader's way. In one of his lectures Herbart remarked "unnecessary simplicity must be avoided," and he certainly never erred himself in the direction of "unnecessary" (or, in fact, any other kind of) simplicity. Indeed, there is probably truth in the translator's suggestion (pp. 22, 23) that Herbart was purposely obscure. Doubtless the obscurity and heaviness of his writings are repellant to many English readers. Happily, English philosophers have never either combined or confused obscurity and profundity. And yet, in spite of this, there are signs that some English and American educators are endeavoring to inoculate the education of the English-speaking race with Herbartianism. In his preface, Mr. Oscar Browning affirms that "Herbart even now may be said to dominate the Training College." This is, we believe and hope, too strongly put; though that Herbart has influenced, and will continue to influence, the training of English teachers is doubtless true. That a great thinker on education should influence us is right and desirable; and this influence may be frankly acknowledged even by those who believe Herbart's system to be erected on the foundation of a false psychology, and dominated by an imperfect view of the work of

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education. But even were Herbart's teaching more complete and more perfect than it is, it yet would not follow that it would be wise to attempt to transplant it bodily to England or to America. This the translators wisely recognize, and they give a not needless warning that "attempts to graft Herbart's system upon one up to the present so radically different in its principles, its methods and its ideals, as the English, must fail" (p. 23).

As to the work of Herbart here given us, the Letters do not seem to us of any great importance. They were reports on his pupils made by Herbart when he was a very young man, and though to some extent his after thoughts can be found in them more or less vaguely grasped, yet they undoubtedly contain but little of any considerable value. With the Lectures the case is quite different. They were written near the end of his life, and they largely work out the principles of the "Science of Education" in their practical application. On the whole, they seem to us less difficult to follow than the more theoretical work, and certainly they go a long way towards clearing up some of the most obscure portions of the latter. Particularly do they throw light on what Herbart understood by "Analytic" and by "Synthetic" instruction, and on the close connection in his mind between "government" and "discipline," —a connection of vital importance which the method of the "Science of Education" tended to obscure. Had the translators supplied an index to the present work, the comparative study of it and the earlier work would have been much facilitated.

Most clearly, now we have all Herbart's important educational works in an English dress, does it appear how very German an educator he was, in his over-emphasis of the importance of instruction, and in his total disregard of games as means of education. And the product he contemplates would be a youth—even a boy—much too "subjective" and introspective for our English ideals. No; we English shall not find educational salvation in Herbart. But we do find inspiration and suggestion in him, and we are grateful to Mr. and Mrs. Felkin for completing their self-imposed task of bringing his most valuable works within the reach of many who are unable to read him in the original German.

J. WELTON.

THE YORKSHIRE COLLEGE, LEEDS, ENGLAND.

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DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT. By James H. Hyslop, Ph.D., Professor of Logic and Ethics in Columbia University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1899. Pp. xiii., 300.

The object of Professor Hyslop's book is to explain why the experience of democracy has been, as he assumes, so unfortunate, and to discuss a remedy. He begins by associating himself with the conclusions to which Professor Lecky has come regarding European democracy; but his outlook and his suggested safeguards are so American that the book is simply a study in the working of the American Constitution. In making his case against democracy, Professor Hyslop fails to show that impartiality of judgment which is necessary if he is to win the confidence of serious political students. Such descriptions of democratic vices as that given in pp. 20 *et passim* are but impatient and unbalanced conclusions which, falling into the hands of the superior person make him more superior still, or into those of the discontented agitator make him more convinced than ever that democratic salvation is to be found only in a bitterly fought out, narrow, class struggle. Or, take this as an example of the maturity of thought which Professor Hyslop has put into his work: "Monarchy may give stability, but it pays too little respect to liberty and justice. Democracy, if it has the sense of justice, has no stability and no capacity for governing." To any one accustomed to weigh the value of words, these sentences stand for nothing except the evidence of an unenviable proneness to write meaningless phrases for effect. Nor do we think Professor Hyslop happier when he ceases to be a critic and becomes a constructive statesman. The gravamen of his charge against American democracy is, that as a machine it has broken down. "The machinery of government is too simple for the problem which it is asked to solve" (p. 37). And then a necessary modification is made. "It is not a question of the number, but of the kind of rulers" (p. 39). Thus the riddle in government which "Democracy" proposes to unravel is that of the relation between political machinery and political quality. Professor Hyslop solves it by an elaborate reconstruction of the American democratic machinery. It is unnecessary to discuss here whether the proposed reforms are workable or not, because we take two objections to Professor Hyslop's method which we believe to be fatal to it. In the first place, no reform of machinery will secure political quality. Professor Hyslop hopes that it will, mainly

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because he takes for granted that the vices of democracy are confined to the poorer classes, because the influence of the money power in politics presents no problem to him. In the second place, in European countries whence the cry comes, which Professor Hyslop echoes in his book, that democracy is a failure, the cause is not the machine system of America. Upon one matter Professor Hyslop is right. Neither the Western nor the Eastern democracies and semi-democracies will tolerate feudal government again, and that being so the only way to improve public life is to raise the character of the citizen and elevate the conception of citizenship.

J. R. MACDONALD,

LONDON.

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH DEMOCRATIC IDEAS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By G. P. Gooch, M.A. Cambridge: University Press, 1898.

This book bears witness to remarkable width of reading and to unusual insight. It is a most skilful and, on the whole, complete sketch of democratic ideas, as developed not only in England, but in Scotland and the American colonies during the seventeenth century. By way of introduction, the author also gives some account of the movement of political thought on the continent, particularly in France and Spain, in the preceding century. Nor does he confine himself to the theorists; he traces also the growth of popular opinion, whether in the minds of the leading men of action or in the creeds of various sects, on the subject of the state, its powers, and their limitations. In dealing with this intricate mass of material, Mr. Gooch shows a most enviable power of seizing the essentials and of rejecting all that is of secondary importance. Hence he has been able to compress the results of what can only be called immense study into the space of little more than three hundred and fifty pages. In one or two instances it may be thought that he has failed to grasp the full significance of the views that he expounds; his account of Milton's theories, for example, hardly seems to display his usual insight, perhaps because he neglects to bring the conception of man's moral and spiritual nature expressed in the "Areopagitica" into connection with the theories of the professedly political treatises. In one instance, again, he has made what he would probably himself admit to be an unfortunate omission: he says nothing of "Leviathan" or "De Cive." Yet these works, though no one would dream of calling

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them democratic, contain some obviously democratic elements; nor can certain other works which, like the "Treatise on Civil Government," are democratic in intention, be fairly understood without frequent reference to their arguments. These, however, are but slight blemishes; and the work, as a whole, will be of the greatest service both to the historian and to the student of political philosophy. It is to be hoped that Mr. Gooch will some day recast his material on a larger scale; separating the historical from the more distinctly philosophical elements of it, giving a fuller account of the more important theorists and men of action, and so throwing the more luminous parts of his subject into stronger relief.

C. VAUGHAN.

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE.

LABOR COPARTNERSHIP. By Henry Demarest Lloyd. New York and London: Harper & Brothers.

In this book Mr. Lloyd turns from the exposition of the typical form of economic consolidation in America—the Standard Oil Company—to the equally typical English form,—industrial co-operation. The book is designed particularly for American readers, the great body of whom stand in need of just the sort of information which Mr. Lloyd's book affords. With Mr. Lloyd the story always has a "purpose," and the present one is certain to contribute definitely towards the progress of co-operation in the United States.

Several aspects of co-operation are presented with new clearness and emphasis, such as to make the whole movement for co-operation in England assume the dignity of the most important of contemporary working-class movements. This impression is given not only by the grand totals, but by vivid pictures of the round of life in certain representative towns in which co-operation is livelihood, recreation, and religion.

Fresh and encouraging information is furnished as to the gradual development of co-operative manufacture. The chapters on co-operative agriculture are particularly suggestive, as applied to the difficult conditions of land tenure in Great Britain. It is at this point that British co-operative experience can be immediately valuable in America, because co-operation seems to find its line of least resistance in the United States, in certain associated schemes for preparing and marketing farm produce. Farming is the one American industry in which the factory form of organization may,

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without great difficulty, be co-operative. This is because agriculture is too scattered and undeveloped to be put through the process of vast and rapid centralization which is going on in every other industrial sphere.

Many readers of Mr. Lloyd's book will need to read also "The Co-operative Movement," by Beatrice Potter (Mrs. Webb). In that book, Mrs. Webb presents the position of the trade unionist and the socialist, as well as of the old-line co-operator, as against the party which Mr. Lloyd so strongly supports. That the workmen employed by productive co-operative societies should receive some direct share in the profits of their work, and should have some voice in the conduct of the industries with which they are associated, is of course desirable from the point of view of thorough-going co-operation. But one would hardly brand as "capitalistic" co-operative societies of the other type, which present to their operatives the fullest opportunity of membership in the societies that together own and control the factories. To one happening to be familiar with the London situation during the period of the great Dock strike, it comes strangely to find a commendatory chapter given up to Mr. George Livesey's frankly avowed scheme for destroying the gas-worker's trade union, and rehabilitating the old vertical organization of industry, as an offset to working-class loyalty.

The co-operative movement, in spite of its winds of doctrine and its competing sects, is without doubt as great a present force as Mr. Lloyd claims it to be. Probably, however, Mr. Lloyd would not hold that it had as great a future part to play as the more elemental, though still relatively ineffective, movements that are making towards practical trade union and socialistic administration. The possibilities suggested by the joint boards of conciliation in the English cotton trade and by the Glasgow municipal tramway mean more in the direction of co-operation than co-operation itself.

ROBERT A. WOODS.

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS.

VALUE, PRICE, AND PROFIT. By Karl Marx. Edited by his daughter, Eleanor Marx Aveling. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1898. Pp. vi., 94.

The first half of this little volume will afford satisfaction to those interested in the history of economic doctrines; and the

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latter half will doubtless give pleasure to those who care to read a brief abstract of the first volume of "Das Capital."

The essay is now printed for the first time. It was communicated, we are told, to the General International (Labor) Congress held in September, 1865. The date is important. It was written in refutation of the views put forward by "Citizen Weston, a delegate from the I. W. M. A." The I. W. M. A. is evidently the International Working Men's Association, founded in London in 1864 at a meeting which was addressed by Karl Marx. The views advanced by Weston were in effect the Wage Fund theory. Marx attacks the theory (pp. 1–41) with moderate success. Now this is particularly interesting because Thornton's book on labor, which turned Mill (see "Dissertations," vol. iv.), was published in 1869. Moreover, Longe's "Refutation of the Wage Fund" did not appear till 1866, and the number of *Fraser's Magazine* containing Cliffe Leslie's article on the subject is dated July, 1868.

The second half of the essay, as the reader would naturally expect, contains Marx's characteristic fallacies. We are told that value is determined entirely by labor, that profits mean the appropriation of "a certain amount of unpaid labor" (p. 66), and so forth.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

MANCHESTER.

A DIRECTORY OF THE CHARITABLE AND BENEFICENT ORGANIZATIONS OF BOSTON, TOGETHER WITH LEGAL SUGGESTIONS, LAWS APPLYING TO DWELLINGS, ETC. Prepared by the Associated Charities. Fourth Edition. Boston: Damrell & Upham. 1899. 12mo. Pp. 476.

The fourth edition of what is familiarly known as the "Charities Directory" is far more than this name implies, and its comprehensive and well arranged contents are, quite apart from their practical usefulness, full of suggestion to the student of society.

The similar volume for New York, issued last year, has more than a third more pages, containing, as it does really, a second directory for Brooklyn; but its scope is much more restricted.

Boston is comparatively a small and compact city; yet it is large enough to develop all the characteristic difficulties of the modern metropolis, and especially of the immigrant port. Its public conscience is strong and sensitive, and perhaps nowhere has the effort to meet these difficulties been more persistent, enlightened, or

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ingenious. It is this richness of experimental effort, together with this comparative manageableness of the field, which makes the Boston problem, and this book as a reflection of it, of peculiar interest.

Here are treated not only the relief agencies in all their kinds, but the most multifarious efforts to educate, elevate, amuse, and employ, and not only these, but the agencies of thrift and co-operative self-help which lie outside the field of philanthropy. Here, too, are not only the public agencies for providing for the needy, the sick, and evil-doer, but, in the shape of Mr. Richard Hale's "legal suggestions" and Mr. Estabrook's summary of housing legislation, a most convenient and instructive outline of what Massachusetts has done in regulations on behalf of education, safety, and health. No exercise could be more fruitful to the public-spirited citizen than to run over these pages, comparing point with point for his own town, noting in which Boston falls behind, in which runs ahead, and how many of the latter are applicable to the conditions with which he has to deal.

The student of municipal functions will also be interested to note the many new lines of municipal activity opened up, to a large extent at least, under Mayor Quincy's leadership—the baths, bathing beaches, and gymnasia, the "chilled-water" fountains, the summer camp for boys on one of the harbor islands, the twenty-seven stations and reading rooms of the public library, the public concerts and public lectures, the latter copied from New York. The credit of the new departure by which the insane, paupers, and children are put under the care of three separate unpaid boards of men and women is also due in part at least to Mr. Quincy.

It is but fair to add a word of well-deserved praise for the intelligent and painstaking execution of the body of this directory, and notably of the index. Only those who have done similar work can measure the cost of this care and completeness.

EMILY GREENE BALCH.

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS.

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BUTLER'S "ANALOGY." By the Rev. Henry Hughes, M.A. London: Kegan Paul, 1898. Pp. xvi., 276.

The aim of this piece of thorough analysis and rigorous argument is to expose the intellectual weakness of the means employed by Butler in his famous defence of Christianity against the attacks of Deism. The work is done from a sympathetic stand-point; for

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not only does Mr. Hughes value highly the enthusiasm for the moral life pervading the "Analogy," but he accepts the doctrine, defended in it. Few of Butler's arguments escape condemnation, while none escape notice. The result is mainly negative: at the same time, Mr. Hughes introduces, more or less incidentally, his own view of the basis of constructive reasoning in support of Christian doctrine. Thus, instead of trying, with Butler, to infer from the natural to the supernatural by the principles of continuity and uniformity, which are properly applicable only to the knowable universe of experience, he would make the Personality of God, revealed in Conscience as moral, the basis of inference; and so, accepting the fact that, as regards the supernatural, we can only predict *moral* facts, avoid making it a mere repetition of the natural. Besides making many other less general objections to Butler's use of analogy, Mr. Hughes questions the sufficiency of the probabilities thus established to serve as grounds for determining virtuous action from prudential motives; but the criticism seems hardly justified, granting that there *is* a balance of probability in favor of a future life in which happiness and misery will depend on present action. Of more importance is his condemnation of Butler's view, implied in much of the practical part of the "Analogy," that a virtuous life, adopted from motives of prudence, is equivalent to a religious life.

Throughout the book, the question forces itself upon one: is such elaborate treatment of Butler's arguments really necessary, considering the distance between his thought and that of the present day?

M. FLETCHER.

GIRTON COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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Books to be reviewed, published in England, should be sent to
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